

**Proceedings of the 4<sup>th</sup> Annual South-  
East European Doctoral Student  
Conference**



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East European Doctoral Student  
Conference**

Edited by  
G. Eleftherakis  
S. Hannam  
E. Kalyva  
A. Psychogios

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© **SOUTH-EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH CENTRE**

24, P. Koromila str., 54622, Thessaloniki, Greece

Tel: +30 2310 253 477

Fax: +30 2310 253 478

<http://www.seerc.org>

## Preface

The 4<sup>th</sup> Annual SEERC Doctoral Student Conference (DSC2009) took place on July 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> in Thessaloniki, Greece, and was organised by the South-East European Research Centre.

The aim of the conference was to initiate an exchange of knowledge between young researchers and to help establish a network of scholars currently undertaking research in South-East Europe. Having identified academic isolation as a problem that many doctoral students face today, SEERC aims to bring researchers together for establishing collaborative links between disciplines, for testing the ground for innovative ideas and for engaging the wider academic community.

Building on the success of the past three conferences, this year's conference attracted a large number of submissions resulting in 80 presentations of both papers and posters. The audience of the conference expanded beyond the boundaries of South East Europe and we had presentations from UK, France, Germany, Holland, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland and as far as Ukraine, confirming the need for Doctoral Students to come together, discuss their experiences and gain external feedback to their work as well as listen to the progress and methodology of fellow PhD candidates.

The event commenced with welcome speeches from Dr. Iraklis Paraskakis (Director of SEERC Doctoral Programme and Chair of DSC2009) and Mr. Nikos Zaharis (SEERC Director) and was followed by the keynote speech, given by Professor Lila Leontidou of the Hellenic Open University. The title of the keynote speech was "*Shifting Boundaries of Europe: Ambivalence and Fluidity of Mappings and Cultural Identities of Modernity and Post-Nationalism*".

The scope of the conference was, again, multi-disciplinary spanning throughout the areas in which SEERC is doing active research and therefore it was divided into four parallel sessions:

- Enterprise and Regional Development
- Information and Communication Technologies
- Governance Politics and Society
- Risk Well Being and Cognition

There were just over 130 submissions and of these 67 were accepts as full papers and 13 for poster presentations. The full papers were divided as follows:

- 21 for the Enterprise and Regional Development track
- 17 for the Information and Communication Technologies track
- 19 for the Governance Politics and Society track
- 10 for the Risk Well Being and Cognition track

One of the main objectives of the conference has been to provide an opportunity for PhD students to receive advice from experts in their chosen field of research. This would not have been accomplished without the participation of the invited discussants. The list of the discussants according to the research track is as follows:

## **Enterprise and Regional Development**

- Prof. Nora Karassavidou, (The School of Economic Sciences of the Faculty of Law, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece)
- Dr. Efi Nikolaidou, (Business Administration and Economics Department, CITY College, International Faculty of the University of Sheffield, Greece)
- Dr. Konstantinos Priporas, (Department of Marketing & Operations Management, University of Macedonia, Greece)
- Ms. Niki Glaveli, (The School of Economic Sciences of the Faculty of Law, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece)
- Dr. Ioannis Krassas, (Business Administration and Economics Department, CITY College, International Faculty of the University of Sheffield, Greece)

## **Information and Communication Technologies**

- Dr Ilias Sakellariou (Department of Applied Informatics, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki),
- Dr Kostas Dimopoulos (Dept of Computer Science, CITY College, International Faculty of the University of Sheffield, Greece)
- Ass. Prof. Panagiotis Bamidis, (Medical School, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece)

## **Governance Politics and Society**

- Prof. Lila Leontidou, (School of Humanities, The Hellenic Open University, Greece)
- Prof. Ralph Negrine, (Department of Journalism Studies, The University of Sheffield, UK)
- Dr. Lia Papatou, (English Language Support Unit, CITY College, International Faculty of the University of Sheffield, Greece)
- Prof. Nikos Hatzipantelis (School of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece)
- Dr Sotiris Serbos (Democritus University of Thrace, Greece)
- Dr. Kalliopi Chainoglou (Department of International European Studies, University of Macedonia, Greece)

## **Risk Well Being and Cognition**

- Dr. Angelos Rodafinos, (Department of Psychology, CITY College, International Faculty of the University of Sheffield, Greece)
- Dr. Vassilis Barkoukis, (Department of Physical Education and Sport Science, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece)
- Dr. Lambros Lazouras, (Department of Psychology, CITY College, International Faculty of the University of Sheffield, Greece)

- Dr. Suzzie Savvidou (Department of Psychology, CITY College, International Faculty of the University of Sheffield, Greece)
- Ms Aimilia Ypsilanti, (Department of Psychology, CITY College, International Faculty of the University of Sheffield, Greece)

SEERC would like to thank all the above named discussants for accepting our invitation and providing their valuable feedback to the PhD students that made their presentations.

Finally, I would like to also thank the members of the Organising Committee, the authors of the papers, all the presenters and participants and our colleagues at SEERC that contributed in making DSC2009 a successful event. We are looking forward to the announcement of the 5<sup>th</sup> conference.

Iraklis Paraskakis  
Director of SEERC Doctoral Programme and Chair of DSC 2009 Conference

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# **GOVERNANCE, POLITICS AND SOCIETY**



# **Together but Apart - Geographical and Cultural Discussions Regarding Turkey's EU Bid**

*Alaaddin F. Paksoy*

*Department of Journalism, The University of Sheffield*

## **1. Introduction**

When the topic is Turkey's EU bid, Europe is 'united in diversity' (The European Union, 2009) like in most disputes on the European agenda. Turkey's long journey started when the first membership application was submitted to the European Economic Community (EEC) on 1st August 1959 (Ugur, 2006: 87). This application would have made Turkey the 7th EEC member after the 6 founding countries. However these expectations have not been realised and 21 countries have attached to the bloc in different periods whilst Turkey is still waiting at the front door. Now Turkey has started the membership negotiations with the EU. Although the European Commission manages the negotiations, it is argued that the final accession can be completed only with the approval of European citizens, something that has never happened in the accession process of any former EU membership candidate. Discussions regarding human rights, the level of democracy, economics and politics have been usual in the process of former enlargement experience of the EU. However, in addition to these important points, Turkey's membership has generally been surrounded by a rhetoric which refers to geographical and cultural associations. This gives Turkey's EU bid the unique position in the overall EU enlargement process. Accordingly, the approach to Turkey's EU bid is more than merely discussions about money and politics but is also significantly about geography and culture.

This paper will analyze historical and contemporary discussions concerning Turkey's position in Europe and her EU bid in terms of geography and culture. The research is constructed with the aim of answering the main question "what are the geographical and cultural disputes about Turkey's EU bid and how do they affect the process of negotiations?"

## **2. Geographical discussions regarding Turkey's EU bid**

Said (2003: 4-5) argues that the Orient and the Occident do not exist as facts of nature. He indicates Vico's opinion that history is made by humans and connects this argument to the relationship between the East and the West which are shown as cultural and geographical actualities i.e. they are actually human made. While for Europeans the Middle East is an eastern place, for Asians it is west. For a western mind, the

term *Maghreb* refers to a land which is a part of the Orient although it means the Arabic west for the Middle Eastern countries. (Delanty, 1995: 94)

The point that should be discussed here is if the fusion between the East and the West has a transitional feature or not. When a map is drawn, deciding on a solid line between two places is theoretically possible but the same thing cannot be applied to the map of cultures. Negrine *et al.* (2008: 50) indicates that Europe has different meanings for different European countries and this makes it very hard to decide where Europe ends geographically and culturally. In one article by Greek journalist Machalis N. Katsigeras (cited in Dülffer, 2007), he sums up the dilemma: "There are different historical interpretations of where Europe's geographical boundaries lie. So there is de Gaulle's vision of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, the Crusaders' idea of a Catholic Europe, the Christian Europe of the Holy Alliance, Hitler's New Europe, and the New Europe of the enlargement-planners in Brussels."

## ***2.1 The Ambiguities in the Eastern Border***

If we go to the beginning of the concept Europe, there is an irony regarding the discussions of Turkey's geographical position because the antiquity Europe was exactly where Turkey is situated now. Delanty (1995: 16) indicates that although the idea of Europe was not significant in antiquity, the concept of Europe referred to the Greek world of Asia Minor not western Europe. In antiquity, the division between the east and the west was more blurred, maybe even did not exist. For instance, in mythology, the name 'Europa' comes from a name of a woman who is from Lebanon. According to the story, she went to Crete and married the King of Crete on this island. (Delanty, 1995: 17). This part of the research argues that the places which are in the zone of geographical ambiguities can be categorized either in or out by means of politics. Thus, the discussions regarding the geographical ambiguity of Turkey may decrease rapidly when political arrangements include Turkey as part of the EU.

'Since the globe is round, notions of East and West are entirely relative' (Lewis, 1985, cited in Delanty, 1995: 94) and if we accept that there are no directions like east, west, north and south in the endless cosmos, the geographical categorizations of our world is highly political as in the example of eastern Europe. The north, south and west of Europe is surrounded by sea and this geographical aspect helps to draw certain physical borders which is not the case for the eastern border. The ambiguities in the eastern border will be explained via four places respectively: the Ural Mountains of Russia, Asia Minor, Cyprus, and the small European piece of Turkey.

## ***2.2 The Ural Mountains of Russia***

Russia is at the centre of discussions regarding where Europe ends. Voltaire (cited in Pocock, 2002: 58) argues that if you stand in the middle of the Sea of Azov which is in the east of Crimea, you cannot know how close you are to or from Asia. It is generally accepted that the eastern border is the Ural Mountains but it is argued that seeing the Ural Mountains as the end of Europe was something propagated by Russian rulers. At

the beginning of the 18th century the western edge of the Russian Empire was defined by this frontier and Russian's European part was emphasized by segregating it from the Asiatic Russia (Bassin cited in Delanty, 1995: 59).

### ***2.3 Asia Minor***

Russian rulers succeeded in their projects and the Empire has become a country which has lands in both continents. Another 'politics led geographical division' could happen in Asia Minor but by military occupation. In the period around WWI, on May 1919, a Greek army came to Izmir with the support of British, French and American warships. First Izmir and then the surroundings were occupied (Lewis, 2002: 241). Eventually, the western part of Asia Minor, almost as far as Ankara, was under Greek occupation. If this region had not been taken back by the Turks, one could claim that the western flank of Asia Minor could be accepted as part of Europe today. This postulate can be seen in the contemporary status of the Greek Aegean Islands on the west coast of Asia Minor.

### ***2.4 Cyprus***

Europe's eastern border is still like pieces of puzzle for politics and new bits were attached to the complete / incomplete European map in the expansion of the EU in May 2004. Among these pieces Cyprus was the controversial one for Turkey in terms of her EU bid. However few people emphasized that the membership of Cyprus was a new legitimating trump for Turkey to use in the discussions regarding geographical aspects. Although Cyprus was an important part of antiquity Europe like Asia Minor, now it is the furthest EU member from the European mainland. The island is 170 km to Beirut while the closest EU capital Athens is 500 km away. From Nicosia it takes half an hour to go to Damascus, one hour to Tel Aviv and four hours to Brussels by flight (Karlsson, 2007: 9).

Like Cyprus, Turkey is sometimes included in European maps and sometimes not but the membership of Cyprus has enlarged the frame of the European map and now the big part of Turkey is automatically included in order to position Cyprus in the frame. However this was manipulated by a new design of the Euro coins where Cyprus was virtually carried and put on the location of the Aegean Sea and Asia Minor. Turkey was completely excluded except for Istanbul.

The former Euro coin design referred to the member states of the EU instead of representing the whole continent but according to the Financial Times, the European Commission proposed a new design which depicts a larger Europe as far as the Caspian Sea, including Turkey. This design was rejected by the European Council and new coins were circulated in 2008. Italian Liberal MEPs, Marco Cappato and Marco Pannella's objections did not change the decision. They claimed 'the design shows dictatorships, such as Belarus but not a democratic country like Turkey with whom the accession talks are ongoing' (Boundsin, 2007). While most nation states and empires have always been keen to add more lands to their sovereignty and to depict these on maps, it is remarkable that the European Council has consciously framed the Europe of

the EU in such a way as to exclude Turkey's geographic existence in euro coins and narrowed the map proposal of the European Commission.

### ***2.5 The Small European Piece of Turkey***

The conquest of Constantinople in 1453 by the Ottoman Empire was the start of ongoing discussions about the location of Turkey *vis-à-vis* Europe. The Islamic civilization's new capital was now in Europe and finally the discussion about 'Turkey in Europe', which is still alive, was born (Delanty, 1995: 36). After proceeding until Vienna, Turkish sovereignty in Europe came back to the most south east of Europe again, Thrace, the land between Edirne (*Adrianople*) and Istanbul. If the eastern border of Europe is drawn by the Ural Mountains, the River Don, the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea (Delanty, 1995: 49), Thrace includes only 3% of Turkey which is bigger than Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Slovenia and insignificantly smaller than Holland and Belgium. This land is remarkably small in the whole Turkish map, however the population in this region is one of the most densely populated area of Turkey with the population of more than 7 million (Karlsson, 2007: 77). It is not meaningful to claim that this 3% of Turkey is the legitimating of Turkey's attachment to Europe. The discussions regarding cultural relationship of Turkey with Europe will produce a broader picture.

## **3. Cultural discussions regarding Turkey's EU bid**

In order to understand something better, one needs to comprehend what is its opposite. This idea is very much related to the historical development of European identity building. According to Delanty (1995: 5), European identity is principally based on negation of the Other instead of finding common values, aims and an apprehension of belongingness. This makes the separation points more important than the common heritage. As a result, European identity was defined by negating the Arabs in Andalusia, the Ottoman Empire, overseas colonies, and the Soviet Union.

While religion was dominant in European political affairs and Turks were going further in the Balkans to more western areas, the main direction of this negation was towards the Ottoman Empire. In 1461, the King of Bohemia, Georg Podiebrad proposed a union of states for peace in Europe. In terms of practical politics, this advice can be seen as the first step of European integration. Ironically the reason for this proposal was because of the fear of Turkish attacks (Karlsson, 2007: 15). Even the concept 'Europeans' started to become stronger by negating the Turks. In the period of the fall of Constantinople, Pope Pius II was one of the first who used the term 'Europeans' and he used it to emphasize the upcoming Turkish menace (Yapp, 1992, p. 141 cited in Delanty, 1995: 37). These historical facts may explain one part of today's problematic agenda in Turkey's EU bid and its uniqueness when it is compared with former candidates. Turkey is trying to be a part of an identity whose building process she had contributed to but unlike the others, as a negation.

However, the idea of Europe is not stable and has been constantly changing. Delanty (1995: 3) thinks that Europe is more product of history than its subject. He defines Europe as 'a historically fabricated reality of ever-changing forms and dynamics'. This approach opens the door to Turkey which has had a relationship with Europe for 900 years (Ortayli, 2008: 111). By this approach Turkey can find a place in the idea of Europe and this opinion is shared by European liberal and leftist politicians. In addition to this ceaseless change in European identity, today's international finance capitalism is becoming more related to the idea of Europe while the cultural apparatus is being segregated and leaving its place to politics and money (Delanty 1995: 145). The developments in Turkey's EU bid in recent years can show the reality of this theory. Although Turkey was historically a negation of the idea of Europe and now is one of the catalysts in the re-production of European identity, the positive improvements on the way of Turkey's EU membership in recent years can be explained by the impact of politics and finance capitalism.

### ***3.1 Does Religion Matter?***

Most of the opponents of Turkey's EU accession argue the differences between the East and the West. Sometimes they go further and draw maps as if we were living in the Crusaders period of the Middle Ages. This map breaks Eurasia into 2 parts by reference to people's religions. This crusaders' map has connections with the discussions about the 'clash of civilizations' and this term is used by both the opponents and supporters of Turkey's EU bid for different aims. According to the opponents, Turkey's accession may bring the problems of the Middle East to the heart of Europe and accepting Turkey to the bloc is the core danger for Europe's Christian identity. Moreover, they worry that when Turkey is welcomed to the EU, the ratio of Muslim people in the Union will increase significantly. Although the affect of religion in Europeans' daily life is not as strong as before the Reform Movement, the Industrial Revolution and the rise of Communism (here Europe is argued as a whole), still today no one can claim that Europe is a completely secular society. The impact of religion has even produced a nickname for the EU which is 'the Christian Club'.

According to Förnas (2008: 125), the European flag's origin comes from the Council of Europe in 1955. EU institutions have been using this design since 1986. The circle of golden stars represents the unity and identity of Europe and the solidarity and harmony among European citizens. Twelve stars denote thoroughness and completeness. The official explanation also indicates that the twelve stars on the EU flag refers to unity and perfection (The European Flag, the EU website, 2009). However, some critics associate the twelve stars on the EU flag with the Twelve Apostles of the Christianity. Arsene Heitz, the designer of the EU flag, revealed that he had been inspired by the Book of Revelation, the New Testament's final section (The Economist, 2004). Even though there is no attribution to any religious element in any EU regulation, the similarity between the Twelve Apostles and the EU flag can be seen on Italian painter Carlo Dolci's work 'Madonna in Glory'.

Some oppositions to Turkey's membership to the EU indicate the impact of religion in Turkish society and how it magnifies the cultural differences between Turkey and Europe. Karlsson (2007: 80-81) believes that 'religion' can never be a criterion for EU membership. If it was, the membership of Eastern Orthodox Greece into mostly Catholic nations' bloc would not be possible. If religion is a matter for European integration, he also asks what happens to the membership of Sweden if one day the number of Friday prayers exceeds the number of Sunday worshippers.

### ***3.2 The Siege of Vienna***

The abstractness of cultural and religious discussions regarding Turkey's EU bid are sometimes objectified by the mythical meaning of the Siege of Vienna (the first in 1529 and the second in 1683) which has always had a popular association with Turkey's EU bid in its media representation. While the agenda was Turkey-EU relations, some headlines referred to this historical occasion when the Ottoman Empire had reached the most western point in its enlargement to the west. At the time of the European Parliamentary elections in 2004, an Austrian magazine which supports the right wing Freedom Party used a slogan: "The third Turkish Siege". Turkish and EU flags and some drawings of Ottoman soldiers from the seventeenth century were also placed next to this slogan (Morris, 2006: 24). This association has a deep meaning in the historical image of the concept 'Turk'. If modern times are excluded, for the average European, the image of the Muslim consists of only Turks because the Arabic effect in Andalusia was a long time ago and Europeans knew less about other Muslim nations before the geographical explorations. When Europeans were talking about Arabs they were thinking about maths and geometry and when asked about Persians, they remembered some great Iranian poems. However if asked about Turks, they were first of all thinking about invasions and warriors (Ortayli, 2008: 120).

The historical impact of Turks on Vienna is also very associated with contemporary politics. Around the time of EU membership negotiations with Turkey in October 2005, many news reports referred to things that had historical references, such as: 'Turks are at the Vienna gates again'. Although Turks had had many wars with others Europeans (Venetians, British, Russians, etc.), 'the Gates of Vienna' has a legendary meaning and very different from the others. By defending Vienna, Catholic Europe strengthened their unity. Still today some Austrians emphasize this fight when they refer to their opposition to Turkey's EU membership.

## **4. Conclusion**

We have a tendency to perceive continental divisions as if they are innocent geographical sections because no other continent's borders in the world are as politically manipulated as the eastern border of Europe. The examples show how slippery it is to decide on the borders of continents, and the definition of geographical places is usually in the hands of politicians. Although the Rome Agreement does not refer to 'having a 100% European land' in order to be eligible for becoming an EU member (Karlsson, 2007: 77), Turkey can use the historical impact of Asia Minor in antiquity Europe to argue for inclusion. As the effect of politics changed the

geographical definition of Europe several times in the past, it may not be a big surprise if one day the east of Asia Minor is accepted as the end of the extended European map.

In any case the cultural and religious dimensions in the discussion cannot be overlooked. Zielonka (cited in Chatzistavrou, 2008) thinks that the cultural clash between the EU and Turkey exists because it is still in people's minds on both sides but the aim of European integration is about accepting different points of view and to foster unity in diversity. However, historically Turkey has been used as negation in the identity building process of Europe and it will be hard to delete this in European identity's memory.

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# Eastern European Mappings in the Discourse of Former British Ambassadors

*Alexandra Moraru*

*“Dimitrie Cantemir” Christian University, Faculty of International Business*

## 1. Introduction

The present paper analyses the discourse of the interviews given by Sir Andrew Bache and Sir John Birch, who have served in Bucharest in the history of Communist Romania, within the British Oral History Programme. The stylistic approach of the language use in the interviews emphasizes the influence of the Romanian experience, which is clearly marked in the discourse of the former British Ambassadors to Bucharest. Thus, the sections presenting the British missions in Romania abound in metaphorical mappings of Romania, Bucharest and its communist leader Nicolae Ceausescu as well as two conceptual metaphors of Eastern Europe. In order to structure the conceptual metaphors and to understand better how Romania is portrayed through the language of the ambassadors, we shall analyse first the conceptual metaphors which involve Romania and the Romanians, and then mappings of Communism, Ceausescu, the Romanian communist policy, as well as Eastern Europe during Communism.

## 2. Romania through the eyes of the British Ambassadors

Sir Andrew Bache introduces his job requirements by referring to Romania and Bulgaria in terms of fragile items which need his protection, as if they were children. This interpretation projects the conceptual metaphor ROMANIA AND BULGARIA ARE CHILDREN in the example:

...my responsibility was *to look after Romania and Bulgaria*. (Bache, p.7)

The elements that trigger this particular metaphor are the phrasal verb *to look after* as well as the employment of the noun *responsibility* which strengthens the idea of child-parent relationship and supports the other pair conceptual metaphor AMBASSADORS ARE PARENTS. This way, Romania and Bulgaria receive the semantic markers which are characteristic of the concept of children [+ANIMATE, +CONCRETE, +FREILTY, +PROTECTION]. Foreseeing this conceptual metaphor makes the speaker imagine the two countries – Romania and Bulgaria – as people who need support and protection from a stronger person. This implied relationship, where the British Ambassador is supposed to take care of the two countries, which were under Soviet influence, places

Sir Andrew Bache on a superior position. Thus, when saying *to look after Romania and Bulgaria*, Sir Andrew Bache instantaneously places himself on a higher level, as the caretaker owns the markers of superiority [+AUTHORITY, +POWER, +STRENGTH]. However, it is not a menacing higher position, but rather a protective role assumed by the representative of the West. This role is actually that expected by Eastern European people during Communism, who were looking towards the West as their only chance of escape from an oppressive regime. These thoughts actually idealised the West, thus turning it into a perfect environment where nothing went wrong and where the Eastern Europeans hoped to have the chance to get to. This particular fairy tale, woven around the West, emphasises the Eastern Europeans' vulnerability, which is surprising here in the ambassador's choice of words, and explained in the interpretation of the conceptual metaphor ROMANIA AND BULGARIA ARE CHILDREN.

In the same line of thought, Romania is then portrayed as a woman, thus upgrading from the status of child and growing into a woman. ROMANIA IS A WOMAN appears a few lines below the child metaphor in:

Romania was now beginning *to assert her own style of independence*. (Bache, p.7)

The transfer from country to person is marked twice, on the one hand by the collocation with the verb *to assert*, and on the other hand by the feminine possessive *her*. Thus, in order to be able *to assert her own style*, Romania acquires the semantic markers [+ANIMATE, +WILLINGNESS, +AGENCY] which allow it the ability to perform an assertion of any kind. Moreover, the upgrading process from the previous inferior position of a *child* to this new position of a *woman* also comes with these markers triggered by the verb *to assert*, because willingness and agency also imply strength and action. Therefore, a person who *asserts her own style of independence* is a powerful self-assured being, not to mention that independence is also an important element which points out the power of acting alone.

Further on, while speaking about Romania, Sir Andrew reminds us about the dispute of language influence between the British and the French, and pictures Romania as a *stamping ground*:

... the French believed that Romania was *their stamping ground*. (Bache, p.26)

This allusion to the mail services and territorial limits helps us decode the conceptual metaphor ROMANIA IS AN ENVELOPE on which one should stick a French stamp. As the stamp performs the role of an identification marker as well as a territorial delimitation, it is used to denote the French supposed influence within Romania. This influence is explained further on in Sir Andrew's interview and it refers to the number of people who speak either French or English as a second language in Romania. And as the French influence has been strongly represented between the World Wars, the French expected the Romanians to be still *their stamping ground*. Therefore, for the French, ROMANIA IS AN ENVELOPE with a French stamp. It is very interesting how Romania was first portrayed as a vulnerable child who needed Western protection, then as a grown woman who asserted herself, only to find itself subject to foreign influences again. Being a less influential country which sought cultural models,

Romania found in France between the two World Wars a true knowledge, culture and civilisation centre and a role model to follow. Therefore, French was taught as the most important second language all over Romania. However, starting with Ceausescu's revolt against the Soviet Union, he started introducing English in schools at the expense of Russian. Beginning with 1989, when the media started developing throughout Eastern Europe, English became the first foreign language to be taught and valued, which led to a lack of interest in French. Thus, Romania may be said to be an envelope with a British or American stamp (Canadian or Australian influence is not the case in Romania).

While speaking about the Romanians, Sir Andrew points out their negative features in relation to other nations, as well as their ability to survive no matter the consequences. In terms of behaviour and international affairs, Romanians are seen as compared to trees *bending with the wind*, by which Sir Andrew maps the concept of plants' flexibility against the powerful wind and overlaps it with the nature of the Romanians:

As a nation they were extremely good at *bending with the wind and coming back up* when the wind died. (Bache, p.26)

The conceptual metaphor ROMANIANS ARE PLANTS underlying the metaphorical expression *bending with the wind* entails both the Romanians' fragile nature when faced with other powerful nations, and their lack of personality to stand up to foreign occupation. The analogy to the action of bending in the wind suggests the Romanians' easiness to submit to new rulers and enforced regimes, while the second part of the metaphoric expression emphasizes the pejorative side of the expression. Thus, *coming back up* implies an ability to return to the previous state, as if the wind does not produce any changes to the inner structure, therefore making the Romanians ready for another wind. It is the same case with the ability to come back to the same state without any change in behaviour, which denotes a lack of implication and a very high level of self detachment towards other people. All these traits stand for the opposite of loyalty and devotion. This ability to bend with no matter what wind illustrates a slippery nature of a nation which prefers to please the invaders in order to avoid the inconveniences of rebellion. Actually, the conceptual metaphor emerges from the transfer of the semantic markers of plant [-ANIMATE, +MOVEMENT, +FLEXIBILITY] to the markers that are inherent to people coming from Romania. Thus, the Romanians receive the semantic markers [+FLEXIBILITY, +SUBMISSION] as opposed to [-STRENGTH, -FIGHT, -RELUCTANCE] which explain the negative interpretation of Sir Andrew's words.

Further on, the line of conceptual metaphors continues with Romanian issues of political life and with Communism. Thus, the next conceptual metaphor to be analysed is ROMANIAN POLITICS IS A JOURNEY, which appears several times in Sir Andrew Bache's discourse when he comments upon Ceausescu's attitude towards the Soviet Union in 1968:

He could do that by *distancing himself from* Moscow. (Bache, p.7)

...and *from then on* they quite deliberately said that they would have no Warsaw pact troops stationed on their country. (Bache, p.7)

They adhered to that *right up to* the tearing down of the wall. (Bache, p.7)

... *they went to great lengths* to get us change ... (Bache, p.8)

In the first example the journey metaphor is obvious since we have the traveller – *he*, who stands for Ceausescu –, we have the movement – *distancing himself from* – and we have the starting point – *from Moscow*. Even if we have no destination point of the journey, the most important three elements emphasized above constitute strong evidence for the conceptual metaphor ROMANIAN POLITICS IS A JOURNEY. The second example is only evidence for movement, or directness, as there is only a suggested start of the journey – *then* – and a suggested continuity – *on*. The third example only points out the end of the journey – *right up to* – which implicitly presupposes a starting point. However, the fourth example includes movement, directness and ground in the metaphorical expression *they went to great lengths*. This way, the journey metaphor is outlined in the commentary regarding the course of the Romanian politics vis-à-vis Western support and understanding.

One of the most appalling conceptual metaphors related to Communism is to be found in Sir Andrew Bache's remark:

There hadn't been *a clean sweep of all the communists* out of the government but a rather pragmatic government... (Bache, p.26)

While speaking about the situation in Romania after the fall of Ceausescu, Sir Andrew pictures the communists as being dirt which had to be swept off from the now democratic government. Therefore, he implies the conceptual metaphor COMMUNISTS ARE DIRT by mentioning the phrase *a clean sweep*. The noun *sweep* presupposes an action of cleaning or clearing with a broom, which implies an anterior presence of dirt. If the government had to be cleaned *of all communists*, then all communists are perceived as dirt, which reinforces the interpretation of the conceptual metaphor COMMUNISTS ARE DIRT.

### **3. Metaphorical Mappings of Communism in the Discourse of the Interviews**

To pass from the conceptual metaphors mapping Romania and the Romanians to those mapping Nicolae Ceausescu, we have to stop at some of the most interesting associations regarding the Romanian communist leader, who is seen either as a powerful person, or as a weak and trapped leader. One of these conceptual metaphors is present in Sir John Birch's interview and refers to Ceausescu's ability to fool Western powers and create the impression of an open-minded leader. The conceptual metaphor – CEAUSESCU IS A BLUFFER – is suggested by the semantic sphere of the word *misjudgement*, by its intensifying modifiers *immense* and *grave*, and by its repetition in the same sentence:

I think that that was *and immense misjudgement by the Americans* in the same way that Ceausescu's visit to London was *a grave misjudgement on our part*. (Birch, p.25)

This conceptual metaphor – CEAUSESCU IS A BLUFFER – is somehow different from the others, as it is hidden in the semantic layer of the phrases, and in order to

decipher it, we have to pass through the lexical-syntactic layer so as to move forward to the metaphorical one. Thus, the predicatives *an immense misjudgement* and *a grave misjudgement* carry the semantic markers [-UNDERSTANDING, -PREDICTION, -INTUITION] over to the subject – Ceausescu’s visit. This way, the subject is invested with these very semantic markers, which leads to a previous decoding of the metaphor, i.e. CEAUSESCU’S VISIT IS A MISJUDGEMENT. Continuing the analysis of the conceptual metaphor we discover that, if the subject is Ceausescu’s visit and Ceausescu is the actor performing the visit, then it is him who is misjudged. Therefore, the semantic markers [-UNDERSTANDING, -PREDICTION, -INTUITION] are attributed to Ceausescu’s agents, because they are the ones who have misjudged him. However, it is Ceausescu who sends a message that diverts his audience’s attention by pretending to be something he is not. From the semantic analysis of the terms *misjudge* and *bluff* we can easily decode the metaphor, because they are a cause-effect pair of words and their semantic markers complete one another: [+MISINTERPRETATION] / [+DECEPTION], [+MANIPULATION] / [+POWER], [+OBSERVATION] / [+ACTION]. Hence, hidden conceptual metaphor CEAUSESCU IS A BLUFFER emerges from underneath the lexical language layer.

Following the same line of discussion, the next conceptual metaphor related to the Romanian leader – CEAUSESCU IS A BULLFIGHTER – is still a mapping of being in control, or having supreme power, as the Sir Andrew Bache suggests:

This, of course, was *a red rag to a bull* as far as Moscow was concerned...  
(Bache, p.7)

By using this metaphor Sir Andrew refers to the Prague spring in 1968, when Ceausescu didn’t let the Warsaw Pact troops to cross Romania. The analogy to the bullfighter is again part of the Western misjudgement concerning the Romanian leader, because in 1968 Ceausescu was thought to be against the Russians and therefore against communism – which proved to be another misunderstanding. However, returning to our conceptual metaphor, if CEAUSESCU IS A BULLFIGHTER, then MOSCOW IS THE BULL. This second metaphor is encoded in the stylistic expression *a red rag to a bull*, where *the red rag* stands for fury and *the bull* stands for Moscow, thus containing two metaphors in one. The red rag metaphor is translated into fury first by the symbolic meaning of the colour *red*, which is frequently associated with rage, fury and anger as it is the colour of blood; and second, by the use of *the red rag* in the bullfighting arena. The most interesting transfer of meaning is, however, in the case of the bull – Moscow pair, where Moscow receives both the semantic markers of an animate item [+PHYSICAL, +CONCRETE, +ANIMATE] and those related to the patient in the bullfighting activity [+FURY, -POWER], which automatically empower the bullfighter. Thus, Ceausescu acquires the semantic markers [+POWER, +TEASING THE ADVERSARY], and enforces the interpretation of the main conceptual metaphor CEAUSESCU IS A BULLFIGHTER.

After being perceived as a powerful character such as the bluffer and the bullfighter, Ceausescu is then presented in circumstances which lower his image to less powerful representation, such as the stray dog in Sir John Birch’s interview – HONNEKER AND CEAUSESCU ARE STRAY DOGS:

Honneker and Ceausescu, who by then had revealed their true colours and *were pretty much in the Western doghouse...* (Birch, p.22)

The metaphorical expression projects disgrace through its meaning and thus shows the speaker's disrespect for the fiercest Communist leaders. The analogy to stray dogs presupposes a feeling of repulsion that is usually attributed to ownerless dogs wandering in the streets. It also accomplishes the transfer of meaning from stray dogs to communist leaders because it reflects the subjects' lack of affiliation to any of the opponent powers, as Ceausescu tried to distance himself both from the Russian influence and from the West. Therefore, *stray dogs* maps the concept of lonely rebels who refuse to depend on a legitimate superpower and want to be dictators on their own terms. The metaphorical mapping of *stray dogs* onto the people in the example (Honneker and Ceausescu) is possible by deleting the semantic marker [+HUMAN] and transferring the meaning from a person to an animal.

#### 4. Conceptualising Eastern Europe

Following the analysis, the focus of our attention is now moving towards the metaphorical mappings of Eastern Europe. One of the most interesting conceptual metaphors concerning Eastern Europe is related to sailing and the sea – an expected mapping given the fact that British people are great navigators. Hence, when Sir Andrew Bache refers to foreign affairs in Eastern Europe, he actually portrays this part of the continent as being a sea, which helps us decode a conceptual metaphor such as EASTERN EUROPE IS A SEA:

... it wasn't all plain sailing as far as Eastern Europe was concerned."  
(Bache, p.6)

The transfer of meaning from land to sea is facilitated by the use of the verb *to sail*, which carries the semantic markers [+WATER, +BOAT, +CREW]. Further on, if we analyse the metaphoric expression *plain sailing*, we find that the verb is in the negative form and it is determined by the adverb *plain*, which triggers other semantic markers, [-CALM WATERS / +TROUBLED WATERS], [-EASY SAILING / +STORM]. Therefore, the concrete meaning of the whole sentence *it wasn't all plain sailing* may be translated as *it was not easy to sail on those waters as the weather conditions were not favourable*, but the metaphoric meaning *it was difficult to do business in that area* is given by the marker [-FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS], whose presence enables the transfer of meaning from difficult sailing to difficult conditions concerning any activity undertaken in that area.

#### 5. Conclusions

In conclusion, the metaphorical mappings of Romania onto the concepts of children, woman, envelope, as they surface in the discourse of Sir Andrew Bache and Sir John Birch, underscore mainly Romania's insecurity and vulnerability engendered by foreign influences. Moreover, conceptualising the Romanian people as plants blowing in the wind and Communists as dirt, emphasises the negative features of the

Romanians as expressed by the British Ambassadors in these particular texts. The same negativism, but this time accompanied by aggressiveness and violence, is captured in drawing the portrait of the Romanian Communist dictator Nicoale Ceausescu mirrored as a bluffer, a bullfighter and a stray dog. Hence, the overall impression of the Romanians is one of a weak, flexible and violent people who will survive due to the lack of morality and the ability of pleasing the ruler.

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# Reading the Apotropaic: Practices and Mentalities of Defense

*Alexandra Tătăran*

*Faculty of European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai' University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania*

## 1. Introduction

The Magical Circle and the Medusa's Head are two powerful images evoked here as quintessence for the idea of apotropaic. The Magical Circle is commonly known as part of witchcraft or sorcery rituals: the magician's safe zone is represented by a circle drawn or imprinted on the floor, in order to protect the performer against the supernatural powers invoked. The forms may vary, from cords around towns and churches to rings and bracelets as individual ornaments; yet, the value and function of a magical circle is always the same: to protect within its limits from outside menacing forces, may those be ghosts, epidemics, enemies or evil spirits. Medusa's Head embodies the very apotropaic principle of fighting fire with fire, or using the horrible to repel the horrible. As expressed by Marjorie B. Garber and Nancy J. Vickers (2003), Medusa's Head 'has over time been seen as the epitome of the apotropaic object' (p. 2). Once attached onto Athena's shield, it becomes a powerful means of warding off the very terror it aroused.

The main apotropaic values expressed through the symbolism of the Magical Circle are: the limit, circumscription, prevention, protection as demarcation. Its defensive and rather passive characteristics are juxtaposed by the aggression of Medusa's gaze, capable of turning a man into a stone. The apotropaic coordinates expressed through the symbolism of the Medusa's Head are: the look/the sight as action, agency, and protection as aggression. Whether static or dynamic, defensive or offensive, both dimensions underlined by the symbolism of the Magical Circle and the Medusa's Head are equally to be found in the apotropaic idea.

## 2. The word behind the image

Before considering it as a symbol, gesture, idea, ritual or concept, the apotropaic is a word. Based on ancient Greek etymology, 'apotropaic' means 'to ward off evil'/'to turn away from evil', from *apo*> 'away from, off' and *tropos*> 'turning'. From a strict etymological point of view, then, it isn't necessarily very clear if the human agent turns himself away from evil (as a motrical back-turning or refuse) or if one acts directly to oppose and block the evil, full-facing the attack. From a functional point of view, this difference in human actor's approach (which resumes the relationship between the Magical Circle and the Medusa's Head sketched before) is only a matter of shading, as long as the result is the apotropaic finality of keeping away and apart from evil. The

very idea of evil is also something not directly present in the etymology of the word. Nevertheless, it belongs to the term due to its cultural and linguistic context of emergence. In ancient Greek language and culture, this ‘turning away’ was understood precisely as a relation **to** and **against** anything defined as evil<sup>1</sup>. Addressing this specific context, Jane Ellen Harrison (1903) builds a system which describes the ancient Greeks’ religion by opposing the newer religion of the Olympians, defined as *do ut des*: ‘I give that you may give’, to the darker elements of a religious stratum primarily concerned with malevolent *dhaimones*, defined as *do ut abeas*: ‘I give that you may go, and keep away’ (p. 7). The distinction operated by Jane Ellen Harrison (1903) goes as follows:

It is clear then that Greek religion contained two diverse, even opposite, factors: on the one hand the element of service (*theraipeia*), on the other the element of aversion (*apotropē*). The rites of *service* were connected by ancient tradition with the Olympians, or as they are sometimes called the Ouranians: the rites of *aversion* with ghosts, heroes, underworld divinities. The rites of service were of a cheerful and rational character, the rites of aversion gloomy and tending to superstition. (p. 10)

### 3. Forging the concept

Placed in the framework of various disciplines, from European national ethnologies to anthropology, archeology, literary criticism, philosophy and so on, the term ‘apotropaic’ becomes a concept and an analytical tool, employed for denominating the particular set of rituals, gestures, psychological attitudes or material devices (such as amulets and talismans) meant to prevent and protect from harm. In regard to this conceptual usage, I follow the general meaning consecrated in Romanian ethnology, where the term ‘apotropaic’ has a certain tradition of employment – while distinctively lacking conceptualization. Observing various textual contexts of ethnological employment, ‘apotropaic’ is commonly understood as prevention (*ante-facto*), distinct from other magical or religious approaches dedicated to therapeutic and healing interventions (such as exorcism), of *post-facto* character.

From an anthropological cultural critique’s point of view, ‘apotropaic’ has to be acknowledged as a name given to specific meaningful ensembles by a scientific community. It represents a conventional tool of certain heuristic value; nevertheless, it is an elitist concept, as long as the term doesn’t belong to the common actors’ vocabulary, when describing their magical or religious means of defense. The task (or the privilege) of qualifying various cultural and social aspects as ‘apotropaic’ falls under the mastery of ethnologists, in their particular dimension as text creators<sup>2</sup>. On the

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<sup>1</sup> A good example is the definition provided by William Smith (1870) for the proper noun *Apotropaei*: ‘certain divinities, by whose assistance the Greeks believed that they were able to avert any threatening danger or calamity’ (p. 247).

<sup>2</sup> As expressed by Clifford Geertz (1973), the final visible product of ethnographic work is the written text: ‘In short, anthropological writings are themselves interpretations... They are, thus, fictions; fictions, in the sense that they are ‘something made’, ‘something fashioned’... not that they are false, unfactual, or merely ‘as if’ thought experiments.’ (p. 15)

other hand, the apotropaic seldom is a pure genre. As any other polarizing meaning core, it manifests itself in vaster ritual contexts, where it coexists with other functional desired finalities: propitiating, augural or fertilisatory.

#### **4. Exploring the meaning: the apotropaic dimension of human behavior**

The apotropaic has to be placed in the more general framework of human modalities of relating to the sacred, the supernatural and all the things unknown. In this respect, Jean Cazeneuve (1958: 39) portrays three major attitudes:

- The first one treats the sacred as something dangerous, ambiguous and threatening to the established order of things. This rather negative attitude informs the basis of all apotropaic actions, those in which human actors (individuals or collectivities) intend to oppose, repel or evacuate the malevolent manifestations of the sacred.
- The second one attempts to manipulate the supernatural and the hidden forces, to control and command them according to the particular interests and needs of the actors. This point loosely describes the magical attitude.
- The third attitude corresponds to religion, as a form of acknowledging a transcending reality and accepting human's conditioning upon the divine.

If we agree that each type of ritual represents a specific way for the human actor to relate to the world, apotropaic rituals point out a negative attitude towards the exterior, as long as practicing them equals with a form of securing the individuals and the community by evacuating and demonizing the supernatural. As one of the many possible faces of human relating to the unknown, the apotropaic attitude represents the pattern stressing out a conflicting approach.

Any type of magic is anthropocentric, as long as magic defines the human as the force-center of its action, as cause and receiver/beneficiary of its effects. The apotropaic rituals particularly highlight this statement about the centrality of the human being. As a relation between the human actor (individual or collectivity) and the evil that has to be warded off, apotropaic rituals emphasize the faces of this evil, as being anything that contravenes the general human interests and well-being. From mice to fleas, from sparrows or scorpions to illnesses and epidemics, from evil eye to evil spell, from hail to fire and strangers, enemies, ghosts or death, the list of these 'fears of' is potentially endless and has yet a single, unifying meaning: they represent all that is - or might be - contrary to human life, its security and prosperity.

The particular forms of fear, as well as the ritual or social modalities of prevention/protection/defense varied throughout time and space, in accordance with the particular social, cultural, economical or historical circumstances. For instance, the ritual object known in Romania as 'the plague's shirt'<sup>3</sup> (*cămașa ciumei*) initially

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<sup>3</sup> 'The plague's shirt' is documented for the Transylvania region up to the beginning of the XXth century. By that time, it was employed in fighting off any type of epidemics affecting humans or

responded to the historical circumstances of plague and, later (XIXth century), cholera epidemics. The scorpion<sup>4</sup>, as menace and embodiment of evil, required protection and cultural devices for warding it off only in those regions familiar with this particular arachnid. Acknowledging the culturally and historically-conditioned faces of fear equals to ascertaining that the apotropaic is a conventional name for a constant dimension of human behavior in space and time, whether we refer to psychological individual attitudes or to socio-cultural mechanisms.

## **5. Reading the apotropaic in ritual contexts: Romanian religious holidays**

In order to illustrate the dynamics and logic of the apotropaic, I will briefly sketch a few ritual exemplifications, based mainly on Romanian material. I will selectively address some of the apotropaic rituals that marked a temporal, seasonal crossing, through the meaningful moments of the calendar. Each one of the apotropaic elements of this context represents, in my view, a statement regarding a border or a limit, explicitly assumed and oriented against any transgressions.

### ***5.1 The ‘twelve days’ of winter***

The period marked by Christmas, New Year’s Eve and Epiphany is known in ethnology as ‘the cycle of the twelve days’ (Mesnil 1997: 272), an apart allure conferred by the popular belief in the instability of this period – symptomatic for the moments of passage in general and for the renewals of time in particular. The Christmas’ Eve traditional custom is, in Romania, going carol-singing from household to household. Previously observed by strict ritualistic prescriptions<sup>5</sup>, the custom was

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domestic animals. As shown by Pavelescu (1998) for the region of Apuseni Mountains, the process of its making was observed by strict ritualistic prescriptions: seven or nine women (magic numbers) gathered around in a house where they had to complete the shirt in a single nighttime – from spinning to tussing, tailoring and sewing it. The shirt thus obtained was placed somewhere at the village’s boundary before the dawn, so that it may keep away the epidemics haunting neighboring villages (p. 52).

<sup>4</sup> For further reading upon powerful apotropaic symbols in Muslim folklore and Byzantium, see Finbarr Barry Flood (2006) and Jurgen Wassim Frembgen (2004).

<sup>5</sup> Until the recent past, the role of young male bachelors organized in age groups used to be highly important for the social life of every Romanian village. In the context of Christmas Eve’ customs, the spatial mobility of this group (required to go carol-singing in every household, throughout the night) was a normative part of the ancient structure of the custom. One dimension of the prescribed behavior on this occasion was the loudness of the group. Whether it was a manifestation of cheerfulness or acoustic expressions through specific instruments (drums, bells), the noisiness of the group had a marked apotropaic character, due to the common belief that the evil spirits are thus frightened and kept away. The basic function of going carol-singing was the magical focusing of various ‘expressions of desires’ (Bârlea 1981: 269) in the spoken and sung words, a process intimately linked to the perceived liminality of this temporal crossing, sought to dormantly contain all the future possibilities.

considered to possess a strong apotropaic dimension (Oișteanu 2004: 21), as part of a wider complex of meaning and functions, illustrated by a belief from the Bucovina region: ‘The devils do not wander around only on Christmas and New Year’s Eve, nor does any other impurity, because they fear the young boys then carrying the carols’ (Năcuț-Voronca 1998: 66).

## ***5.2 The Easter Cycle***

The Easter Cycle consists of three mobile-calculated religious holidays: Palm Sunday (the last Sunday before the Easter), the Easter and the Whitsuntide (fifty days after Easter). The particular character of these religious holidays is the symbolic emphasis on the ‘green branches’ complex, signals of springtime arrival and considered to possess special magical virtues. In the case of Palm Sunday, in the past as well as today, the specific form of these green branches are those of the willow tree’s. As for the Whitsuntide, the best-documented valorized plants are: linden tree leaves, oak leaves, nut leaves and garden plants, such as lovage and basil. Besides their fertilisatory and augural virtues, all these plants have in common an apotropaic value due to an inherent magical potency of warding off evil. The green branches of Whitsuntide were harvested on Saturday evening and then strategically placed around the household, the stable and on all house entrances (Pamfile 1997: 21). Their apotropaic valorization is to be observed from these actions of magically circumscribing the domestic spaces, in order to protect in future the territory thus cut out from any exterior evil. The willow tree buds of the Palm Sunday undergo a process of being hallowed in the church, during the specific morning religious service. After being thus consecrated, the willow tree buds are brought home, where their magical apotropaic efficiency follows two directions. On the one hand, the willow tree buds become a talisman, placed mainly under the religious icon – a passive generic protection projected onto the future. On the other hand, it becomes an active key-ingredient in more elaborated magical apotropaic actions throughout the year, such as the simplest, most common form of kindling a willow tree bud under the threat of hail storm, a magical attempt of keeping it away. This particular apotrope is one of the many cases that illustrate an interesting feature of the magic-religion relation in a rural society: the fact that, outside the religious space (the church), the religious hallowing becomes an act of magical consecration, of potentiating the special virtues that various plants and objects are considered to possess. The Easter proposes a symmetry to this: the extraction of certain objects of religious significance from this initial ritual context and assigning them various other supplementary magical functions. Such is the Easter candle, when used in the liturgical context of Good Friday or the Easter Sunday’s mass. Similarly to the Palm Sunday’s willow tree buds, this candle is to be kept close to the house’s main icon throughout the year and kindled whenever there is a danger approaching, may that be thunder storm or someone’s illness in the family. The candle’s initial role as key-object in a specific religious context prologues itself secondarily outside this consecrating frame, by taking over an apotropaic magical value for an extended temporal period.

### 5.3 Saint George

A religious holiday that voices, by contrast, the necessity of the magical protection mainly for the very moment of the holiday, not (only) for an extended future, is Saint George (23 of April). In the evening preceding it, the locals of Piatra Fântânele village, Transylvania region, make objects known as ‘*Sângiorzi*’, consisting of a small square sod with a branch of hip rose pierced through its middle. Each household places such a ‘*Sângiorz*’ on top of the fence or gate pillars. The square sod with grass addresses the seasonal context of springtime arrival. The hip rose branch and the placing on the household’s entrance are two elements of apotropaic value. The cultural frame-scenario of the Saint George’s holiday is the belief that its eve is the most favorable moment for *mana* thefts, carried out by a category of evil beings known as ‘*strigoi*’. The hip rose represents the best documented apotrope for the Romanian territory in fighting-off this category of supernatural beings. Placing it on the fence or gate pillars is an action of magically circumscribing and thus securing the household perimeter. The threatened *mana* of this period is mainly milk’s, but there are equal preoccupations to magically guard the crops’ *mana*.

These few examples of apotropaic practices inscribed in the key-moments of the calendar and marking seasonal crossing point out, on the one hand, to a general dynamic cosmological pattern of Chaos versus Order (Oişteanu 2004: 15), particularly highlighted throughout these liminal moments of passage (Gennep 1996); on the other hand, they point out to an active human involvement in trying to direct and influence the hidden powers.

## 6. The ‘text’ of apotropaic rituals in the ‘context’ of contemporary Romanian society

The ethnological studies present the apotropaic rituals as part of a larger socio-cultural modality of mediating the complex relation between human actors (individuals and communities) and the exterior, the unknown, the strange. The ensemble represented by apotropaic, propitiating and augural rituals as part of traditional rural society seemed to function as a protective screen, as a space for circulating meaning and multiple negotiations. This organic vision might as well represent an effect of retrospective reading, as embedded in ethnological perspective. Nevertheless, there is a relation established by Marriane Mesnil (1974) between the ‘text’ or the ‘scenario of the unfolded events’ and the ‘context’ or the social reality to which this text belongs (p. 7), which sustains an approach of integrative vision upon apotropaic rituals, as part of a larger cultural framework. If we consider the already illustrated apotropaic rituals as ‘text’ belonging to the ‘context’ of a rural traditional agricultural society, we further have to consider this relationship varying in accordance with the transformations of the ‘context’ term. Romanian contemporary society continues to undergo major economical and social changes, with obvious effects upon the modalities of conceiving evil and protection from it. These transformations continuously reconfigure the profile of the Romanian rural society, to the extent that the split between the socio-cultural

reality and the text of apotropaic rituals can no longer be absorbed by the 'social dynamics' (Mesnil 1974: 42).

In order to illustrate this, I will exemplify with a personal fieldwork observation. In the summer of 2008, I documented the staging of a particular apotropaic ritual in Reteag, a village in the Transylvania region of Romania. The ritual, occasioned by the fact that the family's cow delivered a calf, consisted of knitting together three iron chains, and placing this knit onto the stable's threshold<sup>6</sup>. Neither the cow nor the calf was to leave the stable thus magically guarded for an observed period of time, and no strangers were allowed to enter. At the same time, no object was to leave (as a loan) or to enter (as a gift) the household. The family performing this ritual is agricultural, their main sources of income being obtained through household animal labor, potato crops, fruit growing and occasionally day-laboring outside the household, by means of a horse-wagon. They are placed in a larger social context marked by a progressive transformation of the village structure and profile. Some of the neighboring houses, bought or inherited, are being restored by city folks, as holiday or country-retirement comfortable accommodations. The insidious confrontation between two different ways of life is best illustrated by the fact that the neighbors encourage this family of agricultural sustenance to give up some of the domestic animals they keep, in order to reduce the labor volume and thus allow themselves to start enjoying the very modern pleasures of 'leisure' and 'holiday'. Needless to say, most of the neighbors disapproved the staging of this apotropaic ritual, as something best suited with the distant past.

In contemporary Romania, the whole way of life grounded in agricultural rural type of production is changing. For the time being, it's difficult to assert whether the outcome of a genuine reform is to be expected. The insufficient amount of subventions, the lack of an authentic support from the state and the contradictory character of governmental politics regarding agriculture, are all elements sustaining a rather pessimistic attitude on behalf of the rural actors. Adding to these the natural catastrophes (floods and droughts) that compromised last years' agricultural production, the new exigencies determined by Romania's joining the EU in 2007 (whose logic tend to dissipate and dilute somewhere on the sinuous track between the local authorities and the individual producer) and the abandonment of the villages by migration, we obtain the picture of a rural world still on a path of (re)configuring the very basics of its ways of living.

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<sup>6</sup> This particular ritual has to be placed in the framework of the complex agricultural scenario regarding the magical theft or loss of the milk. For a comparative reading of this scenario in Eastern Europe, see Marianne Mesnil (1990). Arnold Van Gennep (1996: 158) documented the existence of this ritual in Russia, occasioned by the cow's fist exiting the stable in springtime. Aurora Liiceanu (1996: 42) and Gheorge Pavelescu (1998: 58) documented the same ritual for Maramureş and Apuseni Mountains of the Transylvania region. Whether a chain or a crowbar, the apotropaic function of iron (one of the universally best-known apotropaic substances) and the specific function of the threshold (illustrator *par excellence* of the liminality principle) highlight a specific display of apotropaic ritual mechanics. The evil sought to prevent or expel also varies, from premeditated witches' magical attacks to involuntary loss of the '*mana*' principle through a magical transfer, or the effects of the strangers' evil eye.

## 7. Apotropaic dimensions of witchcraft situations: ritual gestures and interior memory

In order to address the apotropaic practices and mentalities in today's Romania, I chose the framework represented by witchcraft situations. While conceding that the witchcraft discourse may not be *the only* relevant context of analysis for the apotropaic today, it seems nevertheless to be one of the most coherently assembled. The particular motivation of choosing the subject lies in its extraordinary recurrence during field investigations, compared to its weak illustration in contemporary specialized studies. More specifically, I came across numerous stories and personal experiences regarding magical aggressions, witchcraft and sorcery, during field investigations focused on the rather more benign pole - that of apotropaic magic embedded in religious holidays and the moments of passage. Discussing the apotropaic embedded in witchcraft accusations of today's Romania leads toward reassessing the complex relationship between popular magic and the Orthodox religion which, as part and illustrator of a continuously changing society, still requires a great deal of further fieldwork and theoretical consideration. For the purpose of this presentation, I will limit my approach strictly to the apotropaic elements. In the particular frame of witchcraft situations, the relevance of apotropaic behavior takes not only a ritual form, but also the form of an individual psychological dimension: the subjective interior relation to one's memory.

The ritualistic aspect is informed by various typical elements of magical defense. The preeminence of red color, whether as a thread on the wrist or as a patch rapping up, with a talismanic value, other apotropaic substances (garlic, pepper, frankincense, silver) is largely common. The individual protection requires constant wearing inside out of any piece of underlinen. There is also an important individual protection provided by religious objects employed as bodily amulets, such as small icons, crosses and frankincense granules. The domestic space is protected by specially forged talismans, as described above, placed mainly on the threshold. The generic protection insured by the house's main religious icon is supplemented by yearly religious hallowing of the interior space (especially on the Epiphany, the 6<sup>th</sup> of January), repeated in times of danger. In contemporary Romania, all these mechanisms of protection address, in rural as well as in urban areas, the threatening possibility of being bewitched.

The psychological dimension of the apotropaic behavior marks the actor's entrance into the witchcraft discourse. As E. R. Leach observed (1949: 163), 'the diagnosis of sorcery is normally retrospective – a kind of symptom analysis'. The key-moment of assuming the diagnosis of being bewitched, along with the motivation for following a future set of necessary therapeutical actions, triggers the process of what Kathleen Marks (2002: 47) calls 'rememory': a suspended moment of retrospective rearrangement of happenings, discussions, interactions, reinterpreted as parts (signs) of the current situation. As in any selective re-memory, a set of previously irrelevant elements become significant and, in the particular context of witchcraft accusations, highly suspicious (a casual shake-hand, an unexpected visit), so that the resulted coherent ensemble of past events can sustain the diagnosis of being bewitched. In this discursive frame, the apotropaic manifests itself as a *tropos*: a turning, returning and figure of speech (metaphor), for a process of (re)adjusting the memory.

## 8. The dialectics of social identitary constructions: the apotropaic dimension of belonging and rejecting

As a form of acculturating fear and negotiating security in any given society, the concept of apotropaic can provide an analytical framework for any social or cultural form of including/excluding, identity constructions and differentiations. Carlo Ginzburg (1996) reminds us that, from a social point of view, 'the dead can only be represented by those imperfectly inserted in the social body' (p. 305). The marginals of every society - whether they are women, lepers, foreigners, minority ethnic groups, religious groups, vagrants, shepherds or homeless people – are those social groups concentrating, at various historical moments, the majority's or the dominant group's cultural representations about dangerousness and the radical alterity. To put it bluntly, the marginals of every society or community are symbolically assimilated, in various forms and various degrees, to the embodied faces of the unknown, the very 'strangers within'. Their social placement of liminality involves a position of ambiguity: half-way in (society, life), half-way out (death and the supernatural). This threshold defining the marginal situation is the *topos* of the apotropaic approach, as a *tropos* or turning away from the difference. Frederik Barth (1969) changed the perception about ethnic identity when he stated that 'the ethnic boundary... defines the group, not the cultural stuff it encloses' (p. 15). Ethnicity (or national identity, for that matter) could no longer be addressed as a reified category from an essentialist perspective. As with any other identity, ethnic identity is a process of boundary-maintaining. Defining oneself is a matter of relating, due to the internal functional paradox embedded in the very idea of 'identity': it represents the 'sameness' (to others in space and to oneself in time) and, at the same time, differentiation (Heckman 1999: 5). Therefore, it develops within apotropaic limitations – spatial and temporal manoeuvre zones for negotiations, transgressions and evacuations.

The apotropaic reflex as social mechanism contours the two faces of the 'identity' coin: belonging means, at one end, to be included (the Magic Circle's circumscribed perimeter of safety); to the extreme other end, to exclude (the Medusa's Head aggressive stare repelling the outside, the alterity and the unknown).

## 9. Conclusion

In conclusion, this article addressed the relevance of the apotropaic concept. When describing a type of magical or religious ritual, the term is able to express some of its fundamental coordinates: circumscription, demarcation, agency, aggression. By the very means of ritual as performative action, the apotropaic elements are made visible and, to a certain extent, tangible. When describing a general human social or individual attitude towards the surrounding world, the apotropaic is grounded in existential insecurity, anguish and a fundamental need to make sense – whether we address the subjective mechanisms of reconfiguring one's memory or the social mechanisms for constructing identities. Articulated through a particular dialectics of retrospection versus projection, the apotropaic concept can function as a prospective reading able to retrace not only the infernos, but also the culturally-represented paradises of every society.

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# A Comparative Study of Civil–Military Relations in Greece and Turkey

*Duygu Öztürk*

*Bilkent University*

**This paper is a comparative case study of the civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey with particular emphasis on how they are affected by the level of unity of the civilians’ perceptions and attitudes about military’s involvement in politics. The research question is why and how Turkish military continues to keep influencing politics while Greece has successfully expelled the military from politics. The main argument of the paper is that along the particular characteristics of the Turkish military, military interventions and historical experiences, comparatively more disunited civilian perception and elite attitude in Turkey about military’s missions and its involvement in politics is one of the main reasons of different level of civil-military relations in Turkey.**

## 1. Introduction

In the literature about Greece and Turkey, there is a widely accepted assumption that those neighboring countries share many similarities. Even though it may be thought that resemblances are mainly in the daily and social lives of Greek and Turkish people, they also have similarities in terms of domestic and foreign politics.<sup>1</sup> One of the resemblances in Greek and Turkish histories is their richness of military interventions in politics. Until 1974 the two countries ‘share similar problems regarding civil-military relations and democratic consolidation’ (Gursoy, 2008, p. 88). Today they have different levels of democratizations; while there is almost no doubt about a consolidated democracy<sup>2</sup> in Greece, the military in Turkey continues to be among the main actors of Turkish politics.

Within this framework, the main research question of this paper is why and how Turkish military continues to keep influencing politics while Greece has successfully expelled the military from politics. It is a comparative case study where Turkish case is compared and contrasted with the Greek case in order to find out the differences and lacking points of Turkish case which leave open paths for military’s intervention in

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<sup>1</sup> Regarding similarities in domestic politics, military interventions, economic and social policies; in terms of foreign policies the similarities in the main target of becoming a part of Western (European) world and steps taken in this road such as NATO membership and EU membership can be sound examples.

<sup>2</sup> By ‘consolidation of democracy’ it is meant non-involvement of non-democratic institutions/actors in politics which is particularly the military in this paper.

politics. The argument of the paper is that along the particular characteristics of the Turkish military, military interventions and historical experiences, comparatively more disunited civilian perception and elite attitude in Turkey about military's missions and its involvement in politics is one of the main reasons of different level of civil-military relations in Turkey. However, it is important to point out that these perceptions and attitudes are not independent from historical experiences and developments in domestic politics; they are crucially affected and shaped by them and also reciprocally contribute to affect and shape current politics.

Within this research question and argument, the paper is constructed in two main parts. In the first part, brief information about military interventions in Greece and Turkey is given in a comparative sense. This part aims to answer the questions of why military intervened in politics, what were the circumstances that brought the interventions, and how they were legitimized by the officers. This part is important in order to see the similarities and differences of military interventions in Greece and Turkey since they have crucial role in the formation of civilian perceptions and attitudes towards military's missions and its role in politics. In the second part, the focus will be on the public perceptions and elite attitudes in Greece and Turkey towards military's involvement in politics during the interventions and after the last military takeovers. In this part, the main question to be discussed is how the consensus and disunity in public opinion and elite attitudes affect the balance in civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey.

## **2. A Brief History of Military Interventions in Greece and Turkey: Similarities and Differences**

### ***2.1 Military Interventions in Greece***

The foundation of the military as an institution happened after the establishment of the Greek state due to the fact that there was not any state tradition and military institution inherited from another state. The split among the political actors as monarchists and anti-monarchists or royalists and republicans was also present in the military. Existence of this split in the military facilitated its involvement in politics by collaborating with civilian political actors. As argued by Messas (1996), interventions were 'mostly in coordination with civilian political figures to oppose the government in power (1843, 1862, 1909 and 1922) or to prevent a particular group from coming to power (1936 and 1967)'. Veremis (1987) also argues that except the 1967 coup which established a military dictatorship, 'most inter-war coups sought to replace one civilian order with another, rather than permanently hand over the government to the army' (p 215).

The first military revolutions in Greece happened against King Otto's ultimate power in 1843 and 1862; with the first intervention, Otto was forced to agree on constitutional

monarchy, and with the second one he was forced to abdicate (Clogg, 1997, p. 70–79).<sup>3</sup> The 1909 revolution was led by young officers who were willing to bring some changes in the social and political lives of Greece. Kourvetaris (1999) argues that they aimed to ‘increase the role of the military in the making of the new nation, to modernize and re-organize the political and military structures, to eliminate corruption and nepotism in public and military life’ (p. 63). In addition to this argument, Messas (1996) argues that the reason of the coup was the unpleasant situation of the antiroyalist officers about the King’s unwillingness to unite Crete with Greek lands (p. 156). The important point with these three coups is the fact that they are separately evaluated from the rest of the coups in Greece with the argument that they were in line with the public sentiments of that time and their translations into action (Messas, 1996, p. 165).

The defeat in Asia Minor against Turkish forces resulted in another intervention by the military in 1922. The royalist government was blamed for the failure and it was replaced with a revolutionary committee. With this intervention, the head of state in Greece was for the first time an active military officer, General Stylianos Gonatas (Messas, 1996, p. 157). During the period from 1922 to 1936, as argued by Karabelias (1998) the officers ‘made habit of staging interventions in the country’s political life every time they felt uncomfortable with the decisions of the civilian government’ (p. 49). He also states that ‘Except the General Pangalos coup of 1926, the officers did not take power but invited political leaders whom they supported to form the government (p. 49). 1936 elections held a balance between the two main political camps. In order to form a government, both camps needed to get the support of Communists who had a very small –15 seats in 300 total– but important share in the parliament. Displeased with the position of communists, the king appointed General Metaxas, who was the leader of Freethinkers Party which was a minuscule participant in the parliament, to form the government. However, continuance of economic crisis with the political uneasiness made Metaxas to take the measure of dissolving the parliament and start his dictatorship.

After the end of the Second World War, the schism between republicans and monarchists was enhanced by ‘an even more important division, that between communists and anticommunists’ (Kaloudis, 2000). 1963 and 1964 elections were the victory for the Center Union of George Papandreou, which was supported by leftists and communists.<sup>4</sup> Kaloudis (2000) argues that the importance of the Center Union’s victory arose from the fact that it was considered as a threat to balance of power in Greece between the parliament, the monarch and the military. It was perceived that this balance could to be abolished by causing a loss in military’s power in politics and increasing the power of the parliament. This perception continued until the 1967 elections. Before the elections the military took the power because, as argued, to ‘prevent a certain victory of the Center Union’ (Kaloudis, 2000). However, for the

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<sup>3</sup> Psacharopoulos and Kazamias (1980) also argue that the political upheavals for constitution were supported by professors and students in the University of Athens which was then called The Ottonian University. Before his abdication, the student protests against him continued.

<sup>4</sup> For information about the political situation in Greece and importance of 1963 and 1964 elections, see Richard Clogg (1992) *Modern Yunanistan Tarihi*. İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları.

justification of the coup, the military claimed the existence of communist threat in the country. The 1967 coup formed one of the turning points in the Greek politics and civil-military relations. It is differentiated from the previous interventions with the main characteristic of being a 7-year military dictatorship.

## **2.2 Military Interventions in Turkey**

From the very beginning the military tradition in Turkey held different characteristics than the Greek military. First of all, Turkey inherited a state and military tradition from the Ottoman Empire. In the Ottoman Empire, there was the main division of the ruling class called *askeri* and the ruled *reaya*. Military officers were also included in the *askeri* ruling class. Even though there was not a direct continuation of the Ottoman institutions in the new republic, the heritage of strong military institution was transferred to the new state with the fact that military cadres and military elites of the empire played the main role in the establishment of Turkish Republic.

Today, it is hard to argue that the military has been put under the total control of civilian rule. Instead, it is attributed to have supra-governmental and supra-political characteristics which mean that they are not interested in the daily politics or short-term interests of different political groups but they consider the long-term interest of Turkish state and nation within Kemalist ideology. These particular characteristics of the Turkish military formed the main motivation behind the interventions.

Even though it has not been a century since its establishment, Turkey experienced two military takeovers, one in 1960 and the other in 1980, two military memorandums, one in 1971 and one in 2007 as e-memorandum and a semi-intervention in 1997 which is popular with the name of 'postmodern coup'. During ten-year period of Democrat Party (DP) government, various new political, social and economic policies were introduced, populist policies and pragmatist use of religion were followed and by time, the DP power turned into an authoritarian regime that suppressed the opposition.<sup>5</sup> Under these conditions, civilian unrest in the society particularly in the universities started. The military took the power on 27 May 1960 with the official declaration of prevention of fratricide and extrication of the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they had fallen (Zürcher, 1993, p. 253).<sup>6</sup> After the military takeover, a commission of professors was appointed with the mission of drafting a new constitution. The most democratic constitution of Turkey was prepared and stayed in force less than two decades. Towards the end of the 1960s, political violence re-started in the streets. In 1971, the military intervened however; it was not a take over of the

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<sup>5</sup> For information about DP policies during the 1950s, see Erik J. Zürcher (1993) *Turkey*. London, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd Publishers. p. 231–252.

<sup>6</sup> There is also another strong argument about why the military intervened. According to Karabelias (1998), the reason was the declining power and the prestige of the military as a result of DP's policies and authoritarian attitude (p. 23). This argument is also supported by Turkish scholar Tanel Demirel, see Tanel Demirel (2005) *Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective*. *Armed Forces & Society*, 13(2), 248. Zürcher (1993) also argues that the committee founded by the DP government to investigate the links between the RPP and the army could be among the reasons of the intervention (p. 252).

power. Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel was handed a memorandum by which he was warned about the possibility of a military take over if a strong government was not established to end the anarchy in the country. As a result, Demirel's government resigned and a new government was established headed by Nihat Erim from Republican People's Party. However, none of the precautions could prevent schisms in the society as Alevi-Sunni, communist-nationalist, left-right, Kurdish-Turkish and the rise of violence resulting deaths everyday. The unrest in the society and the political crisis was ended by the military take over on 12 September 1980. A new constitution bringing various limitations on democracy, human and civil rights was prepared and approved by a referendum.

Even though 1980 coup was the last military take over in Turkey, it was not the last intervention in politics. The military officers, who were displeased with the domestic and foreign policy of the coalition government under the premiership of Necmettin Erbakan who was the leader of religiously-oriented Welfare Party (WP), handed a list of demands in the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on 28 February 1997. The list was 'designed to eliminate the creeping Islamization of Turkey and to fortify the secular system' (Cizre, 2008, p. 311). After the meeting, Erbakan's government resigned and the WP was closed down. With 28 February a new era started in Turkish politics. Within the 28 February process, various parties have been closed down because of the links they had with political Islam or Kurdish separatism. Besides the external threats and the internal threat of PKK terror, political Islam also became one of the security priorities of the armed forces.

After 28 February, the influence of the military in politics continued through different channels such as NSC meetings, various political figures and parties, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations. Even though important steps have been taken to eliminate military's influence in politics since Turkey's candidacy for EU membership, the last intervention happened as a warning from the website of Turkish armed forces on 27 April 2007. The 'e-memorandum' was resulted from the displeasure in the armed forces arising from Abdullah Gul, who was the candidate of Justice and Development Party for presidency. Abdullah Gul's candidacy was perceived by the military as 'an act contrary to secular principles' (Sarigil, 2008, p. 2). The emphasis was on secularism and on the characteristic of the armed forces that it was a defender of secularism and it would display its attitude and action openly whenever necessary.<sup>7</sup>

### **3. Civilian Attitudes and Civil-Military Relations in Greece and Turkey**

Until here, brief information about the military interventions in Greece and Turkey is given and the differences of these interventions are displayed. In this part, it is aimed to discuss different perceptions and attitudes of the civilians in Greece and Turkey which are seen to be crucial factors in the consolidation of democracies.

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<sup>7</sup> For the whole text of e-memorandum, see 'TSK'nin internet sitesinde yayınlanan e-muhtıra', available from [http://www.iyibilgi.com/haber.php?haber\\_id=21145](http://www.iyibilgi.com/haber.php?haber_id=21145) [accessed 28.12.2008].

It is argued (Burton et al, 1991) that a key factor in the stabilization and survival of democratic regimes is ‘the establishment of substantial consensus among elites concerning rules of the democratic political game and the worth of democratic institutions’ (p. 3). However, not only at the elite level but also at the mass population level similar consensus about democratic regime becomes important when it is thought that the basic characteristic of existence and survival of a democratic regime is the free and fair elections with mass participation where no group or segment of the population is intentionally excluded from participation.<sup>8</sup> Even though elite attitudes and mass perceptions do not coincide all the time and may even entirely differ from each other on the some issues, they affect and contribute shaping of each other. Moreover, in liberal democratic regimes, due to the idea of ‘democracy’ they need each other. Disunity among the elites and the mass population –at least in the majority of the population– about whether or not democracy is ‘the only game in town’ would end in problems concerning the quality of the regime. The disunity of the civilians leaves channels open for non-democratic actors’ involvement in politics by creating legitimacies for non-democratic actors to intervene. Within this theoretical framework, Turkish and Greek cases constitute two examples for how different levels of unity among the elites and masses may affect democratization of civil–military relations.

When the levels of unity of the civilians in Greece and Turkey about military’s involvement in politics are compared, it is seen that civilians in Greece have had more united attitude than Turkish civilians towards the expulsion of the military from politics and formation of civilian control on the military. For Turkey, on the other hand, while important steps have been taken for the ‘demilitarization’ of the regime within EU conditionality, it is difficult to talk about a consensus among the civilians for the noninvolvement of the military in politics.<sup>9</sup>

The last military takeovers in Greece and Turkey contributed crucially to the shaping of perceptions and attitudes of the civilians about military’s involvement in politics with the way the officers came to power and the way they left. Moreover, the civilian attitudes in Greece and Turkey towards military’s involvement in politics were different from each other in the preparation period of the interventions. As argued by Gursoy (forthcoming), there was not any encourage from influential political elite for the intervention of the colonels however, in Turkey, military’s takeover happened after frequent meetings between the chief of the general staff and politicians. Moreover, Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren stated that one of the deputies even told him that he would have considered intervention if he were at Evren’s position and seeing a non-military person thinking in the way the military thinks gave him strength (Gursoy, forthcoming).

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<sup>8</sup> Elites and the mass population should not be taken as segments independent from each other. They both affect the perception and attitude of each other and contribute their opinion formations.

<sup>9</sup> For the usage of ‘demilitarization’ and ‘civilianization’ see Evin, A. (1994) Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime. In: Heper, Metin and Evin, Ahmet (eds.) *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*. Boulder, CO: Westview. p. 23–40. Since 1999 when Turkey gained candidacy status for the EU membership, amendments have been made in the structures of state institutions and National Security Council for civilian control over the civilian sphere, for the specific amendments see progress reports of Turkey [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm).

The cooperation between the officers and the civilians in Greece and Turkey were also different during the military rule. The colonels in Greece did not have either popular or elite support. Moreover, there was not a homogenous attitude within the military that while army officers supported the junta, navy and air forces opposed to it (Kaloudis, 2000, p. 39).<sup>10</sup> The opposition was also overtly visible among politicians, bureaucrats, university professors, and students.<sup>11</sup> In order to ease the oppositions and criticisms on the regime, Colonel George Papadopoulos, the leader of the military regime, attempted to install a puppet civilian government in 1973 (Karabelias, 1998, p. 52). However, he did not get support for the government from political elites who did not act in collaboration with the colonels and tried to mobilize the public not to trust the officers who claim to establish a democratic regime (Danopoulos and Gerston 1990, p. 540, cited in Gursoy, forthcoming). The same year in November, students at the Polytechnical University in Athens revolted against the coup.<sup>12</sup> Psacharopoulos and Kazamias (1980) argue that with the civilian support behind it, the uprising of the students might have contributed to the collapse of the junta a few months later. Whether it had contributed or not, more important can be the meaning attributed it and the way it is evaluated after the fall of the junta.<sup>13</sup>

In Turkey, the civilian attitude towards the military takeover was different than the Greek case. The intervention did not cause a similar civilian attitude either at the mass public level or elite level. Besides the historical background of civil-military relations and state tradition, the perception that the military ended the political crisis and the anarchy in the streets, and the fact that there were political elites and bureaucrats acting in cooperation with the generals during the military rule can be seen among the main reasons of it. Political elites and bureaucrats were also disunited during the military rule about cooperation with the military. There was collaboration between bureaucrats and the officers in the restructuring of the regime. Among these bureaucrats, Turgut Ozal who became the first prime minister at the end of 1983 elections and then elected as president also took place.

It is argued that type of transition from authoritarian regime to civilian rule also influences the extent that authoritarian figures continue to have effect on politics (Karakatsanis, 1997, p. 5).<sup>14</sup> As argued, Greece and Turkey form two examples for

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<sup>10</sup> This situation can also be thought as explaining counter coups in Greece against the junta.

<sup>11</sup> For attitudes of university professors and students, see Psacharopoulos, George. and Kazamias, Andreas M. (1980).

<sup>12</sup> “A group of angry youths barricaded themselves behind the doors of the National Technical University (The Polytechnio) protesting against the oppressive rule of the junta and clamouring for “freedom, bread, and education”. After their refusal to withdraw, army tanks smashed through the iron gates of the University and armed soldiers soon crushed the rebels, leaving behind several dead and wounded.”, directly quoted from, Psacharopoulos and Kazamias (1980, p. 128)

<sup>13</sup> The 1973 uprising of students is commemorated nation-wide every year. It is seen as the symbol of Greeks’ struggle against the junta, fight for freedom and democracy.

<sup>14</sup> For the arguments about the effects of types of transitions see, Share, Donald (1985) Transitions to Democracy and Transitions through Transactions. *Comparative Political Studies* 19 (1); Stepan, Alfred (1986) Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations. In: Guillermo O’Donnell et al (eds.) *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:*

different ways of transition to democracy and different levels of involvement of non-democratic actors in politics. The end of Greek junta came as a result of unsuccessful coup attempt in Cyprus which introduced intervention of Turkish forces on the island. The Cyprus fiasco which 'revealed the military's lack of preparedness to defend the country against a possible Turkish attack' did not leave any ways out for the military rather than to leave (Karakatsanis, 1997, p. 5). It totally abolished prestige and image of the military. Konstantinos Karamanlis was called back from his self-exile to take the power. Incapable situation of the junta strengthened Karamanlis hand and he turned back with the condition that 'the armed forces should return to their former military duties, and desist from further interference in government' (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 131). In short, transition in Greece was realized under the entire civilian control as a result of collapse of the military regime. Furthermore, in addition to the way the junta left power, the structures and the cadres of the political parties established in the post-junta period also contributed to the illegitimacy of the junta regime. They showed a continuation of pre-1967 period (Featherstone, 1987, p. 34). This linkage is evaluated 'as a major reason for the smoothness of the transition to democracy' (Featherstone, 1987, p. 34).

Totally different than the way Greek junta left power, transition to civilian rule in Turkey came at the end of a restructuring period prepared by the officers and the bureaucrats in collaboration. Involvement of the military officers in the preparation of conditions of the transition cut the linkages between pre-coup and post-coup periods. This situation can be seen as bringing some kind of legitimization for the intervention by blaming pre-coup political actors for the crises.

Even though the political system in Greece faces some problems from time to time, it is by now widely accepted that democracy is consolidated and secure in Greece (Duman and Tsarouhas, 2006, p. 412). The study of Kourvetaris and Dobratz (1999) which depends on a survey conducted in Greece in 1977, supports the point of view that besides the Greek elites, Greek public opinion also achieved high level of consensus about the military's role in the civil life particularly in politics. Even though Kourvetaris and Dobratz do not mention a question like do you think the military should intervene in politics, the questions that they focus on are to measure Greeks' perceptions about the influential factors/actors in politics and society. According to the survey data, Greek people think that the most influential factor in the 1974 elections was the political personalities whereas the military was perceived as the 8<sup>th</sup> factor to be influential. The military comes again in the 8<sup>th</sup> line among the factors which have greatest influence on Greek society. Concerning the importance of the military in society, the answers for 'no' distribute between 60–89 % depending on different independent variables such as age, political party affiliations, and education.

On the other hand, for Turkey, questions about the quality of the democracy still exist because of continuance of the influence of non-democratic actors in politics. Even though important amendments have been made in the 1982 constitution to close down

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*Comparative Perspectives*. Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 64–84; O'Donnell, Guillermo and Schmitter, Philippe C. (1986) *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore and London, the Johns Hopkins University Press.

the formal channels of military's involvement in politics in order to fulfill the criteria for EU membership, informal channels, which is particularly civilian perception and attitudes about military's involvement in politics stay open. A very recent work of Sarigil (2008) which is based on *World Values Survey* data of 1999–2000, shows Turkish public's perception about the military. According to the survey data, the military is the most trusted institution in Turkey with a percentage of 86.2 while the confidence on government and parliament is 45.4% and 41.5%. This work also shows the disunity among the civilians in Turkey regarding the military; the popularity of the military is 'high among the nationalist, it is rather limited among pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish groups. Another very interesting finding of this study is the fact that 'trust in civilians and support for democracy does not necessarily reduce the military's popularity' (Sarigil, 2008, p. 13). A more recent survey conducted by *KONDA* in Turkey with a representative sample of 6482 people, shows that Turkish people do not see military's involvement in politics as against democratic tradition and consolidation of democracy. The survey shows that 88,3% percent of the interviewers agree with the statement that Turkey should be governed by democracy under every conditions and circumstances; at the same time 48% of the respondents state that the military should intervene when necessary.<sup>15</sup> Those numbers show us that at least 32,05 % of the people who say that Turkey should be governed by democracy under every conditions and circumstances also say that military should intervene when necessary. Even though it draws a very paradoxical picture of the Turkish public about democracy and civil-military relations, it shows how Turkish people perceive military and military's involvement in politics within the democratic regime.

Although it is not saying that military's involvement in politics is entirely welcomed by the civilians, it is a fact that there is still not a common civilian perception about the missions of the military. At the elite level one of the reasons of disunity about military's role in politics arises from party interests. There have been many examples of this situation in the discourses of politicians since late 1940s when transition to multi-party regime happened.<sup>16</sup> For instance, as argued by after post-modern intervention in 1997, there was not opposition from major political parties mainly because of their party interests even though the army challenged not only the coalition government but the democratic political system as a whole (Demirel, 2003). There have been more recent examples of this kind of attitude during the Justice and Development Party governments. Silence and the support towards military's involvement in politics not only have come from political elites but also from mass public and the NGOs. During the period of the election of new president in 2007, mass public and the elites were divided about the possibility of Erdoğan's candidacy for the presidential post. Republican demonstrations were organized during April–May in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir to protest the JDP's policies and Erdoğan's possible candidacy for presidency. In the demonstrations which politicians from opposition parties, university professors, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and NGOs joined, slogans

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<sup>15</sup> The analysis of *KONDA* is available at [www.konda.com.tr](http://www.konda.com.tr) [accessed 10 April 2009].

<sup>16</sup> For the examples of the discourses of politicians in a way of inviting the military in politics see Demirel, Tanel (2003) *Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Two Patterns of Civilian Behavior Towards the Military*. *Turkish Studies* 4(3), 1–25.

inviting the military to intervene in politics were shouted.<sup>17</sup> In line with the survey of KONDA, these demonstrations reflect the disunity and paradoxical situation of the attitude of the civilians in Turkey towards military's role in politics.

#### **4. Conclusion**

Event though both Greece and Turkey experienced several military interventions in politics, today they have reached different levels of democratizations. In this paper, different levels of civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey are analyzed with particular emphasis on how they are affected by the level of unity of the civilians' perceptions and attitudes about military's involvement in politics. It is argued that one of the main reasons of different levels of civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey is their differences in the levels of unity among civilians, namely political elites and the public.

When the historical background of civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey are looked over, differences and similarities are seen. Until the midst of 1970s, the two countries shared many similarities regarding military's role in politics. The situation started to change after 1974 when the Greek junta collapsed as a result of failed coup attempt against Makarios. Along the illegitimacy of the 7 year old dictatorship and the path of transition, the unity of the civilians about military's involvement in politics also contributed to the consolidation of democracy in Greece. Different than the picture in Turkey, there was not any negotiation or collaboration between major political actors and the officers either before coup or during the military regime. It was followed by the student uprising at the Polytechnical University of Athens which is symbolized today as resistance of the Greek youth against military rule. The transition to democracy in Greece was controlled by the civilians and the channels of military's intervention in politics were closed down. Since then, the empirical data shows that there is a high level of unity among the civilians about military's influence and role in politics and social life.

While Greece successfully expelled the military from politics, democratization of civil-military relations in Turkey still continues. Just like Greece, paths of the transition to democracy after the coups were among the main determinants of civil-military relations in the post-coup periods in Turkey, too. However, the military rule in Turkey left power voluntarily and prepared the conditions of the transition in collaboration with political elites. This situation formed legitimacy and left channels open for military's involvement in politics after the military rule. Even though there have been developments in the democratization of civil-military relations since 1999 with Turkey's candidacy for the EU membership, the disunity among the political elites and the public continue to leave the channels open for military's involvement. During times of political crises, there is still a tendency in the civilians to look at the military and ask for help. Although high amount of Turkish people support democratic regime in the

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<sup>17</sup> Among the slogans, the slogans of 'we want coup' and 'military, to its mission' were also shouted.

surveys, almost half of the respondents in the survey does not hesitate to state that they agree with the statement that the military should intervene when it is necessary.

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# **In the Mirror of Occident: The Idea of Europe and Albanian National Identities in the Interwar Period**

*Enis Sulstarova*

*Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tirana, Albania*

## **1. Introduction**

At present the question of European identity is at the forefront of the debates about the current situation and the future of European Union (EU). Very often the EU is compared to the achievement of the nation-state, and the possibility of a European identity is thought of against the background of the existing national identities in Europe. Hence, the arguments about the impossibility, or at best the shallowness of the European identity (Smith, 1997) and the projections of a European post-national identity in a post-national constellation (e.g. Habermas, 1998; 2001). But the relationship between the nation and 'Europe' is older than the EU. On the one hand, the EU legitimizes itself by appealing to an idea of Europe, presenting itself as the embodiment of 'Europe', and as the realization of various historical projects advanced for the unity of Europe, against the divisions and vagaries of the nation-state. On the other hand, it is also true that since the advent of modernity the various nations in the continent have been imagined in conjunction with perceptions of 'Europe'. This has been a two way process: not only have nations been constructed in the milieu of European or Western civilization, but also 'Europe' has been imagined through the lens of the nation. That is why there has never been such thing as 'Europe', in an essentialist sense, but many imaginations of Europe (Malmborg and Strath, 2002).

As 'Europe' is closely tied to the history of the nation-state in the last two hundred years, then adjectives 'European' and 'national' are not alternatives, but are articulated in multiple ways (Malmborg and Strath, 2002, p.6). Questions such as 'How European is our nation?', or 'What does Europe think of us?', or 'Should we love or hate Europe?', are continually asked in national contexts, even at present, with important consequences for the future. In this paper we will be dealing with the various meanings of Europe articulated in political debates for the way of development of the Albanian nation-state in the interwar period. The research questions that we will attempt to answer here are what are the main meanings of 'Europe' articulated in Albanian political discourse of the time, how do they vary according to the different subject positions and if there was a dominant understanding of 'Europe' at that time.

In our opinion, the Albanian case during the inter-war period is very revealing for studying the meanings of Europe in nation-building processes in the periphery of the continent. Albania is one of the new nation-states in Eastern Europe which came into existence, or regained their independence after the collapse of Habsburg, Ottoman and

Russian empires at the end of the Great War. The interwar period is deemed essential for the national identity of these peoples, because a time when the national political and cultural elites in the new states of Eastern Europe were looking up to the West to provide legitimacy, moral inspiration and guidance, security and assistance to their countries, at a time when, ironically, the Western civilization was in crisis and Europe was turning into what Mark Mazower (1998) has aptly called the 'dark continent'. But, considering the dismemberment during and after the Second World War, or, incorporation to the communist empire, in the historical memory of these national states the interwar period has often been considered as the highest point of their aspiration to join European or Western 'civilization'. After the break down of the communist regime in 1990, many Albanian intellectuals are nostalgically considering the interwar period as the most 'Western' one in the history of the country and there are similar feelings across the region of ex-socialist states. The predominant discourses in Albania portray communism as another rupture with the natural course of Albania toward the West in and intellectuals are seeking to 'reconnect' the present with the ideas flourishing in the Albanian press during the 1920s and 1930s, so as to provide a contemporary moral and spiritual renewal of national identity, as well as a guidance to the integration process in NATO and the EU. For example, in the introduction to the one thousand-page book, *An Anthology of Albanian Thought 1870-1945*, published in 2003 and including contributions from the main intellectuals of the inter-war period, the editor writes about the 'Western vision' these authors collectively served to the political orientation of Albania (Kulla, 2003, p.14). Such an uncritical assessment of their contributions, taken detached from the political context of the period, hides the layered and multiplicity of meanings that the idea of 'West' ('Occident'), or 'Europe' displayed in the political discourses of the period.

This paper will try to reveal the multiplicity of the meanings of Europe/Occident in the political discourses of Albanian intellectual elites from 1918 to 1939. It will demonstrate that there was indeed a dominant discourse about "escaping" the East/Asia and "returning" to Occident/Europe, to which nearly all of the intellectuals of the time ascribed, but which nevertheless did allow the existence of more nuanced understandings of the idea of Europe, depending on the different projection of the Albanian development and future that were debated at that time. By 'discourse' we understand 'a meaningful practice that forms the identities of subjects and objects' (Howarth and Stavravakis, 2000, p.3-4). The strategy of discourse analysis is to show that meanings of the concepts are not fixed in advance, but depend on the ways they are arranged in a discourse around nodal points. Following Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.112), a discursive nodal point has the function to construct a temporary and unstable center for the arrangement of meaning in a discourse.

The stabilization of the dominant discourse of the period in Albania was performed by the nodal point of 'Occident'. More than a geography, it referred to the idea of civilization (or *the* civilization), whose meaning depended on the opposition to its counterpart, the 'East', or 'Orient', or 'Asia'. As such, it demonstrated most of the characteristics of that discourse Edward W. Said (1978) termed 'Orientalism'. This was an Albanian variant of Orientalism (Sulstarova, 2007), which borrowed the binary structure of Orientalism and applied it to the Albanian realities. The opposing categories of West and East were associated with other polarities, such as modern vs. backward, new vs. old, innovation vs. tradition, progress vs. stagnation, secularism vs.

bigotry, emancipation vs. servitude, etc. One chain of equivalence, the occidental one, was considered as the dominant trend of national identity, and the other, the Oriental one was considered as decadent and destined to perish.

Through the dominant discourse the intellectuals tried to suspend the meaning of the Albanian nation to a 'transitional' period between Europe and Asia, West and East and to construct the subject position of the new intellectual as the harbinger or spiritual guidance towards the 'New Albania'. This was made possible due to the political arrangement at that time. After 1924, King Zog I had built an authoritarian regime where there were no political parties. On the other hand the regime allowed for the freedom of press, up to certain limits, and for public criticism directed against the bureaucracy and the parliament, with the exception of the king himself, his family and the foreign policy with Italy. This gave the opportunity to Albanian intellectuals to debate especially about contemporary social and cultural situation in the country and to advance ideas about its modernization. In the absence of the political parties, some of them were grouped around currents of thoughts, influenced by the contemporary ideas and ideologies in Europe, which operated within the hegemonic discourse of Occident vs. Orient. The idea of Europe gained several meanings, according to the projects that each current represented. The rest of the paper exemplifies the hegemonic discourse and its different variants. The next section gives a short overview of the political and social situation of interwar Albania, the third section examines the Albanian version of Orientalism, the fourth one looks more closely to alternatives from the right and left in Albanian politics. The last section deals with the relevance of our argument for contemporary debates about 'Europe'.

## **2. Interwar Albania**

Albania came out of the First World War in very depressing conditions. During the war it had been invaded by Serbian, Greek, Italian, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and French armies battling one another, which had inflicted victims and sufferings on a people who had already felt the savagery of the Balkan Wars. Its future seemed uncertain, because of the plans made by the Allies during the war to grant pieces of Albanian territory to the neighbors. Due to a patriotic fervor and to the new international atmosphere after the war, Albania managed to preserve the 1913 boundaries of the state and to be accepted as a member to the League of Nations in 1921.

At this time, Albania was one of the most primitive countries in Europe in terms of development. Its economy was an agrarian one, in a country of nearly 1 million inhabitants, which nevertheless could not feed the population without importing grain every year. In the cities there were few manufactures and the only modern inter-city road system was constructed during the war for the supply of the invading armies. Despite the various reforms, Albania remained a poor and underdeveloped country throughout the interwar period and was hit hard by the Great Depression. There the crisis lasted longer than in developed countries and reached its peak in 1934. By 1938 the level of foreign trade was still under that of year 1928 (Prifti and Shpuza, 2007, p.108-9). To overcome stagnation, Albania needed foreign investments and aid, and it

turned to Italy, which was interested in Albania for strategic reasons. The new fascist regime wanted to turn Albania into a base for its expansion in the Balkans.

In the early 1920s, after the stability of the state boundaries was secured, a degree of internal instability followed. There were frequent changes of government, sometimes including armed struggles between different contenders. The politician who dominated during the period was Ahmet Zog, originally a young chieftain from Mat region, in the north of Tirana. He overcame the opposition and managed to rule the country, first as prime-minister, then as president (1925-1928), until he was crowned king in 1928, till 1939. Early in his career, Zog understood that the stability of his rule depended on the development of the country and he initiated many administrative, economic and cultural reforms. In an interview by the *Daily Telegraph* in 1928, King Zog declared that 'we are centuries behind Europe in civilization... It is my determination to civilize my people and make them as far as possible adopt Western habits and customs' (Zog, 1928, cited in Fischer, 1995, p.22). During his rule, Albania adopted the civil, penal and commercial legal codes of European countries, a central bank was established, a land reform was attempted, many public works were accomplished throughout the country, a system of primary and secondary schools covered nearly all the country, foreign instructors were brought in to train a modern army, and efforts were made to change the traditional ways of living of Albanians and to introduce Western modernity in education and cultural spheres.

Nevertheless, the costs of these reforms made Zog more and more dependent on Italy. He thought that he could take the Italian money and use it to strengthen the Albanian economy, in order to create a national unity that would deny the Italians the political control of the country (ibid., p.37). This policy succeeded, in the sense that a Pyrrhic victory is a victory, until 1939, when Mussolini finally deposed him and invaded the country, at the eve of Second World War. Despite the many failures, the regime of Zog provided Albania with a central government, the contours of a modern state, and unity for enough time to establish a strong national identification among the cultural elite, as this is demonstrated by the lively intellectual debates on the development of the country.

### **3. Albanian Orientalism**

In the texts by Albanian intellectuals during the interwar period, the signifiers 'Occident' and 'Europe' accompanied diverse political, social, and economic demands and plans, in the interests of different groups of population. 'Europe' was articulated in discourses that made the apology of the regime, as well as in discourses that expressed dissatisfaction with the current situation and called for social reforms. 'Occident' signified 'Western civilization' and in geographical terms it usually covered Western Europe, but at the time included USA, even Central Europe, according to arguments advanced by authors. Nearly all intellectuals active in public debates were 'Westernizers', even those of left-wing sympathies, who otherwise were critical of bourgeois civilization. One of the latter category, the poet Migjeni (alias Millosh Gjergj Nikolla) (1998) wrote the following verses in praise of 'Marvelous West': 'This is a song of the West, a song of the man who is elevated by self-confidence/His song is a beautiful hope, carried by wings of another life/Where the sun will change its course;

is will rise in the West' (p.37-8). Images of the Occident exerted a powerful attraction to the intellectuals, because it represented a new model of social organization and way of life, which they wished for Albania. In essentialist terms, they thought that Albanians belonged to Europe, thus their destiny is the European civilization. As one young intellectual, Ismet Toto (1997) put it in an article in 1936: '*Albania should be Europeanized, it should become a Switzerland in the Balkans...* The logic of history, our geographic position, the spiritual capabilities of our people and all that is good and noble in this country, compel us to choose the way of *Europeanization* and the embracing of moral principles of means and manner invented by the science and the civilization of this continent' (p. 60; emphasis in original).

The emblem of the modern civilization was considered to be the machine and the factory. Branko Merxhani (2003) compared the machine to a new god that replaced the traditional ones, first in Europe and now in all parts of the world (p.245). To be industrialized means to be Westernized, and that is why another intellectual congratulates Albania for, 10 years after the proclamation of the monarchy, 'entering in the rhythm of mechanical civilization and the technical progresses of the century' (Koça, 1999, p.40). In other words, Albania is bridging the gap that separates her from the industrially advanced countries of Europe.

Why is there such a gap between Albania and Occident, or, who is to blame for preventing Albania to be Occident? The unanimous vote of young intellectuals in 1920s-1930s goes for the Ottoman Empire. The main lasting influence of the Ottoman invasion, was the 'pollution' of the Albanian, otherwise a European type, with Oriental influences. That is why at present there is a battle between the 'Occidentals' and 'Orientals' in Albanian society. According to one literary critic, the Occidental type includes those few who work hard and sacrifice themselves for the good of the collectivity, whereas the Oriental majority includes those who lead an idle and egoistic life. The solidarity of Orientals, if it exists, is the solidarity of wolves, where each of them is always ready to attack his companions for his own interests (Maloki, 2003).

Who are the Albanian Orientals that are impeding the advancement of the country to European civilization? The young intellectuals directed their main attacks to the ministers and high ranking bureaucrats of the time, most of whom were long time and close associates of the king. According to the young intellectuals, these men of power were remnants of the old Ottoman system, and by consequence they had old and Oriental mentality and habits, which did not fit to a new European/Western Albania. For example, for Foqion Postoli, writing in the early 1920s, the majority of officials of the Albanian government had an Asian mentality and they fought against everything that represents progress and Occidental civilization. His only hope was that the healthy minority of Western minded officials that still exists in their midst would overcome the majority (Postoli, 1990, p.321-2). The respective perspectives of Albanian Occidentals and Orientals are irreconcilable to one another:

The Oriental considers the anachronism of the present old society left behind by the Ottoman rule as the best of societies, as the most beautiful and most ideal society in the whole world; but the Occidental, the one who sees the world and our inner life with the eyes of a European, cannot be satisfied with the poverty and ignorance in our country (Shpuza, 1999, p.96-7).

These intellectuals were complaining that the administration of the state was in the hand of corrupted and conservative men, who knew only the cunning methods of Ottoman administration and were out of touch with the European realities. To appease these voices and to gain more internal support for his regime, King Zog in 1935 formed a new government with 'liberal' young ministers, who had not held these positions before. The 'liberal' government of prime-minister Mehdi Frashëri was hailed in press by some intellectuals as the advent of a new era in Albania. But this experiment with 'liberalism' was short-lived. Because of internal security concerns, and external pressure from Italy, which considered the new government too 'anglophile', the king decided after a while to return to his trusted aides and the Frashëri government resigned after losing majority support in the Parliament (Fischer, 1996, p.258-60). The intellectual battle between 'the young' and 'the old' continued for a while, till the invasion of the country by Italy.

#### **4. Alternatives from right and left**

The clash of ideologies of extreme right and left in Europe were reflected in the debates of Albanian intellectuals. What is striking is the lack of voices calling for the establishment of liberal democracy in the country. Of course, liberal democracy could not be articulated freely in the press due to the pressure by the government censors, but other reasons existed as well. Most of the intellectuals thought that the country was not fit for liberal democracy, because of its backwardness, lack of strong middle classes, lack of proper education, lack of tolerance, etc. They feared that the establishment of pluralism would degenerate into anarchy. A timid defense of political liberalism was articulated by Branko Merxhani, who advised for a gradual and disciplined path of monarchy towards liberal democracy, first by establishing a responsible press, which would form sound public opinion; after that allowing the direct election of candidates by ballot only in the major cities and, only when the time was ripe, the rural (i.e. the majority of) population could be enfranchised (Merxhani, 2003, p.409; Koka, 1985, p.104). For his theses on liberalism, Merxhani attracted upon himself the wrath of other intellectuals; for example Krist Maloki called liberalism an 'Oriental bazaar', and he was in favor of an autocratic regime, like the one in Italy, or Austria at that time (Maloki, 2005, p.161-5).

As Albanians did not seem fit for liberal democracy, other alternatives were expressed in the press. More openly was articulated the right wing dictatorship, euphemistically called 'enlightened dictatorship', which according to its defenders was the Occidental political system of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. As for some of intellectuals inclined to the left, they hinted at a socialist revolution, although they could not articulate it openly, but which was implicit in their critique of Western capitalist society.

The most eloquent defender of the 'enlightened dictatorship' was Ismet Toto, a young journalist and author who was very active in the 1930s. He articulated the aspiration of the youth for a European Albania, against the worldview of the old Oriental generation. Toto's assumption was that the battle of Albanian young intellectuals was part of the world youth movement rebelling against the 'ancient regime' (Toto, 1997, p.56), and his conception has many similarities with the cult of the youth which developed in the fascist milieu in Italy (see Ledeen, 1972, p.3-25). Therefore, the main problem for him

was how to organize the Albanian young people in the same way that Hitler and the Nazis organized the German youth in a disciplined whole (Toto, 1997, p.57). The organization of the youth should be part of the creation of an organic and disciplined society: 'A strong nationalist climate, a social reorganization, a discipline and arrangement of all the classes and their interests, a strong activity towards Occidentalism, this is the ideal Albania' (Toto, 1997: p.70). All this can be accomplished only by a dictatorship with an Occidental outlook:

We want a powerful Albania, we want an organized Albania like the other states of Europe, we want an advanced Albania. Enough with the Orient... And we ask for dictatorship, because only the dictatorship will awaken in the heart of the people these passions; only dictatorship will bring to enlightenment the Albanian masses; because only dictatorship will sanctify the feelings, will grant health and will Europeanize the fatherland of Kastrioti [15<sup>th</sup> century prince who fought the Ottomans, and considered as the national hero of Albanian nation] (Toto, 1997: p.150).

According to him, and other supporters of 'enlightened dictatorship', liberalism was dead in Europe and the battle was waged between right and left dictatorships (Toto, 1997: p.189; Koka, 1985, p.61). As for the Albanians, they had never experienced democracy in their history, dictatorship was their permanent condition, thus the only question now was to give them an Occidental one (Toto, 1997, p.161, 175). As for the left dictatorship, there were no social conditions for its success in Albania and, moreover, Europe would never permit a 'red dictatorship' in Albania: 'unless, the whole Europe became communist, even if we became one million Lenins, we cannot make Bolshevik Albania' (Toto, 1997: p.78).

Thus, the only alternative was a right dictatorship, like those of Italy and Germany, but adapted to the Albanian conditions. Toto called for the king, as the leader of the young generation, to proclaim the dictatorship and work for building a regenerated nation. But his hopes were not fulfilled, because the king did not support his views. Disillusioned after the resignation of the Frashëri government, he joined an unsuccessful coup d'état led by his brother, ex-minister of interior in the Frashëri government. After the suicide of his brother, Ismet Toto surrendered to governmental forces, was tried and executed in 1937.

Intellectuals who sympathized with communism and the Soviet Union did not constitute a homogeneous group either. They favored the modernization of Albanian state and society, to overcome the 'Oriental' past, but at the same time expressed concern for the plight of the Albanian peasants and workers. Within the limits of the free speech during the monarchy, they criticized the government and the combined rule of 'Oriental' landlords and urban bourgeoisie. They were also critical of the imperialist fervor of the European status and worried about the dependency of Albania on fascist Italy. Some left publicists of the period were part of the clandestine communist groups.

In the 1930s, these intellectuals criticized the Occidental civilization, by focusing on two interrelated events in Europe: the economic crisis and the new imperialism of Italy and Germany. They highlighted the dire situation of the workers and peasants in Albania during the years of the economic crisis. Migjeni, in an ironic twist in one of his short stories, based on the life of an ordinary man in the city, pretended that at last the Albanian worker was equal to the European worker, because both became

unemployed: 'So our worker wanders in the city roads. Looks for job. Like his colleagues in Berlin and London' (Migjeni, 1998, p.86). Nonda Bulka, a journalist, wrote in the same vein: 'Do you consider a sign of civilization the wandering in the streets of London, New York, or Berlin, by millions of people demanding work or bread?' (Bulka, 1980, p.278).

Bulka and others observed the tense atmosphere of international relations in the middle of the 1930s. In one article in 1935 he mocks the civilizing pretensions of the Occident, in the light of the Abyssinian war: 'In the times of Noah used to live a great and civilized people, called 'European people'. The men composing this people were divided in different nations, which quarreled like dogs with one-another. Precisely these peoples (which quarreled like dogs) decided to spread their civilization beyond Europe' (Bulka, 1980: p.335). In this way, Great Britain and France 'civilized' hundred millions of Africans and Asians and taught them English and French and sold these peoples commodities they did not need. Now comes Italy into the race and Britain says to her: 'It is not human to rule another people. In the name of civilization you are not allowed to invade Abyssinia' (p.336). Migjeni in the story 'Bogy' (1998) allegorically pointed to the fear of communism, which he said the Western governments were using to control their restless peoples and to open the way to fascism: 'The bogy has spread his legs from one side of the continent to the other... Fear of bogy they use like mothers who frighten the children in order to stay in peace, instead of asking why the children cry' (p.116-7).

In this period of European crisis, the left intellectuals said that not everything could be borrowed from the Occident. One could appropriate the latest achievements in science and culture, which served to the whole people and not only to the learned intellectuals. Also the intellectual should turn to the reality of people and popular culture and should not deal with constructing abstract systems of thought (Koka, 1985, p.284-5). At that time, Selim Shpuza (1999) asked if 'it is right that intellectuals be busy with "perfectionism", in a time when the majority of people live in darkness' (p.145). In other words, they were rejecting the bourgeois aspects of the European civilization as well as the capitalist system and devoted their energies to an alternative social system which would be modern and beneficial to the people at the same time. But the communist Albania after the Second World War II did not turn out to be precisely this system most of them wished.

## 5. Conclusion

The notion of 'returning to Europe' has had a strong cultural appeal in the East European countries during transition and many East Europeans look nostalgically at the interwar period as the time when their country was part, or at least was entering, Europe. In other words, 'returning to Europe' is interpreted as 'returning to history', after the long communist 'pause'. This nostalgia exists in Albania, too. During the contemporary debates about the 'European' identity of Albanians, the arguments advanced by intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s are uncritically accepted as indication of Western inclination of the Albanians. For example, last year one could read a laudatory article about the 'Occidentalism' of Ismet Toto, where there was no mentioning of his fascist sympathies (Jorgaqi, 2008). Likewise, one may find

accusations against left-wing intellectuals of the 1930s for using ‘Occidentalism’ as a mask to hide their subversive activities that aimed at the establishment of a communist regime in Albania (Plasari, 2003, p.12).

Despite the frequent occurrence of signifier ‘Occident’, one should be cautious when looking into the intellectual discourse of interwar period to find cultural guidance or inspiration for today’s process of integration to the ‘West’. One should recall that both communism and fascism were considered by many intellectuals at that time to be possible genuine ways for advancing or regenerating the Western/European civilization in the future. On the other hand, today’s integration of European countries to the EU (and possibly NATO) depends foremost to the democratization, inalienable human rights and the establishment of the state of law, which are seen as means to overcome the effects and scars that totalitarianism left on the face of the continent and to ensure a future for European peoples that is different from the past.

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# **Structural Properties of Turkish Media Industry and Their Impact on Editorial Autonomy**

*Gulsen Seven*

*Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey*

## **1. Introduction**

It has generally been acknowledged that the 1980s and subsequent years constitute a new phase in the development of human history, the period which has been denominated by the general term, “globalization”. The term has been applied to underline series of changes the world has experienced, ranging from changes in the economic realm, to changes in political and socio-cultural dimensions of societal formations. These changes have had their repercussions on the media sector, culminating in a quantitative and qualitative transformation of the media apparatuses.

Quantitatively, the 1980s with its emphasis on neo-liberal economic tenets of deregulation and privatization witnessed privatization of previously publicly owned radio and TV channels, as well as their proliferation in Continental Europe. In addition to advancement of neo-liberal economic policies, technological developments that rendered the need for allocating frequencies obsolete, absence of a political conjuncture threatening national security of sovereign states (end of Cold War), as well as liberal discourse of minimization and withdrawal of the state have contributed to changes in the ownership and organizational structures of the firms operating within the media industry. The notions of “common good” and “public interest”, which, prior to the 1980s, were instrumental in designating media activities as a kind of “public service” as argued by Kaya (2006), have been redefined in the face of changing economic and political conditions and argued to be promoted only in a free market atmosphere without any hindrance and intervention by the state authorities.

Within this general framework, the aim of the paper is to address the question of whether the notions of “common good” and “public interest” that should be the main considerations of democratic media can be reconciled with an impetus for profit maximization, which is the primary maxim of free market economy. The issue is examined on the basis of Turkish media that have increasingly institutionalized themselves along capitalist lines beginning with the 1980s. Despite the fact that, after that date, Turkey has witnessed proliferation of media channels, this increase in the number of media did not result in concomitant increase in different views voiced in those apparatuses, one of the main reasons for which is increasing cartelization of the media landscape. This fact is elaborated on in this study by examination of structural properties of Turkish media industry and their impact on editorial autonomy on the basis of an analysis of a dispute between two rival media groups regarding Petroleum

Office Corporation (POAS). The account is supplemented by ten journalists' own views with regard to existence of editorial autonomy in Turkey. The journalists are selected among those that are based in Ankara, Turkey, and among those that occupy different positions within the professional hierarchy ranging from reporters to top editors in order to obtain a representative sample. Below (Table 1) is a list of journalists with whom personal in-depth interviews have been conducted in December 2007 and who will be mentioned throughout the text by references to their numbers in Table 1, i.e. J1, J2, J3....:

	NAME	POSITION	GROUP
J1	Ahmet Abakay	Head of Progressive Journalists Assoc.	Independent
J2	Bekir Coskun	Columnist for Hurriyet newspaper	Dogan Group
J3	Fikret Bila	Editor-in-chief of Milliyet Newspaper	Dogan Group
J4	Muharrem Sarıkaya	Columnist for Sabah Newspaper	Ciner Group (then sold to Calik Group)
J5	Murat Yetkin	Editor-in-chief of Radikal Newspaper	Dogan Group
J6	Nuri Kayis	Head of Birgun Newspaper Ankara	Independent newspaper
J7	Anonymous	Reporter	Ciner Group (then sold to Calik Group)
J8	Anonymous	Columnist	
J9	Anonymous	Reporter	Dogan Group
J10	Anonymous	Columnist	

**Table 1: List of Journalists Interviewed**

## **2. Liberal-Pluralist Media Paradigm and Editorial Autonomy**

The contention of the liberal-pluralist paradigm is that only a media institution whose functioning is predicated upon free market principles is able to secure freedom of expression and freedom of press. However, oligopolistic, if not monopolistic, organization of the media industry has rendered the traditional liberal theory of democratic role and functioning of the media increasingly obsolete. In the face of increasing consolidation and monopolization of the media industry, one of the most important attacks against the liberal-pluralist media paradigm has been that media

institutions that increasingly behave in accordance with market logic and principles are far from providing their primary public function. One of the basic hindrances against this primary function of the media institutions is argued to be the fact that because of their size the media institutions and the people working in these institutions tend to behave in accordance with the political and economic interests of either the owners of these institutions or of the companies themselves.

Against these criticisms posed against the liberal-pluralist media paradigm, the latter proposes the argument that in contemporary phase of capitalism ownership and control are separated from each other, thanks to the managerial revolution that culminated in the principle of near non-interference between the owners and controllers. Accordingly, with regards to the media institutions in general and newspapers/print media industry in particular, it is argued that the media content is determined not (directly) by the owners of the media institutions but by the editors (mainly the editor-in-chief), editorial cadres or top managers, who are guided by the professional ethical codes in their activities. Then, it should be considered only as an interesting coincidence that the formulation of the notion of “professionalism” coincides with the period of rise of media giants. To quote from Edwards and Cromwell (2006):

It is no coincidence that just as corporations achieved this unprecedented stranglehold; the notion of ‘professional journalism’ appeared... By promoting education in formal ‘schools of journalism’, which did not exist before 1900 in the United States, wealthy owners could claim that trained editors and reporters were granted autonomy to make editorial decisions based on their professional judgment, rather than on the needs of owners and advertisers (p. 11).

Even if we leave aside the question of professionalism and hold the idea that professional ethos exists among the journalists, still, it is difficult to defend the applicability of editorial autonomy that may be argued to be predicated upon the idea of separation of ownership and control, since the problem faced today is of a structural kind, as put forward by Nebiler (1995):

It is possible to state that Turkish media industry is monopolized to a large extent. The supporters of this tendency towards monopolization usually argue that the owners of those big media giants do not propose anything that would limit the possibility of having multiple voices in the media and that they do not try to pose limits on the autonomy of the writers. Yet, although this may hold for some individual cases, the problem is not an individual problem but a structural problem and it is this structural tendency that needs to be challenged and questioned. Freedom of press should not be equated with the personal liberty or freedom of the journalists, but with the freedom of the people to be informed rightly and correctly (p. 22).

Accordingly, rather than simply positing that the only hindrances in front of establishment of full editorial autonomy (in Turkey) are the high rates of commercialization of the industry, the prevalent tendencies of monopolization, lack of ethical ethos among journalists or the evil character of the media owners that do not want to grant autonomy to the journalists, it may be argued that the greatest obstacle resides in the structural properties of the Turkish media landscape as a whole, that are depicted in the next section.

### 3. Structural Properties of Turkish Media Industry

In Turkey, it is only starting with the 1980s that it is possible to talk about the emergence and institutionalization of the media industry in the full sense of the term. This change had two precursors one of them being commercial and the other one political; namely, 24 January 1980 economic restructuring policies, and 12 September 1980 military takeover. The overall aim and effect of these two was “to establish and institutionalize capitalism, to break up the tradition of social welfare state, to emphasize communication and information technologies and to free the financial capital from its basis in production and to free it from its territorial dependence by means of granting it high levels of mobility” (Nebiler, 1995, p. 35). These two precursors have led to change in the composition of the capital investing into the media industry, change in the ownership profile, related change in the media market structure and changes in organizational and managerial structures of the media institutions.

First of all, people who have accumulated their capital outside of the media industry started to enter into this economic realm, eventually, replacing the traditional owners and traditional small media enterprises operating on the basis of small capital. Keeping in mind that the media sector of the time was a low-profit sector, the process of privatization that was initiated in line with the restructuring of the economy along capitalist lines provided one of the most important motivations for the big capital to invest into the media industry. Sonmez (2003) argues that big business conglomerates were not driven into the sector solely by profit-making motivations, but also to benefit from the prestige that the media ownership structure confer on the owner and the firm, and to expropriate the media’s power of influence that would be instrumental in defining and re-defining the relationships between the major actors of the society; namely, the relations between the state, capital and the society at large, as well as the relations among the capitalists themselves (Tilic, 2000). J2 explains the impact of privatization in the following manner: “All of these changes started with the process of privatization in 1983...The capitalists started to be interested in the media. To have a newspaper or a TV station meant having benefits in the process of privatization...The most important reason was, thus, the hugeness of the privatization cake and its appetizing smell”.

The overall change of the Turkish economy and the concomitant change of ownership structure of the media institutions led to changes in the organizational structure of the media institutions as well. One of the most important causes of change was, of course, related with the transformation of the press institutions into media institutions that were not only engaged in press activities but extended their realms of operation into the other so-called media business.

Today, the Turkish media industry is under the command of few big companies that operate not only in the media sector, but in various other realms ranging from energy to finance. Below (Table 2) is a synopsis of the main players of Turkish media industry and their realms of operation:

NAME OF THE GROUP	MEDIA OPERATIONS	OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE MEDIA SECTOR
DOGAN GROUP	More than 20 companies (7 daily newspapers, 3 TV and 3 radio stations, printing, distribution, production, internet, music, cable TV)	Commerce, industry, trade & services sectors-15 companies Energy sector (petroleum)-10 Companies
CINER GROUP	9 Companies (1 daily newspaper, 2 TV channels, printing, magazine publication, production)	Commerce, industry, trade & services sectors-13 companies Energy (electricity) & mining 9 companies
CUKUROVA GROUP	2 Companies (3 daily newspapers, 2 TV and 3 radio stations, media marketing & 5 magazines)	Commerce, industry, trade & services-27 companies. Energy - 3 companies Communication-15 companies
DOGUS GROUP	2 TV & 4 radio stations 5 magazines	Engaged in financial services, construction, energy, tourism ssector, automobile industry and real estate- 25 companies
CALIK GROUP	Contemporarily acquired a newspaper and a TV station (Criticized as is known to be close to the government)	Operates in textile industry, energy sector, construction, finance and logistics
Other small groups operating in media sector and designated at times as Islamic Media, including Samanyolu Group and Ihlas Group (sold its shares to Murdoch's Fox TV in 2006)		

**Table 2: Dominant Players of Turkish Media Industry and Their Realms of Operation**

Source: Data compiled by the author on the basis of information taken from Groups' official websites as of January 2009.

These companies listed above are the ones that were able to secure their vertical, horizontal and cross-integration processes, to combine their activities under the umbrella of a holding organization that have led them to benefit from common management and from synergies created as a result of common use of resources and to adopt and apply the management mentality in their functioning along the lines of specialization and professionalization. Within this organizational structure, it is possible to monitor a related change in the organization of the relationships between the previously separate and independent management and editorial boards and functions within the media institutions, as well as the command of the former over the latter in the course of its functioning. Gulseren Adaklı (2006) states:

In addition, previously the top managers were only responsible from the content of the newspaper, whereas today, it is possible to argue that management has entered into their domain of activity. This is, in fact, linked with another change, namely the change of the previously small enterprises into large holdings and concomitant increase in the importance of the principles of corporate management. In direct contrast to the previous periods, when and where the technical and administrative functions and management were set apart from the functions of editing and publication, now, it is possible to speak of a total media management that is fused with all calculations regarding profit making, advertisement, editing etc. (p. 294).

As a result of this, it is possible to claim that the autonomy of the editorial boards is threatened and that they are, in a sense, made to act in line with the market logic that conceptualizes the audience as consumers rather than as citizens. In such an environment, it becomes highly difficult to envisage media professionals that are solely guided by their primary responsibility to the public, who, instead develop auto-censorship as a kind of solution for not being directly controlled. This point is very clearly summarized by J1, who says: “People say that our boss does not interfere with us? But which manager can admit that? If the boss is not interfering that is only because you are much more of a boss personality than your own boss”. J6 elaborates on the same point in the following words:

Editorial autonomy is a lie. Depending on who is the boss, all the media workers are eventually made to act in line with his demands and interests. Those who do not comply are fired after some time. Nobody playing with billion dollars in his business would like one with a salary to write whatever he wants, that is to say, to do proper journalism.

The utterances of both J1 and J6 seem to be verified in the case of Petroleum Office Corporation (POAS) dispute, which is the topic of the next section.

#### **4. The Case of Petroleum Office Corporation (POAS):**

The case of Petroleum Office Corporation (POAS) refers to a case in which Dogan Group, which is the biggest media group in Turkey, owning at the same time the corporation under question was being interrogated for a tax leakage of 1.2 billion Turkish Lira with regard to the same company in 2006, the event of which did not find any place in media channels owned by the same group. This event initiated now a

classical example of media war between the groups that are the major players of the media industry since the news published on 23<sup>rd</sup> of December 2006 in Sabah Newspaper, owned by Dogan Group's rival not only in media but in energy sector as well, Ciner Group.

Accordingly, from 23<sup>rd</sup> of December on, there took place a media war between the Sabah newspaper owned by Ciner Group and primary newspapers of Dogan Group, namely Hurriyet and Milliyet, in which both of the groups engaged in slandering one another. Dogan Media Group and the above mentioned newspapers were accused by Sabah newspaper on the basis of them having lost their autonomy vis-à-vis the economic interests of its owner, Aydin Dogan. Columnists of Sabah newspaper pointed to growing cartelization of media industry in Turkey and argued on the basis of POAS case that the newspaper could not retain its autonomy to declare the wrongdoings of POAS. In addition, the group was accused of refraining from criticizing the government of the period as a result of ongoing negotiations for the settlement of the leakage issue. As the editor-in-chief of Sabah newspaper at the time, Fatih Altayli wrote:

After Sabah newspaper revealed the billion dollar tax leakage in POAS a briefing has been made to Dogan Group managers and writers/journalists by POAS management, which is a case that you cannot come across in any newspaper in the world...And, we have been informed also later on that these journalists also received a "directive": "Do not write anything that would annoy Minister of Finance and Prime Minister". Now there is need to ask the following question, "Is this a publication principle or POAS principle". What it has got to do with journalism and principles of publication to order the journalists not to write anything that would annoy Minister of Finance and Prime Minister in order to solve the problems of a Group company engaged in tax leakage. Or, has a new principle been added in Dogan Group newspapers saying "To defend the grievances of the boss and not to harm his other business operations"

*after I left <http://www.sabah.com.tr/2007/02/11/yaz1437-40-126.html>, Retrieved on 15 May 2007, italics mine).*

Despite the fact that editor-in-chief of Hurriyet newspaper, Ertugrul Ozkok, refrained from writing explicitly on the subject of editorial autonomy after the incident and limited himself of accusing Ciner Group of blackmailing, his views on editorial autonomy are known from his previous writings, in which he explicitly delineates the concept as a myth. Ozkok states in his 13<sup>th</sup> July 2003 dated column:

Do the media owners have any right to interfere into publication policies? Since the time that I have entered into this profession, I believe that bosses have such right...In any country of the world, to say this is too risky. This is because the profession of journalism is under the pressure of myth of "editorial autonomy". Do not take me wrong. I am not saying that the boss should definitely interfere. If s/he wants, of course, s/he may choose not to interfere...Yet, to what extent it is just and realistic to say to the boss "Give me the money and do not be concerned about the rest"? Is it right to relegate

the boss, who clearly separates his other businesses and media operations, to the position of “unauthorized custodian”.

<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=152914>, Retrieved on 15 May 2007).

This media war between Dogan and Ciner Groups is illuminating not only in the sense of pointing out the limits of editorial autonomy, but also in illustrating the power of the owners or companies over journalists, as well as the latter’s adoption of a boss personality that has been mentioned throughout the paper. The case in question is Fatih Altayli, who for many years worked for Dogan Group and later was transferred to his rival, Ciner. Comparison of columns written by him, when employed by two different groups respectively are very useful in figuring out the fact that editorial autonomy is an inapplicable ethical principle within the media structure that operates in accordance with market precepts. Below is a piece written by Altayli, when working for Dogan Group:

...because I knew Aydın Dogan. I was writing in one of his most important newspapers for 10 years and I was one of his most important writers. He has never called me to tell me write something or not. Even when we wrote accusations for politicians that we knew were his close friends, he never complained. At times, when he liked my writings he would call to congratulate...For more than a year I have been managing one of the mostly viewed channels of Aydın Dogan, Channel D. He never interfered. He communicated his only demand before the 3 November elections and said: “Never give up impartial broadcasting. Please do not be partial on behalf of any political party or candidate.

<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=193802>, Retrieved on 15 May 2007).

Currently, on the other hand, being employed by one of the rival groups of Dogan, that is to say, Ciner Group, Altayli engages himself with the close scrutiny of Dogan Media Group activities and regards Ciner (his new boss) as having a completely different nature and orientation than Dogan. The following are excerpts taken from his column writings and interviews:

Exactly because of that Turgay Ciner will be a perfect media boss. He does not care about money. His life is simpler than mine. He has few friends. Cares about nobody and is responsible to nobody. He does not care about money making and the things that money can buy, because he had not been rich when he came to his 60s, but already there in his 30s.

(Yeni Harman [http://www.fatihaltayli.com.tr/content.cfm?content\\_id=525](http://www.fatihaltayli.com.tr/content.cfm?content_id=525), Retrieved on 05 January 2008).

These writings by Altayli represent the fact that he assumed two different positions when working for the newspapers of two different groups. In fact, the Turkish media industry is full of such examples as the mobility of the people within the sector is high. Even in the case that the employer does not directly interfere with the writings of the journalists, it is the case that the journalists themselves are engaging in the practice of auto-censorship as a result of absence of job security, high mobility of people in the

sector and also of the material benefits that accrue to the editors-in-chief; in short, due to structural features of the media industry itself.

## 5. Conclusion

Taking into account the discussions provided up until here, concerning the contemporary organization of media industry and media ownership structures in the global scale and in Turkey in particular, it is possible to argue that we are witnessing a new phase of capitalism promoted by both the neo-liberal economic tenets and new rightist political principles that has been enabled to a large extent by the developments in communication technologies in the last several decades, which, in turn, culminate in concentration of the media industry and in the emergence and institutionalization of global media giants that operate on a global scale. The significance of this fact for the members of the societal formations, that is to say, for the citizens and thus, for the social sciences, on the other hand, is caused basically by the unique nature of the media products that are instrumental in generating a social and political vision in the minds of the people, who, in turn, structure and restructure their ideas about themselves and their activities in this world. In line with this, it becomes important to engage in a struggle to open and form the means/channels of communication that would enable the representation of various differing viewpoints and interests in the public arena that would be utilized for the establishment of a democratic vision of the social and political formations. Below are the suggestions of journalists themselves for establishing and sustaining such a vision:

J8 - Now, it is not possible to speak of editorial autonomy in Turkish media because of the structural things that I have explained before (irrespective of good intentions), but it needs to be established...What I am saying is that, journalists should remain there even if the institutions are bad and try to keep their ethical positions as much as they can within them.

J3 - The workers in this structure do not have much power to affect the results. Thus, what needs to be done is the empowerment of the journalists with the collective and continuous pressure and outcry by the readers. Thus readers should be organized and act collectively to make their views heard and to pressure the media institutions, which would also empower the journalists. The readers and journalists should collaborate to countervail and counterbalance the cooperation between the capital and the political authority.

J6 - The question is whether media owners should be doing another job or not? According to me media is a special sector and job. If you are a media owner you should not be allowed to operate in the other realms of economy. There should be a legal legislation for that. You cannot expect the media owners on their part to be ethical, to be concerned with the problems of the society as their greatest concern. You cannot expect these. You must force them to consider these through legislative measures.

Taking these into account, it may be suggested that all of the comments on the establishment and sustaining of editorial autonomy in Turkish newspapers have some

relevance in the Turkish context. Yet, given the structural properties of the Turkish media system and the difficulty of trying to change that system once and for all, through laying down professional standards of ethical conduct for journalism, either by journalists themselves or by “right” media owners and politicians, the challenge is to open up channels for the establishment and existence of an alternative media besides the mainstream one. As argued by Edwards and Cromwell (2006):

The hope is not to inform all audiences, editors and journalists so that they can change the dominant media system immediately. Rather, the hope is by extending the awareness on the actual freedom of the media to open a space for the flourishing of an alternative one. Alternative media may not only influence the editorial line of the mainstream media, but may also arrange some popular movements and affect the political decisions and structures that regulate the media environment. Change may not be a gift from above it should be demanded by the populace and that should be the aim of efforts of raising public awareness (p. 195-196).

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# **Investigating the Effect of Text and Reader Variables on the Comprehension Difficulty of English KPG Reading texts: a Multifaceted Approach**

*Trisevgeni Liontou*

*Faculty of English Studies, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece*

## **1. Introduction**

Although a great deal of research has been conducted in the field of second language acquisition with specific reference to ways of reading and text processing strategies, Alderson (2000) stresses language testers' lack of success to clearly define "what sort of text a learner of a given level of language ability might be expected to be able to read or define text difficulty in terms of what level of language ability a reader must have in order to understand a particular text" (p.104). In addition to that, no empirical justification is provided by many test batteries regarding the principles underlying the selection of texts to be used in reading comprehension examinations (i.e. suitability of a text in terms of topic, discourse features, lexicogrammatical complexities, etc.). Most importantly, no specific information is available regarding the kind of text and the degree of text complexity a learner of a given level of language ability is expected to be able to process. Thus, the stimulus for the present research has been both the need for empirical evidence to supplement the mainly intuitive selection of prospective reading exam material by item writers, and the necessity to determine candidates' characteristics in terms of levels of language ability, needs and preferences. Such information will be useful in providing empirical justification for the readability level of texts that test-takers are expected to be able to process when sitting for the KPG English Language exams.

After all, as pointed out by Alderson (2000) "If the reading process or product varies according to such influences, and if such influences occur in the test or assessment procedures, then this is a risk to the validity of test scores, to the generalisability of results or to the interpretation of performances" (p.81). Test designers' knowledge of the variables that can influence the reading process and product is, thus, in many respects linked to the validity of the reading tests i.e. test designers need to know whether and to what extent their measurement instruments of reading ability are

affected by the readability<sup>1</sup> of the texts, the difficulty of the tasks or readers' background knowledge.

The originality and complexity of the present research, amongst other things, lies in the fact that instead of controlling one specific variable and examining its effect on the reading comprehension process (a method often employed by researchers), the effect of various text and reader variables will be investigated and cross-related for their interaction to be better clarified and predicted within the context of the KPG exams. The originality of the study is also inevitably related to its usefulness and overall contribution to the field of second language acquisition and test performance.

More specifically such a study aspires to shed light on the effect specific text and reader variables have on the reading comprehension performance of Greek learners of English and the extent to which these variables interfere with overall task and test difficulty. This way, a better match between readers and texts will be possible, whereas the validity and reliability of the exam will be further enhanced, since the control over specific text and reader variables will be maximized. The findings will, also, lead to the creation of a Text Rating Index according to which texts appropriate for different exam levels will be selected based on both quantitative and qualitative data. Precise text selection guidelines (in the form of a grid) will be developed for item writers to follow when reviewing prospective exam material so as to determine in a consistent way the suitability of a text for a specific exam level. This way, the design of an electronic bank of leveled texts from which item writers will draw material according to specific text attributes (database fields) will be facilitated.

Finally, such a study will provide English language teachers with useful knowledge regarding the appropriate level of reading texts their students should be exposed to and reading strategies they should have developed for a successful performance in the exam. Most importantly, potential candidates will have a better idea of what the reading comprehension part of the KPG English exam measures and what level of text difficulty they are expected to be able to cope with given their language ability level.

## **2. Methodology**

### ***2.1 Candidates' Questionnaires***

To get valuable information on candidates' profile and reading preferences as well as their perceptions of text and task difficulty, a survey has been conducted on a national scale in the form of questionnaires administered to all KPG candidates sitting for the B2 and C1 English Language exams in May and November 2006 and 2007 examination periods. The questionnaires were administered on the day of the exam in

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<sup>1</sup> Dale and Chall (1995) have proposed a definition of readability as "the sum total -including the interaction- of all those elements within a given piece of printed material that affect the success a group of readers have with it. The success is the extent to which they understand it, read it at an optimal speed and find it interesting" (p.80). Readability is, thus, an umbrella term that broadly refers to the ease or difficulty of a text.

exam centres all over Greece. For the survey sample to be appropriate for detailed statistical analysis and as representative as possible of the target population a decision has been made for its size to be at least 10% of the total number of candidates taking each exam with a minimum of 500 questionnaires per examination period. More specifically, once test-takers had finished their exam and before leaving the examination room, they were kindly requested to provide some personal information regarding their age, sex, years of learning English and preparation for the KPG exams. They also rated on a Likert scale of 1-5 or 1-3 a variety of statements on Module, Task, Text and Instructions Difficulty, Topic and Genre Familiarity, Topic Preference, Text Lexical Complexity, Text Processing Strategies and any problems they might have faced regarding time restrictions.

The design of the questionnaire has been rather time consuming and asked for careful piloting and refining for its final version to contain a comprehensive range of questions. However, this has paid dividends since the collected data has yielded valuable information from the candidates that would not be possible to obtain otherwise. The actual process of designing the questionnaire involved the clarification of the research purpose and the formulation of specific questions that responded to this purpose. More specifically, since the aim of the study was to investigate the effect specific text and reader variables have on the reading comprehension performance of KPG candidates, the questions were designed to elicit information related to these variables i.e. text topic, genre, structure, lexical complexity, background knowledge. Bearing in mind the fact that the larger the sample of a questionnaire the more reliable the findings, the present questionnaire has been administered to a rather large sample (i.e. all candidates sitting for the B2 or C1 English language exam) and, thus, had to include structured, close, numerical questions. This kind of questions are, according to Cohen *et al* (2000), very useful in large-scale surveys since they enable collection of data amenable to thorough statistical analysis and allow comparisons to be made across groups for patterns to be observed in the same sample. To avoid dichotomous questions, a Likert scale has been employed since such a scaling of questions can provide a range of responses with a degree of sensitivity (i.e. very-not at all) while still generating numerical values (Cohen *et al*, 2000)

As can be seen in the following table, up to the present 6000 questionnaires from four examination periods have been analyzed, 4000 of which in relation to the B2 level and 2000 in relation to the C1 level.

TOTAL NUMBER: 6.000				
B2 Level: 4.000			C1 Level: 2.000	
May 2006			November 2006	
Sample	Frequency	Percent.	Frequency	Percent.
B2 Level	1750	16.75	500	12.96
C1 Level	500	13.03	500	30.85
May 2007			November 2007	
B2 Level	1000	13.55	750	23.16
C1 Level	500	15.87	500	47.43

**Table 1: Candidates' questionnaires**

## 2.2 Text analysis

In order to get a rough idea of the readability level of reading texts and check whether specific readability formulas could be of any practical usefulness within the context of the KPG exams, the readability level of all reading texts used in past KPG exams has been electronically estimated using 4 readability formulas, namely the Dale-Chall, the Flesch Reading Ease Index, the Gunning's Fog Index and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade level Index and 2 computer programs i.e. the AceReader Pro Deluxe and the TextAnalyser Version 2 software. Up to date 22 texts of the B2 and 21 of the C1 level have been processed which accounts for a total of 172 analyses. Along with readability indices, additional text features that may contribute to text difficulty at a word and sentence level have been measured such as word length, number of sentences, average characters per word, average words per sentence, average number of syllables per 100 words, average number of sentences per 100 words and lexical density i.e. the proportion of content (lexical) words -basically nouns, full verbs, adjectives and adverbs derived from adjectives- over the total number of words in a text.

Most importantly, an attempt has been made to investigate whether *text lexical diversity* (D) can provide a consistent measurement tool of text difficulty. Lexical diversity refers to the range of vocabulary displayed in the discourses as roughly defined by Durán *et al* (2004) and has been extensively mentioned in literature related to learners' written or spoken production. Actually it has been considered an essential indicator of learners' quality of output, but has not yet been extensively applied to reading texts. Measuring lexical diversity is a rather complex task that has troubled researchers across several disciplines and has triggered the development of different formulas, amongst which the most widely used has been the type-token ratio, the ratio of different words to total words used in a text. However, the traditional TTR has been considered sensitive to sample size and according to Arnaud (1984) and Richards (1987) renders itself incapable of assessing lexical diversity in a satisfactory way if the sample sizes vary a great deal. Most recently another transformation of the traditional TTR was developed by McKee, Malvern, and Richards (2000) and incorporated into the *vocd* program, which is included in the CLAN suite of programs in the Child Language Data Exchange System (*CHILDES*). A minimum sample size of 50 words-tokens is required to compute a valid D. First data has to be transcribed in a standard format (CHAT), following a specific coding system (which in fact makes the whole procedure rather time consuming), but once the text has been checked and the coding accepted, the software calculates the average of Ds three times and reports a final optimum D value for a text. According to its designers, D presents methodological advantages over other measures of lexical diversity since it is independent of sample size and makes it possible to perform valid comparisons between varying quantities of linguistic data.

As stated before, up to the present measurement of lexical diversity has been mainly confined to data produced by learners. However, given the fact that it relates to vocabulary and vocabulary itself consists an important element of reading texts, the idea of investigating the relation between lexical diversity (D) and text readability could not remain unexplored. After personal communication with Professors Richards and Malvern such an application has been considered eligible, so in the following section some preliminary findings of such an investigation are presented.

### 3. Preliminary findings

#### 3.1 KPG Candidates' profile

Descriptive statistics have shown that KPG B2 candidates' age in all four exam periods ranges from 12 to 62 years. Although age values are scattered indicating lack of normal distribution, most values are found within the range of 15-20 years with 15 being the most frequent age for candidates sitting for the B2 exam. As far as sex is concerned, women outnumber men in all four exam periods. Regarding years of learning English, the majority of candidates have stated that they had been learning English for about 6-8 years before sitting for the exam and also that they have been especially prepared for it (which means that they were at least partly familiar with the format and type of activities included in the exam).

With regard to KPG C1 candidates' profile, age values in all four exam periods range from 12 to 48 years. Nevertheless, once again values follow no normal distribution, most of them can be found within the range of 16-24 years with 16 being the most frequent figure. As far as sex is concerned, once again women taking part in the C1 exam outnumber men in all four exam periods. In relation to years of learning English, the majority of C1 candidates seems to have been learning English for about 7-9 years before sitting for the exam. However, as opposed to the B2 findings, a lower percentage of candidates sitting for the C1 exam have stated that they have undergone some kind of special preparation before sitting for the specific exam.

#### 3.2 Age & years of learning English

Statistical analysis has shown that *age* can have an effect on candidates' perception of reading module difficulty, topic familiarity, topic preference and text lexical complexity. More specifically, ordinal and logistic regression analysis has shown that at a 5% significance level the older the candidates the higher the probability to find the reading module more difficult and the text language more complex to comprehend (Table 2). However, at the same time older candidates seem to be more familiar with and to like reading more about specific topics, such as environmental issues, than their younger counterparts.

Age (predictor variab.)	May 2006		November 2006		May 2007	
	Estimate	Sig.	Estimate	Sig.	Estimate	Sig.
Overall Exam Difficulty	.039	.000			.045	.000
Topic Familiarity (Text A)	.021	.001			.014	.009
Topic Preference (Text A)	.015	.000	.021	.050	.025	.000
Text Lexical Complexity (Text B)	.025	.000	.017	.007	.030	.000
Expected Text Level			.015	.045	.028	.002

Table 2: The effect of age as a predictor variable

*Years of learning English* as an independent variable can also be used to a limited extent to predict candidates' responses. Regression analysis has shown that as the years of learning English increase candidates are more likely to be more familiar with certain topics and to find the reading module less difficult and the text language less complex to comprehend. Surprisingly enough, an effect of *sex* on task instructions difficulty has also been observed. In all four B2 and in two C1 examination periods it has been found that women are more likely than men to find exam instructions difficult to comprehend.

### ***3.3 Candidates' perspective on module difficulty***

Data analysis of KPG B2 candidates' perspective on overall difficulty of the Reading Module has shown that in all four exam periods the majority of responses ranges from "slightly" to "fairly difficult" and only a small percentage of test-takers found the module "very" or "extremely difficult" (12% in May 2006, 9% in November 2006 and 16% in May 2007). Task instructions were mainly treated as "not difficult" or "slightly difficult". However, when coming to expected level of text and item difficulty a noticeable difference can be traced between May and November 2007, since in May 2007 a much lower percent of candidates found the texts and the items as difficult as expected whereas in November 2007 a great majority of participants (almost 80%) stated that texts and tasks were as difficult as expected. Such a discrepancy asks for further investigation for specific patterns of difference to be identified.

As far as C1 candidates are concerned, their perceptions of reading module and instructions difficulty are quite similar to those of the B2 level i.e. in all four exam periods the majority of participants found the reading module "slightly" to "fairly difficult" and the task instructions "not difficult" to "slightly difficult". However, when coming to expected level of text and item difficulty a discrepancy can once again be traced between two exam periods. In November 2006 a much lower percentage of participants found the texts and the items as difficult as expected in comparison with May 2006 and November 2007.

### ***3.4 Candidates' perspective Vs textual features***

The comparative examination of candidates' questionnaires and textual features has provided a preliminary insight into text comprehension constraints from the part of the reader. In the following table (Table 3) data regarding B2 candidates' perspectives on text lexical complexity are presented and cross-related to readability formulas and estimates of lexical diversity. In the first column candidates' perspective on text lexical complexity, which is ranging from "very" to "extremely difficult", is displayed, whereas in the next four columns readability scores are presented. All four readability formulas fail to consistently come in agreement with candidates' perspective on text lexical complexity, since texts are mainly rated as very difficult by readability formulas and appropriate for advanced readers (above the average reader). On the other hand, if we compare data in the first and last column, there seems to be a better correspondence between participants' responses and lexical diversity (D), since as the percentage of

participants who found the text “very” to “extremely difficult” increases, so does the lexical diversity of the text.

B2 MAY 2006						
	Text Lexical Complexity Very - Extremely Difficult	Flesch Reading Ease Index (0-100, 100=easy)	Dale-Chall Grade Level	Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level	Gunning's Fog Index	Lexical Diversity (D)
Text A	12.7	57.3	9-10	9.6	10.40	80.75
Text B	13.8	52.6	11-12	9.9	10.80	81.32
Text C	14.7	52.7	11-12	12.9	12.40	81.16
B2 NOVEMBER 2006						
Text A	9.1	53.8	9-10	11.3	13.20	96.58
Text B	7.0	74.0	7-8	6.8	8.00	60.89
Text C	6.9	60.0	9-10	10.4	11.60	111.84

**Table 3: B2 candidates' perspective vs textual features**

An additional comparative exploration of textual features amongst texts that candidates have rated very differently in terms of lexical complexity has been rather revealing in terms of text comprehension difficulty. In November 2007 Text B (which was about *climate change*) was found “very” to “extremely difficult” by a high percentage of B2 candidates, whereas in November 2006 Text C (which involved *Film reviews*) was treated as the least difficult of all four examination periods. As can be seen in Table 4, Text B is shorter, consists of more sentences (20 as opposed to 19), but all other features (characters per word, words per sentence, Dale-Chall and Flesch Index) are of a lower rate than those of Text C. However, lexical density and especially lexical diversity are of a much higher level, a factor that might have affected participants' perception on overall text difficulty.

B2 Level	November 2006 Text C	November 2007 Text B***
Words	421	254
Characters	2029	1128
Sentences	19	20
Average Characters per Word	4.7	4.3
Average Words per Sentence	22.2	12.7
Average number of syllables per 100 words	147.03	142.512
Dale-Chall Grade Level	9-10	7-8
Flesch Reading Ease	60.0	73.4
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level	10.4	6.2
Lexical Density	.59	.65
Lexical Diversity	111.84	159.53

**Table 4: B2 Quantitative Text Measures**

Similarly, in relation to C1 texts, from all four examination periods Text B of November 2007 (which was about *general quiz rules*) was found “very” to “extremely difficult” by the highest percentage of candidates, whereas Text B of May 2006 (which was about *going to the dentist*) was treated as the least difficult. As we can see in Table 5 below, both texts are of equal word length, level of lexical density and consist of exactly the same number of sentences (16). Text B of November 2007 has been rated as “very difficult” according to the Dale-Chall index but “fairly easy” according to the Flesch index, so no clear conclusion can be drawn from these indices. However, a difference can be noticed in relation to lexical diversity which is of a much higher level in Text B and might partly account for such a discrepancy.

C1 Level	May 2006 Text B	November 2007 Text B ***
Words	231	230
Characters	1187	1137
Sentences	16	16
Average Characters per Word	5.0	4.8
Average Words per Sentence	14.4	14.4
Average number of syllables per 100 words	158.01	147.62
Dale-Chall Grade Level	7-8	9-10
Flesch Reading Ease	58.5	67.3
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level	8.7	7.5
Lexical Density	.62	.62
Lexical Diversity	86.74	108.46

**Table 5: C1 Quantitative Text Measures**

### 3.5 Additional effects

Analysis of the questionnaires has yielded valuable information regarding the effect additional variables such as text lexical complexity, item and task difficulty may have on the reading comprehension performance of KPG candidates. More specifically, in all four examination periods (2006-2007) of the B2 and C1 KPG English language exams text lexical complexity has been consistently found to correlate significantly with module difficulty, i.e. the more difficult candidates find the vocabulary of the text the more difficult the whole module becomes for them (Spearman Correlation coefficient ranging from .270 to .388) (Table 6). Item Difficulty and Task Instructions have also been found to correlate significantly with module difficulty which indicates that as the items become more difficult to answer and the task instructions more complex to comprehend candidates find it more difficult to cope with the whole reading module.

B2 Level			
	May 2006	November 2006	May 2007
Text A	Value	Value	Value
Kendall's tau-b	-.105	-.159	-.187
Spearman Correlation	-.124	-.189	-.224
Text B			
Kendall's tau-b	-	-.123	-.228
Spearman Correlation	-	-.144	-.262
Text C			
Kendall's tau-b	-.088	-.176	-.177
Spearman Correlation	-.105	-.207	-.213

**Table 6: Text lexical complexity affecting module difficulty**

Data analysis has also shown that text preference negatively correlates with text lexical complexity (Table 7). In other words, the more candidates like the topic of a text the less difficult they find its vocabulary. Topic familiarity has also been found to correlate significantly with text preference which indicates that the more familiar candidates are with certain topics the more they like reading them. Finally, module difficulty and text lexical complexity significantly correlate with specific reading strategies such as underlining parts of the text, trying to guess the meaning of unknown words, translating in L1 to better understand the meaning, reading selectively or combining information from different parts of a text.

### 3.6 Employed reading strategies

The questionnaire analysis has provided valuable information regarding the extent to which specific reading strategies are employed by KPG test-takers, to the best of their conscious knowledge. So, as we can see in the following table (Table 8), frequent use of problem-solving reading strategies such as rereading the text, guessing the meaning

of unknown words, translating in mother tongue for better understanding has been observed, whereas support reading strategies such as underlining text information, selectively reading and combining information from different parts of a text are less often used.

B2 Level			
	May 2006	November 2006	May 2007
Text A	Value	Value	Value
Kendall's tau-b	.336	.322	.278
Spearman Correlation	.376	.359	.319
Text B			
Kendall's tau-b	.348	.333	.290
Spearman Correlation	.388	.371	.323
Text C			
Kendall's tau-b	.342	.348	.231
Spearman Correlation	.363	.388	.270

**Table 7: Topic preference affecting text lexical complexity**

November 2007		
	B2	C1
Underlining parts of the text	32.0	41.6
Trying to guess the meaning of unknown words	68.0	79.4
Translating words in L1 to better understand their meaning	63.7	52.5
Selectively reading specific parts of a text	16.8	14.3
Combining information from different parts of a text	47.6	59.1
Reading first the questions and then the text	52.4	38.4
Reading the text more than once	61.0	76.4

**Table 8: Employed reading strategies**

## 4. Conclusion

In the present paper an attempt has been made to provide insights into the reading comprehension attitudes of KPG candidates, by shedding light on the effect specific text and reader variables have on the reading outcome and the extent to which these variables interfere with overall task and test difficulty. In the context of the KPG

exams, such findings could be of practical use to the KPG exams in other languages that are currently administered i.e. French, Italian and German, and beneficial to the design of reading comprehension tests of the other levels that are going to be introduced in the years to come. They could, also, be of benefit to other test batteries worldwide, since assessment of reading comprehension is an important component in various language exams.

The preliminary analysis has shown that a better match between readers and texts is possible and the validity and reliability of the exam can be further enhanced, should the control over specific text and reader variables be maximized. For texts calibrated to specific levels of language competence to be created text designers should take into consideration the effect text lexical complexity, topic familiarity, topic preference, item difficulty and task instructions have on the overall reading comprehension performance of KPG candidates. More specifically, in relation to text difficulty, preliminary research findings have shown that, apart from measuring readability indices and text features such as word length, number of sentences, average characters per word, average words per sentence etc., estimating *text lexical diversity* should be considered as a more consistent measurement tool of text complexity.

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# Sustainable Development and the Bulgarian National Strategy for Regional Development 2005-2015: an Application of a Tree dimensional Teoretical Model

*Ivan Ivanov<sup>1</sup> and Julia Dobрева<sup>2</sup>*

<sup>1</sup> *Department of Statistics and Econometrics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Sofia University, St. Kliment Ohridski”, 125 Tzarigradsko chaussee blvd., bl.3, Sofia 1113, Bulgaria, e-mail: [i\\_ivanov@feb.uni-sofia.bg](mailto:i_ivanov@feb.uni-sofia.bg)*

<sup>2</sup> *Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Sofia University, St. Kliment Ohridski”, 125 Tzarigradsko chaussee blvd., bl.3, Sofia 1113, Bulgaria, e-mail: [dobрева\\_julia@abv.bg](mailto:dobрева_julia@abv.bg)*

## 1. Introduction

The Bulgarian social and economic policy for the last decade has been mainly focused on the development of an effective and competitive economy within the context of EU integration. The existing regional differences in the country, similar to other countries, are a source of social and political problems which can only be solved through the government's interference with its regulative mechanisms. In this paper we will propose a three-dimensional model of sustainable development and its concrete implications in the regional development model, incorporated in the Bulgarian National Strategy for Regional Development for the programming period 2005-2015. The theoretical sustainability model which we propose is analyzed in the applied model for regional development in Bulgaria. We propose that the sustainability effect can be studied through the impact of subsidies, provided by the EU structural funds and in particular through the Bulgarian operational programme for regional development. We claim that they have a great impact on the shifts in sustainability levels and that as a financial instrument they have a significant social and economic impact not only for the country but also for the entire Balkan region.

Our paper demonstrates that a distinction should be made between sustainability and sustainable development. In order for sustainability to become sustainable development one has to compare the results of the three dimensional optimal decision-

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making in time. Therefore, we introduce the time factor in our model and we postulate that sustainability turns into sustainable development when there is a steady increase in the values of the arguments of our proposed objective function and in the value of the solution to the dual problem. This positive growth is traced by comparing the results obtained for each moment with the preceding as well as with the initial one. Thus, we make a differentiation between weak and strong sustainable development, by referring to the first as “sustainability” and to the second as “sustainable development”. We further provide a practical application of the model in the regional development policy of Bulgaria.

The optimization models have a wide application in the analyses of economic processes, such as those which can be found in the theoretical approaches of Friedman (1990), Mas-Collel (1995), Moschandreass (1994), and Varian (1992). In this paper, we claim that the solution to the proposed three-dimensional maximization problem leads to the definition of its “dual” in which we swap the places of the constraint and the objective function and find a solution for a minimum. A similar approach has been suggested by Menezes and Wang (2005) and also by Sedaghat (1996), yet, the models proposed by them do not provide an in-depth analysis of the unique solution to the maximization and the minimization problem and its application in economics. Ivanov and Dobрева (2007) propose that the common solution to the maximization and the minimization problems, which they prove in another paper (Ivanov and Dobрева, 2007), indicates the relation between the maximum and the minimum of the two problems and the suggested model leads to the definition of the dual problem and the Slutsky equation as well as to the definition of a classification of variables, which are arguments of the objective function. Their analysis provides an application of the model in the processes of sustainable consumption and sustainable production and it is further used for defining a positive governmental policy for sustainable development. In this paper we further develop the idea by proposing a study of the same relation but in the three-dimensional case by also introducing the time factor.

The economic processes of sustainable development with regard to the change of the economic operations and their transformation into more sustainable structures have been analyzed by Demange and Heunet (1991), Hensler and Edgeman (2002), Kamihigashi and Roy (2007) and Kratena and Wueger (2004). The object of study in these papers is the relation between optimization processes and the notion of “sustainable development”. In our three-dimensional model we show that the dual problem and the derived Slutsky equation, as well as the classification of variables based on it, can be used in the analysis of the policy for sustainable regional development. By applying the classification of the different types of variables in the analysis of the optimizing behavior of economic agents in the three dimensions, namely business activities (combining consumption and production) on the one hand, environmental policy and social policy, we show that in the long-run we can study the optimal choice of public and private goods which balance economic growth with social cohesion and environmental protection. The analysis of the policy for sustainable regional development is discussed in terms of the governmental regulation in its role as a policy developer and policy implementer and in the context of new horizons for financial assistance under the EU structural funds.

## 2. The Model

In our analysis we shall introduce the function  $\varphi(x, y, z)$ , defined in a convex and compact set  $(x, y, z) \in X \subset R^n$ , which is *continuous, monotonic, twice differentiable, quasiconcave and homogenous of degree 1* and this set is also characterized by local non-satiation. The function  $\varphi(x, y, z)$  is an objective function, which we wish to maximize under a given linear constraint. In the  $n$ -dimensional case the model takes the following form:

$$\max_{x \geq 0} \varphi(x, y, z)$$

$$\text{such that } \langle (a_1, a_2, a_3), (x, y, z) \rangle \leq b$$

where  $x, y$  and  $z$  are vectors of the arguments of the objective function,  $a = (a_1, a_2, a_3)$  is a vector of parameters, which are positive numbers and influence the constraint. The scalar is  $b$ , which determines the value of the constraint and  $b \geq 0$ . The solution to this problem is the vector  $m^*$ , which is the optimal vector and in which the arguments of the defined objective function  $\varphi(x, y, z)$  take values in which the function  $\varphi(x, y, z)$  reaches its maximum.

The graphical representation of the function  $\varphi(x, y, z) = k$ , where  $k$  is some number, gives the coordinates of the points  $(x, y, z)$ , in which the objective function has one and the same value of  $k$ . We consider the three-dimensional example  $x \in R^1, y \in R^1, z \in R^1$ . On fig. 1 this function is represented by **surface curves**, which are defined upon changes in the value of  $k$ . The second element of the model is a **linear constraint**, which is the surface  $l : a_1x + a_2y + a_3z = b$ , where  $b$  is some constant.




Fig. 1 Three-dimensional optimization model

The aim with this model is to find the vector  $m^* = (x^*, y^*, z^*)$ , for which the function  $\varphi(x, y, z)$  has a common point with the constraint and at this point it reaches its maximum value. We will prove that point  $A(x^*, y^*, z^*)$  in fig. 1, represented by the vector  $m^* = (x^*, y^*, z^*)$ , in which the curve is tangent to the constraint  $l$ , is a solution to the maximization problem.

We introduce the **value function**  $v(a, b)$  which takes the following form:

$$v(a, b) = \max_{x, y, z \geq 0} \varphi(x, y, z) \quad (1)$$

$$\text{such that } \langle (a_1, a_2, a_3), (x, y, z) \rangle \leq b$$

In our equation the value function  $v(a, b)$  is *decreasing* in  $a = (a_1, a_2, a_3)$  and *increasing* in  $b$ , *homogeneous* of degree zero in  $(a, b)$ , *quasi-convex* in  $a$ , and *continuous* for all  $a > 0, b > 0$ .

The solution to equation (1) is the vector  $s^*(a, b)$  which defines the point of maximum.

As the value function  $v(a, b)$  is monotonic with regard to  $b$ , then for each surface curve  $\varphi(x, y, z) = k$  we can get the minimum value of  $\langle (a_1, a_2, a_3), (x, y, z) \rangle$ , necessary for obtaining a certain level of  $k$  with a given vector  $a$ .

We now introduce a second **value function**  $g(a, k)$ , which represents this dependence and we can formulate the problem for obtaining a minimum value of  $\langle (a_1, a_2, a_3), (x, y, z) \rangle$ :

$$g(a, k) = \min_{x, y, z \geq 0} \langle (a_1, a_2, a_3), (x, y, z) \rangle \quad (2)$$

$$\text{such that } \varphi(x, y, z) \geq k$$

The function  $g(a, k)$  is *increasing*, *homogenous of degree 1*, *concave* and *continuous* in  $a$ . The solution to this equation is  $h^*(a, k)$ , which defines the point of minimum.

Thus, we have found a solution to the so called “dual” problem by swapping the places of the objective function and the constraint. The point of minimum coincides with the point of maximum, i.e. the solution to the two problems is one and the same vector.

We shall now formulate the following Theorem, proven by Ivanov and Dobrova (2007):

## Theorem 1

If the function  $\varphi(x, y, z)$  is continuous and defined in a three-dimensional space, consisting of convex and compact sets  $x \in X \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $y \in Y \in \mathbb{R}$  and  $z \in Z \in \mathbb{R}$ , then the optimal vector  $m^*$ , which is a solution to the problem for maximizing  $\varphi(x, y, z)$  determines the optimal vector  $m^*$ , which is a solution to the problem for minimizing  $\langle (a_1, a_2, a_3), (x, y, z) \rangle$ . And vice versa, the optimal vector  $m^*$ , which is a solution to the problem for minimizing  $\langle (a_1, a_2, a_3), (x, y, z) \rangle$  determines the optimal vector  $m^*$ , which is a solution to the problem for maximizing  $\varphi(x, y, z)$ . This dependence takes the following form:

$$v(a, b^*) = \max_{\varphi(x,y,z)} \varphi(m^*) = \varphi^* \\ \langle (a_1, a_2, a_3), (x, y, z) \rangle \leq b^*$$

and

$$g(a, \varphi^*) = \min_{\langle (a_1, a_2, a_3), (x, y, z) \rangle} \langle a, m^* \rangle = b^* \\ \varphi(x,y,z) \geq \varphi^* .$$

Hence, from Theorem 1 it follows that we can formulate the following identities:

$$g(a, v(a, b)) = b \text{ and } v(a, g(a, k)) = k \quad (3)$$

and

$$m(a, b) \equiv h(a, v(a, b)) \text{ and } h(a, k) \equiv m(a, g(a, k)) \quad (4)$$

From identities (3) and (4) and by applying the chain rule we can derive the following equation:

$$\frac{\partial m_i(a^*, b^*)}{\partial a_j} = \frac{\partial h_i(a^*, y^*)}{\partial a_j} - m_j(a^*, b^*) \frac{\partial m_i(a^*, b^*)}{\partial b} \text{ for } i, j = 1, \dots, (5)$$

In this equation we will call  $\partial h_i / \partial a_j$  **substitution effect**,  $m_j \times \partial m_i / \partial b$  we shall define as **constraint effect**, and  $\partial m_i / \partial a_j$  we claim to be the **total effect**. The substitution effect determines a surface which is tangent to the surface of the function  $\varphi(x, y, z)$ . The total effect  $\partial m_i / \partial a_j$  determines the change of some variable,

respectively  $\partial h_i$  or  $\partial m_i$ , as a result of the change in a given parameter from the vector  $a$  and this is shown through the difference  $\partial h_i / \partial a_j - m_j \times \partial m_i / \partial b$ .

Using equation (5) we get:

$$\frac{\partial m_i(a,b)}{\partial a_j} \Delta a_j = \frac{\partial h_i(a, v(a,b))}{\partial a_j} \Delta a_j - \frac{\partial m_i(a,b)}{\partial a_j} \frac{m_j(a,b)}{\partial b} \Delta a_j$$

By substituting with  $a$  and  $b$  in the equation from the two-dimensional case, the total effect is the following vector:

By solving equation (5) and depending on the changes that occur in the values of the vector  $a$  and the parameter  $b$ , we can propose a classification of the variables  $x$ ,  $y$ , and  $z$ , contained in the optimal vector  $m^*$ . Thus, following the general equilibrium theory, and depending on the changes in the values of the constraint, we can classify the variables as normal, ordinary, luxury, necessary, inferior or Giffen variables, and also as substitutes or complements.

### 3. Sustainability and sustainable regional development

We shall analyze sustainable regional development by introducing the time factor  $t$ , where  $t \in [1, +\infty)$ . If  $E$  is the aggregate quantity of environmental products,  $B$  is the aggregate quantity of private goods which are products of the business activities, and  $S$  is the aggregate quantity of public goods and social services, then the value function (1) in our model of sustainable regional development will take the following form:

$$v^t(p^t, M^t) = \max_{E, B, S^t \geq 0} u(E^t, B^t, S^t) \quad (6)$$

$$\text{such that } \langle p_E^t, E^t \rangle + \langle p_B^t, B^t \rangle + \langle p_S^t, S^t \rangle \leq M^t,$$

where  $p_E^t$  is a vector of the price for environmental goods,  $p_B^t$  is a vector of the price for private consumer goods and  $p_S^t$  is a vector of the price for public goods and other social welfare activities;  $E^t = (E_1^t, \dots, E_s^t)$  is a vector of the quantities of environmental goods for the period  $t$ ,  $B^t = (B_1^t, \dots, B_q^t)$  is a vector of the

quantities of private business production for the period  $t$ , and  $S^t = (S_1^t, \dots, S_w^t)$  is a vector of public goods and services provided;  $M^t$  is the budget of a given consumer in terms of labor and non-labor income.

According to the analysis of the Slutsky dynamical equation [15] the vector  $x_t^* = x_t^*(p^t, M^t)$  which is a solution to our problem (6) is “locally asymptotically stable”, and each change in the income and prices  $p^t = (p_E^t, p_B^t, p_S^t)$  is followed by a change in the value of the optimal vector  $x_t^*$ . We claim that sustainability and sustainable (regional) development are two different notions. In order to analyze the consumers’ behavior with regard to the three types of products and to evaluate the level of sustainability, it is necessary for our model to be analyzed in dynamics, i.e. to find the solutions to the problem for finding an extremum after the period  $t$ . If  $t \in \{1, 2\}$ , then the solutions to the problem for  $t_1 = 1$  and  $t_2 = 2$  will be accordingly  $x_1^*(p_E^1, p_B^1, p_S^1, M^1)$  and  $x_2^*(p_E^2, p_B^2, p_S^2, M^2)$ . We will claim that namely the difference  $x_2^* - x_1^*$  for period  $t_2$  compared to the one for period  $t_1$  indicates sustainable development in the transition from period  $t_1$  to period  $t_2$ , or for the vector  $v_2$  we will have  $v_2 = x_2^* - x_1^* \geq 0$ .

By substituting with the arguments of the value function (6) in the expenditure function (2) we get:

$$e^t(p^t, \bar{u}) = \min_{E, B, S^t \geq 0} \langle (p_E^t, p_B^t, p_S^t), (E^t, B^t, S^t) \rangle \quad (7)$$

$$\text{such that } u^t(E^t, B^t, S^t) \geq \bar{u}.$$

The solution to the minimization problem for period  $t_1 = 1$  is the vector  $h_1^*(p^1, u^1)$ , and for period  $t_2 = 2$  is the vector  $h_2^*(p^2, u^2)$ , and we also have  $e_2 = h_2^* - h_1^* \geq 0$ . By applying Theorem 1 and the Slutsky equation (5) in our model of sustainable regional development, we introduce the following two definitions:

**1. Sustainability:** Sustainability is present when the solution for a maximum of the utility function and minimum of the expenditure for period  $t$  is higher in value than the solution to the same model for period  $t - 1$ , where  $t \in [1, +\infty)$  or:

$$x_t^*(p^t, M^t) \equiv h_t^*(p^t, u^t) \geq x_{t-1}^*(p^{t-1}, M^{t-1}) \equiv h_{t-1}^*(p^{t-1}, u^{t-1})$$

Hence, by applying the Slutsky equation and the classification from the optimization model in Section 2 we claim that:

**2. Sustainable (regional) development :** Sustainable development is a three-dimensional optimization model in which the quantities of environmental goods, private goods and social welfare goods increases over time along the optimality path, i.e. we have a process of sustainable development from moment  $t_0$  when in each moment  $t$  that follows ( $t > t_0$ ) the goods remain of the type they were in the initial moment  $t_0$ . This means that there are indications of sustainable development if the goods are normal in moment  $t_0$  and they remain normal in the next time periods.

The proposed two definitions are equivalent and they represent two different approaches to the concept of sustainable development.

If for period  $t$  one of the aggregate products  $E$ ,  $B$  or  $S$  is an *inferior good* or a *Giffen good*, i.e.  $\frac{\partial x_j}{\partial M} < 0$  or  $\frac{\partial x_j}{\partial p_j} > 0$  and  $x_t^*(p^t, M^t) \leq x_{t-1}^*(p^{t-1}, M^{t-1})$ , and respectively  $h_t^*(p^t, u^t) \leq h_{t-1}^*(p^{t-1}, u^{t-1})$ , then we will claim that the principle of sustainable development has been violated.

#### 4. The policy of financing sustainable regional development as a three dimensional model

We can apply problem (1) from Section 2 to formulate a problem for maximizing the utility from the subsidies for regional development for a given period  $t$ :

$$v^t(\theta^t, F^t) = \max_{E^t, B^t, S^t \geq 0} W(u_1(E^t, B^t, S^t), \dots, u_n(E^t, B^t, S^t)) \quad (8)$$

$$\text{such that} \quad \theta_1^t E^t + \theta_2^t B^t + \theta_3^t S^t \leq F^t,$$

where the objective function  $W(u_1(E^t, B^t, S^t), \dots, u_n(E^t, B^t, S^t))$  is the social welfare function in the choice of a bundle of subsidized environmental products, private goods and public social welfare goods,  $E^t$  is the total (aggregate) quantity of

subsidized environmental commodities for period  $t$ ,  $B^t$  is the total (aggregate) quantity of subsidized business products in the form of private goods,  $S^t$  is the total (aggregate) quantity of subsidized public goods;  $\theta_1^t$  is the cost for the financing of investments which aim at environmental protection,  $\theta_2^t$  is the amount of grants for the financing of goods as output of private investments,  $\theta_3^t$  is the amount of grants for the financing of public goods and service and  $F^t$  is the total amount of the budget constraint (budget for structural funds) available to the government for these two activities for period  $t$ . We define the function  $v(\theta^t, F^t)$  for the purposes of our analysis as *the indirect social welfare function*, expressing the utility from the financed environmental and non-environmental private goods. The solution to problem (11) is

the function  $x_t^*(\theta^t, F^t) = \begin{pmatrix} E^t(\theta^t, F^t) \\ B^t(\theta^t, F^t) \\ S^t(\theta^t, F^t) \end{pmatrix}$ , which in our model we define as the

Marshallian function in the choice of the government between subsidized environmental goods (activities), private and public goods at the moment  $t$ .

Also, by applying problem (2) from Section 2, we can formulate the dual (inverse) problem of (8) for cost minimization. This problem takes the following form:

$$e^t(\theta^t, W^t) = \min_{E^t \geq 0, B^t \geq 0, S^t \geq 0} \theta_1^t E^t + \theta_2^t B^t + \theta_3^t S^t$$

$$\text{such that } W(u_1(E^t, B^t, S^t), \dots, u_n(E^t, B^t, S^t)) \geq W^t,$$

where we define the function  $e(\theta^t, W^t)$  as the function of governmental expenditure for subsidizing the three-dimensional regional development activities. The solution to this problem is the function  $h_t^*(\theta^t, W^t)$ , which we refer to as the Hicksian demand function, defining the political optimal decision for sustainable regional development. By applying Theorem 1 we can claim that the following identities are fulfilled:

$$x_t(\theta^t, F^t) \equiv h_t(\theta^t, v(\theta^t, F^t)) \text{ and}$$

$$h_t(\theta^t, W^t) \equiv x_t(\theta^t, e(\theta^t, W^t)).$$

It is necessary to solve a number of problems for finding an extremum (a minimum and a maximum) in different time periods in order to assess the policy for sustainable

regional development. By deriving and solving the dynamic Slutsky equation in this application of our model and thus analyzing the substitution effect, the budget effect and the total effect, we can classify the goods, subsidized by the budget for regional development. Hence, we can claim that a successful regional development policy is a policy in which the solution for a maximum of the social welfare function and minimum of the expenditure for subsidized production for period  $t$  is greater in value than the solution to the optimization model for period  $t - 1$ , where  $t \in [1, +\infty)$  or:

$$x_t^*(\theta^t, F^t) \equiv h_t^*(\theta^t, W^t) \geq x_{t-1}^*(\theta^{t-1}, F^{t-1}) \equiv h_{t-1}^*(\theta^{t-1}, W^{t-1})$$

To make the differentiation, a sustainable regional development policy from moment  $t_0$  is a policy in which we observe sustainability when in each moment  $t$  that follows ( $t > t_0$ ) the subsidized commodities/activities remain of the type they were in moment  $t_0$ . This means that the sustainable regional development policy is positive if the subsidized goods are normal in moment  $t_0$  and they remain normal in the next periods and also if the goods/activities are luxury goods in moment  $t_0$  and they remain such in each subsequent moment.

## **5. Sustainable regional development and its incorporation in the Bulgarian National Strategy for Regional Development 2005-2015**

The Bulgarian regional development policy has been firstly laid down in the Constitution since 1990 which states that “the State creates conditions for a balanced development of the separate regions of the country and provides support to the territorial units and activities through the financial, credit, and investment policy.” The period 1992-1998 is marked by intensive preparation to overcome the negative effects of the central planning system during the socialist period and to set up the necessary legislative system for a new kind of planning which takes into account the regional problems as well as the principles of partnership and subsidiarity. The particularities and specificities of the Bulgarian regional development policy are incorporated in the differences within the regions. There are typical contrasts of the type “centre-periphery” and mostly affected are the frontier territories, many of the rural regions and the regions populated with ethnic minorities. The Bulgarian National Rural Development Policy aims at diminishing the differences with the other EU countries and the differences within the regions. The ultimate goal of the Strategy is to set up a system of main priorities and goals in order to establish a policy for a balanced regional development. Another important element of the policy is the transnational cooperation and the development of infrastructure especially through the physical opening of the national territory to neighbouring countries.

Regional development is a great challenge because the relation is often ruled by conflict due to the controversies in the concept of sustainable development. On the one hand, environmental development slows down economic growth and on the other hand social development is possible only through sustainable economic development. Also, a policy targeted at one-sided achievement of balance would lead to a halt in the economic growth of the stronger regions.

The goals and priorities of the National Strategy for Regional Development of Bulgaria are defined in the Law for regional development, the socio-economic policy of the country and the EU socio-economic cohesion policy. The first goal is to increase regional competitiveness and diminish the differences between the regions. It is primarily focused on the achievement of sustainable economic growth through the development of business networks and regional clusters as well as modernization of the regional infrastructure to provide for economic growth and employment in terms of transport as a public good, environmental and business infrastructure. The other goal is the achievement of social development and cohesion through improvement in the quality of life of the strategy target regions – provision of education, health and other public services and preservation of the environment. The final goal is development of European and regional cooperation and partnership. The protection of the environment as a major requirement for sustainable development is a horizontal priority. The goals are interrelated and they require the implementation of an integrated approach in the regions upon the definition of the measures and projects for their implementation.

The strategy encompasses the period 2005-2015 which covers a span of two years prior to Bulgaria's accession to the EU. It is the document which settles the political frame for the conception of regional sustainability and development. In fact, the practical elements of the strategy are incorporated in the operational programme "Regional Development" which was launched in December 2007 and which is the financial instrument through which support is granted to investments in the above-listed priorities. The programme is managed by the Ministry for Regional Development and for the period December 2007 – February 2009 a total of 759 projects have been submitted. The data provided in Table 1 is summary information on the available financial resource for the years 2008 and 2009. Considering the results of our model we can conclude that with the increase in the absorption levels of EU grants for regional development there is a substantial increase in the sustainability levels.

In addition to the financial resources above, there is forecasted expenditure for 2010 under priority axis 1 with two new financial schemes – home policy with a financial resource of 40 031 89 euros and development of local infrastructure for business networks with a financial resource of 120 095 607 euros. The specific aims of these schemes are to provide modern social homes for minority groups through the renovation of existing public buildings and to renovate and develop the infrastructure which is close to business centres.

The analysis shows that the amount of the financial aid provided is either increasing or remains the same, which influences the number of investments by increasing the quantity of the goods produced – private, public and environmental. It should be further mentioned that the main beneficiaries of the financial resource under the Operational Programme for Regional Development are the municipalities and the regional structure of the respective ministries of education, culture, and health.

However, the final beneficiaries are the residents of a given region, or the local community, that are final consumers of the three-dimensional optimal choice bundle.

Priority Axis	Scheme	Major investment activities	Allocated financial aid for 2008 (EUR)	Forecasted financial aid for 2009 (EUR)
1. Sustainable and integrated urban development	Social infrastructure	Reconstruction and renovation of universities, social and cultural centres	28 722 864	280 223 088
	Improvement of the physical environment and risk prevention	Improvements of roads, streets, parks, monuments, etc.	210 413 468	238 589 939
	Systems for sustainable urban transport	Development of plans for the transportation traffic and supply of equipment	160 127 475	160 127 475
2. Regional and local accessibility	Information and communication infrastructure	Development of a critical and reliable state information and communication infrastructure	16 012 747	20 015 934
	Access to sustainable and effective energy resources	Development of technical research for gas and water supply electric power stations	9 007 170	60 047 804
3. Sustainable development of tourism	Improvement of tourist infrastructure	Reconstruction and renovation of cultural and historic infrastructures	152 665 535	152 665 535
	Development of regional tourist products and marketing	Organization of cultural events with regional meaning	3 189 619	32 714 044
	National tourist marketing	Research, marketing activities, development of the tourist network	32 714 044	32 714 044
4. Regional development and cooperation	Small-scale local initiatives	Purchase of vehicles and equipment for garbage collection, infrastructure for prevention against landslides	15 385 453	15 385 453
	Cooperation between the regions	Exchange of know-how, cooperation with EU partners	6 405 099	6 405 099

**Table 1.**

Further to the local regional sustainability, the model can be applied to the study of the process within the entire Balkan region. The development of cross-border economic,

Development. For the programming period of 2007-2013 the main objective for cross-border cooperation on the Balkans is defined in the Cohesion Policy and the ultimate aim is to strengthen transnational co-operation through actions related to Community priorities and through the promotion of integrated territorial development while also exchanging experience at the appropriate territorial levels. This cooperation for sustainable regional development sets a strong connection with the aspiring neighbouring countries, i.e. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey as well as with the two EU member states – Romania and Greece. The transnational cooperation with the aspiring countries is achieved through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), while with the Member States it is the Structural Funds that assist in this process. The main instrument through which this cross border cooperation is managed is the definition of the so called “cross-border areas” which are the regions to benefit from the joint efforts of the respective countries. Thus, regional development is not only limited to the increase in production output and social welfare within the country but it also covers the neighbouring region and could also be analysed and measured by applying the three-dimensional theoretical model, proposed in our paper.

## **6. Conclusion**

This paper examines the relation between a theoretical three-dimensional model and the political visions for regional development. Its major goal is to prove how the mathematical optimization model can be used in a practical application, namely the planning of political decisions by taking into account the precise measurement of their intended impact. The analysis in the paper shows that the Bulgarian National Strategy for Regional Development 2005-2015 and its Operational Programme provide substantial financial resource for achieving the targeted sustainability levels and we comment on a tendency of increase in the amounts of provided grants, evident from our two-year empirical data, which is an indicator of positive sustainable regional development.

Finally, it should be argued that the levels of sustainability achieved during the two years after Bulgaria’s accession to the EU are much higher than those from the preceding years of transition. Our conclusion is that sustainable regional development is not a self-regulative phenomenon. It is a process which greatly depends on exogenous factors, the most influential of which is the fluctuation in prices brought about by the implementation of granting schemes and similar mechanisms for financial assistance.

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# Media Models – How Do They Fit in the Bulgarian Context?

*Lada Price*

*Department of Journalism, University of Sheffield, UK*

## 1. Introduction

This paper is concerned with the effects of the changes from Communism to a form of Capitalism on the Bulgarian media. Specifically I examine the political, economic and cultural changes to the Bulgarian media landscape and how our current theoretical models and conceptual understandings of such changes are insufficient. I ask: is it viable to identify a specific ‘true’ post-communist media model with common characteristics for all former communist countries or is that impossible given their profound historical, political and cultural differences? By examining one specific case – Bulgaria – I hope to add to the academic debate about media systems and models of media transformation.

The quest for designing a theoretical framework which captures the essence of the postcommunist media systems has carried on since media researchers in Western and Eastern countries started exploring the media systems of individual countries in the former communist block that experienced major ‘revolutionary’ changes in the late 80s and early 90s. However, as Jakubowicz (2008) points out in the latest contribution to the debate on media models, ‘no coherent theory of the process unfolding in postcommunist countries has emerged to replace it, nor indeed is expected to emerge’ (p.9). Why such pessimism after nearly two decades of research in Eastern Europe? Surely, logic assumes that by now academics and media experts should have a reasonable explanation of how and why those post communist countries are not ‘behaving’ and developing in the way they were expected to in the early 90s. Several theories, such as ‘transitology’ for instance, predicted that Eastern societies should more or less take on the shape of their Western counterparts once they completed the transition from totalitarian or authoritarian regime to become democracies<sup>1</sup>.

In the mentioned above volume on media systems in postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Sparks (2008: 44) rejects the approach by transitologists as fundamentally mistaken and unable to explain the incredibly complex process of change that has taken place in Eastern Europe despite the great variety of research conducted so far. The reason for this, argues Sparks, is that the expected outcome was related to a pre-designed historical paradigm with a beginning and eventually an end of transitions. That paradigm assumed that at one point or another each former communist

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<sup>1</sup> For example of ‘transitology’ see Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

country will reach their goal of becoming a Western type democracy with a functioning market economy. The conditions 'democracy' and 'market economy' were seen as vital elements of the paradigm, which also included media 'transition' from a communist type media to a Western type notionally free media.

Mughan and Gunter (2000) claim that 'the mass communication media are the connective tissue of democracy' (p.1). They follow a similar comparative approach to try and examine the contribution of the media to the process of political change and the transition to political democracy. In his earlier research of Eastern and Central Europe, Sparks (1998) claims that 'democracy, in the modern senses of the word, is literally impossible without the media. It is a characteristic claim of Western societies that they are democratic precisely because they have both regular elections and a free media'(p.16). He argues that if there really has been a change from one system (totalitarian) to another (democratic) then the mass media would to some extent register and cast light upon this process. Ten years after his research was published, Sparks (2008) expresses some doubts: 'In general, it is stated that a free and independent media is a necessary condition for democracy, but the discussion remains innocent of any of the issues concerning such a statement that have been raised by research into media and communication'(p.45). He suggests the different approach of 'elite continuity' to try and figure out why similar political and economic circumstances in former communist countries produced such varied media systems across the region, once known as the Soviet block. As in previous studies, Sparks focuses on the 'Western fringe' of the block, more specifically Poland, Russia and China<sup>2</sup>. He stresses that 'the evident failure of the "transition paradigm" to provide a satisfactory account of political and economic development, either at the general level of political science or in the narrow but central field of the media, necessitates a reconsideration of our theoretical orientation'(p.46).

Illuminating as it is, the current research by well known and established scholars still leaves unanswered questions and scope for further research. If Eastern and Central European countries do fit a new theoretical model of 'elite continuity', what about South East European postcommunist countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania and the former Yugoslavian Republics? Their place on the wide European map has carried and still carries difficult historic 'baggage' and has caused problems for media researchers precisely because they represent an exception. Most researchers agree on common characteristics and stages in the dynamic of change in all former communist countries but the problem lies in the differences and why they can not fit easily in any existing media models and theories.

Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008) rightly highlight this pressing problem:

...disappointment with "western models" and their applicability to post-communist countries, as well as with the ability of those countries successfully to adopt such models and breathe life into them. The strong impression is that the international community and organizations, as well as all the other western players involved in the process, presented to post-

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<sup>2</sup> Interestingly, China is a fairly new addition in comparative postcommunist media research, having been excluded so far on the grounds that it still has a communist regime.

communist societies an unrealistic, idealized and wart-free image of “free and democratic” media and journalism to emulate, while the reality in their own countries may have been different (p.19).

James Curran (2000) argues that one must know the history of the country, the way the political and economic systems work, the inheritance from the past and its impact on the development of civil society. Curran believes that media institutions change as they develop and grow but that development is influenced by events of the past and specific cultural and societal characteristics. Hallin and Mancini (2004) present a similar argument while Williams (2005) reiterates the crisis in the ‘transitology’ approach:

Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire it was assumed that the mass media in Eastern Europe would rapidly assume the form of their counterparts in the West. Democracy and the market economy would be accompanied by media systems that stressed the core practices of western journalism, including objectivity and balance, as well as independence from the state and critical scrutiny of the powers that be. This process has not been easy or straightforward (p.102).

Given this context, it is important for research to address the dynamics of media change in an in-depth way to on the one hand to gain a good understanding of the historical process in Bulgaria and on the other hand to contribute to the current levels of theoretical knowledge by identifying gaps in current media research. Utilising Somers ‘historical sociology of concept formation...designed to analyse ‘how we think and why we seem obliged to think in certain ways’ (Hacking 1990:362; Foucault 1973 [1970], 1978 [1996])’ (p.28) I address the question of what concepts were adopted to explain the changes to the Bulgarian media incurred by the transformation from Communism to a form of Capitalism. Referring to the changes in Eastern Europe in 1989, Somers argues that ‘for while we have a historically obvious explanation for the anti-statism of the Eastern European revolutionaries, we do not yet have an explanation for the unquestioned association of freedom with private markets’ (p.28). The methodology used by Somers is designed to find out how concepts work by “reconstructing their construction, resonance, and contestedness over time, and thus to help us ‘unthink’ (Wallerstein 1991) seemingly natural assumptions’ (p.28). This approach proves to be a useful tool to explore why in Bulgaria well developed Western theories and concepts such as ‘capitalist market economy’, ‘democratic public sphere’, ‘civil society’, ‘free media’ and various other media concepts seem to be accepted as the norm by the new political and media elites, something to aspire to and to try to ‘import’ from the West and why other forms of media models were not considered, or are being considered by non-elite groups. The assumption that all postcommunist countries will follow the ‘transitology paradigm’, for example, could be reconstructed by exploring the historical processes that led to its formation and how it was taken for granted that inevitably all of those countries, including Bulgaria will follow it.

In order to explore and comprehend the process of media change in Bulgaria I would like to look briefly at two other major areas of change: economic and political. I will then focus mainly on changes of the mass media after the fall of communism.

## 2. The landscape of change

In Bulgaria the events of 1989 are often referred to as ‘the change’ or the beginning of ‘the transition’ and those two terms denoted everything that was different from the previous status quo. Until 1989 Bulgaria was governed by a communist government, running a centralised economy. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1999), in the 1980s Bulgaria was relying heavily on foreign credit to sustain its failing economy. The early 90s were characterised by economic chaos where every new government tried half-heartedly to implement economic reforms, for example ‘shock-therapy’, suggested by Western institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, various NGOs and think-tanks. The reforms proved to be unpopular especially among the older population, which had grown to be dependent on state services such as free health care, education, pension and national insurance. In order to stabilise its economy and prevent social unrest Bulgaria reached an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank of debt moratorium. However, internally the country’s assets were being depleted systematically through dubious, non-transparent privatisation deals. ‘The assets and profits of the state-owned enterprises and banks were being stripped by vested interest groups, and in some cases, criminal elements’<sup>3</sup>, warned the IMF. The mid-90s brought a ‘full-blown’ economic crisis and it also led to vanishing social safety nets created by the communist regime and burgeoning inequalities ‘naturalized as inevitable to the process of democratization’ (Somers 2001: 25). In the same year a currency board was introduced, which achieved ‘remarkable’ results in stabilising the Bulgarian economy, thus branding the country a ‘champion in the region’<sup>4</sup>. By then it seemed that Bulgaria was steadily following the ‘transition’ paradigm and was on its way to becoming a ‘free democratic society’ with a ‘market economy’, as predicted. Political and economic reforms by governments were justified exactly on the basis that there will be an end of this process of transition at some point in the future but no-one could guarantee when. The new political and economic elites were not inclined to question this assumption and or to look for a viable alternative. Western experts and economists, such as George Soros, were chief advisers to the government on free market reforms while at the same time capitalising on investment opportunities in the region. The remote, at the time, prospect of joining the European Union imposed conditions that membership will be possible only if certain economic and political criteria, set by the Western members, were followed. Instead of adopting a strictly individual approach to each former communist country based on its historic, social and cultural differences from the other postcommunist countries, the EU was busy trying to ‘unite’ Europe and make it follow in the steps of developed Western members. The European Union’s approach of punishing governments by stopping funding for not implementing necessary reforms or most recently for major corruption scandals has not had the expected effect. Reforms still need to be conducted and corruption in Bulgaria is worse

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3 IMF (1999) Bulgaria - Recent Economic Developments and Statistical Appendix; IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/26; April 19, 1999; Available from: <http://www.imf.org> as a Pdf file. [Accessed: 12/04/09]

4Ibid

than ever<sup>5</sup>. But most importantly there are no alternatives of how to ‘deal’ with former communist countries, still carrying the complex legacy of the past.

The early 90s also brought major political changes in Bulgaria. The rule of the communist (renamed as the Socialist) party ended in 1991 when the first democratic elections were held with numerous opposition parties competing for votes. A new constitution was adopted, stating that ‘political activity in the Republic of Bulgaria shall be founded on the principle of political pluralism and ... no political party or ideology shall be proclaimed or affirmed as a party or ideology of the State’<sup>6</sup>. The process of political changes in Bulgaria has been dominated by an unremarkable succession of governments, formed by the main political parties such as the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Union of Democratic Forces, and National Movement Simeon II or coalitions between them, including the party representing the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, the Movement for Rights and Freedom<sup>7</sup>. The newly adopted Constitution not only established the right of the Bulgarian citizens to vote freely in elections but also aimed to protect freedom of speech. Article 39 (1) states that ‘everyone shall be entitled to express an opinion or to publicize it through words, written or oral, sound or image, or in any other way’<sup>8</sup>. The Constitution (Article 40 (1)) goes even further to proclaim that ‘the press and the other mass information media shall be free and shall not be subjected to censorship’<sup>9</sup>. However, there were several negative trends. Since political and economic changes began, media legislation in Bulgaria has been on the agenda of every government in power. The existing laws on TV and Radio broadcasting were aimed generally towards the establishment of public service broadcasting, as ‘prescribed’ by Western, mostly American, media experts. Bulgarian National TV and Bulgarian National Radio are defined as ‘national public operators’<sup>10</sup> financed directly from the state budget, rather than the independent Radio and TV Fund, as envisaged by the latest law. However, the Fund does not exist yet despite conditions imposed by the EU. Bulgarian media legislation has to a large extent been harmonised with European standards and obligations. In theory The Law on Radio and Television, for example, has been fully harmonised with the EU ‘Television without

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<sup>5</sup> Transcript from a meeting of the Bulgarian Parliamentary Committee for National Security on 26/03/08, *Capital*, Issue 15, 12-18 April 2008; Available from: [www.capital.bg](http://www.capital.bg) as a Pdf file. [Accessed 12/04/09]

<sup>6</sup> *Constitution of The Republic Of Bulgaria*; Prom. SG 56/13 Jul 1991, amend. SG 85/26 Sep 2003, SG 18/25 Feb 2005, SG 27/31 Mar 2006, SG 78/26 Sep 2006 - Constitutional Court Judgment No.7/2006, SG 12/6 Feb 2007; Available from: <http://www.parliament.bg/?page=const&lng=en>; [Accessed 23/01/09]

<sup>7</sup> See Appendix 1 for a brief chronology of key events in Bulgaria from 1945 until 2007.

<sup>8</sup> *Constitution of The Republic Of Bulgaria*; Prom. SG 56/13 Jul 1991, amend. SG 85/26 Sep 2003, SG 18/25 Feb 2005, SG 27/31 Mar 2006, SG 78/26 Sep 2006 - Constitutional Court Judgment No.7/2006, SG 12/6 Feb 2007; Available from: <http://www.parliament.bg/?page=const&lng=en>; [Accessed 23/01/09]

<sup>9</sup> Ibid

<sup>10</sup> By the Law on Radio and Television adopted in 1998. Available from: [http://www.crc.bg/files/\\_en/LAW\\_FOR\\_THE\\_RADIO\\_AND\\_TELEVISION.htm](http://www.crc.bg/files/_en/LAW_FOR_THE_RADIO_AND_TELEVISION.htm) [Accessed on 12/04/09]

Frontiers' (TWF) Directive, and more recently the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, but in practice this yet has to be implemented.

### **3. The media during and after communism**

Before attempting to understand the complex postcommunist media landscape in Bulgaria I would like to emphasise on the role of the state and the Communist Party in running and controlling the country's media during the regime. For the Communist state to function, it was necessary that the party leadership had total monopoly over all institutions, which included the police, military, judiciary, political parties and organisations, trade unions, communications networks, the centralised economy and the print and broadcast media. Opposition to the Party or the government was virtually non-existent and where detected, it was suppressed immediately. Crampton (1994) points out that the Communist party rule was based on the principle of 'democratic centralism', which means 'that decisions taken at the centre could not be questioned by subordinate party organizations...and once the decision was taken acceptance of it had to be absolute' (p.243). This explains the 'fear and loathing of the state' (Somers, 2001: 27), mistrust of any centralised power, state institutions, government policies and laws, a phenomenon evident after 1989 in the citizens, and to some extent media.. The media had a momentous role in the totalitarian communist state. According to Sparks (1998) 'in the theory of totalitarianism the mass media have an important and special role. They are the mechanism through which the primary organisation of the symbolic universe of the ruling group is disseminated and generalised. To the extent that they are successful, they are the central instrument of the totalitarian project'(p.27). Sparks (2000) also argues that the classic totalitarian model of Stalinism, for example, can not be applied to all former communist countries directly because they all had historical differences and especially in the 80s some were deviating from the model of the party-state. Poland was such an example where communist rules were not applied as strictly as in Bulgaria and Romania. In Poland and Hungary there was, to some extent, disregard of communist policies and a limited degree of press freedom. In Poland this press freedom included moderately oppositional Church media and extremely oppositional underground media run by Solidarity (p.38). This is evidence suggesting that there wasn't 'one, single communist media system that was reproduced, everywhere and at all times, in the same form' (p.38).

To sum up – by the end of 1989 the process of political, economic and media change had started and quickly gained momentum in Bulgaria. The former communist party tried to survive in the new political and economic environment by relying on new, relatively unknown faces from the former *nomenklatura* to give it an image of a 'reformed' organisation. Whereas before the Communist party had a total monopoly of the political process now it was forced to compete with other actors in the political arena, mainly the opposition parties. In Bulgaria it is common knowledge but difficult to prove, due to the lack or destruction of hard evidence, that the Bulgarian communist leaders and communist elite had prepared well for the changes by siphoning large amounts of money into foreign bank accounts before the process of *Perestroika* started.

Those sums were later transferred back to Bulgaria to start several private legal and illegal businesses, such as protection firms, covert money laundering operations, drug and human trafficking and other criminal activities<sup>11</sup>. Undoubtedly all such activities would have been impossible without the help of the new political elite, because it had the advantage of holding key positions in government, parliament and the presidency. From the start ‘the transition’ has been plagued by legalisation of shadow businesses and the conflicts of interests between different economic and political groups: a closely knit circle of political, business and media elite, which changed with the arrival of each new government in power. This process only replaced actors or ‘players’ with new ones. It should also be noted that in Bulgaria, the political and economic/business elites are closely interlinked, where the political elite aims to acquire capital or funding and the economic elite to gain political favours. (See Fig 1)




Figure 1.

Since the early 90s in Bulgaria there have been some attempts via journalistic investigations to prove links between corrupt politicians and businesses and the emergence of serious press outlets has also contributed to the investigation of the links between political and economic circles, exposing shadowy deals and wrongdoings. Recent studies however claim that those attempts are diminishing<sup>12</sup>.

What role did the media play in the process of change? According to Williams (2005):

<sup>11</sup> See Hristov, H. (2008) *Imperiata na zadgranichnite firmi II. Kontrabanda pod zakrila na darzavata*, *Dnevnik*, 18 Feb 2008. Available from: [www.dnevnik.bg](http://www.dnevnik.bg) [Accessed 18/02/08] and Hristov, H. (2007) *Tainite Ffaliti na Komunizma*. Siela Publishing

<sup>12</sup> Bulgarian Helsinki Committee Annual Human Rights Report (2008). Available from: <http://www.bghelsinki.org/index.php?module=resources&lg=bg&id=791#7> [Accessed 27/03/09]

The collapse of communism in the late 1980s was a momentous event. It represented a fundamental shift in European society. For many the media played a crucial role. Some argue that television was responsible for the rapid collapse of the Soviet-styled regimes in Eastern Europe by empowering the people of these societies to get out in the streets and demonstrate. Technological developments increasingly made it impossible for communist regimes to control the flow of information into their countries' (p.98).

In Bulgaria, for example, Znepolski (1997) points out that by multiplying the images of citizens' discontent, citizens' demonstrations, strikes, protests, the choosing of new leaders and political negotiations, the media actually built the 'landscape of change (p.11)'. Znepolski argues that the media were creating an image of a constantly changing society but what was happening in one city, for example, was being projected on the whole country and reported to be valid for the whole country. The act of the media 'witnessing' the event and reporting it created a huge magnifying effect. Znepolski finds a big difference between classic revolutions and media revolutions with the latter actually exchanging the revolutionary action with revolutionary representation i.e. the physical violence is replaced by a multiplied widespread evidence of change. He gives Romania as an extreme example where one very well staged revolutionary spectacle of bringing down the communist dictator Ceausescu gripped the whole nation. Even in non-extreme cases as in the Czech Republic, German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria, the role which the television and press played was very similar by 'exerting' pressure on society. In the case of Romania it was preventive to avoid violence and bloodshed on the streets. In Bulgaria it was stimulating to encourage citizens' participation in the process. The media not only showed the events but verified their existence. Spassov (2000) goes even further to insist that the 'revolutionary representations' (p105) from the beginning of the transformation were simulated and the relationship media – reality is very problematic.

Znepolski (1997) insists that without a doubt television played a decisive role in realising the peaceful change, but it stayed very close to the previous formula when it was controlled directly by the state. 'The belief that TV gives incomparable advantages to those who control it is widespread. Its role today is reduced to being an instrument of the political status quo' (p.13).<sup>13</sup> The author gives the press and the main dailies in Bulgaria significant credit for creating and maintaining a new social and political public sphere but with many limitations, which unfortunately this paper cannot focus on, due to limit on space.

#### **4. Western media models – could they be valid for Bulgaria?**

The complicated politics-economics-media relationship in Bulgaria bares a resemblance to the one described by Hallin and Mancini (2004) in their analysis *Comparing media systems: Three models of Media and Politics*, and more specifically to the Polarized Pluralist Model. The study was somewhat perceived as a 'milestone' in media research. Hallin and Mancini suggest three media models, which they find to

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<sup>13</sup> Note: quote was translated from Bulgarian by the author of this paper.

be dominant in the West. The first is the Liberal model, mainly valid for Britain and the United States, ‘characterized by a relative dominance of market mechanisms and of commercial media’ (p.11). The second is the Democratic Corporatist Model, common in northern Europe with ‘historical coexistence of commercial media and media tied to organized social and political groups’ (p.11) and where the state has a limited role. The third is the Polarized Pluralist Model, which prevails in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean countries where it is common that the media is integrated with party politics and the state has greater intervention in the media systems of those countries.

Significantly, the analysis does not include more recent members of the EU and therefore cannot account for those Eastern European countries which are emerging from totalitarian pasts. As more recent research points out, in the former communist countries the implementation of Western models was ‘mimetic’<sup>14</sup> and caused further chaos when attempts were made to import them without even adapting them to the particular countries. Rössland (2005:23) gives as an example the case of Lithuania borrowing the Swedish media accountability system and the failure of that system to work. Jakubowicz (2008) also argues that a ‘few understood at the beginning of the transformation that social, political, cultural (and, in some cases, economic) prerequisites for the proper operation of independent and impartial media, including public service broadcasting organizations, did not really exist’ (p.19). In Bulgaria, for example, one can find elements of all of the models defined by Hallin and Mancini. One can also find elements of the ‘elite continuity’ model suggested by Sparks. This, I find, has particular relevance to my aim to study the unique Bulgarian media landscape and media system. The Western and even recent Eastern models so far have not proved to work well in the post-communist context, and can not be directly or fully applied to Bulgaria either.

Let’s take, for example, an American approach. Croteau and Hoynes (2001) suggest the ‘market’ and ‘public sphere’ models. The market model of the media is based on the assumption that media outlets are market driven enterprises pursuing profits and where ‘lost audiences means lost profits’ (p.6). They argue that the market model can be applied to all types of media. Examples of the market model can be seen in the West, with giant media conglomerates constantly expanding and merging with competitors. This view of the market oriented media is valid to some extent in Eastern Europe and specifically Bulgaria. For example, one large corporation WAZ has acquired such dominant positions in the market in the last 10 years that one Bulgarian author (Spasov, 2004) states bluntly: ‘The history of the Bulgarian press from 1989 to 2004 can be divided roughly in two periods: until the arrival of German conglomerate Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (WAZ) in Bulgaria in 1996; and after 1996, a period dominated by the WAZ – owned papers’ (p. 50).

According to Croteau and Hoynes, the public sphere model is based on the principle that citizens are not just consumers and need varied information in order to make informed decisions and participate in political life. The model focuses on the need for news, which educates and serves the public interest. While both the market and the

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<sup>14</sup> Jakubowicz, Sükösd *et al.* (2008) suggest that ‘influences on the “mimetic orientation” included the social responsibility press theory, a guardianship/stewardship role for the media, an administrative paradigm, service and democratic surveillance functions for journalists’ p.18

public sphere models can be useful in understanding to some extent the media landscapes in most Western countries and especially the United States, their assumptions are based on an ideal, i.e. a 'vibrant public sphere is essential to a healthy democracy...and media play a critical role in helping create such a vibrant public sphere' (p.15) or 'it is consumers in the marketplace, not government regulators, who will ultimately force companies to behave in a way that best serves the public' (p.15). It would be a simplification to claim, for example, that the market model is dominant in Bulgaria based on the fact that all press is privately owned and unregulated and generally follows the principles of the market. This will not take into account the complicated situation with broadcasting, which is strictly regulated, and as I mentioned before, the close relationship between economics and politics, which shapes to a large extent the development of the media in Bulgaria. This model follows an approach, described by Somers (2001) as 'conceptual landscape with firm boundaries and epistemological divides demarcating between the two mutually exclusive conceptual zones of public and private: Bobbio's (1992:2) great dichotomy' (p.28) where the world is explained and divided between the two concepts of public and private and state and market.

It's important to point out that all Eastern European countries had different media systems - some like Romania, and Bulgaria, which followed the soviet propaganda media directive closely; and others like Poland and Hungary, which had some scope for deviation. Bulgaria, for example, and its media was characterised by a much stronger degree of continuity with the old system than Poland, Czech Republic or Hungary. The end of communism opened the door to notionally free markets and free media enterprise but what has persisted as a common characteristic in all Eastern European countries was the close relationship between political and economic power, a legacy of the old centralised government.

McQuail (2005) notes that in their famous book *Four Theories of the Press*, published in 1956, Sielbert, Peterson and Schramm theorised about societies rather than the media and this 'approach has been unable to cope with the diversity of media and changing technology and times... and the complexity and incoherence of media systems and thus the impossibility of matching a press theory with a type of society' (p.178). He does not discourage from pursuing a different normative theory and approach but advises scholars to look at other directions just as Jakubowicz, Sükösd *et al* did recently in *Finding the Right Place on the Map*. The overall theme of the book is the correlation between media and societal changes and its central argument is rooted in debates about the relevance and development of Western media models and systems in postcommunist countries.

To give them due credit, Bulgarian media experts and scholars have also been eager to analyse the existing Western media theories and models and to claim their appropriateness (or not) to the Bulgarian media landscape (Alfandari, 2000; Znepolski, 1997; Spassov, 2000; Kiosev, 2000). Analyzing the Bulgarian media landscape since 1989, Alfandari (2000) argues that the Bulgarian media, more or less, follow the Italian model, as described by Paolo Mancini in 1991 (p. 13).<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> He states four main characteristics of the Italian model: 1. the media are under strong government control, which is direct as in the case of state radio and TV and indirect as in the

## 5. Conclusion

This paper is part of a wider research. More specifically, I am exploring the journalists' perceptions of media change and their role in the changes of the Bulgarian media landscape from the end of communism in 1989 until the entry into the European Union. I am currently interviewing Bulgarian journalists who work in the media now and aim to interview journalists who worked in the media before the changes began. Several important issues have come up in my pilot interviews such as the newly found political, economic and media freedom which journalists strongly associate with political, economic and criminal pressure and influence on the Bulgarian media; the quality of journalism and the hybridisation of the press; the need to follow the emerging journalistic code of ethics, the unclear ownership of the press and the still dependent 'former' state broadcasting. One of the challenges will be to assess what journalists make of the environment they work in now, what are the challenges and every day obstacles they face in a, as one journalist put it bluntly, 'non-civil society'. However, the limitation of my research is that I am only concerned with Bulgaria and this will make European or even Eastern European wide generalisations difficult.

Where does the academic and expert debate about media models leave former communist countries such as Bulgaria? It would seem that they do not easily fit any established media model or theory. So far traditional versions of Western media models are typically assumed to be that which the Bulgarian media should aim for and that all changes should be judged according to how closely they approximate to the 'open' Western European media models. And yet the landscape in which the Bulgarian media operates sees these models adapted to suit a particular Bulgarian context. The extent to which the Western models are or should be adapted has yet to be fully understood. McQuail (2005) insists that 'in most countries today, the media do not constitute a single system with a distinctive philosophy or rationale' (p.178). Bulgaria's media can certainly fit within this definition. Perhaps it's time researchers stopped trying to construct one common model for all postcommunist countries. Instead efforts could be directed towards comparative case studies and my case study of Bulgaria could be part of a broader development of regional studies with a view to building a framework to address the distinctiveness of those countries while also finding common features between them. This kind of comparative research could provide the sought after models of postcommunist media transformations.

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different forms of subsidies of the press. 2. Big degree of party engagement of the media 3. Big degree of integration of journalistic and political environment. 4. Lack of a system for professional and ethical journalistic norms

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## Appendix 1

### Chronology of key events in Bulgaria from 1945 until 2007<sup>16</sup>

Year	Chronology of key events
Soviet –style state 1947	New constitution along Soviet lines establishes one-party state. Economy and industry sectors nationalised.
1954	Todor Zhivkov becomes Communist Party general secretary. Bulgaria becomes staunch USSR ally.
1968	Bulgarian troops take part in Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
1971	Zhivkov becomes president.
1978	Georgi Markov, a BBC World Service journalist and Bulgarian dissident, dies in London after apparently being injected with poison from the tip of an umbrella.
1984	Zhivkov government tries to force Turkish minority to assimilate and take Slavic names. Many resist and in 1989 some 300,000 flee the country.
End of Communist regime 1989	Reforms in the Soviet Union inspire demands for democratisation. Zhivkov ousted. Multiparty system introduced. Opposition Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) formed.
1990	Economic crisis. Communist Party reinvents itself as Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and wins free parliamentary elections. President Petar Mladenov resigns and parliament appoints UDF's Zhelyu Zhelev. BSP government collapses amid mass demonstrations and general strike.
1991	New constitution proclaims Bulgaria a parliamentary republic and provides broad range of freedoms. UDF wins election.
1992	Zhelev becomes Bulgaria's first directly-elected president. UDF government resigns. Lyuben Berov heads non-party government. Todor Zhivkov sentenced to seven years in prison for corruption in office.
1993	Mass privatisation programme.
1994	BSP returns to power in general election.

<sup>16</sup> Source: BBC Timeline: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country\\_profiles/1061402.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/1061402.stm) [Accessed on 12/04/09]

1995	BSP's Zhan Videnov is prime minister.
1996	Financial turmoil. Petur Stoyanov replaces Zhelev as president. Bulgarian Supreme Court overturns Zhivkov's conviction. Videnov resigns as prime minister and chairman of the BSP.
1997	Mass protests over economic crisis. Opposition boycotts parliament and calls for elections. Interim government installed until elections, when UDF leader Ivan Kostov becomes prime minister. Bulgarian currency pegged to German mark.
1999	Protracted demolition attempts on marble mausoleum of first communist leader Georgi Dimitrov become national joke.
2000	Post-communist prosecutors close file on Georgi Markov case. In December Markov is awarded Bulgaria's highest honour, the Order of Stara Planina, for his contribution to Bulgarian literature and his opposition to the communist authorities.
2001 June	Former King Simeon II's party, National Movement Simeon II, wins parliamentary elections. Simeon becomes premier in July.
2001 November	November - Thousands march through Sofia on 100th day of Simeon's premiership, saying he has failed to improve living standards. Socialist Party leader Georgi Parvanov wins presidency in an election with the lowest turnout since the fall of communism. He vows to improve people's lives and to speed up EU and NATO entry.
2004	Bulgaria is admitted to NATO
2005	Socialist Party led by Sergei Stanishev tops the poll in general elections. After weeks of wrangling the main parties sign a coalition deal under which he becomes prime minister.
2007 January	Bulgaria and Romania join the European Union, raising the EU membership to 27.

# Translation of Drama as an Intercultural Dialogue Between Two National Literatures

*Lucia Mattová*

*Department of Russian Language and Literature, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia (on russian plays translated into slovak since 1989)*

## 1. Basic Principles

D. Durishin, a Slovak comparatist, (1992) states that ‘translation is one of the most outstanding phenomena in an interaction process between national literatures within World literature’ (p.209). Translation can be understood to be an initiator of communication between two (or even more) national literatures; a source of their mutual interaction.

National literature is defined and at the same time limited by a territory of a particular nation and usage of particular language. National literature is developed in line with development of a particular nation, its language, history and traditions. World literature is a collection of individual national literatures created in a single literary process. Based on this World literature is a unique system composed of many subsystems (of various importance), i.e. national literatures, that interact within integrated area.

M. H. Abrams states that ‘drama is a form of literature dedicated for staging. [...] It depends mostly on a dramatic dialog of its actors’ (pp.61-62). If a dialogue is understood to be a conversation between two or more individuals, an aim of this paper is to show that a dialogue is not only a characteristic feature of each drama but a process of interaction between two national literatures as well. For a purpose of his paper we have chosen drama as one form of national literature to define a role of translation in an overall communication process between two literatures (and also between national cultures and languages).

## 2. Slovak-Russian Relationship and Interconnections

There is a long and rich tradition of Slovak-Russian relationship. It is partially caused by the fact that both Slovak and Russian languages belong to the Slavonic group of languages (a subgroup of Indo-European languages) therefore it was natural for intellectuals to communicate between each other and to exchange their experience in the field of science, culture and literature and this principle is valid even nowadays. As a result of extraordinary relations first pieces of literature and scientific works were translated from Russian to Slovak in the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

With the creation of USSR and Slovakia (at that time a part of Czechoslovakia, a common state of Slovak and Czech nation) becoming a part of Soviet Bloc, translation of Soviet literature obtained political connotations. During this period despite political pressure to translate mainly politically *appropriate* literature (i.e. using Social realism, the official USSR art form) the most important works of Russian classics were translated (A. Pushkin, M. Lermontov, L. Tolstoy, F. Dostoevsky, I. Turgenev etc.); quality of translation was rising simultaneously with Slovak translation experience. Besides classics there was a significant pressure to translate soviet authors whose works could have been distinguished not by their high artistic or literary quality but pro-regime value only.

As a result of the dominant position of Russian literature in the corpus of translated literature into Slovak that lasted several decades, after the collapse of Soviet Bloc in 1989 everything Russian was being refused and the process of Russian literature incorporation into world literature started in early 1990s.

### **3. Translation as a Cultural Dialogue**

Translation activities are having a long and rich tradition in Slovak provenience. This tradition was initiated with the beginning of Slovak literary activities and since then translated works from other literatures are an inseparable part of Slovak national literature. They are continuously enriching Slovak literary tradition being a counterpart to national literature.

Since 1989 one parameter in Slovak culture and literature was dramatically modified. Up to 1989 Russian fiction, poetry and drama possessed a dominant share of overall translated literature into Slovak. This share decreased to almost zero in early 1990s and Slovak publishing houses and theatres focused mostly on English written literatures. Besides them Slovak recipients started to continuously discover literatures entirely unknown in the Slovak region at that time (Indian, African, Japanese, etc.). To resume a rank of translation has been enlarged with the dominant position of English written works, but translations of Russian literature almost disappeared from Slovak culture.

As it was already mentioned above Russian literature (Russian drama included) had been well known to the Slovak recipients. The first translation of a Russian play appeared in Slovak culture in 1860s; it was a comedy *Urok dockam* by I. A. Krylov. Since this moment Russian plays started to be frequently published and produced. There were classical works of Russian drama translated into Slovak firstly. In the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century plays written by Anton Chekhov, Nikolai Gogol and Aleksandr Ostrovsky were widely translated and the most popular among the Slovak audience. Besides the above-mentioned plays of Aleksandr Pushkin, dramatizations of Fyodor Dostoevsky's novels, etc. appeared in Slovak culture. In the period of 1950s – 1970s about thirty new translations of Russian plays were published and produced yearly. This development continued ceaselessly up to 1980s.

In the 1980s for the very first time Russian *samizdat* appeared translated into Slovak and this was a signal of a changing approach with regard to what literary work shall be chosen and translated. Pro-regime orientation of a particular piece of literature was no more the only indicator of its *high quality*.

The approach of Slovak publishing houses and theatres towards Russian plays changed immediately after 1989. Since this year two basic streams, two types of a dialogue between Russian drama and Slovak literature and culture, can be observed.

### ***3.1 Dialogue 1: Contemporary Russian Drama in Slovak Literature and Culture***

A concept of contemporary Russian drama has been established no sooner than at the end of 1990s. For many years young Russian playwrights were refused not only by Russian critics, but by the audience and readers as well. J. Freedman (2008) states that ‘these young playwrights belong entirely to the 21<sup>st</sup> century and to modern European drama’ (p.293). Despite initial lack of interest of cultural community, dramatic production of these playwrights slowly but successfully penetrated into other national literatures. D. Pribyl (2008), a Czech stage director, concludes that ‘it was a fear of failure and lack of interest that had prevented Slovak and Czech director to produce contemporary Russian plays’ (p.22).

For Slovak literature it was N. Sadur, a Russian novelist, short story writer and playwright, who for the very first time initiated bi-lateral Slovak-Russian dramatic dialogue. A collection of her plays was translated into Slovak and published in 1998 in limited edition of a small Slovak feminist publishing house *Aspekt*. In the same year a play *Panochka* was staged in Slovakia as well. Success of this single performance did not cause an increase of interest in contemporary Russian drama and did not lead to other translations. The dialogue between Russian and Slovak drama had been interrupted for several years.

During the period 1999 – 2002 there was an absolute decrease in the field of translation of Russian drama into Slovak. There was no contemporary play published or performed in Slovakia. This zero activity was caused by overall lack of interest in everything that came from Eastern Europe (and this approach is partially understandable taking into consideration that since socialism everything Russian has been understood as a symbol of past non-democratic regime). Moreover Slovak cultural community representatives tried to bring innovative impulses into the Slovak culture and literature, but Russian drama could not attract their attention despite its innovativeness. Slovak culture was enriched by translations from other mostly non-European literatures.

A breakthrough in this approach appeared in 2002. In this year young Slovak students of dramatic arts prepared (probably accidentally) several performances of contemporary Russian drama: *Tanya-Tanya* by O. Mukhina, *Dorogaya Jelena Sergejevna* and *Vladimirovskaya ploshchat* by L. Razumovskaya. These plays were translated by students or non-professional translators and quality could not be compared with translations done by professional and experienced translators. Despite this shortage three Russian plays attracted not only Slovak students but Slovak audience in general and since this moment contemporary Russian drama has become an integrated part of repertoires of Slovak alternative stages and students performances. What shall be highlighted is that contemporary Russian drama was brought to Slovak literature and culture not by the older generation of translators and

stage directors whose knowledge of traditional Russian drama was widespread but by the young generation. This was the very beginning of a dialogue between contemporary Russian drama and Slovak culture.

The dialogue continued next year with two plays, *Klinch* by A. Slapovskij and *Chornoe moloko* by V. Sigarev both produced as students' performances. In the period 2004 – 2008 thanks to the initiative of these students who brought new Russian stream of drama with current topics, characters and unusual style caused that even professional theatres decided to produce some pieces of contemporary Russian drama as a regular part of their repertoires (i.e., *Sny* by I. Vyrpajev, *Murlin Murlo* and *Kurica* by N. Koljada, *Zima* by J. Grishkovec).

Finally, the very first anthology of contemporary Russian drama was published at the end of 2008. This anthology consists of five plays – *Podjem, zhdet mashina* by J. Kladijev, *Lejjet* by O. Mukhina, *Kukhnja* by M. Kurochkin, *Volchonok* by V. Sigarev, *Ijul* by I. Vyrpajev. The anthology was published by Slovak Theatre Institute in NEW DRAMA edition in which anthologies of German, Hungarian, Serbian drama etc. were published lately. Being published in this edition contemporary Russian drama has been incorporated into contemporary European drama within Slovak literary context. Based on this we can pronounce that the dialogue was primarily initiated by students who wished to discover for their school performance something innovative but not knowing Russian drama tradition represented mostly by Chekhov, Gogol and Ostrovskij, led to contemporary Russian drama gradual integration into Slovak literature and culture; the integration process is still in progress. Contemporary Russian drama later on appeared also at stages of professional theatres and the first translations of Russian plays in magazines oriented on literature and culture finally led to the first anthology of Russian drama being published by the renowned Slovak Theatre Institute.

### ***3.2 Dialogue 2: Destiny of Classical Russian Plays After 1989***

Classical Russian drama used to be a dominant part of repertoires of Slovak theatres; it was regularly translated into Slovak and frequently published before 1989. There were several editions devoted to world classics in which classical Russian drama could have been published. Each publication of Russian classics usually required a new translation or adjusting of older ones. Publishing houses created a pressure which resulted into the creation of a high quality translation tradition. The process of regular re-edition of Russian classical literary works was interrupted as a result of social and political changes after 1989.

Looking backwards at the period 1989 – 2008 it can be pronounced that classical Russian drama completely disappeared from Slovak publishing houses edition activities. Current Slovak public can be acquainted with Russian drama from old editions that can be found in libraries or second-hand bookshops only.

Despite the absence of new translations of classical Russian drama and their publishing, Slovak theatres (especially professional theatres like Slovak National Theatre and *Astorka*) regularly include classical Russian plays into their repertoires. It is exactly the above-mentioned absence of new translations that can be taken as an issue. J. Ferenchik (1982), a Slovak “translatologist” and a translator, states that ‘a

translation of drama becomes out-dated sooner than it is the case with fiction or poetry. Therefore a re-translation of drama shall be created based on the current needs of theatres or publishing houses' (p.84). It shall be highlighted that re-translation needs are not caused by the low quality of the original translation but by the dynamic development of the target language, the current interpretation of a particular play and the modern concept of a new performance. Slovak stage directors usually use older translation of a play as a basis for a performance with adjustments done not by a professional translator but a stage director, actors etc. These adjusted translations are recorded in scripts that are never being published.

As an example a play *Tri sestry*<sup>1</sup> written by A. Chekhov in 1900 and firstly produced in 1901 can be mentioned. This drama of four acts is considered one of Chekhov's major plays and it is even regarded by some critics as the best drama of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This play was for the very first time translated into Slovak in 1924 by B. Skultetyova. Since then it has been re-translated several times: in 1947, 1952 by P. Janchik, in 1967 by Z. Jesenska, in 1972, 1984 by V. Strnisko (in 1990 it was adjusted for a performance of the University of Dramatic Arts; in 1994 it was adjusted for Trnava Theatre; in 2008 adjusted for the Slovak National Theatre).

The play *Tri sestry* was recently produced by the Slovak National Theatre in 2008 on a basis of a translation dated in 1984. Its director R. Polak with his innovative techniques and a modern approach situated this melodramatic story not in Russian urban Moscow but in Chechnya of the 1990s and based on this element he build up a performance in which dissatisfaction, frustration of present existence and a search of meaning in modern world are preserved as main themes. The modernistic conception of R. Polak demonstrated the large scale of possible approaches in the understanding of a classical piece of literature. Critics appreciated mostly the ability of R. Polak to attract young audience and the older generation at the same time; however his modernistic approach was not always accepted with understanding.

#### 4. An Intercultural Dialogue and Enrichment of culture

Penetration of Russian literature into Slovak culture goes with the enrichment of Slovak language with Russian words connected to lifestyle, culture and history.

As mentioned there was a turning point in translating contemporary Russian drama into Slovak in 2002. Creation of these translations was initiated mostly by the young generation, by students interested in a new way of writing, new themes and world contemporary theatre. Since 2002 there were about twenty plays translated into Slovak. In these plays the Slovak public is getting acquainted on the one hand with traditional Russian food and drinks (*pelmeni*<sup>2</sup>, *vodka*, *kvass*<sup>3</sup>, *shchi*<sup>4</sup>, etc.), clothing (*sarafan*<sup>5</sup>) or

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<sup>1</sup> Three Sisters

<sup>2</sup> a dish usually made with minced meat filling, wrapped in thin dough

<sup>3</sup> a fermented mildly alcoholic beverage made from black rye or rye bread

<sup>4</sup> cabbage soup

lifestyle (*samovar*<sup>6</sup>), on the other hand with current general topics like life in the Russian province, drugs, violence but also friendship or love that are used as concepts for a play written in an original poetic way that is so symptomatic for new Russian generation of playwrights. These playwrights refuse a traditional concept of a play using montage, movie techniques, and an internal monologue instead of a dramatic dialogue in combination with modern language, however still following Chekhov's heritage of play writing.

## 5. Conclusion

There is a rich tradition of translating into Slovak and translation is understood to be a source of enriching of Slovak national literature by new phenomena. Literary works translated from other national literatures bring not only new themes, poetics and ideas but also new impulses in terms of foreign culture, lifestyle or traditions.

The basis of Slovak-Russian relationship was created at the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Literary and cultural relations were for many decades influenced mostly by non-literary and non-cultural factors. Nowadays, despite the negative approach towards everything that comes from Russian (or Eastern Europe in general), even the 21<sup>st</sup> century Slovak-Russian intercultural dialogue has been initiated again. A young generation of translators, stage directors and publishing houses started to discover contemporary Russian literature and culture.

The aim of this paper was to describe the initiation and development of the bi-lateral Slovak-Russian intercultural dialogue in the case of translation of Russian drama into the Slovak language. The dialogue is still in progress and there are still many inspiring works to be translated; therefore there is a confidence that this dialogue will be developed further.

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<sup>5</sup> a traditional Russian long, shapeless jumper dress worn as Russian folk costume by women and girls

<sup>6</sup> a heated metal container traditionally used to heat and boil water for tea

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# **‘Not Like it Used to be Bosnia’ – Grounding Bosnian Post-Refugee Transnationalism: the Politicisation of Nationalism, Ethnic Reification and Religiosity in Post-Dayton Bosnia<sup>1</sup>**

*Maja Halilovic Pastuovic*

*University of Dublin, Email: [halilovm@tcd.ie](mailto:halilovm@tcd.ie)*

## **1. Introduction**

The aim of this paper is to situate Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism in relation to post-Dayton Bosnia. The focus of the paper is on the Bosnian migrants who entered Ireland in 1992 as programme refugees and who, from the moment of their arrival, were subject to a lengthy reception and resettlement programme. This programme was coordinated by the Irish government and its main objective was the long term successful integration of Bosnian refugees in Ireland.

However, despite the fact that seventeen years have elapsed since their arrival into the country, Bosnians do not feel part of Irish society; instead they feel racialised and marginalised within it (Halilovic-Pastuovic, 2003). Yet rather than repatriating back to Bosnia, they have chosen to divide their time between the two countries. They spend most of the year in Ireland but during the summer months they migrate to Bosnia with their families.

This paper interrogates the specificities of Bosnian post-refugee migrations through two theoretical lenses – theories of transnationalism and Goldberg’s (2002) racial state theory – and situates the Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism as a resistance strategy to the ‘politics of ethnicity’ enacted by both nation states – Bosnia and Ireland.

In understanding transnationalism as grounded between two racial states that migrants endorse, this paper focuses primarily on the conditions of post-Dayton Bosnia in order to explore the reasons for the lack of permanent return of Bosnian migrants to Bosnia. The paper argues that the politicisation of nationalism, ethnic reification and increased religiosity, which characterise post-Dayton Bosnia, contribute to Bosnian migrants

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choosing transnationalism over permanent return 'home'. Understood as such, in some cases forced migration may lead to (en) forced transnationalism.

## **2. Grounding Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism**

In the past decade the emerging field of transnational studies has presented transnationalism as a useful conceptual tool to deal with the twin forces of mass migration and electronic mediation (Appadurai, 1996) which characterise the current period of globalisation. Born out of a workshop in 1990, led by anthropologists Nina Glick-Schiller, Cristina Blanz-Szanton and Linda Basch (1994) the concept aimed to elucidate the "processes by which immigrants and refugees forge and maintain multistranded social relations that link together their places of origin and places of settlement" (p.7). This followed the observation that an increasing number of people are able to live dual lives where

"...participants are often bilingual, move easily between two cultures, frequently maintain homes in two countries, and pursue economic, political and cultural interests that require presence in both" (Portes, 1997, p. 812).

The scope of academic work that has emerged over the past years with regard to transnational activities has been vast, leading to a problem, not uncommon to theorisations of 'novelty' phenomena, where the concept is fraught with inconsistencies in meanings and usage. Furthermore, its swift movement across different disciplinary boundaries of anthropology, sociology, political science and geography, to name but a few, has added to its increasing conceptual ambiguity.

In trying to disentangle the discursive ambiguity of the concept Nolin (2006) proposes differentiating between two streams of typologies with regard to transnationalism, identified by Glick Schiller (1997) and Mahler (1998) respectively.

Glick Schiller identifies the currents of transnationalism branded as transnational cultural studies, transnational migration studies and transnational communities studies. Within the stream of transnational cultural studies the concepts of unboundedness (Basch et al., 1994), postnation/transnation (Appadurai, 1996) and cultural hybridity (Bhabha, 1994) are explored, according to Glick, in largely abstract theoretical terms. On the contrary, transnational migration studies, being grounded in empirical research, focus on more tangible effects of population movement and 'double consciousness' (Mahler 1995; Smith and Guarnizo 1998). Finally, transnational communities studies focus on bi-national households and communities and transnational social relations (Goldring, 1998; Levitt, 1998; Portes 1996a, 1996b; R.C. Smith, 1998).

Mahler (1998) differentiates between transnationalism from below and transnationalism as transmigration as the two main strands of transnational studies. According to Mahler, transnationalism from below is generated by grassroots politics and social movements that resist and disrupt the workings of transnationalism from above represented by structural elites, processes and international bodies that influence the reconfiguration of global capital such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or the nation state. Transnationalism as transmigration focuses, on the

other hand, on the migratory process itself and the impact it has on the communities concerned.

Despite the diversity of currents within the field study of transnationalism, Smith and Guarnizo (1998) argue that there is a “peculiar cultural bent” and “postmodern discursive flavour” to the whole field that can be traced back to the discipline of cultural studies (p.4). Furthermore, they question the totalising emancipatory character which is present across many approaches. Indeed cultural hybridity, multi-positional identities and border-crossings by marginal ‘others’ are often viewed as conscious and successful efforts by ordinary people to escape control and domination from above by the state. In other words, their activities are being constructed as oppositional to state hegemony. While understanding that transnational practices, as ‘counter narratives of the nation’ can and do disturb those ideological manoeuvres through which imagined communities are given essentialist identities (Bhabha, 1990), Smith and Guarnizo (1998) remind us of the “enduring asymmetries of domination, inequality, racism, sexism, class conflict, and uneven development in which transnational practices are embedded” (p.6).

In warning us against a celebratory vision with regard to the dialectic of domination and resistance within transnational studies, Smith and Guarnizo go beyond the deceptive local-global binary present within a significant segment of transnational research, re-focusing their analytical lens on different thematics relating to transnationalism from below in particular, including, amongst others, the need for the grounding of transnationalism.

In proposing an understanding of transnational actions as grounded, they call for an image of transnational migrants, viewed as ‘deterritorialisated, free-floating, “neither here nor there” people’ to be reconceptualised by focusing on the locality of transnationality since

“transnational practices while connecting collectivities located in more than one national territory, are embedded in specific social relations established between specific people, situated in unequivocal localities, at historically determined times” (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998, p.11).

Therefore, when discussing Bosnian transnationalism we have to situate it and ground it within the two societies this particular group of Bosnian migrants live in and between. On the one hand there is Ireland, into whose ‘ready made’ intercultural industry they were inserted from the beginning, and where they feel racialised and socially marginalised. On the other hand there is a ‘not like it used to be’ post-Dayton Bosnia characterised by the politicisation of nationalism, ethnic reification and increased religiosity.

In addition to situating Bosnian post-refugee transnationalism as grounded between the conditions of two states – Ireland and Bosnia – I follow Goldberg’s (2002) conceptualisation of nation states as racial states. While producing a comprehensive philosophical archaeology of racial conceptualisation commencing with Hobbes and moving forward to Rousseau, Kant, Marx, Hegel, Mill and others, and through exploring the work of post-war European intellectuals such as Zygmunt Bauman and Michel Foucault, as well as expanding on the work of racial state pioneers Eric Voegelin and Omi and Winant, Goldberg developed a comprehensive theory of

modern nation states as racial states where race and state are intrinsically interconnected and defined through each other. Goldberg (1993) links the Enlightenment's preoccupation with classification and order with liberalism as the governing project at the level of the social hence situating the discourse of race and racism as 'one of the central conceptual inventions of modernity' (p.3).

Goldberg posits that every modern state is a racial state, albeit each in its own specificity, not only because of their passive denial of the inherent heterogeneity of the populations they en-border, but because of their active role in constructing and naturalising homogeneity.

Goldberg argues that it is possible to define the nation state as a more or less coherent entity in two related ways: as state projects 'underpinned and rationalised by a self-represented history as state memory', and as state power(s). It is precisely the power that the state has, or that the state is, which enables the state to define and carry out projects and to authorise official narrations of historical memory. The state has 'a power to define the terms of its representations and to exercise itself and those over whom the authority is claimed in light of these terms' (Goldberg, 2002, p.8). By using constitutions, border control, policy making, the law and different governmental technologies such as census categorisations, modern states exercise their power to categorise and exclude and include in racially ordered terms.

Post-Dayton Bosnia is yet another example of the racial state. Built through the Dayton Agreement reached in Ohio in 1995 by the members of the international community and three presidents from ex-Yugoslavia<sup>2</sup>, the Bosnia of today is a divided country where ethno-religious identities have been foregrounded and have penetrated both public and private spheres. Most of the interviewees I spoke to refuse to permanently return to such a demographically changed and divided country but opt instead for annual summer visits. In the next couple of sections I discuss the major changes that have occurred in post-Dayton Bosnia that affect their lack of return, namely the politicisation of nationalism, ethnic reification and increased religiosity.

### **3. The state they are in I: Post-Dayton Bosnia, ethnic reification and the politicisation of nationalism**

In both entities [ Republika Srpska and the Federation] ... on the whole territory of the state, a very small number of people is concerned with the economy for example. Everybody is concerned with politics, and I mean nationalistic politics and that is it. Everything is about nationalism, everything is divided, everything has to have a representative from the first, second and third nation [*naroda*] ... starting with sports, culture, arts etc. Everything ...absolutely everything.

It is the fact that before life was better down there [in Bosnia]. Much better than now ... now it is like a circus. I am thinking ... when I look at the news and hear politicians

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<sup>2</sup> This included at the time the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, the Croatian president Franjo Tudman and the Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic.

talking ... it is ... I feel disgusted ... It is very nationalistic ... well, yes ... still, that nationalistic element is still there ... I don't understand why.

Then it was Yugoslavia, we were all Yugoslavian and that was it. But now, if you go to Banja Luka [Republika Srpska entity] and if you sit down somewhere and ask somebody what do they feel they are, nobody is going to say they belong to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nobody, absolutely nobody. Everybody is going to say this is Serbia ... that is their state now, that is their homeland and as long as that way of thinking exists there would be no Bosnia and Herzegovina ... unfortunately. It has gone too deep and too far ... it took roots, I don't know ...

As the extracts above show, my interviewees felt disappointed with the degree of nationalism still present in Bosnia fourteen years after the conflict ended. They kept comparing the Bosnia they have left behind when they migrated to the Bosnia of today and were not prepared to return and partake in the nationalistic divisions.

In his theorization of collective experience of different past in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jansen (2005) argues that there exists a clear line between 'that before' and 'this now'. This distinction goes beyond the chronological tool used for structuring narration, rather there is a collective event, a turning point, something that happened outside the will and power of Bosnian people, which overshadows individual personal life stories. As Jansen (2005) notes "despite the differences within, all the life pathways shared the collective past that was very different from present circumstances" (p.13). This 'that before' would not simply correspond to the temporal dimension of before the war, it corresponds more to the set of understandings of what being part of 'Yugoslavian times' meant. Most of my respondents found it difficult to adjust to the changed Bosnia they found upon their return, particularly the nationalistic element of it, and kept referring to the times before the conflict as a time when more cohesion was felt amongst people.

In terms of national belonging, Yugoslavian socialist ideology was a variation of the classical theme of modernization: because of the homogenizing strength of industrialization, antifascism and socialist class solidarity, national or rather nationalistic elements would cease to exist. Indeed, since the Constitution of 1946, the equality of all people on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia was determined by the law. Also, the category of Yugoslav was introduced in 1950 to debase nationalistic primordial belonging. In other words the 'national question' of ex-Yugoslavia was being resolved through a politics of balance and compromise with a long-term prohibition of politicisation of nationalism (Jansen, 2005).<sup>3</sup>

In terms of discussions with regard to differences between "that before" and "this now" this is one of the most significant changes. The taboo on the politicisation of nationalism has been broken by the politics of the conflict, institutionalized through the international community's involvement in the conflict, and finally constitutionalised by the Dayton Agreement.

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<sup>3</sup> This is particularly relevant with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina since it was the most mixed republic of the six republics of former Yugoslavia. The last census before the conflict shows that 44% of the population identified themselves as Muslims, 31% as Serbs, 17% as Croats and 8% as Yugoslav (Filipovic, 1997).

In contemporary Bosnia “there is little room for anyone who does not follow a national agenda” (Friedman, 2004, p.84). The ethnically defined political parties control decision making within the administrative, judicial and economic institutions. All three major ethnic groups have taken steps to maintain cultural distance. Each ethnic group maintains its own school with curricula that “reinforce ethnic hatred, blame the other groups and glorify their own mythology” (Lyon, 1999, p.35). Advantage is to be found in alliances to one’s ‘own’ ethnic/national group, and competition against other ethnic groups. If people of other national groups manage to return and regain their former land, competing ethnic groups consider that their own power may be compromised. This has been one of the major difficulties for returnees trying to re-establish themselves in areas that are currently occupied by other ethnic groups, so called minority returnees. Many minority returnees end up exchanging property and moving to where their ethnicity is dominant. This has resulted in Bosnia being more ethnically clustered at present than prior to the conflict. King (2004) suggests that 90 per cent of the population in Bosnia now live in ethnically homogenous entities. As recognized by my interviewees

Bosnia has gone backwards ... it should be different, there should not be ... how would you say it... there should not be ... people are divided ... people are divided now, it is not how it used to be, those times are gone ... now it is “I am a Muslim, you are a Serb, he is Croat” ... everybody is keeping a distance, keeping a distance from one another. They say he is a Muslim, run away from him ...

Bosnia will never again be Bosnia, not the way it used to be when it was a part of Yugoslavia. Now we have a totally different state. It is divided, you know, people are spending time with their own group more.

I wish to argue in this paper that ethnically segregated present day Bosnia is the direct consequence of the Dayton Agreement which has legitimised exclusivist projects by conflating ‘ethnic’ with ‘national’ and produced a partition along these lines.<sup>4</sup> The agreement has in effect created a boundary line within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina along the ethnic lines popularised by the conflict, and as such, through politics of “security through separation” (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail, 2005) authorised ethnic segregation. This further led to the reification of ethnicity and interrelated politicisation of nationalism that persists to this day in post conflict Bosnia.

#### **4. The state they are in II: Post-Dayton Bosnia and the issue of religiosity**

In addition to ethnic reification and the politicisation of nationalism, the issue of religion is also of importance. Religiosity in Bosnia has always been difficult to measure. Particularly in the years after the death of Tito, when studies of this kind were being attempted, it was often difficult to ascertain exactly how much of the population

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<sup>4</sup> The most prominent part of the Dayton Agreement is linked to Article 3 dividing the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina into two entities: Republika Srpska for the Serbian part of population and the Federation designated for the Muslim and Croat majority.

was devotionally committed to religion as opposed to identified nationally through religion. Here one needs to be aware of the extraordinary ethnic mixture of Bosnia and Herzegovina while it was still a part of ex-Yugoslavia. Apart from Bosnian Orthodox and Bosnian Catholics, who might or might not think of themselves as respectively ‘Serbs’ or ‘Croats’, there were Bosnian Muslims whose religious practice varied greatly, from practicing individuals to individuals with a more secular orientation. There were also minorities of Jews, Germans, Hungarians and Roma populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of whom were and are in themselves heterogeneous (Bringa, 1995).

Bosnia and Herzegovina had no one major religious group. One third of the population was Orthodox, while one-sixth was of Catholic background, people who were seen as having their ‘homeland’ in Serbia and Croatia respectively. The largest population group was made up of Bosnian Muslims, who accounted for just under half the population, and were viewed as ‘coming from’ nowhere but Bosnia (Cockburn, 1998). It is also important to add that the Yugoslav census of 1961 furnished a new identification option, ‘Muslim in the ethnic sense’, while the 1971 census developed this official identity one step further by proposing the category of ‘Muslim in the sense of nation’.

Consequently descriptions of what being Bosnian meant would often intersect religion and ethnicity. Even when religiosity was incorporated into their ethnic identification Bosnians have been described as “wearing their faith lightly” (Friedman, 2004, p.84). They would often distinguish themselves from the larger Muslim *umma* community and stress their ‘European’ Muslimness. For example, in her study of Bosnian refugees in the UK and Netherlands, Al-Ali (2002) notes

“over and over again I was told that Bosnian Islam is different from Islam in other parts of the world. ‘We are European as much as we are Muslim’ was a common remark not only by Bosnian refugees but also by their relatives and friends in Bosnia” (p.256).

A similar sense of complexity with regard to religious identification can be found in the interviews that I have conducted.

*we are Muslims*, but European progressive Muslims... We eat all kinds of food, we don’t separate...the way we lived in Bosnia before the war, we live now. We changed nothing. *We did not change into Muslims*, we still don’t go to the mosque, we still did not give up pork.

we don’t wear veils, we are not that type of Muslims... to be covered... only people who work in the mosque are covered.

I mean I will say that I’m Muslim, but I’m not really a believer. For example I don’t believe in god. But I was born into a Muslim family, I have a Muslim name you know ... both of my parents are Muslims ... but they never went to the mosque ... I have never been to the mosque either...

It was during the time of the conflict when ethnic differences were reified in Bosnia that religion was “hijacked by radical nationalist or sectarian politicians to increase their own legitimacy” (Friedman, 2004, p.84), resulting in what Gordon Bardos (1999) terms de-secularisation of Bosnia in post-Dayton times. The largely secular urban

population which yearned for democratization has received, and keeps receiving, a steady dose of desecularisation.

This increased religiosity in Bosnia and Herzegovina was initially prompted by Muslim fighters and charity workers who came to the country during the war trying to induce people to follow strict Islamic prescriptions (Al-Ali, 2002).

Newly mobilized clergy of all religions are becoming more and more active within political, but also social and cultural spheres, promoting for example religious education in schools. The urban revival of Islam that characterizes post-Dayton Bosnia has often not been endorsed by refugee communities abroad. In her insightful discussion with regard to the issue of veiling in Bosnia, Al-Ali (2002) points out that very few Muslim women used to wear the veil prior to the outbreak of conflict and it was only during the conflict that many women took up the veil. This became a contentious issue for many refugee women who were not in Bosnia during the war, for not only did they wish to stay secular in their orientation to Islam, but they were aware of the symbolic nature of the veil for the increased religiosity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Similarly one of my respondents notes that one of the reasons for not moving permanently back to Bosnia is increased religion

it was not like that before the war, this is new now ....after the war ... the whole of Bosnia has gone under burqa

Another two comments on seeing more veiled women on the streets of post conflict Bosnia

No, before it was not like that ... it was not the same ... ok women were wearing *marame* [veils]<sup>5</sup> but they were older women ... and they were not totally covered. But now there is much more religion in Bosnia ... lots of *ninjas*<sup>6</sup>...

It was never like that in Bosnia before ... *medrese*<sup>7</sup> [madrasah] existed before and those girls that attended them wore a headscarf of course, but now these *ninjas*, those are sects, that is not real Islam, they are not Bosnian Muslims, and the saddest thing is that everybody thinks that all the Muslims are the same ... Bosnian Muslims are not like that at all.

One interviewee states that one of the reasons for his and his wife's refusal to permanently return to Bosnia is mandatory religious education for children starting in the kindergarten.

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<sup>5</sup> The veils that were worn in Bosnia prior to the conflict were type of a headscarf kept loosely around the head rather than the full face covering hijab.

<sup>6</sup> *Ninja* is a slang word referring to a fully covered Muslim woman since their burqa, being dark and covering the whole body, resembles the outfits of the Japanese ninja warriors.

<sup>7</sup> *Madrasah* is a traditional school for boys and girls based on study of Qur'an

You see they are introducing *vjeronauk* [religious education]<sup>8</sup> in the kindergarten ... I have huge problem with that. A five year old kid needs to play, not be taught that.

The increased religiosity can be noticed in the streets of Bosnia too. During my stay in Sarajevo I have been surprised by the amount of mosques that have been erected around the city in recent years. Some interviewees have commented on this. One respondent said

The biggest problem is that lots of people are investing into building new *bogomolje* [places of worship] new mosques and churches ... if there is a new mosque on the territory of the Federation, immediately you have someone building a new Orthodox church in the Republika Srpska ... that is the stupid Balkan mentality ... some kind of competition ... everything is divided now ...

In discussing the five pillars of Balkan Nationalist-Authoritarianism<sup>9</sup> Bardos (1999) argues that de-secularisation of politics and society was an important feature of post-conflict Bosnia. He points out that Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox clergy became prominent figures in public life and have gained a political legitimacy that has resulted in a mixing of church and state. For example, at the ceremony marking the opening of the new facility for the Sarajevo water works a sheep was ritually slaughtered in traditional Islamic fashion, while “at the inauguration of the Republika Srpska National Assembly in 1996 members were asked to swear an oath of allegiance on a Bible and kiss a cross held by an Orthodox prelate” (Bardos, 1999. p.12).

I argue that increased religion as well as ethnic reification and the politicisation of nationalism in post-Dayton Bosnia have influenced Bosnian refugees in Ireland to opt for transnationalism rather than a permanent return ‘home’.

## 5. Conclusion

As the sections above show, the Bosnians I spoke to found upon their return home that Bosnia was not ‘like it used to be’. When discussing transnationalism resulting from forced migration it is important to take into account a couple of things. Firstly, the time that elapses between leaving the home country and their return to it produces a *jet lag* type condition where the person returning is not accustomed to the social climate that exists there. Secondly, and this is particularly relevant for refugees fleeing from ethnic conflict, political and other changes that follow the cessation of the conflict are

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<sup>8</sup> *Vjeronauk* does not correspond to the term religious education directly. It is made up of two words, *vjera* which means faith, and *nauk* meaning the science, translating as the science of the faith. However the only faith that the child would learn would be the one child ‘belongs’ to. There would be no *vjeronauk* teaching the child all four main faiths in Bosnia.

<sup>9</sup> Bardos proposes that regimes in both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina are based on the structure of power resting on five pillars: i) control of the security and governmental apparatus; ii) control of the economy (and a widespread corruption it engenders); iii) control of the media; iv) ruralisation and v) de-secularisation of society.

significant. The racial state of post-Dayton Bosnia achieved through the politics of 'security through separation', largely orchestrated by the international community, is an ethnically divided state where ethnic and religious identities took on a political significance that was not present prior to the conflict, and where the politicisation of nationalism and the reification of ethnicity have been institutionalized and constitutionalised through the Dayton Agreement. Most Bosnian migrants I spoke to refuse to permanently return to this changed Bosnia.

I wish to argue that it may be helpful to theorise post-refugee transnationalism separately from other types of transnationalisms. While acknowledging discontinuity and change as principal parts of all migration processes, post-refugee transnationalism stemming from ethnic conflicts in particular, can incorporate such significant social and political changes that it may become enforced (Al-Ali et al., 2001). In other words state policy, historical context and/or particular political configurations can constrain or push transnational activities in certain ways. In those cases forced migration may lead to (en) forced transnationalism.

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# The Early Twentieth Century Islamist Discourses in the Late Ottoman Society: A Case Study of the Journal *Sebilü'r-reşad* (*Sirat-ı Müstakim*) between 1908-1924

*Mehmet Ozan Aşık*

*Middle East Technical University*

## 1. Introduction

My intention in this study is to examine the transformation of the Turkish Islamist discourse combined with different nationalist ideologies throughout the years between 1908-1924 in the journal *Sebilü'r-reşad*. After 1908, when the Sultan Abdülhamit II was overthrown by the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress)<sup>1</sup>, his oppression and censorship over the intellectual and political life terminated. Subsequently, various thoughts and ideologies began to be debated and articulated freely in hundreds of newly emerging journals, such as *Sebilü'r-reşad*. The journal started to be published with the title of *Sirat-ı Müstakim* (which means straight path, and also the name of the bridge leading to paradise) on the 14<sup>th</sup> of August, 1908. It was the major mouthpiece of Islamist intellectuals and politicians at that time in the Ottoman Empire.

In this study, I examine in what ways the early twentieth century Islamist discourse in Turkey was constructed and associated with multiple notions of nationalism under different political and cultural circumstances during a particular period. For that, I approach the issue from a historical sociological perspective. While taking the similar period into consideration, Ismail Kara (1985) argues about a historical process which terminated the ideology of Ottomanism and gave birth to Turkish nationalism, and which was mediated by Islamism (p. 1408). I doubt Kara's argument because it might not be the case that Islamist ideology had that strong and clear-cut agency so as to mediate this transformation, but it might have positioned or structured itself in different ways. Focusing on this process, therefore, I intend to analyze the political and intellectual transition in discourse from being "the Ottoman subject" to being "the

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<sup>1</sup> The Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) was established initially as a secret society in 1889 by pro-Western Ottoman intellectuals, politicians, officers and professionals coming from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. It became a political organization among Young Turks in 1906. During the disintegration period of the Ottoman Empire, it came to power between 1908 and 1918. At the end of World War I, most of its members were brought to the court by the sultan Mehmet VI and imprisoned.

citizen of the Republic of Turkey.” Albeit this transition constitutes a non-linear, fluctuating and complex historical process at first glance, I was able to categorize it by making a triple periodization: 1908-1913; 1913-1919; and 1919-1924. During each of these three periods, different major historical and political changes occurred so as to give a new direction to the Islamist discourse in the society.

To examine the discourse, I studied in the archives of National Library in Ankara, Turkey, and analyzed thirty op-ed articles published in *Sebilü'r-reşad* between 1908 and 1924. For studying this historical transformation of the Islamist discourse, there are some other Islamist journals, such as *Beyanü'l-Hak* and *Volkan*, which are actually fruitful first-hand sources. However, I had to leave them out of this study due to time limitations. Yet, I believe that I reached sound and concrete findings as a result of my fieldwork.

I hope that this study makes some contribution to the academic studies on the political culture of the late Ottoman and contemporary Turkish society. In the courses of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and foundation of the Republic of Turkey, Ottomanism, Turkism and Islamism presented different notions of the state, subject and nation. Overall, this study tries to demonstrate how a political ideology can bear varying and even conflicting notions of “belonging” in a particular historical context. I believe that these notions are still in demand and on the agenda of the Islamist discourses in contemporary Turkey.

## **2. A General Outline of the Theory of Islamism in the Early Twentieth-Century Turkey**

It is possible to demonstrate the historical formation of the above-mentioned triple ideological formula chronologically. The ideology of Ottomanism, which dates back to the reign of Mahmud II, constituted the basic pillar of the state ideology of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I. The aim of Ottomanist ideology was to foster a type of citizenship comprising all the Ottoman subjects, regardless of their religious and ethnic origin, in order to maintain the integrity of the empire and diminish the separatist nationalist movements. Specifically, it developed during the Tanzimat period, and it was intended to hinder the disintegration of the empire by recognizing equal social rights to non-Muslims.

However, during the period of Abdülhamit II, the idea of Ottomanism began to gain an Islamist character, and the discourse of the unity of the empire turned into the unity of the Muslim societies (Pan-Islamism). As Deringil (1993) states, the major goal of Abdülhamit II for manipulating Ottomanism in that way was to rally the Muslim subjects of the empire under the umbrella of Caliphate against the political and cultural encroachment of European colonial powers (pp. 4-5). Moreover, the loss of territory and the separatist movements in Balkan and Arab regions weakened the ideology of Ottomanism on the one hand. The empire lost the control over the most of its Christian territories in Europe after its defeat in the Ottoman-Russian War (*93 Harbi*) that occurred between 1876 and 1878. Consequently, it tipped the balance between Christian and Muslim populations in favor of the latter, which was strengthened by the Muslim migration from Europe to Anatolia as an aftermath of the war. This change in

the population numbers generated a breeding ground for the rise of Islamism. On the other hand, Gülalp (1995) argues that Islamism in the late Ottoman society was provoked with the grant of equality in rights and status to the non-Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat period (1839-1876). This atmosphere escalated the Islamist reaction, and made Islamism an appealing ideology among the Muslim subjects of the empire.

After the overthrow of Abdulhamit II, it is difficult to distinguish Islamism during his reign from the Islamism in the Second Constitutional Period. Nevertheless, as Deringil (1991) puts forth, their political reactions and attitudes are actually different from each other because the rule of Abdulhamit II oppressed and weakened the Ottoman *ulama* and religious men of letters in the face of the state. As Gündüz (2007) claims, at that time, the journal of *Sebilü'r-Reşad*, which supported the Second Constitution and the 1908 Revolution against the despotism of Abdulhamit II, found itself ideologically positioned beside of the CUP, which was the political and intellectual founder and the most important representative of the Turkist nationalist movement (p.216).

Turkism is the basic political ideology of the CUP, consisting of secular and pro-Western military elites, who ruled the empire until the end of the WWI, and entered the war on the side of Axis countries. Their ethnic nationalist project (*Turançılık*) was called Pan-Turkism aiming at uniting all Turkish and Turkic people in Anatolia, Caucasia and Central Asia under a single nation based on “Turkish blood.”

#### ***a) A General Formulation of Sebilü'r-Reşad Nationalism:***

On the one side, there is Europe, the science and technology of which are advanced, but the moral and social structures of which is degenerated, which is belligerent, and still desires to conquer and disintegrate the East with its missionaries. On the other side, a defeated East is there... having fallen into the trap of backwardness, being unaware of its problems, and distanced from Islam and the truth, a Muslim world is waiting for the time of salvation. (Tunaya, 1962, p. 19)

In the general formulation of *Sebilü'r-Reşad's* nationalism, it is possible to touch upon two basic approaches, external and internal. Internal approach is towards the Muslims and the Ottoman society itself. The authors and columnists of the journal defended that idea that Islam is not incompatible with modernity, science, technology and other developments in the world, and Islam does not impede the progress of the Ottoman society. Therefore, it should be examined why Muslim societies have stayed behind the West in terms of politics, economics and science. For that, the major aim of Islamism was said to be to start an Islamic renaissance, free Muslims from the Western political hegemony and build an Islamic unity –*ummah*– which would gather all Muslims under one single nation. In this sense, this ideology roughly aims to reach the unity of Islam beyond all types of territorialism and nationalism, including Ottomanism and Turkism. Hence, the journal obtained and published countless information and news about the political, economic and cultural conditions of the Muslims in all over the world (especially Turkic Central Asian region) through its reporters and correspondents living in different parts of the world. Gündüz (2007) claims that, thanks to the news, the journal succeeded to establish a network of communication and solidarity among

Muslims regardless of where they live, and inform its readers in Istanbul and Ankara continually about other Muslim societies (p. 236).

The most of this above-mentioned news were about the anti-colonialist struggle of Muslim people from different regions against the Western countries. They reflect the external approach of the journal as I mentioned above. Gül (2007) states that the journal considers Western colonialist powers as imperialist others or enemies; they were supposed to aim at dismantling the unity of Islam, contaminating Islamic morality and culture, and establishing an alien anti-Islamist political hegemony over Muslim people (p. 43). Arabacı (2004) views Islamism in *Sebilü'r-Reşad* as a reaction or an idea of defense against Western colonialism and encroachment (p. 96). The main theme of the journal, in which various topics were articulated, was mostly to defend the Islamic tradition and culture against this encroachment.

The internal and external approaches of Islamism are of the main characteristics that shaped Turkish nationalism in *Sebilü'r-Reşad*. At the beginning, the journal took the responsibility of a vast territory in order to solve its problems, and presented itself as the representative of this territory. It overlaps with the Ottoman and even Turkic territories in Central Asia, particularly in Turkistan.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the writers and columnists of the journal, who were close to Turkists, privileged the Turkish nation in the idea of the building *ummah*. Arabacı (2004) gives the example that while demonstrating the position of Turks in Islam, Eşref Edip states that 'Turks are the precious one of all nations... They are the best Muslims among the Muslim societies. Rather than other nations, it is Turks whose nature is the most suitable to Islam and the leading nation which will elevate Islam' (p. 127).

Nonetheless, it is necessary to distinguish the notion of nationalism in *Sebilü'r-Reşad* from Turkism. The pursuit of the Turkist nationalism was to forge a new past and an ethnic genealogy from within the diminishing Ottomanist ideology by attempting to rewrite the history and emphasizing the notion of ethnicity. In this context, Gündüz (2007) says that the main theme of Turkism is building and maintaining a new nation and state along the territory which would implicitly or explicitly be shaped on the basis of race (p. 226). Instead of racism and ethnicity, he continues that the journal had a particular notion of nation on the basis of the idea of *ummah*, and the salvation of the Turkish nation and state was identified with the salvation of the religion of Islam (p. 247). As Tarık Zafer Tunaya (1962) argues, according to the general perspective of Islamists at that time, the salvation of Turkishness was bound to Islam; the idea of Turkish unity could be derived from the unity of Islam but the former alone could not generate anything (p. 82). For example, in *Sebilü'r-Reşad*, the article dated 1919 and entitled "*Türkler ve İslamiyet*" (Turks and Islam) argues about how the soul of Islam politically and culturally enhanced Turkish and Arabic people. According to the article, Turkish people, who had had a void and materialist life before Islam, found the meaning and goal of life in it (p. 166-168).

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<sup>2</sup> There is a lot of detailed news about the wars and rebellions of the Muslims in Turkistan against the Bolshevik Russians (see Türkistan. *Sebilü'r-Reşad* 1339/1923, 23 (279), p. 112; Türkistan'da Cumhuriyetler. *Sebilü'r-Reşad* 1340/1924, 24 (601), p. 96; Türkistan'daki İslam Hareketi. *Sebilü'r-Reşad* 1340/1924, 24 (601), p. 48; Türkistan'da Müslüman Hareketi. *Sebilü'r-Reşad* 1340/1924, 24 (601), pp. 45-46)

***b) The Impact of Anti-Westernism in Islamism oo Sebilü'r-Reşad's Approach to Nationalism:***

The anti-Westernist stance of the journal influenced the Islamists having either sympathy or antipathy to Turkism. For the Islamists who positioned themselves close to Turkism, the colonialist encroachment of Western states to the Turkish nation targeted at the religion of Turks, i.e. the last standing castle of Islam. As Arabacı (2004) recounts, Eşref Edip argues about three aspects of this encroachment, which seeks to destroy the religion of Turks: i) Christianizing Turks, ii) freemasonry and Judaism, iii) Communism and atheism (p. 125-126). As a part of its religious legitimization of nationalism, the journal reproduced the perception of external threat (which has still been omnipresent in Turkish nationalism) as being directed to Islam, the spirit of Turkish nationalism as called.

The general assumption of *Sebilü'r-Reşad* was that the Turkish nation was left vulnerable and decayed because of the cultural and moral imitation of the West basically. It was frequently articulated in the journal that one of the most important reasons for the decadence of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish society and the Muslim world was the sacrifice of their own culture, tradition and religion for the sake of adopting the morality and culture of the Western societies. In an article, it was expressed that the imitation of the West was accused of destroying nationalist sentiments among the Turkish youth (*Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 1911b: 156-157). In this regard, the Levantine minorities living in İstanbul, İzmir and Selanik (Thessaloniki) were viewed to undermine the political, cultural and religious life of Turkish society as the carriers of blind imitation of the West. They were claimed to poison the Turkish youth and blunt their nationalist feeling with anti-Islamic European life style, therefore, nationalist feelings must be enhanced among the Turkish youth (pp. 156-157).

Furthermore, along the similar line with anti-Westernism, some columnists of the journal such as Necmeddin Sadık and Ömer Rıza criticized Turkish nationalism as an outcome of the imitation of the West, detrimental to Islam and Muslim societies. Necmeddin Sadık states that 'Turkish nationalism came out to imitate the negative social and moral characteristics of foreigners whereas it were going to be the most proper nationalism to catch up with international standards in science and industry but retain Turkishness in culture and morality' (*Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 1924a: 106-107).

In the anonymous comment section after his article in the journal, it was urged that Turkish people should have a certain reservation not admiration towards foreigners; otherwise they could not go further but go backwards in terms of nationalist sentiments (pp. 106-107). It is likely to see that anti-Turkist Islamists consider Turkish nationalism as an ideology which is not relevant to Islam, but even harmful to it. As the aim of the Islamists was to establish an Islamic unity and solidarity without any sort of discrimination as Tunaya argues (1962), the clash of Islamism and Turkish nationalism which was accused of praising ethnic identity and damaging the idea of *ummah* was to be inevitable. From this perspective, Turkish nationalism paved the way for the decay of the Islamic culture from inside, while the Christian West did the same with its colonial practices from outside. Overall, some of the Islamist writers in *Sebilü'r-Reşad* adopted Turkish nationalism as one of the basic pillars of their ideological stance and assigned a significant role to it for the protection of Islamic

culture and tradition. On the other hand, some of them condemned Turkish nationalism as an aberrant political movement which was harmful to their own societal cause.

### **3. Shifting Variations of Nationalism in Islamism between 1908-1924: Three Types of Nationalism in *Sebilü'r-Reşad***

#### ***a) 1908-1913: The Alliance between Islamists and the CUP***

These years comprise the period during which *Sebilü'r-Reşad* supported the CUP regime. The overthrow of Abdülhamit II reign brought about sympathy among the Islamists who had gone against Abdülhamit II. As Gündüz (2007) demonstrates, the articles supporting, praising the CUP regime and trying to rally mass support for it were frequently published in the journal (p. 239). Moreover, many of them were written even by Turkist writers themselves in the journal at that time. Eventually, even though *Sebilü'r-Reşad*'s general approach to Turkish nationalism was cool-headed, its support for the CUP, the separatist movements in the Balkans and the loss of territory gave a nationalist tendency to the journal.

During this period, it is possible to see the elevation of the Turkish nation as the ideal Muslim society and the protector of Islam. Tunaya states that it was the Turks who were supposed to build the unity of Islam, and the only way for that was the integration of other Muslim societies into the Turkish nation (p. 82). In one of his articles entitled *Türklük Gayreti* (Turkishness Zeal), Ispartalı Hakkı buttressed Turkists' theses of history and nationalism saying that 'Turkishness... The troop which shakes the ground with its march and holds the sky with its flag... Today's communities, states, civilizations and humanity all were born out of that moment. We, main Turks, also created the world at present. We gave nations and distributed states to the world' (*Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 1911b: 165-166).

Going further in his commendation of Turkism, Ispartalı Hakkı defended the thesis that the languages in all over the world are rooted in Turkish:

Is it impossible that Turkish can be the mother of all languages, while Turkishness is the mother of all nations? Even though Adam is the father of the entire world as well as of Turks, Adam is Turkish... We should reconsider ourselves, and we should not anymore say that Turks are a backward nation, or that Turkish is a rude language. (pp. 165-166)

There are also some xenophobic Turkist writers whose articles were published in the journal. As Gündüz (2007) quotes, Fahreddin Necip, in his article dated 1912, urges Muslims not to buy anything from foreigners (particularly Greeks) and to use domestic goods (p. 259). The main theme of this article is controversial with Ottomanism which Islamists integrated with their ideological formulation as the legacy of Tanzimat and Abdülhamit II's periods. As Tunaya (1962) states, according to the notions of state and nation in Ottomanist ideology, Muslims, Turks, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Jews in the empire's territory are "all the Ottomans and brothers" (p. 87). This

controversy indicates how the Islamist ideology articulated in *Sebilü'r-Reşad* was affected by a particular political conjuncture in the Ottoman Empire.

It is a hard task to figure out the points at which Turkism differentiates from Islamism, which was adjusted to Turkish nationalism of the CUP regime as a result of the political events during the Second Constitutional period. As Gündüz (2007) quotes, in one of his articles dated 1912, Mehmed Fahreddin asserts Islam and Turkishness to be two same things. Regarding this issue, Haldun Gülalp (1995) states that the rise of Islamist and Turkist-nationalist consciousnesses are not separated processes. Both of them emerged as a reaction to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as a result of rising European imperialism.

Tunaya (1962) gives a brief summary about the general nationalist perspective of the Islamist writers and columnists called “Turkist-Islamists” in *Sebilü'r-Reşad* during this period as follows: ‘according to Turkist-Islamists, the period in which they were living was the age of nations; nobody can hinder nationalist feelings and the idea of nationality; religion and nationality do not weaken but strengthen each other’ (p. 85). From this perspective, Tunaya claims that *Sebilü'r-Reşad* advocates the unity of Islam as the major religious ideal, and Turkish-Ottoman Caliphate as a kind of confessional or secondary cause within this ideal (p. 85). In conclusion, the Islamism of the Second Constitutional period begun to diverge from Ottomanism inherited from the nineteenth century and adopt the certain notions of nation and society of ethnic nationalism, which actually conflict in theory with the idea of Islamic unity –*ummah*.

### **b) 1913-1919: The Failure of Turkist Ideology and the End of Alliance**

This period witnessed the process in which the liberal and enthusiastic environment of 1908 Revolution ended, the WWI started and the fall of the Ottoman Empire entered its last stage. The excitement and enthusiasm created by the nationalist ideas of the CUP were replaced with disappointment and hopelessness. Tunaya (1962) argues that, in this second period, the CUP was held to be the main responsible by Islamists for the deterioration of the political and cultural situation, and its members were accused of not putting the country into an Islamic path (pp. 53-54). According to an anonymous article which was taken from another journal, *Taşfir-i Efkar*, and published in *Sebilü'r-Reşad*, the most urgent need of the society was Islam, i.e. establishing political and cultural life on the basis of Islam (*Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 1919a: 441-442). In this sense, the CUP regime was accused of abandoning Islamic politics and switching to Turkish politics; the idea of founding a new party, besides or even against the CUP, which would pursue Islamic politics was asserted (pp. 441-442).

Under new political circumstances of the second period, the journal of *Sebilü'r-Reşad* almost completely became disillusioned with Turkish nationalism propagated by the CUP. Gündüz (2007) claims that religion begun to have a more important function in the conceptualization of nation and society, while Muslim brotherhood and unity turned out to be the major emphasis instead of Turkishness (p. 227). The conceptual boundaries between Islamism and nationalism became much clearer, and Islamist characteristics of the journal regarding political and cultural issues became more visible (p. 224). Gündüz summarizes the positioning of Islamist ideology itself in the face of nationalism in this period in the following way:

- 1) Ethno-nationalism and racism are prohibited by Islam
- 2) There is an idea of Islamic nation on the basis of religious principles. It is ignorance (*jahiliyya*) to seek for another nationality instead of that.
- 3) Nationalism and ethno-nationalism damage Muslim brotherhood. Nationalist and racist values can not cover Islamic values at all.
- 4) Muslim nations collapsed in the past due to the faction and dissonance.
- 5) The termination of Muslim states means the end of religious life.
- 6) Ethno-nationalism is a non-Islamic European tradition.
- 7) ... The most beneficial path to be followed is the policy of unity of Islam (*ittihad-ı İslam*) based on Muslim brotherhood. (p. 227)

Moreover, in the second period, Islamism underwent a sort of ideological trauma because of certain serious events such as the problems of the Armenians, the riots in Arab provinces of the empire and their fighting against the Ottoman army in the WWI and the Kurdish society's demand for political autonomy. Eventually, these events culminated in the de facto disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, which brought about the end of Ottomanism, and Arab-Kurdish revolts caused big ruptures in the idea of *ummah*. Taking a look at the issues of *Sebilü'r-Reşad* at that time, it was Turkish nationalism which was harshly criticized and counted as the sole responsible for these incidents. In the article entitled *Türkçülerin Siyasi Mefkûreleri* (The Political Aims of Turkists), Turkism was accused of paving the way for the collapse of the empire and sowing the seeds of dispute (*fitne*) among Muslim societies:

The political aims of Turkists:

- 1) To divide Turkey into two parts: defining Anatolia, the part which is resided by Turks, as "Turkish Motherland"; separating the part which is resided by Arabs as "Arabic Motherland" by recognizing their political autonomy, even independence.
- 2) To provide minority groups living in the territory of "Turkish Motherland," such as Armenians, Greeks and Jewish, with political autonomy to some extent... to recognize them equal rights with Turks. (*Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 1918: 211)

In his article entitled *Türk, Kürt, Arap* (Turkish, Kurdish, Arab), Ömer Rıza defines Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic people as three Muslim societies (*ümmet-i İslam*) which have the same culture, religion and common interests in politics and economy (*Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 1919b: 111). In his opinion, 'the Ottoman government was not a Turkish government, but it was the government of the Ottoman motherland' (p. 111). In another article of him, which is entitled *Türkçülük, Memleketçilik* (Turkism, Nationalism), he also argues that the Ottoman Empire must turn into a political body in which everybody can live freely without any religious or ethnic discrimination (*Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 1919c: 68-70). For him, it was Muhammadanism, which constituted the spirit of existence of the Ottoman society covering all political, social and moral spheres: 'everything that is non-Islamized is alien to us, and Turkism and nationalism sowed the seeds of dispute in Islam' (pp. 68-70). According to him, if a Muslim said "I

am Turkish,” “I am Arab” or “I am Kurdish,” it would severely damage Muslim brotherhood (pp. 68-70).

Along similar lines, as Gündüz (2007) quotes, Ahmed Naim, in his article dated 1916, claims that Turkism should not have priority over Islam; societies should be evaluated according to their Islamic character and belief, not their ethnicity (p. 263). Tunaya (1962) quotes one of Naim’s article dated 1914 and entitled *İslam’da Dava-i Kavmiyet* (The Cause of Nationalism in Islam), in which Naim criticizes Turkish and Arab nationalism. Naim argues that if there is a necessity to privilege a nation over the other, the privileged one is the Arab nation where Islam rose, the Prophet Muhammad was born, and which spread Islam to other nations (1962: 81).

The Islamist criticism and reaction to Turkish nationalism sometimes targeted at the secular ideas and policies of the CUP government. The secular tendency in Turkism became more apparent and strengthened with religious reformation attempts of the government, thereby rendering the distinction between Islamism and Turkism clearer. Especially, it is possible to see this criticism and reaction in the articles about *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Organization) in *Sebilü’r-Reşad*. In an article entitled *Türk Ocağındaki Münasebetsizlikler Hakkında* (Regarding Inappropriateness in Turkish Organization), the balls and concerts in *Türk Ocağı*, modern dressing of Turkish women without headscarf and their hanging out with men freely were viewed to be inimical to Islam (*Sebilü’r-Reşad*, 1919d: 119). This Western and nationalist group of people identified with the CUP by Islamists was accused of imitating the West, contaminating the morality and culture of Turkish society, encountering with Islamic principles and overlooking helpless and poor Anatolian people. Instead of being beneficial and helpful, this group associated with *Türk Ocağı* was claimed to be harmful to the Turkish nation.

In conclusion, it seems obvious that the different political conjunctures made the distinction between the two ideologies more visible. Islamist writers in the journal begun to believe that Turkist and secular policies of the CUP brought about the end of a Muslim empire with political, moral and cultural decadences.

### ***c) 1919-1924: Turkish Independence War in Anatolia and the New Alliance between Islamism and Territorial Turkish Nationalism***

This period is characterized with the aftermath of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, such as that the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was coming to its final stage and the winning powers of the WWI (France, England, Russian and Italy) started to divide the Ottoman territories among themselves. In the eyes of the Islamist writers of *Sebilü’r-Reşad*, this encroachment was taken as Western colonialism and imperialism. It was against this political situation that some high-ranking officers of the disbanded Ottoman army (most of them were the old members of the CUP) commenced an armed struggle under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk with the ultimate aim of creating a Turkish nation and founding a new Turkish state in Anatolia. Even though some articles praising the US or British mandate were published in *Sebilü’r-Reşad*, the journal generally took a stance on the side of these officers in this period. As Arabacı (2004) states, the journal believed in the necessity of uniting allied

Muslims in Anatolia and supported the leadership of Atatürk for the independence war (p. 107).

It is significant to see how changing political circumstances determine the ideological orientation of Islamism. As a result of the termination of the Ottomanist ideology and the separation of Arab provinces from the Turkish state, there seemed to be no chance anymore for the realization of the idea of *ummah*, uniting all Muslims in the world, in the minds of Islamist writers and columnists of *Sebilü'r-Reşad*. Hence, the journal rearranged its Islamist ideological formulation in lines with the territorial Turkish nationalism based on the political geography of Anatolia. Instead of the news and information about the other Muslims living in the other parts of the world, the journal started to publish articles about the problems and complaints of Anatolian people, and gave the news on the independence war to the Muslims in all over the world as well as in Anatolia. At that time, Anatolia was represented as the last independent castle of the Muslim world in the journal. In an anonymous article entitled *Türk Milletine Hür Yaşamak Hakkı Verilmedir* (The Right to Live Free Must Be Given to Turkish Nation), it is stated that '[a]ll the nations in the Ottoman Empire have right to live free altogether... the right to live free must be given to Turkish nation [too]. The winning Allied powers are trying to shatter the Ottoman Empire on the pretext of solving the empire's internal conflicts. This is a murder committed against God' (*Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 1919e: 15).

Considering the general political stance of *Sebilü'r-Reşad* in this period, the journal geographically positioned its Islamist ideology through Anatolian territory on the one hand. On the other hand, the encroachment of Western powers after the WWI was presented as an onslaught aiming to destroy not only Turkish nation but also the religion of Islam thoroughly. For example, in an anonymous article entitled *Arazi-i Mukaddese Manda Altına Alınamaz* (The Sacred Land Can Not Be Put under Mandate), the occupation of Istanbul and many other Ottoman territories after the defeat of the empire was considered to be a threat not only towards the political independence of Turks but also towards their religious purpose (*Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 1920: 166-167).

Focusing on Anatolian territory within this perspective, Armenian and Kurdish separatist movements were taken into consideration as a threat to the Turkish nation, while Kurdish revolts were also seen as a rebellion against the caliphate and Islam. The journal viewed the Kurdish separatist movement as pointless because they were Muslim as well. Furthermore, in the same article, the Armenians, who were in an attempt to separate from the Ottoman Empire and establish their own state in the Eastern Anatolia, were claimed to provoke Kurdish people to rebel against the empire and incite them to be dependent on the Armenians themselves (*Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 1920: 224-225). According to the same article, if there is a demand for independence of Kurdish people, it is solely the members of the Ottoman Assembly (*Meclis-i Mebusan-ı Osmaniye*) who have the right to speak on behalf of the Kurds, and it is only the Ottoman state (*Devlet-i Aliye*) which is supposed to recognize and take their demand into consideration (pp. 224-225).

It is possible to notice that the decline of Ottomanism and the idea of *ummah* inevitably brought *Sebilü'r-Reşad* approximate to Turkish nationalism as a result of changing political conditions. However, it is also vital to notice the different conceptualization of

this territorial nationalism from Turkism. The main nationalist connotation of the journal shifted to the idea of a Turkish Muslim society which was born in Anatolia fighting against the West and the idea of a Turkish-Islamic state which was expected to be founded in Anatolia in the future.

Despite the constitutive relation between Islamism and territorial Turkish nationalism, *Sebilü'r-Reşad* usually had considerable reservation in its approach to the policies of the newly emerging Turkish Republic, which was being led by a pro-Western-elite-military cadre having the CUP origin. As a result of the Islamists' disappointment with the CUP policies between the years of 1913-1919, they seemed to be wary of choosing their discourse with respect to this new leading cadre in the last period. For example, in his article entitled *Tahripkâr Milliyetperverlik* (Devastating Nationalism), Necmeddin Sadık debates on national fanaticism referring to the religious fanaticism. He argues that national fanaticism created by blind and ebullient emotions turns out to be harmful and devastating for the society (*Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 1924a: 106-107). Sadık who views Turkism as a destructive national fanaticism states that:

What was done here with the aim of "Turkification" only damaged what we have had. Everything and every place on which we want to apply Turkification are merely perishing. We should work for instilling sounder and healthier thoughts to minds and souls, or more accurately, for putting the sense of nation in its correct channel... Many political, historical and economic causes gave a threatening form to our national sentiments... After the years of wars and revolutions, it will be only us shattered by the destruction of this envious spirit which destroys everything except itself. (pp. 106-107)

In the anonymous article, which addresses to Sadık's article, the editors of the journal state that '[t]he sense of nation in human beings is natural and inborn... [However] It is a ridiculous, unnecessary and deleterious attempt to boost this sense. As long as it maintains its naturalness, it can provide temperance. Otherwise, it results in extremism or inadequacy' (*Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 1924b: 106-107).

While accepting the naturalness of nationalism, the journal considers Turkism to be extreme, unnecessary and devastating. In this context, the Islamists condemn Turkism of making the society go backward and clashing with Islam, which is claimed to be contrarily progressive. According to this mainstream thought, provided that nationalism maintains its naturalness, it can be compatible with Islam. Otherwise, zealous nationalist sentiments will allegedly take societies back to their far past, which is claimed to entail the alienation of Muslims from their religion. In contrast to progressive Islamists, retrogressive nationalists are seen to be an obstacle in front of the development of the nation with their extreme nationalist ideas and sentiments (pp. 106-107).

Finally, coming to the end of the period when the Republic of Turkey was newly founded, *Sebilü'r-Reşad* considered the new Turkish Republic as an Islamic state, and supported the new state. In effect, even though the state was not institutionalized and shaped yet at that time, one of the basic articles of the Constitution was that "the religion of the state is Islam." On the other hand, there were arguments asserting this new state to be a secular and non-religious one as is the case in France. While

criticizing these arguments, the journal insisted on the idea that the new Turkish government was the government of Islam (*Sebilü'r-Reşad*, 1923: 72). However, after the abolition of the caliphate by the National Assembly in 1924, *Sebilü'r-Reşad* started to pose serious criticism about the new Turkish state, and later on, it was closed down by the government due to the accusation of the journal for playing a role in Şeyh Sait Revolt in 1925.

#### 4. Conclusion

This study shows that Islamism turned out to have various, even controversial, ideological variations during the sixteen-year period under different political circumstances, though it has a certain general paradigm in theory. While aspiring to the ideal of building an Islamic political unity, Islamist ideology got adjusted to different kinds of belonging based on territorial or ethnic nationalism as articulated in *Sebilü'r-Reşad*.

During the transition from being the Ottoman subject to being the Turkish citizen between 1908 and 1924, the journal synchronically or diachronically formulated and defended three different sorts of belonging based on Ottomanism, Turkish nationalism and Islamism. In the first period, Islamists seemed to approach to the ideological emphasis of the CUP on the Turkish character of the Ottoman Empire and Muslim society in a positive way. The authors of the journal gathered around the idea of establishing a caliphate over the whole Middle Eastern region, which would be led by the “Turkish nation.” However, the second period was remarked by strong Islamist opposition to the CUP regime and its ethnic nationalism, and by their considerable shift to the ideal of *ummah*. Finally, in the last period, while viewing the Turkish war of independence as an attempt to save Islam from Western hegemony, Islamists sought to develop a sense of Islamic belonging through territorial Turkish nationalism, excluding Arabs separated from the Ottoman Empire.

In the formulation of three types of belonging, particularly in the second and third periods, Islamists mostly constructed the Western societies and culture as a destructive, intruder and hostile “other”. Subsequently, they created their ideological variations through this other. In this framework, Islamic unity is presented as an idea of belonging which must be protected and elevated against the other. Besides the otherization of external enemy, meanwhile, there is the otherization of internal enemy in Islamism. These internal enemies are the Ottoman subjects who are allegedly harmful to the Muslim society, imitating the Western culture and adopting its so-called degenerated morality. Armenians, Greeks, Levantines, pro-Western intellectuals and the members of the CUP were counted in this group. On the one hand, Islam is asserted to be a tradition, spirit and a culture which must be defended against these internal and external enemies. On the other hand, Turkish nationalism is positioned both against and with Islamism through this otherization process.

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# Welfare-States in South-East Europe. A Comparative Analysis of Labour Market Policy in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia

*Michael Sauer*

*University of Cologne. michael.sauer(at)uni-koeln.de*

## 1. Introduction

The development and the structural changes of labour markets pose enormous challenges to welfare states. An international comparison is going to raise the question of the transferability of certain success stories to other states. The corresponding keywords are *activation*, *workfare* and *flexicurity*. Are the possibilities of political control converging in this context? Or are there persistent differences in the logics of national activities? What role do the national welfare regime types play in the development of national labour market policies? Do they play a role at all? Are they relevant for the explanation of varying employment and unemployment rates? These questions are not only relevant in the context of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-states, but as well for transition and developing countries. In 1989 the collapse of the communist regimes in (South-)Eastern Europe led to fundamental changes of the political and economic systems and, in turn, the welfare systems. Thus, it has been of eminent importance to identify transformation processes on the labour markets and to analyse existing as well as new policy-options to fight unemployment, poverty and social exclusion. Moreover the stagnation of the welfare states' growth and the associated political, economic and social change processes since the 1980s have influenced the transition for these Eastern states. Since the European Union (EU) Thessaloniki summit in 2002, the states of the Western Balkans have been given a clear perspective for EU membership. With this perspective the EU's set of objectives (e.g. the Lisbon-goals or the European Employment Strategy) has become relevant for those countries too.

The aim of this research paper is to identify distinct regimes in the spheres of welfare and labour markets in the countries Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. The set of objectives of the analysis is threefold: the comparative analysis of the labour market policies in the chosen countries offers a general overview and identifies similarities and differences. The paper also tries to contribute to systematic and comparative research while identifying typologies of welfare states in the sense of Esping-Andersen and typologies of labour market policies in the chosen countries. It cannot be the aim of this analysis to contribute with waterproof causal inferences, as the preconditions for such an approach in the chosen geographical context are simply not given. However, it is rather the aim to apply approved concepts and theoretical discourses to transition countries such as Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia.

## 2. Methodology

Central to the methodological proceeding is the comparison via welfare state and labour market policy regime types. For this purpose, theory-guided and empirically-established methods are applied in order to go beyond pure description. On the one hand, Esping-Andersen's welfare state typology<sup>1</sup> marks an instrument, which abstracts from concrete social policy problems and which shortens results. Thus it allows describing macro-regimes in simple terms (Siegel, 2007: 296). On the other hand while looking at various worlds of labour market policy, the identification of specific problems and challenges is guaranteed. The study of the interaction of welfare states (macro level), the subsystem labour market (intermediary level) and single labour market measures (micro level) contributes to the connection of different levels of social policy analysis, as it is demanded by Siegel (2007: 291-2).

In a first step, the analysis tries to assign the three countries Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia to the three known clusters introduced by Esping-Andersen. This typology has been chosen because of two reasons. Firstly, it is the most prominent attempt to group welfare states in different types. Secondly, the studies of Scruggs and Allan (2003; 2004; 2006) deliver recent replications of the original study, which themselves are based on the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset. The analysis of the labour market policy is built as cross-section of the world of labour market approaches developed by Gallie and Paugam (2000), Rehm and Schmid (2001), Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer (2004), Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl (2006) and Daguerre (2007). The analysis methodically works with a combination of a cluster analysis and descriptive country studies. The cluster analysis – as a tool to condense single indicators – uses a number of variables concerning the coverage of labour market regulatory policy (legal aspects), scope and range of passive and active labour market policy as well as the scope and structure of employment. The integrated variables are theoretically relevant. The labour market regulation policy will be incorporated by using the Employing Workers Indices<sup>2</sup> provided by the World Bank, passive labour market policy through five indicators concerning unemployment insurance (i.e., benefit rate, qualifying and waiting period, duration of payment, benefit range) from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset and active labour market policy on the basis of the relative weight of expenses for vocational training (TRAIN), wage subsidies (SUB) and public work (PUB). Further variables that are considered in the analysis are the level of public expenses for active and passive labour market policy – measured as their proportion of the GDP – as well as the employment rate, apportioned in different sections of employees. Incorporating the last mentioned variables shall help to display the structure of labour markets. As a measure for distance the cluster analysis uses the *Squared Euclid Distance* and as fusion algorithm the *Ward-Method*.

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<sup>1</sup>This paper does not incorporate a description of Esping-Andersen typology and its critique. Besides the original source of Esping-Andersen (1990) and among others Abrahamson (1999) and Arts/Gelissen (2002) deliver a good overview on the topic.

<sup>2</sup>The overall index is composed of following single indices: Difficulty of Hiring Index, Rigidity of Hours Index, Difficulty of Firing Index, Rigidity of Employment Index and Firing Costs Index. Refer to the codebook for further details. The codebook of the analyses can be delivered on demand.

The topic examined here in general as well as the concrete procedure pose problems, which form the basis for the following discussion. A first question might be that of the general feasibility of the study in the chosen regional context. In Croatia and even more so in Serbia transition processes have not been finalised yet. But the long history of social policy and the existence of welfare elements in all of the countries (Sauer 2006; Bartlett 2008) support the argument pro-feasibility. Moreover, prior studies affirm the transferability of scientific concepts from industrial states to South-Eastern Europe (Bartlett, 2008: 148). The major problems are insufficient data and sources. If it is difficult to gain detailed and standardised data for OECD-countries (e.g. for single labour market instruments) it seems quite impossible for the countries of interest here. The data acquisition was possible only by using varying sources which has a negative impact on the reliability and comparability of the information. In some cases the research falls back upon information from national authorities. For single indicators, no sources have been available. For such cases plausible assumptions were made to bridge the gaps.<sup>3</sup> Varying survey methods for the data and the resulting biases are not impossible. Another problem is caused by the changing Serbian state character, formerly the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1992-2003, and the state union of Serbia and Montenegro from 2003-2006. All statistical material older than 2006 is related to the respective federations. Such a procedure is seen as unavoidable. No special identification of these differences will be included in the statistics. The notion of Serbia is also applied to the dates before 2006.

The research done here are first steps on little-known terrain. Classifying countries using welfare state and/or labour market policy typologies can improve the understanding of the countries' initial position as well as the assessment concerning necessary reforms. The choice of the methodology is less about rigorous testing of hypotheses, but rather about the exploitation of empirical interrelations in space and time on the basis of the close interplay of theory, methodology and data (Konle-Seidl, 2007: 676-7). The paper's set of objectives tries to respect this fact. Instead of searching for causal inferences, an emphasis on descriptive inferences takes centre stage. Moreover the combination of quantitative (cluster analysis) and qualitative methods (country studies) is owed to this fact.

### **3. Replication of Esping-Andersens worlds of welfare capitalism**

This chapter comprehends the attempt to assign the examined countries to the worlds of welfare capitalism by Esping-Andersen. The replication, displayed in table 1, delivers interesting results. Although the known clusters can be retrieved from the table, it's not possible to draw a distinct line between them so that some countries cannot be explicitly allocated. The three analysed South-East European states are not found, contrary to the thesis of Ferge (2001; 2006), as residual welfare states at the end of the decommodification ranking. The results for these countries are relatively clear. While Serbia and Croatia are members of the conservative cluster, Slovenia is second

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<sup>3</sup>For details refer to the *codebook*.

concerning the decommodification criteria and shows a strong social-democratic characteristic concerning stratification.

	decommodification: rank	stratification		
		conservative	liberal	social-dem.
Norway	1	+	0	++
Slovenia	2	-	0	+
Netherlands	3	0	0	++
Denmark	4	-	+	++
Sweden	5	-	--	++
New Zealand	6	--	-	++
Belgium	7	+	0	++
Germany	8	+	0	+
Austria	9	++	0	0
Serbia	10	+	0	0
Australia	11	-	0	++
Finland	12	0	0	0
Ireland	13	-	0	++
Great Britain	14	-	+	++
Croatia	15	+	0	0
Italy	16	+	0	-
France	17	++	0	0
Canada	19	--	++	+
Switzerland	18	--	++	-
Japan	20	+	+	0
USA	21	+	++	0

**Table 1: characteristics of decommodification and stratification**

*Source: author's composition. Following labels reflect the characteristic value of the stratification:*

*++ = very high, + = high, 0 = average, - = low, -- = very low.*

*Refer to the codebook for an exact description of classification.*

Serbia's level of decommodification might be surprising at first sight. But the relative level of benefits, which is comparable with conservative countries, and the coverage rate of 87% in average widely explains this result. Croatia possesses a benefit level below average, but provides the benefits for a number of beneficiaries that is above average. Concerning the criteria of stratification Serbia as well as Croatia exhibit conservative characteristics. Slovenia has to be characterised as a social-democratic welfare state based on both criteria. The high level of decommodification results from the high benefit-level of the Slovenian social insurances and from the high coverage rate of the unemployment and old age insurance. Qualifying and waiting periods are rather low. The stratification effect can be explained through the wide scope of the social insurances and the low range between average and maximum benefits. Further it should be explicitly mentioned that the replication has considered only persons on the formal labour market, thus not covering the big group of population employed in the informal sector.

Due to methodological weaknesses of the analyses, the results should not be taken as a be-all and end-all. The relative capability of social security might be lower in reality compared to the results presented here. It was not possible to obtain all data from internationally recognised comparative studies. Some data are based on information gained from local authorities. Moreover plausible assumptions were made for missing data.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, it is not impossible that some data, especially the level of benefits and the coverage rate of the social insurances are overrated. Based on such a scenario, the level of decommodification would decline, and the characteristic of social-democratic stratification weaken. But even in this case none of the three states could be found at the end of the ranking. Therefore, a plausible result for Slovenia would be one between a high- and a middle-range and for Serbia and Croatia between a middle range and a low decommodification level. Serbia and Croatia would maintain their status as conservative types, while Slovenia could be rated as an intermediate type between the conservative and social-democratic world.

Neither the classic analysis by Esping-Andersen nor the replication by Scruggs and Allan differentiate between conservative and South-European country clusters. The analysis conducted here suggests that such a distinction would make sense. It can be assumed, that both countries Serbia and Croatia could be assigned to the South-European cluster. Incorporating this cluster and considering further Mediterranean countries is desirable for further research.

#### **4. Labour markets in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia**

Serbia's labour market is characterised by a high level of persistent unemployment and a low level of employment. Because of the still existing over-employment in state-owned and socialised enterprises an improvement of the situation at short notice is not to be expected. Labour markets are strongly segmented and the capability of labour market policy is limited. The informal sector alternatively offers flexible employment opportunities. Arandarenko and Paunovic (2005: 16) name five hurdles for a better

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<sup>4</sup>Cf. *codebook* for details.

development on Serbia's labour markets: the inert economic development (1), the lack of flexibility on labour markets (2), the limited scope of active labour market policy (3), the insufficient involvement of communities (4) and the low qualification-level of employees (5).

	SRB	HR	SLO	liberal	conser	soc.-dem.	EU-15	OECD
<b>employment rate [%]</b>								
total (15-64)	49,9	55,6	66,6	71,8	63,7	75,6	66,0	66,1
old employees (55-64)	32,6	34,4	32,6	59,4	37,5	66,0	45,6	53,0
young employees (15-24)	19,5	-	35,0	54,5	35,0	53,6	40,2	43,3
women (15-64)	40,6	49,4	61,8	64,9	56,4	72,5	58,5	56,8
men (15-64)	59,2	62,0	71,1	78,7	71,0	78,7	73,5	75,6
low qualified <sup>5</sup>	44,1	45,1	56,1	58,8	52,7	63,6	57,8	56,5
<b>unemployment rate [%]</b>								
total (15-64)	20,9	11,1	6,0	5,1	8,1	4,9	8,0	6,3
old employees (55-64)	10,0	5,5	2,7	3,9	6,3	3,1	6,4	4,4
young employees (15-24)	47,8	28,8	13,9	10,1	17,4	12,5	16,1	12,5
women (15-64)	24,7	12,7	6,8	5,0	8,8	5,1	8,8	6,6
men (15-64)	17,9	9,8	5,1	5,2	7,4	4,6	7,3	6,0
low qualified	19,2	12,2	8,7	8,4	12,3	7,5	9,1	11,0
long-term (> 12 months)	17,0	6,7	2,9	0,9	3,8	0,8	3,5	2,0

**Table 2. labour market structural data, 2006**

Source: composition by author, data: Republic of Serbia, NES (2006), OECD (2007), Republic of Croatia, Statistical Office (2007), Eurostat (2008a; 2008b), ILO (2008).

Labour markets in Croatia are marked by a continuous and fundamental change process. The unemployment rate declines while the employment rate rises. The main problems are in particular the segmentation of labour markets, discrimination to old and low-educated employees, and the low geographical and technical mobility. The informal sector, which is of respectable size, forms a counterpoint to the formal labour markets and functions as a buffer for inadequate working place generation in the

<sup>5</sup>Defined as categories 0-2 of the ISCED 1997 classification. Cf. UNESCO (1997).

formal sector. There are only a few junctures between formal and informal employment. Croatia tries to countervail this through adjustments in the legal systems as well as with active labour market policy. Despite the gradual reforms towards a more flexible labour law, regulations concerning employee favourable protection as well as the regulations concerning passive labour market policy still give advantage to labour market insiders compared with outsiders.

All in all Slovenia shows a relatively advantageous situation on its labour markets. Most of the structural indicators record Slovenia above EU-average. Only the low employment rates of young and old employees seem problematic. Besides rigid labour legislation, Slovenia exhibits relatively substantial protection against the risk of becoming unemployed. The spending level in their active labour market policy is below those of most industrial countries. Nevertheless several measures, in relation to the promotion of young employees, have been successful. For Kajzer (2007: 481), the biggest challenges for the Slovenian labour market and employment policy are the development of an ageing strategy, the continuation of the employment service reforms, the development in offering advanced vocational training, the development of specific programmes, preventive measures and evaluation competences concerning unemployment amongst young people and long-term unemployment. The informal sector is one of the main problems for Slovenia's labour markets, too.

Besides the differences concerning structure and stage of development of the labour markets, common labour market challenges can be described for all three countries. The most concise similarity is the dimension of the informal sector, which has to be considered in the construction of each labour market measure. Further, all labour markets in South-East Europe are strongly segmented. Exclusion of certain population groups can be stated for all countries as well as problems for young people to find work. Ethnic minorities and people with disabilities are the most disadvantaged groups. Old-aged persons, women and people with low qualifications are affected as well but on a lower level and not globally. Moreover considerable regional disparities are characteristic for all countries.

The relative relevance of active labour market policy in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia is low and financing depends on tax revenue and the unemployment rate. From this follows a certain discontinuity concerning financing, leading to problems for the consistent management of the programmes. In the past such programmes were marked by ad-hoc decisions and were tailored for big target groups. But increased focus on specific target groups comes to the fore. Also, advanced vocational training gains in importance. This does not hold for Croatia, where most of the available funds for active measures are spend on wage subsidies. Activation strategies are part of the Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian national employment strategy, but more detailed definitions have not been provided. One reason for this might be the missing availability and quality of reliable data. It is likely that a deliberate activation strategy does not exist in these countries. This is supported by the low level of the respective expenses. Their relative weighting does not deliver a clear picture. Considering the three active labour market policy measures: training, wage subsidies and public work, Croatia spends 86% of its active labour market policy expenses on wage subsidies. Central to Serbia's active labour market policy are wage subsidies (60% of the total expenses) and vocational training (32%). In Slovenia the expenses for the three

measures are almost equally distributed, whereas the share for public work (41%) is the largest.

Flexicurity can be defined as the combination of labour market and employment flexibility and social security. None of the three countries comes close to such a flexicurity portfolio. Although most of the newly signed labour contracts can be classified as temporary employment in all three countries, flexible forms of employment are the exception rather than the rule. So far part time employment is an atypical form of employment even among women – which might be traced back to the Yugoslav heritage – and increases only slightly. Though the labour law allows for such forms of employment (part-time work, temporary employment, etc.), it sets narrow boundaries at the same time. The design of the social security, especially the limited coverage (in terms of the overall workforce), and the scope of active labour market policy are not compatible with the flexicurity-logic. The slowly increasing transition to flexible forms of employment was so far not flanked by adequate social security measures in favour of employees. So far one can speak of little *Flexi* without *curity*. The highest degree of flexibility, almost without any institutionalised security exists in the informal sector.

## 5. Worlds of Labour Market Policy approach

As visible from figure 1, the cluster analysis done here provides a clear result. According to this four clusters can be distinguished at a relatively low heterogeneity score. Four worlds of labour market policy can be distinguished: a liberal, a social-democratic, a South-European and a conservative world. For Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia the following pattern emerges: Slovenia can clearly be assigned to the conservative cluster. Croatia and Serbia form the small South-European cluster, together with Italy. The classification highly corresponds with the Esping-Andersen's worlds of welfare capitalism, notably if they are expanded with a Mediterranean cluster.

A comparably disadvantaged labour market situation has to be attested for the South-European and the conservative cluster. The expenses for passive labour market policy are above average for the conservative type whereas for active measures the expenses are on average. The South-European type shows a low level of spending for passive as well as for active measures. In the latter cluster the expenses are mainly concentrated on wage subsidies. Within the conservative cluster no spending preferences regarding active measures were found. Compared with the social-democratic and liberal cluster both, the South-European and the conservative cluster have stricter labour legislations. For countries within the social-democratic cluster the active labour market policy is of high importance, reflected in the comparably high level of expenses. The situation concerning employment is positive for this cluster. States within the liberal cluster exhibit low levels of spending of active and passive labour market policy combined with a favourable situation concerning employment. The main characteristics of the single country clusters are summarised in table 3.




Figure 1. Cluster analysis dendrogram<sup>6</sup>

Source: author's diagram.

## 6. Interpretation

One aim of the analysis is to identify distinct types of labour market policy and indicate interrelations between the spheres welfare and labour market. The results of the country studies correspond with those of the cluster analysis.

The condensed results can be formulated as stage model, with Slovenia as the state with the best labour market performance and the most consistent and efficient labour market policy, followed by Croatia and Serbia. This result is reflected in the cluster analysis, insofar as Slovenia can be assigned to the conservative cluster. Serbia and Croatia are part of the small South-European cluster. Although both clusters are closely

<sup>6</sup>The analyses was compiled with SPSS 15.0.1. The variables are standardised on values between 0 and 1.

related – which can be documented with the common problems and challenges – compared with the conservative cluster the labour market policy of South-European countries is less extensive. The employment situation in total as well as for the regarded groups is more disadvantageous. The data suggests that in Serbia and (less clear) in Croatia only a small part of the total work force hold a stable and permanent position in the official labour market. Alongside this group, that is totally integrated in the labour market, a second group exists, that is not integrated at all (inactivity) and the large group of those, who are only loosely connected with the labour markets (seasonal, temporary and informal employment). Only small differences exist between conservative and South-European countries regarding labour market regulatory policy.

Cluster	liberal	social-democratic	South-European	conservative
labour law rigidity	very low	low	high	high
generosity of the unemployment insurance (level and duration)	low	extensive	low	extensive
expenses for passive labour market policy	very low	middle	very low	high
expenses for active labour market policy	low	high	very low	middle
main instrument of active labour market policy	TRAIN	TRAIN and SUB	SUB	TRAIN, SUB and PUB
employment situation	positive	very positive	very negative	negative
countries	CDN, USA, UK, JAP, AUS, IRL, NZ	CH, S, N, DK	HR, SRB, I	A, NL, F, FIN, D, SLO, B

**Table 3. Different feature characteristics of the labour market worlds**

*Source: composition by author.*

However, the challenges concerning labour market policy vary between the two clusters. Active labour market policy is much more focused in Slovenia as it is in Serbia, mainly because of the number of potential participants and thus the possibilities to focus on target groups. Basically it seems that in Serbia and partially in Croatia measures targeting employment policy and social security in general are yet more promising than active labour market policy. The general challenges so far disguise many more specific problems. To what extent problems and challenges will change with the ongoing transition and to what extent Serbia and Croatia may move from one cluster to another remains to be seen. In the case of Slovenia, transition can be regarded as widely completed.

Independent from the classification of the concrete case, the cluster analysis provides a quite explicit pattern and thus supports the thesis that different basic types of labour market policy exist in the context of OECD. These types are a liberal, a social-democratic, a South-European and a conservative world. This pattern closely corresponds with the classical welfare typology by Esping-Andersen. An enhanced concept of this classical study, incorporates a fourth welfare state type, namely a South-European one.<sup>7</sup> In this respect it can be asserted, that the two world approaches – the labour market policy and the welfare capitalism – comply with each other.

All South-East-European countries analysed here are available for the categories of international comparative welfare state research and the comparative analysis of labour market policy. Despite methodological problems, the results deliver coherent interpretations. The countries, that have been subject of this research do not converge in this process, but allocate in different welfare state clusters. The thesis of a race to the bottom, which assumes such a convergence process in direction towards a residual welfare state, has to be negated here. Generally the persistence of different welfare state types can be documented, and the development of new types, e.g. a (South-)East-European type negated.

The title as well as the problem outline of this paper refer to the possibilities of the theoretical contextualisation of the states Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. An examination of social policy in real terms apart from relative quotas might convey a different image. Looking at life in the suburbs of Belgrade or in the communities in the Sandžak-region may raise scepticism about Serbia being a welfare state. The same is valid for Croatia, even though to a lesser extent. But such an examination has not been the aim of this research. Rather the here presented theoretical understanding of welfare states in South-East-Europe should be opposed to the reality in a next step in order to identify challenges and possibilities for development. Enough starting-points have been presented in this work.

## 7. Conclusion

Despite the common SFRY-PAYG (pay-as-you-go) heritage the social-political performance considerably varies in the single countries. Slovenia can be characterised a consolidated welfare state. In the case of Serbia, this has probably to be negated, especially against the background of the widespread poverty risk. Croatia takes a middle range position. The extent of the informal sector constitutes a challenge that is common to all three states. Moreover the research asserts that labour markets are strongly segmented in all three countries, what is especially true for young employees, ethnic minorities and handicapped persons. A consistent application of the political activation trends, particularly that of *workfare* and/or *flexicurity* can not be attested. In all three countries the design and the relative amount of passive labour market measures are comparable with industrial states. But due to the small coverage rate the support is accessible for a limited group of people only. Active labour market policy

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<sup>7</sup>Cases for which there is no clear compliance between the worlds of welfare capitalism and the worlds of labour market policy are Switzerland, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Slovenia.

measures are gaining relevance, not at least because of the gaining influence of the EU. Also these measures increasingly focus on specific and narrowly defined beneficiary groups. But nevertheless, the level of expenditure remains low and volatile. The possibilities to evaluate active labour market policies remain limited.

Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia can be assigned under both (welfare and labour market) approaches (1) without describing a new (South)-East European regime cluster (2). The thesis of a *race to the bottom* has to be negated in the chosen regional context (3). What all three countries have in common are the conservative characteristics in view of the welfare state regime and the labour market regime classification. As Slovenia combines these with social democratic characteristics, Serbia and Croatia can also be related to the *Mediterranean regime world* (4). To put it in a nutshell, applying Esping-Andersen's methodology is – despite of all valid critique – an adequate instrument for the research. While additionally considering worlds of labour market policy, various levels of social-political analysis have been combined. The results are also of empirical relevance, as evidence for the probability of diffusion and implementation of certain political solutions can be derived.

The work's dataset partly appears as a scientific puzzle. Critiques in this sense are not pushed aside but are emphatically demanded. This analysis marks a first step, as far as approved concepts and theoretical discourses are transferred into the South-East-European context. Further research has to prove the empirical robustness of these conclusions.

The paper unfolds diverse links. Many items have only been regarded from an isolated perspective. In order to obtain more precise results regarding the social policy in South-East-Europe it is necessary to expand the efforts on research as well as to improve coordination. Further analysis on the relevance of family and kinship in South-East European welfare states but also on the scope of the state, markets and the third sector in view of the welfare production are worth to conduct. Moreover questions concerning demographic change and work-life-balance also apply here. Continuing and expanding the described research project, especially the incorporation of another policy field is planned, namely that of long-term care. As adjustments on labour markets may follow common international trends, care regimes in South-East Europe and the OECD-world most probably vary widely. To analyse the background of these variations, especially the role of family and society in various welfare regimes is considered the next step. This inevitably leads to the incorporation of more interdisciplinary elements into the research project, namely anthropological and historical aspects.

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# Regime Change and the Politics of Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Serbia 2000-2002

*Mladen Ostojic*

*Queen Mary, University of London*

## 1. Introduction

Since the downfall of Milosevic, cooperation with the ICTY has been set both as a necessary condition for Serbia's integration into the international community, and as a symbolic measure of Serbian society's willingness to 'come to terms' with the legacy of the former regime. Serbia's reluctance to cooperate has often been associated with widespread denial of the atrocities committed by Serbs during the wars of Yugoslav succession, and with the irresponsible behaviour of its political elite unwilling to embrace the principles of liberal democracy.

These accounts generally overlook the complexity of democratic transition, and its interaction with transitional justice processes. A closer look at the intricacies of Serbian politics will allow us to offer a more substantial explanation of the domestic elites' attitudes towards cooperation with the ICTY and towards the pursuit of justice at the national level. In addition, contextualizing transitional justice within the process of democratisation that followed the overthrow of Milosevic should provide us with a greater understanding of the political implications of war crimes trials in Serbia.

The existing literature on state cooperation with the ICTY assumes that cooperation is a function of the external pressure to cooperate (i.e. conditionality) and the relative power between nationalist and moderate political groups at the domestic level. While some authors have emphasized the role of the Tribunal in pressuring states to cooperate<sup>1</sup>, others have stressed the role of internal political dynamics in order to explain shifts in cooperation with the ICTY<sup>2</sup>. At the domestic level, the terms of cooperation are usually deemed to be dependent on the relative power of nationalists,

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<sup>1</sup> See Kerr, R. (2004) *The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, Politics and Diplomacy*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, and Peskin, V. (2008) *International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans*. New York, Cambridge University Press.

<sup>2</sup> Subotic, J. (2008) *Coerced Justice: International War Crimes Tribunals, Conditionality and Compliance*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting at Hynes Convention Center in Boston, Massachusetts, 28th August.

who are assumed to be opposed to cooperation, and moderates, who are divided into 'instrumental compliers' and 'true believers'.

However, the situation is not so clear-cut on the ground. Political identities and preferences are neither pre-defined nor static. During democratic transitions, these identities are often blurred and those preferences are constantly altered as they are a function of the changing political circumstances. By neglecting these contingencies, the existing literature fails to explain why political actors support or oppose the process of transitional justice, and why their attitudes and discourses change over time. Those limitations represent a major obstacle for understanding the impact of international judicial intervention on the process of regime change in Serbia.

My research aims to compensate for this lack by investigating how Serbian domestic elites have accommodated the externally-led transitional justice initiative process embodied in the ICTY into the domestic political agenda. Instead of examining the determinants of state cooperation with the ICTY, my objective is to analyse how this issue has influenced elite-pacting during the early stages of democratisation in Serbia. In this paper, I examine the evolution in political elites' attitudes towards The Hague Tribunal during the first two years of the transition, which have been crucial in shaping the political landscape in post-Milosevic Serbia. This period is also important because it corresponds to the elaboration and adoption of the Law on Cooperation with The Hague, which contributed to the increased politicization of this issue.

## **2. Serbia's New Leadership and The Hague Conditionality**

The pursuit of justice in the former Yugoslavia has been deeply conditioned by the international community through the establishment of the ICTY. Unlike in the countries of the 'third wave' of democratization, the domestic elites in the former Yugoslavia were not allowed to make the choice of either proceeding with amnesty or using the instrument of transitional justice that they deemed most appropriate<sup>3</sup>. The need to carry out war crimes trials at the international level was based on the premise that the Yugoslav conflict was a direct consequence of 'incitement to hatred and organization of systematic violence by those in positions of leadership'<sup>4</sup>. War crimes trials were purported to expose the responsibility of the elites in triggering the conflict and tolerating or perpetrating atrocities. This was deemed necessary in order to pave the way for the peaceful coexistence of different communities. By specifically targeting the most high-ranking Serb officials, the ICTY office of the prosecutor (OTP) sent a clear message that it considers the Serbian political elite to be disproportionately responsible for the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia. Consequently, it should be

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<sup>3</sup> The notion of a 'third wave of democratization' was coined by Samuel Huntington to characterise the political transitions which took place in late twentieth century Southern Europe, Latin America and post-communist Central and Eastern Europe (See Huntington, S. P. (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. University of Oklahoma Press.)

<sup>4</sup> Akhavan, P. (1998) Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 20 (4), p. 765.

expected that the political impact of the ICTY on targeted countries will be most sizeable in Serbia.

During the nineties, cooperation between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the ICTY was almost inexistent. Although Milosevic had recognised and committed himself to cooperate with The Hague Tribunal by signing the Dayton peace agreement, he never took up this commitment. During this period, official propaganda denounced The Hague tribunal as an instrument for the demonization of Serbs by portraying the indictments against Serb individuals as ascription of the collective guilt of the Serb nation. These accusations escalated during and after the Kosovo war as the Tribunal issued indictments against key representatives of the regime, including Milosevic. In this context, the ICTY was depicted by government officials and state-sponsored media as a terrorist organisation that worked as an ideological support for the NATO aggression against the FRY.

The wave of mass protests that toppled the regime of Slobodan Milosevic on 5 October 2000 opened a new era in Serbian politics. Milosevic was defeated at the Yugoslav presidential and parliamentary elections on 24 September 2000 by Vojislav Kostunica and the DOS coalition that brought together eighteen parties of the democratic opposition. As Milosevic refused to recognise his defeat, the opposition organised a general strike and a series of mass protests that culminated on the 5 October with the demonstrators taking over the parliament and the state television. In view of his incapacity to stop the wave of mass protests, Milosevic surrendered the reins of power to the opposition. In the following days, the DOS coalition struck a deal with the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) to create an interim government and called for early parliamentary elections in the Republic of Serbia in December 2000. These elections consolidated the opposition's authority, as Milosevic's SPS and the right-wing Serbian Radical Party (SRS) became marginalised. The new Serbian government was led by Zoran Djindjic, one of the most important actors within the democratic opposition as leader of the Democratic Party (DS).

These events marked the end of a decade of political repression, armed conflict and international isolation that had caused dramatic socio-economic decline in the country and the entire region. The new authorities strived to reintegrate the country into the international community, which was indispensable in order to proceed with the reconstruction of the economy and the reform of the state administration. While the Western governments unconditionally supported and welcomed Serbia's new leaders as they stepped into power, the issue of cooperation with the ICTY soon acquired in importance on the agenda of foreign diplomats. After a 'grace period' of several months which allowed the new Serbian authorities to settle in, the urge for cooperation increased with requests for the extradition of Milosevic and other war crimes suspects.

The position of the new authorities towards the Tribunal was hard to discern. As mentioned above, the governing DOS coalition was composed of eighteen parties whose attitudes towards the Tribunal amply differed. On the one hand, the leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and president of Yugoslavia, Vojislav Kostunica, was a pronounced critic of the ICTY. He openly rejected the possibility of extraditing Milosevic to The Hague during the presidential campaign in the summer 2000 and

continuously blamed the ICTY for being biased against Serbs<sup>5</sup>. This position was confirmed during Carla Del Ponte's first visit to Belgrade in January 2001, when he barely accepted to meet her, and even then only to express his objections to the work of the Tribunal. On the other hand, Prime Minister Djindjic and most of the other leaders in the DOS coalition considered that cooperation with The Hague was inevitable for Serbia's reintegration in the international community. However, they insisted that domestic prosecutions would be preferable, especially with regards to Milosevic. The persistence on trying Milosevic in Serbia initially provided a common ground for articulating these different positions within the DOS coalition by suggesting that cooperation would not necessarily imply the extradition of Yugoslav citizens.

This position did not satisfy The Hague tribunal and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) who insisted on the extradition of all war crimes suspects to the ICTY, including Milosevic. Although there were some suggestions that the trial of Milosevic could be partly held in Belgrade, this possibility was rejected by the Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte<sup>6</sup>. The main arguments against such an option were that it would have been difficult to bring and guarantee the safety of witnesses in Belgrade, and that this concession would have triggered the same demands from other suspects. Furthermore, the possibility of organising domestic prosecutions was discredited by the inertia of the Serbian judiciary, which had not yet undertaken any proceedings for war crimes in spite of the change of regime. As a result, the new authorities were presented with the fact that further economic aid and progress towards full integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions would be conditioned upon cooperation with the ICTY. The US government summoned the authorities in Belgrade to adopt a clear stance with regards to cooperation with the ICTY by 31 March 2001. Failure to do so would result in the freezing of financial assistance and the withdrawal of America's support to the FRY in international financial institutions<sup>7</sup>. This request followed intense diplomatic activity by the Tribunal's Chief Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, who appealed to Western governments to condition economic aid on cooperation with The Hague tribunal<sup>8</sup>.

Such an increase in foreign pressure led Zoran Djindjić and the Serbian government to undertake measures towards implementing cooperation with The Hague. However, the Serbian government room for manoeuvre was constrained by the fact that Serbia's constitution did not provide for any type of extradition. This matter was within the remit of the federal Yugoslav government that was in charge of the country's foreign policy. The Yugoslav constitution prohibited the extradition of Yugoslav citizens to

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<sup>5</sup> Koštunica: Milosević neće ići u Hag (Kostunica : Milosevic will not go to The Hague), *B92*, September 5, 2000

<sup>6</sup> This suggestion was made by the Deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt in early March 2001. (Tribunal spreman da sudi Miloševiću u Beogradu [The Tribunal is Ready to Try Milosevic in Belgrade], *Danas*, March 8, 2001)

<sup>7</sup> The US Congress established an annual certification process for assessing Yugoslavia's cooperation with the ICTY in the fall of 2000. This certification was made a condition for the delivery of financial assistance and support to the FRY. (Peskin, V., 2008, p.68)

<sup>8</sup> Evropa mora da uceni SRJ (Europe must put pressure on the FRY), *GLAS*, February 19, 2001.

foreign countries, but it was unclear whether this applied in the case of international institutions such as the ICTY. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the federal government relied on a coalition between DOS and the Montenegrin Socialist Popular Party (SNP), Milosevic's closest political ally throughout the nineties. This awkward coalition was based on the intention to preserve and reform the Yugoslav federation, whose legitimacy and functioning were however hampered by the Montenegrin DPS leadership's continuing boycott of federal institutions<sup>9</sup>. Although the SNP representatives pledged cooperation with The Hague, they firmly opposed the extradition of Yugoslav citizens to the ICTY. This prevented the adoption of a law on cooperation with the ICTY at the federal level that would entail the transfer of war crimes suspects to the Tribunal.

In the absence of political consensus and legislation with regards to the extradition of Yugoslav citizens, the authorities decided to proceed with the transfer of foreign suspects residing in Yugoslavia. The first to be delivered was Milomir Stakic, the former Mayor of Prijedor, who was arrested and transferred to The Hague on 23 March 2001. Although the Yugoslav legislation allowed for the extradition of foreign citizens, this move was condemned by President Kostunica and the SNP who argued that transfers to The Hague should await the adoption of a law on cooperation with the ICTY<sup>10</sup>. With no regulations or procedures in place for the arrest and transfer of war crimes suspects to The Hague, the critics and opponents of cooperation denounced Stakic's extradition as a kidnapping.

In addition, the Serbian authorities proceeded with the arrest of Slobodan Milosevic on 31 March 2001 so as to meet the deadline set by the US administration. Milosevic was convicted for corruption and abuse of power by the domestic judiciary which struggled to collect enough evidence on time to meet the US deadline. While the arrest of Milosevic was welcomed by Western officials, his indictment for ordinary criminal offences further raised doubts about Belgrade's ability and readiness to prosecute the former Yugoslav president for war crimes. Despite the insistence of the Yugoslav authorities that Milosevic should be tried in Belgrade and allusions by some Western diplomats of such an option being conceivable, it became clear that his extradition to The Hague was inevitable. Djindjic's calls to the domestic judiciary to instigate prosecutions for war crimes fell upon deaf ears. This could not have been undertaken without thorough reforms of domestic institutions that remained staffed with Milosevic-era executives and crippled by inertia. Unsatisfied with Belgrade's level of cooperation with the ICTY, Washington made US participation to a donor conference for the reconstruction of FRY conditional upon further improvement in this field. This

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<sup>9</sup> The Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS), which was in power in the Republic of Montenegro, boycotted the Yugoslav institutions from 1998. This boycott was a measure undertaken by the DPS leader and Montenegrin president, Milo Djukanovic, in order to distance itself from the regime of Slobodan Milosevic.

<sup>10</sup> Koliko međunarodne norme (ne) obavezuju na saradnju (To What Extent Can (Not) International Norms Force Cooperation), *Politika*, March 27, 2001.

time, it was made explicit that this request entailed extraditions of war crimes suspects to The Hague<sup>11</sup>.

### 3. The Extradition of Milosevic as Political Breaking Point

The increased pressure on the Yugoslav authorities to cooperate with The Hague brought the issue to the top of the domestic political agenda. The firm position adopted by the American authorities with regard to this matter substantially raised the stakes of non-compliance, which led the domestic elites to change their attitudes towards the Tribunal. This change of mood was noticeable in Kostunica's pledge for the adoption of a law on cooperation with the ICTY during his visit to the United States in early May 2001<sup>12</sup>. Upon his return from America, the Yugoslav president declared that alignment with the international community required difficult compromises with regards to The Hague tribunal<sup>13</sup>. Kostunica's change of tone was mitigated by his insistence on two-way cooperation between Belgrade and The Hague, and his appeals to the Prosecution to raise indictments against the Croatian and Kosovar Albanian leaderships. For the Serbian government, the participation of the United States to the donor's conference scheduled for the 29 June 2001 was vital in order to secure political and financial support for the implementation of reforms in the country. This induced the Serbian officials to prioritize cooperation for the sake of economic recovery and the integration of the country into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Nonetheless, the Serbian government's endorsement of cooperation was mixed with open criticism of the work of the Tribunal and requests to the Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte to investigate war crimes committed against ethnic Serbs<sup>14</sup>.

In early 2001, the DOS leaders agreed that cooperation with The Hague should be administered through the adoption of a new piece of legislation on this matter<sup>15</sup>. This view was particularly defended by Kostunica, who adopted legalism and the respect of institutional procedures as his political marker. Kostunica insisted that the adoption of a law on cooperation with the ICTY was necessary in order to guarantee the rights of the indictees and the integrity of the State. In his public appearances, the Yugoslav president cautioned that cooperation with The Hague should not impinge upon the implementation of the rule of law and democracy<sup>16</sup>. However, the SNP's continuous

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<sup>11</sup> Izručenje-pre svega (Extradition - Above All), *Večernje Novosti*, May 11, 2001.

<sup>12</sup> Zakon o saradnji sa sudom u Hagu do kraja meseca (Law on Cooperation with The Hague Tribunal by the End of the Month), *Politika*, May 13, 2001.

<sup>13</sup> Neophodno pravno utemeljiti saradnju sa Hagom (Cooperation with The Hague Must be Given a Legal Framework), *Danas*, May 28, 2001.

<sup>14</sup> Batićevo pismo Karli Del Ponte (Batic's Letter to Carla Del Ponte), *B92*, April 5, 2001.

<sup>15</sup> Svi za sudjenje, sporno mesto (All are for the Trial, But Where?), *Blic*, February 7, 2001.

<sup>16</sup> Koliko međunarodne norme (ne) obavezuju na saradnju (To What Extent Can (Not) International Norms Force Cooperation), *Politika*, March 27, 2001.

opposition to the extradition of Yugoslav citizens to the ICTY prevented the adoption of such legislation at the federal level.

This situation largely contributed towards misleadingly shifting the debate about The Hague tribunal from the political to the legal sphere. Both the supporters and the opponents of cooperation with the ICTY increasingly resorted to legal arguments in order to justify their positions. Government officials stated that Yugoslavia was bound to cooperate on the basis of its membership of the UN and its commitments under the Dayton and Kumanovo peace agreements. This argument was also advanced by the Tribunal's officials and their local supporters who considered that a law on cooperation with the ICTY was unnecessary since cooperation could be based on the direct application of the Statute of the Tribunal<sup>17</sup>.

On the other hand, the opponents of cooperation with The Hague tribunal argued that any type of extradition was proscribed by the constitution. The 'battle' over the interpretation of the legislation implicated an array of lawyers and legal experts who substantiated the claims put forward by the rival political groups. The 'legalist' argument was espoused by the representatives of the former regime as a supplement to their established anti-Western rhetoric, which depicted the tribunal as an anti-Serbian institution. Shifting the debate to the legal field had several advantages for the opponents of The Hague tribunal. First of all, they knew that the adoption of a law on cooperation was highly improbable due to the opposition of the SNP. Secondly, even if such legislation was passed, it would be easily challenged by the Constitutional Court which was still staffed with Milosevic's appointees. In those circumstances, legalism constituted a powerful strategy for obstructing cooperation with The Hague.

These debates about the law on cooperation with the ICTY and the extradition of Milosevic coincided with the discovery of mass graves in central Serbia. In May 2001, Serbian public opinion was struck by the disclosure of evidence that the former regime had been concealing the atrocities committed in Kosovo by displacing the corpses and hiding them across the country. These events constituted the first direct 'encounter' of the Serbian public with the war crimes perpetrated in their name by the regime of Milosevic. Although Serbian society has been deeply traumatized by the NATO bombings, the average citizen had been relatively spared from the remote 'theatres of war' in Croatia, Bosnia or Kosovo. In this context, the discovery of refrigerator trucks filled with bodies in the Danube and the excavation of mass graves in the suburbs of Belgrade came as a shock for the majority of the people.

These events provided strong evidence and a moral argument for sending Milosevic to The Hague. The working group established by the Ministry of Interior accused Milosevic and the highest political and military officials of having organised the displacement of mass graves from Kosovo in order to conceal the atrocities for which they were responsible. The government officials reinstated the need for war crimes trials in order to individualise guilt and instigate the process of reckoning with the past. And since the domestic judiciary did not undertake any steps to elucidate these crimes, the arguments against the surrender of war crimes suspects to The Hague lost some of

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<sup>17</sup> Ni odlaganje predaje ni ustupanje slučaja Milošević ('Neither Delay of Rendition Nor Concessions in the Milosevic case'), *Danas*, March 27, 2001.

their credibility. However, the representatives of the SPS and SRS blamed the authorities of staging the discovery of mass graves and spreading misinformation in order to justify the extradition of Milosevic. While these accusations clearly only illustrated the viciousness of these political factions, it is a fact that the issue of mass graves and war crimes faded off the agenda soon after Milosevic's extradition. The new authorities had good reasons to avoid this issue. The political elites heavily relied on the allegiance of military, police and other high-ranking officials who carried a significant share of responsibility for the exactions committed in Kosovo<sup>18</sup>.

By mid June 2001, it became clear that the long-lasting negotiations between the DOS coalition and the SNP regarding the adoption of the law on cooperation with the ICTY had not and would not bring any results. This issue threatened to destabilize the federal government and to imperil the very existence of the Yugoslav state, whose subsistence depended on the coalition in power<sup>19</sup>. As the date of the donor conference was set for the end of June, the DOS coalition opted to replace the project law with a decree that could be voted by the federal government without being approved by the parliament. This alternative constituted a compromise between the Serbian government's urge to show proof of cooperation and thereby guarantee the success of the donor conference, and Kostunica's insistence on legalism. On the basis of this legal act, the Serbian authorities initiated procedures for the extradition of Milosevic. In the following days, the decree was abrogated by the Yugoslav Constitutional Court on the initiative of the SPS and a group of lawyers representing Milosevic. But on the eve of the donor conference, the Serbian government took the decision to proceed with the handover of Milosevic to The Hague on the basis of the direct application of the statute of the ICTY.

The extradition of Milosevic on the 28 June, which corresponds to the date of the historic Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and Milosevic's most important political rally in 1989, marked a symbolic break with the former regime. Djindjic justified the government's move by challenging the legitimacy of the Yugoslav Constitutional Court's decision on the basis that this institution remained in the hands of Milosevic's cronies<sup>20</sup>. He added that failure to cooperate with the ICTY would imperil economic recovery and result in renewed isolation of the country. However, this event also marked a clear break within the leading DOS coalition. The extradition of Milosevic was heavily condemned by Kostunica who characterised it as an attack against the rule

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<sup>18</sup> In January 2001, Colonel Sreten Lukic was appointed as new Chief of Public Security and Deputy Serbian Interior Minister. He was subsequently indicted by the ICTY for his role as Chief of the Headquarters of the Ministry of Interior in Pristina during the Kosovo war. This move provoked substantial deterioration in the relations between the Serbian government and The Hague tribunal in 2003.

<sup>19</sup> One of the main objectives of the DOS-SNP government was to set the ground for the reform of the Yugoslav federation, which led to the creation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in early 2003.

<sup>20</sup> Milošević u Hagu (Milosevic in The Hague), *Blic*, June 29, 2001.

of law and the federal state<sup>21</sup>. These criticisms echoed the accusations of the representatives of the former regime, who equated the government's decision with a coup. In the following days, the representatives of the DSS formed into a separate group in the Serbian parliament and called for the formation of a new Serbian government. At the federal level, the representatives of the SNP resigned from government. However this measure proved to be only symbolic, as they shortly afterwards formed a new cabinet with the DOS coalition for the sake of preserving the Yugoslav federation and their position in the federal government.

#### **4. The Hague at the Centre of Domestic Power Struggles**

The extradition of Milosevic gave some respite to the authorities with regard to cooperation with The Hague. Having met the conditions set by the international community, the government could temporarily postpone the extradition of the remaining war crimes suspects. This issue soon disappeared from the public spotlight, as officials insisted that the country needed to 'move on' and stop dealing with Milosevic<sup>22</sup>.

Nevertheless, the altercation over the extradition of Milosevic badly affected the cohesion of the ruling coalition. Although the DSS did not officially withdraw from the DOS coalition, the relations between this party and the rest of the coalition significantly deteriorated in the subsequent period. The increased antagonisms created a clear split between the Yugoslav president Kostunica and his Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) on the one hand, and those political groups allied to Djindjic's Democratic Party (DS) and centred around the Serbian government on the other. The summer of 2001 was marked by the outbreak of political scandals in which the opposing factions mutually accused each other of being involved in corruption and organised crime<sup>23</sup>. These sporadic quarrels turned into an open political crisis as the DSS withdrew from the Serbian government in August 2001. This move did not undermine the DOS government, which could still rely on a substantial majority in parliament, but it did however put an end to the unity of the so-called 'democratic bloc'.

The row between the DSS and the rest of the DOS coalition soon turned into a broader power struggle that was nourished by the premature electoral competition between these political parties. The DSS had good reasons to ask for a government reshuffle or anticipated elections as their share of power within the government was neatly inferior

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<sup>21</sup> Izručenje se ne može smatrati zakonitim (Extradition cannot be considered lawful), *Blic*, June 29, 2001.

<sup>22</sup> Vreme je da prestanemo da se bavimo Milosevicem (Let's move on from Milosevic), *Politika*, 30.06.01

<sup>23</sup> Vasić, M. (2005) *Atentat na Zorana*. Beograd: Politika, B92, Vreme, Narodna Knjiga, pp. 100-123

to their actual political rating<sup>24</sup>. Indeed, although the DSS was only a minor opposition party during the nineties, Kostunica had since become the most popular political figure in the country, as the man who defeated Milosevic. Therefore, this party had no more interest in participating in a coalition government in which its political weight was marginal. At the same time, the rest of the DOS coalition, dominated by the Democratic Party (DS), had good reasons to marginalise and weaken a prospective electoral opponent. In those circumstances, every opportunity for discrediting the rival was fully exploited by both sides.

The cooperation with The Hague once again became a central theme in the power struggle between Kostunica and Djindjic following the mutiny of the Special Operations Unit (*Jedinica za Specijalne Operacije* or *Red Berets*, JSO) in November 2001. The JSO was a military unit placed under the command of the Serbian State Security Services (*Resor Državne Bezbednosti*, RDB). This unit had been created by Milosevic in the beginning of the nineties in order to organise paramilitary groups and coordinate military actions in Croatia and Bosnia, as well as to get rid of political opponents in Serbia. Its members were heavily involved in organised crime, as were most of the Serbian Security Services under Milosevic<sup>25</sup>. However, during the events surrounding 5 October 2000, the JSO shifted their allegiance to the opposition<sup>26</sup>. They forged a close relationship with Djindjic, who called on them on several occasions, including for the arrest of Milosevic.

On 9 November 2001, the JSO was ordered to assist the police in the arrest of two Bosnian Serb brothers - Predrag and Nenad Banovic - who were immediately transferred to The Hague. This arrest provoked the revolt of the JSO, who claimed not having been informed that the two brothers were indicted by the ICTY. The JSO organised a week-long protest during which they stopped responding to the orders of their superiors and on several occasions blocked the major highways using their armoured vehicles. The unit requested the resignation of Serbia's Interior Minister Dusan Mihajlovic and the adoption of a law on cooperation with the ICTY, without which they would refuse to arrest other war crimes suspects. It emerged that the mutiny of the JSO was at least partly motivated by the news that The Hague tribunal was inquiring into the actions of the unit during the nineties. However, it seems that the main objective of this action was to halt the government's attempts to tackle organised crime, which explicitly targeted, amongst others, the leaders of the unit<sup>27</sup>.

The action of the JSO was unilaterally condemned by the representatives of the Serbian government who denounced it as a political manipulation. The fact that the members of the JSO took to the streets in their uniforms and armoured vehicles was particularly disturbing as it raised the question about whether this constituted a protest or an

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<sup>24</sup> Fieldwork interview with Milan Milosevic, Belgrade, April 2009.

<sup>25</sup> Edmunds, T. (2008) Intelligence Agencies and Democratisation: Continuity and Change in Serbia after Milosevic. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 60 (1), pp. 32-33.

<sup>26</sup> Vasić, M., 2005, pp. 16-30

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 75-95

insurrection. President Kostunica and the DSS stood out in their support to the mutineers and their condemnation of the Serbian government for sending people to The Hague without any legal basis. They argued that the demands of the JSO were legitimate and that these events substantiated the need for the adoption of a law on cooperation with the ICTY. Once again, the posture of the DSS was in line with the stance of the former regime's representatives that were equally critical towards the Serbian government. The crisis was eventually resolved after a series of negotiations between the government and the mutineers, following which the heads of the State Security Services were dismissed and the unit was reallocated to the Public Security Services.

The implicit collusion between some political parties and tabloid media with the mutiny of the JSO revived rumours about a so-called 'anti-Hague' lobby seeking to undermine cooperation with The Hague. In the following period, misinformation with lists of alleged suspects wanted by the ICTY were regularly placed in the tabloid press in order to spread fear and animosity towards The Hague within the ranks of the police and military. The adoption of the law on cooperation with the ICTY once again became a top priority for the authorities as well as a point of contention between Kostunica and Djindjic. In view of the unpopularity of The Hague tribunal, both leaders attempted to place the responsibility for this issue on the other side and to blame each other for failing to enact the legislation.

In December 2001, the DSS put forward a proposal that provided for the adoption of an outline law at the federal level that would allow the republics to adopt their own legislation regarding cooperation with the tribunal and the handling of the process of extradition. This proposal, which allegedly sought to resolve the impasse created by the SNP in the federal parliament, was rejected by the rest of the DOS coalition that insisted on keeping this matter within the remit of the federal government. Indeed, the DOS representatives argued that there was no reason for the Serbian government to assume entire responsibility for the 'dirty business', as this would necessarily result in a sharp loss of popularity<sup>28</sup>. But increased international pressure forced the authorities to resume the negotiations with the SNP for the adoption of a federal law on cooperation with The Hague. As the deadline for the American certification of cooperation with The Hague was set for 31 March, the Serbian government announced that it would once again proceed with the extraditions on the basis of the Statute of the Tribunal if the legislation was not enacted.

After a series of altercations between Djindjic and Kostunica, in which they accused each other of undermining the adoption of the legislation and leading the country into isolation, the law on cooperation was finally enacted by the Yugoslav parliament on 10 April 2002. This was done with the support of the SNP, which changed its political calculus in view of the impending parliamentary elections in Montenegro<sup>29</sup>. The SNP accepted to vote for the law under the condition that extradition would be applicable

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<sup>28</sup> Ni DOS ni Vlada Srbije neće odobriti predlog DSS (Neither DOS nor the Serbian Government to Support the Proposal of DSS), *DANAS*, December 20, 2001.

<sup>29</sup> Ševeningen specijalis (Scheveningen Specialis), *Vreme*, April 11, 2002.

only in the case of suspects that have already been indicted by the Tribunal<sup>30</sup>. The adoption of the law was marked by the suicide of the former Minister of Interior and Hague indictee Vljako Stojiljkovic on the steps of the federal parliament. The critiques of the Tribunal, including Kostunica, used this event to denounce the destabilizing effect of international pressure to cooperate with the ICTY. In spite of this, the following months marked a radical increase in the number of extraditions to The Hague, which led the US to approve economic support and temporarily ease the pressure for cooperation<sup>31</sup>.

## 5. Conclusion

The Serbian case shows that state cooperation with international tribunals cannot simply be understood as a function of the international pressure to cooperate and the power relations between predetermined moderate and nationalist political groups in the targeted country. The obstacles to cooperation with the ICTY in Serbia did not emanate from a homogeneous group of actors who shared the same ideological stance or identical political goals. The so-called 'anti-Hague' coalition was rather a loose group of actors whose interests coincided or differed according to circumstances. However, this coalition transcended the dichotomy between former regime and former opposition, which changed the political calculus among the new elites and contributed towards the erosion of the ruling coalition.

This analysis also shows that the relationship between international justice and democratisation is reciprocal and variable. While the international pressure to cooperate with the ICTY initially affected domestic elite-pacting in the case of the extradition of Milosevic, this issue has subsequently been instrumentalized in the power struggle between the domestic elites. Bearing in mind the wide unpopularity of the Tribunal amongst the domestic constituency, the issue of cooperation with The Hague has been used by the two competing factions within government to discredit each other in view of the prospective electoral competition.

The Serbian case raises serious questions about the democratizing potential of international justice. It shows that the premature insistence on justice may represent a factor of instability in the wake of regime change. It also shows that too rigid an approach to justice may be counter-productive. Djindjic's calls for postponing the issue of war crimes until the initial stage of reforms has been completed fell on deaf ears, as the Chief Prosecutor insisted on the immediate handover of all war crimes suspects<sup>32</sup>. These observations call for the reassessment of the sequencing between justice and democratization and the re-conceptualization of the governance of international justice.

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<sup>30</sup> This provision was heavily criticized by the representatives of the Tribunal, and it was subsequently amended in 2003.

<sup>31</sup> Peskin, V., 2005, pp.78-81.

<sup>32</sup> See, for instance, Djindjic's speech at the conference 'In search of Truth and Responsibility - Towards a Democratic Future' held in Belgrade in May 2001. [www.b92.net/trr/2001/diskusija/index.php?lang=srpski&nav\\_id=42447](http://www.b92.net/trr/2001/diskusija/index.php?lang=srpski&nav_id=42447)

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# Motivational Issues in Teaching English for Specific Purposes (ESP): Implementing a Motivationally Conscious Teaching Approach

*Nataša Kostić*

*Institute of Foreign Languages, Montenegro*

## 1. Introduction

Motivation is defined as the learner's orientation with regard to the goal of learning a foreign language. No matter what the underlying motivation to study a second language, what cannot be disputed is the fact that motivation is an important variable when examining successful second language acquisition. Much of the research on the role of motivation in second/foreign language (L2) learning achievement has been inspired by psychologists Robert Gardner and Wallace Lambert (1972) who established a social psychological approach to L2 motivation as well as scientific research procedures, assessment techniques and instruments. In the past the majority of studies focused on the social and pragmatic dimensions of L2 motivation; in the last three decades some researchers have added new components (e.g., Julkunen, 1989; Skehan, 1989; Brown, 1990; Ramage, 1990; Crookes and Schmidt, 1991), of which the most general and well-known is the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Behaviours that are extrinsically motivated are the ones that the individual performs to receive some extrinsic reward (e.g., good grades) whereas in intrinsically motivated behaviour the reward is internal (e.g., a satisfaction in doing a particular activity). Deci and Ryan (1985) argue that intrinsic motivation is potentially a central motivator of the educational process and that 'when the educational environment provides optimal challenges, rich sources of stimulation, and a context of autonomy, this motivational wellspring in learning is likely to flourish' (p.245). Extrinsic motivation has traditionally been seen as something that can undermine intrinsic motivation. However, research on intrinsic/extrinsic motivation has shown that under certain circumstances, i.e. if they are sufficiently self-determined and internalized, extrinsic rewards can be combined with or lead to intrinsic motivation. The self-determination theory was introduced by Deci and Ryan as an elaboration of the intrinsic/extrinsic construct. Self-determination (i.e. autonomy) is seen as a prerequisite for any behaviour to be intrinsically rewarding. Pintrich (1999) has suggested that for university students, who have greater choice and control over time, effort, studying and class-attendance than high school students, a concern about gaining good grades acts as a motivation-boosting mechanism which encourages students to attend classes and become involved in the course work. Kantaridou (2004) even states that ESP (English for Specific Purposes) and EAP (English for Academic Purposes) learning is not

intrinsically motivating, basically for two reasons: a) English is not their main subject matter, and b) student motivation to learn EAP is neutral, i.e. neither strong nor negative. She also argues that ESP teachers should not be worried by any detrimental effects from external rewards because these only appear in cases where the activity is intrinsically motivated, which is not the case here.

In order to grasp the array of variables and processes involved in motives related to the learning situation Dörnyei (1990) separates three sets of motivational components: 1) course-specific motivational components, i.e. the syllabus, the teaching materials, the teaching method, and the learning tasks; 2) teacher-specific motivational components concerning the teacher's personality, teaching style, feedback and relationship with the students (sharing responsibility with them, offering them options and choices, letting them have a say in establishing priorities and involving them in the decision making); and 3) group-specific motivational components concerning the dynamics of the learning group, with special emphasis on goal-orientedness, norm and reward system, group cohesion and classroom goal structures. Based on the components of this model, Dörnyei (1996) proposes the most systematic collection of L2 motivational macrostrategies which are broken down to several microstrategies and techniques. Although the proposed model integrates many lines of research and represents a theoretical possibility many of its components have been verified with little or no empirical research in the L2 field.

## **2. Background**

I have taught English for 9 years at the Institute of Foreign Languages, University of Montenegro and for the last three years Medical English to the first, second, fourth and fifth year medical students at the University of Montenegro. English is a compulsory subject in the first four semesters at the School of Medicine, and in the fifth, eighth and ninth it is one of the electives. At the beginning of the academic year 2008/2009 I devised a questionnaire in order to assess the needs of the first year students and find out about their expectations. The results showed that they were eager to learn English, and that they were aware of the fact that English is indispensable in their future career. Among other things, I asked them to complete the following sentences: (1) During this course, I want to learn...(2) During this course I will improve...(3) After I complete this course, I will be able to...(4) In my English class I would like to do...(5) In my English class I wouldn't like to do... Having analyzed their answers, I detected some typical examples of instrumental motivation (i.e., interest in learning a language because it is useful in some way), such as "I want to learn how to express myself in every situation in my future job"; "I want to learn a lot of medical words that I need in order to communicate with patients and colleagues"; "I will be able to read medical literature in English"; "I will improve my vocabulary and my general knowledge of English"; "I will improve my speaking skill". This is consistent with the results of the studies that have found that generally students select instrumental reasons for the study of foreign language. Still, there were also a few answers that showed other reasons for learning, for example: "Communication with my colleagues will contribute to developing a flexible relationship between us, and, as a result, we will understand each other better and we will cooperate better"; "English literature has always interested me, and I would like to know more about British culture and people, become a better translator

of English literature and visit England one day". These answers exhibit another type of motivation, namely integrative motivation, which is characterized by the learner's positive attitude towards the target language group and the desire to integrate into the target language community. Brown (2000) makes the point that both integrative and instrumental motivation are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Learners rarely select only one form of motivation when learning a second language, but rather a combination of both orientations.

As for the answers to the sentences (4) and (5) the majority of students said they would like to do some useful things, such as "the exchange of knowledge with other people" – as one of them wrote. What they all agreed to do is participate in conversations where everyone gets the chance to say something and express their opinion about the topic. On the other side, everybody disliked traditional grammar exercises and the type of class where students are mainly passive recipients of knowledge.

Although students attended my classes regularly, during the first half of the first semester they seemed to lack deep involvement in learning. Having talked to my students, I established several factors that seemed to impede their motivation: there are more "important" subjects to study (e.g. Anatomy, Histology); there are subjects that earn much more credits (23 (out of 60) for Anatomy compared to 6 for English); all the students who pass the examination get the same grade ("pass"); their timetable is crowded and, as a result, students usually come to English classes very tired; finally, first year students' attitude towards English classes is heavily influenced by the experience they bring from high school (low amount of autonomy, too much grammar and few communication activities, so they expected the same in my classes).

Teaching materials failed to capture the interest of my students due to heavy emphasis on vocabulary and grammar. The typical textbook unit consists of a medical text followed by comprehension questions, vocabulary exercises (such as find words in the text that fit the description, give words with similar or opposite meaning, use the correct form of a word in brackets) and standard grammar exercises. I concluded that these exercises were not entirely satisfactory, as they: (a) do not promote student - student interaction; (b) rely solely on reading/interpreting; (c) do not promote creative use of language; (d) do not require further manipulation of input; (e) take but a couple of minutes to solve, and (f) offer no real challenge or enjoyment.

It seemed that the kind of motivation my students already had at the beginning of the academic year simply wasn't strong enough when faced with the circumstances they found themselves in. I decided to boost another type of motivation, namely the one created by myself as a teacher through a good rapport with my class, and by the confidence I can create in them. My reasoning was that interest, enjoyment and a sense of accomplishment in class is important, and that the lack of it can undermine even the strongest internal motivation felt by a student. The purpose of this paper is to describe and discuss some practical activities designed with an aim to increase the students' motivation in an ESP/EAP learning context and thus demonstrate how it is possible to motivate students by: encouraging them to make more responsibility for their learning, promoting considerable student autonomy and encouraging their participation in decision-making about the selection of classroom activities. Although this paper will deal with the issue of motivation in medical English context, I believe that the activities presented are applicable to many teaching situations and the

conclusions are useful for all teachers, no matter whether they teach General English or ESP.

### **3. Method**

I devised and implemented interesting and enjoyable activities that, in my opinion, can help boost students' motivation. These were designed according to my view of learning as something which should be very dynamic and interpersonal, having in mind all three sets of motivational components proposed by Dörnyei (1990) (course-specific, teacher-specific and group-specific) and combining them in a way to achieve the best results. Proposed activities have in common goals of increasing autonomy for learners and giving a high priority to satisfying learner's needs. What I will stress is the importance of encouraging students to take more responsibility for their learning. Emotional aspects of learning, such as a feeling of self-worth and the need to cooperate with others, are also emphasized. All the activities are in line with Allwright's (1981) observation that 'teacher overload often entails learner underinvolvement since teachers are doing work learners could more profitably do for themselves' (p.11).

#### ***3.1. Participants***

Participants were first year students of the School of Medicine, University of Montenegro (a total of 24 students) who enrolled in the first year in academic 2008/2009. The activities were done in three classes in the second half of the first (autumn) semester.

#### ***3.2. Classroom Activities***

##### ***3.2.1. Activity 1***

This activity focuses on reading skills (skimming, as well as extracting specific information), speaking skills (oral presentation) and writing (summarizing, making notes). It is done in groups. The class was divided into six groups of four students (my class has 24 students, but the activity is also possible in groups of two). Each group was given a medical text followed by specific tasks. In some groups two students were responsible for carrying out the same task, and in some groups all four had to cooperate in order to perform the same task. The texts were taken from the Internet site [www.medicalnewstoday.com](http://www.medicalnewstoday.com) and they all contained the latest news from the medical world.

Three groups had to prepare a role play following the instructions indicated on a piece of paper that each member of a group got with the text. Group one had to prepare an interview based on an article entitled "Facts about Influenza", with two students acting as journalists and the other two as doctors. Both of these 'subgroups' had to make notes and prepare questions (or be prepared to answer) on the basis of the article they had to read before the interview. They were told that they wouldn't be allowed to read from the text during the role play, but they could use the notes they had made when

preparing for the activity. Group two was given the article called “New Scientific Yoga and Art of Relaxation” and a task to prepare an interview; in this case two students had to assume the role of an Indian Yoga trainer and his assistant (the article is about his yoga, meditation and relaxation sessions in London) and the other two the role of interviewers whose task was to present these people and their work to the audience. Like in group one, students had to read the article, make notes and prepare questions (or be prepared to answer); again, they were told that they wouldn’t be allowed to read from the article. Students in group three had the same tasks as in group one, but a different article; in this case, topic was anxiety and the article entitled “What is Anxiety? What causes Anxiety? What to do about it?” provided a very interesting and detailed medical description of it.

The other three groups had to prepare presentations based on the articles that reported on the results of two studies and a survey. Their task was to read the article, and, within a group, discuss the topic of the study (or a survey), its methodology and conclusions. Then, assuming the roles of the researchers mentioned in the articles, to think of the best way to present the research to their colleagues. They were allowed to make notes, but not to read from the article during the presentation, and the task had to be equally divided among all four members of the group. One group reported on a study that showed how sleep improves memory, published in the journal *Neuroscience*; the other read two papers on insomnia, the one presented at the Annual Meeting of the Associated Professional Sleep Societies and the other from the *Journal of Behavioural Sleep Medicine*; the last group presented the results of a survey conducted by the American Medical Student Association entitled “Are Medical Schools Teaching Future Doctors Everything They Need to Know?”

At the beginning of this class I explained what we were going to do and allowed them to choose the topic each group was going to deal with, having in mind the fact that the students are more ready to do something they are interested in. Students were also free to choose the setting of what they were going to do (conduct an interview or have a presentation) and they obviously enjoyed this kind of freedom. I asked each group to act out in front of the class, with the rest of the students and myself being their audience, which involved a certain amount of physical activity as well. Members of some groups were very original when presenting each other and used this opportunity to show their creativity.

At the beginning of this activity students were also told that it was not organized solely for the purpose of their presenting something they read; groups in fact had to do their best because each presentation was marked according to pre-set criteria and the goal was to attain the title of the best presentation. So, in fact, I organized a competition. Criteria were established before they started doing the tasks and included: clarity of the presentation (Can I understand what is being talked about?), language accuracy, and overall impression. Members of the audience voted after each presentation, and for each of these criteria presenters could score between one and five points. The winner was the group that scored the highest number of points. Knowing that their work would be rewarded, my students tried really hard to do their best and earn as much points as they could. And since they had to cooperate in order to do this, very often stronger members of a group helped the weaker ones if they became confused and didn’t know what to say next.

### **3.2.2. Activity 2**

This activity is also based on competition, but the focus is on vocabulary building and speaking. The topic of the lesson was General Parts of the Body. I divided the class into six groups of four students and explained the rules of the game right at the beginning. Each group had to explain the meaning of six words describing different parts of the body that I wrote on the board, one by one. Before writing the words each group had to select a representative whose task was to sit in front of the class, facing his colleagues, with the board behind his back, and to try to guess the word written on the board. Members of the group had to describe the word to their representative, that is, part of the body it refers to, using whatever general, medical or linguistic knowledge they found useful, but without pointing to the part of the body being described. After each correct answer the group earned a point and was given another word to explain; however, if they didn't know the meaning of the word or if the group representative couldn't guess the word in 90 seconds they lost half a point and another group had the right to describe the same word to the same person; if they succeeded, they earned two points. In this activity there were 36 words in total, six for each group, and the activity lasted until all the words were explained. The winner was the group that scored the highest number of points.

Students were very excited and lively during the activity, and tried really hard to explain the words and earn the title of the best group. They used all their knowledge and creativity to perform well. In some cases they were even able to explain the words they didn't know the meaning of: they weren't allowed to reveal any letter of the word being described, but they used other English words instead that rhymed with the given word. In most cases, if a group representative was already familiar with that English word, he/she was able to guess the word from such hints (e.g.: throat : boat; cheek : weak; nail : mail; sole : hole, etc.). The activity provoked a lot of speaking, and, of course, some (or, for some students, a lot of) new words to learn. After the game was over, students were given a handout with the sentences containing the definitions of all 36 words and blanks they were asked to fill in. In this way, they had another opportunity to learn new words and consolidate the knowledge of the ones they just learned or had already known. Although gap filling vocabulary exercises are usually not especially attractive for my students, this time they were very motivated to do it because they had the opportunity to test what they just learned from a pleasurable activity. Last, but not least, members of the winning group were rewarded by a certain number of points that contributed to their final mark.

### **3.2.3. Activity 3**

This activity was organized with the help of a colleague, a medical doctor, who speaks English well. The focus of the activity is on listening, making notes and speaking. My guest was a specialist in gastroenterology who prepared a lecture for my students on the topic of the common disorders of the digestive system and ways of treating them, based on his own clinical practice and the research he had done lately. The content of the lecture was adapted to the level of medical knowledge my students had at that stage of their studies and they were well prepared for this lecture: a week before it we read a text on the major parts of the digestive system, its functions, and the process of digestion, so students were familiar enough with the medical vocabulary that was used during the lecture. The task they were assigned to do in this class was to make notes

during the lecture and prepare questions for the discussion that was to follow. The fact that my colleague is not a native speaker of English was not important because the situation my students found themselves in was a simulation of a real life situation: a presentation at an international conference, for example, or a lecture delivered by a visiting professor. The lecture lasted for about 45 minutes and the discussion afterwards was of almost equal length.

My students found this activity extremely useful; they were able to use English in a way they were not accustomed to use in a classroom and really enjoyed being able to discuss medical matters with a professional. In this case an interesting lesson was created and the students' attention was gained. Encouraging students to become more active participants in a lesson can sometimes assist them to see a purpose for improving their communication skills in the target language. At the same time successful communication using the target language resulted in students' feeling a sense of accomplishment.

#### **4. Pedagogical Implications**

The activities I presented involved students more actively, by providing opportunities for them to actually use the language in what I expected would be a challenging, engaging way. Special attention was paid to the speaking skill to cater for the students' wants as far as the speaking skill is concerned, although the other skills (writing, reading and listening) were not neglected. I suggest that the question does not so much lie in the content of the materials (i.e., whether they are subject-specific or not), but rather in what we do with them in the classroom; it is not only the nature of the materials but the methodological exploitation of them, including tasks and activities, that needs careful attention.

My experience with the proposed activities has several implications for teachers with respect to classroom practice and the teacher – student interpersonal relationship:

- a) Reward. Students who do not yet have powerful intrinsic motivation to learn can be helped by extrinsic motivators in the form of rewards; e.g., reward correct behaviour and answers (extra points, exemptions from final exam, verbal praise). The important point is that extrinsic motivators can, over a period of time, produce intrinsic motivation. Everyone likes the feeling of accomplishment and recognition and rewards for good work produce those good feelings.
- b) Have students participate. One of the major keys to motivation is the active involvement of students in their own learning. Standing in front of them and lecturing to them is thus a relatively poor method of teaching. It is better to get students involved in activities, group problem solving exercises, helping to decide what to do and the best way to do it, working with each other, or in some other way getting physically involved in the lesson.
- c) Satisfy students' needs. Students should be allowed to choose from among two or three things to do. Many students have a need to have fun in active ways; they need to be noisy and excited. Rather than always avoiding or suppressing these needs, an educational activity can be designed in a way that fulfills them. Students will be much

more committed to a learning activity that has value for them, that they can see as meeting their needs, either long term or short term. They will do an amazing amount of hard work if they are convinced that what they are learning ultimately meets their needs.

d) Use positive emotions to enhance learning and motivation. People remember better when the learning is accompanied by strong emotions. If we, as teachers, can make something fun, exciting, happy, loving, students will learn more readily and the learning will last much longer.

## **5. Conclusion**

Classroom activities presented in this paper were devised as the result of combining all three motivational components of an L2 learning situation and implemented with an aim to enhance motivation in an ESP classroom. In order to make use of theoretical postulates and motivational strategies proposed in the literature I designed three classroom activities that were at the same time adopted to the needs and expectations of my students. The results of their implementation in the classroom justified my expectations regarding the goals they were meant to meet. My students were very active, enthusiastic, cooperative and eager to learn. They were fully involved in the lesson, took their part of responsibility for learning and exhibited a considerable amount of autonomous thinking and creativity. The results also point to the fact that the teacher's own behavioural modelling should be exploited more thoroughly in motivating learners, particularly in the sense of creating regular opportunities for students to experience success, making learning activities challenging and giving clear instructions. Teachers have to give particular importance to the nature of the teacher – learner relationship, as it strongly affects students' learning-related motivational beliefs.

This study was limited to first year medical students and to a small number of classroom activities. This puts certain limitations and raises some further issues to be dealt with. First of all, more activities should be devised and implemented with an aim to select the ones that best suit the needs of the target learner group. It leads us to the next question that needs to be discussed, namely, motivational beliefs of older students (e.g., fourth and fifth year students) might be different and merit to be investigated separately. For example, fifth year students have less subjects and longer record of learning ESP as well as more opportunities to use it, such as in student exchange programmes or at international student conferences. Thus, they probably have higher awareness of the need to learn English and, as a consequence, more powerful instrumental motivation.

Finally, this investigation did not involve testing of the learning benefits in terms of improved knowledge of medical English, but rather yielded only perceived benefits to students' readiness to commit themselves to learning. Further research following an experimental design is needed to examine the extent to which implementation of motivation enhancing activities actually contributes to more efficient learning.

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# Is Patriotism Conducive to Democracy?

*Olga Brzezińska*

*Institute of European Studies, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland*

As a prelude to discussing patriotism in Poland, a brief explanation of the term patriotism needs to be provided. Patriotism is a complex and contested phenomenon. Scholarly literature provides a wealth of scientific considerations of the concept of patriotism. However, there seem to be conspicuous differences in conceptualisation, which often may result in difficulties in distinguishing between patriotism and nationalism. It may be argued that the idea of patriotism calls for redefinition, given the fact that the frames of reference, to which the notion has been traditionally linked, are changing, as a result of concurrent processes of systemic transformation, European integration and globalization. With regard to the abovementioned processes, the question arises if patriotism is still a viable option in the new environment and if it fosters or hinders the consolidation of democracy.

Mixed approaches to patriotism in political and academic discourses may have resulted from many experiences in which patriotism was a subject of manipulation to serve short-sighted political goals and on many occasions justification for extreme nationalism. The word itself seems to evoke varied reactions – it is either embraced or rejected immediately. The insight into the current public discourse provides a reflection that the topic of patriotism is to a large extent treated marginally or abandoned as a phenomenon that does not fit in with modern times. Due to its elevated dimension, patriotism is sometimes regarded as backward or irrelevant in the new paradigm of social organisation. In a highly individualised society a collective manifestation of fierce emotional attachment to one's homeland may be considered as a threat to democracy if it degenerates into chauvinism. On the other hand, patriotic commitments can be conducive to the consolidation of democracy, on condition that it fosters citizens' active engagement in the civic and political life of the community. I argue, patriotism as a phenomenon still exists in the lives of individuals and collectivities, but the influences of far-fetched processes of globalisation, European integration and systemic transformation in the case of Poland triggered off the change in its understanding and content.

Patriotism has been a subject of study and analysis within the realm of social science paradigm. The term derives from the Latin word *patria* and in the course of history and in different contexts it has been ascribed various renderings. The myriads of proposed definitions seem to have at least two common denominators – love of one's own country and commitment. Bar-Tal has proposed a definition which appears to encompass various notions present in other scientific considerations, "(...) in its fundamental form patriotism refers to attachment of group members to their group in which they reside (...) and the basic element of patriotism is the desire to belong to a group which is positively evaluated" (1993:48). This psychological factor may account for pride in one's country which often connotes patriotism.

Nevertheless, in common language, as well as in scholarly reflection, the word 'patriotism' often connotes 'nationalism'. As Kłoskowska has noted, strong emotional attachment to one's own ethnic or national group is called patriotism, which does not have to be equated with aggressive nationalism, but, as she argues, distinction of the two attitudes is often blurred due to the fact that one's own group members tend to define nationalism as patriotism, but patriotism of other people as nationalism (2005: 16-17). In the context of modernity, the concept of patriotism has been associated with the idea that only nations can claim such a virtue and as such is linked to nationalism. In academic writings as well as in public discourse these two concepts are often used as synonyms. This logic has for instance been justified in the following way, "Patriots, even moderate patriots, have a special regard for their own country. It stands out from the many nations of the world as the one to which they are most attached, the nation they identify with and whose well-being they have a special interest in pursuing. Because patriotism gives a special value to one's nation, it seems natural to equate patriotism and nationalism" (Nathanson, 1993: 185)

Maurizio Viroli emphasized the fundamental difference between 'patriotism' and 'nationalism' by means of reconstruction of the meaning of the two terms in political, cultural and ideological contexts in modern Europe,

"The language of patriotism has been used over the centuries to strengthen or invoke love of the political institutions and the way of life that sustain the common liberty of a people, that is love of the republic; the language of nationalism was forged in late eighteenth-century Europe to defend or reinforce the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic oneness and homogeneity of a people. Whereas the enemies of republican patriotism are tyranny, despotism, oppression, and corruption, the enemies of nationalism are cultural contamination, heterogeneity, racial impurity, and social, political, and intellectual disunion" (1995: 1-2)

He posits that patriotism and nationalism seek to support two different visions of the reality. While the former pursues common good with respect to diversity, plurality and tolerance, the latter reinforces homogeneity, ethnic, cultural unity. This is echoed by Dietz, "The blurring of patriotism into nationalism, or even acknowledgement of nationalism as a "species" of patriotism reveals that we have literally lost touch with history, with a very real past in which real patriots held to a particular set of political principles and their associated practices – to a conception of citizenship that bears scant resemblance to modern nationalism" (1989:191)

The investigation of patriotism in Poland requires analysis of complex social phenomena – the processes of (re)construction of national identity, the creation of nationalism and chauvinism, the process of building new meanings in the changed and ever changing environment, the utilisation of symbols and language. It is all but cliché to say that Polish patriotism thrived on oppression. In the formative period of the nation in modern sense, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Poland was partitioned, which influenced the feeling of patriotism in the country; it developed somehow in opposition to the state. The legacy of the oppressive state was even further augmented by the Communist rule after the Second World War. Again, Poles did not trust the state institutions, which they perceived as alien and as a consequence the symbolic sphere was invested with great importance. In the absence of a Polish state and its institutions, Poles had to look

for unifying factors in the culture, the ethnic background, the language and the tradition and referred to available structures, with the most significant case of the Roman Catholic Church. However, one should notice that when political energy is generated and exercised mainly in the symbolic sphere and non-political institutions assume the role of political ones, the whole process is far from transparent and accountable.

Far-reaching processes of social and systemic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe with the augmenting process of European integration have forced Polish people to challenge the whole system of meanings they were used to and prodded into internalising by the former Communist system. The legacy of Communist times impacted on the perception of patriotism in Poland. The period of Soviet domination constitutes a particular time for the study of patriotism. Traditionally a patriot is associated with love of its country and loyalty to the nation. At that time, however, who was a patriot could not identify with the state, its institutions, because they were alien, forcibly introduced on the Polish ground. This was another formative period which impacted upon the tradition of Polish patriotism as it brought about a distinctive feature of opposition to the state. A true patriot loved the ideal of Poland, but could not pledge allegiance to the state authority. This is still noticeable in low levels of trust in state institutions and weak engagement in political life.

Patriotic discourse is one of the factors that influence the attitudes and may impact upon activities people undertake. Useful as it is for sustaining the tradition and commemorating the past, this is also a potent tool for shaping attitudes. Głowiński emphasises the importance of patriotic discourse by pointing out that its role does not only consist in upholding tradition, shaping attitudes, but is also a symbolically characterised factor of national identification (2006:14). Homeland and its priorities has always been present in public discourse, however the form and content has undergone substantial changes. During the time of oppression the discourse used different words, nowadays, in time of freedom and democratic rule of law, patriotic discourse seems to assume a different rhetoric. While the role of symbols, history and culture cannot be underestimated, what merits pondering is whether current discourse in an altered context still draws on the symbolic past. Suffice it to say that national holidays have been celebrated in the same way for the last twenty years. The celebration of the Independence Day is full of pathos, any performances that take place focus on praising the heroes' and martyrs' of the Polish strive for independence and sovereignty. Omnipresent national symbols, flamboyant, fervent speeches of the head of state and most prominent politicians in the country make it all a gloomy, sepulchral festival, something which informs 'patriotism of failure' (Surdykowski, 2007). This particular vein of patriotic discourse seems unlikely to evoke constructive patriotic feelings and provide enough energy to hold people together. I am convinced that currently we need a different language and more modern ways of triggering off patriotic feelings. The longer patriotism is associated with celebratory commemoration of the mythologized past, the more likely it will remain embedded in the past, abstract, with little or no relevance to the reality which requires constructive action.

The question arises if it is feasible to break up this old-fashioned and stereotypical mode and introduce a progressive, modern model of affiliation and loyalty. Bobrownicka argues that the concept of patriotism underwent depreciation in public discourse especially due to overuse in populist rhetoric. Thus, she posits, a remedy can

be found in rectification of unnecessary pathos and subjecting patriotism to rational, constructive criticism (2006: 262). In the study of public discourse, attention needs to be given to clear distinction between nationalistic and patriotic discourses. Drawing on the abovementioned conceptualization of two phenomena of nationalism and patriotism, it may be concluded that they are distinct as regards their axiological perspectives, normative premises and ends. The differences between patriotic and nationalistic discourses have been well accounted for. The former adduces political as well as cultural factors, but is, above all, open, inclusive and positive in its enunciation, and does not feed on the image of enemy, whether real or not. On the other end of the spectrum lies the latter, which focuses on ethnic factors (such as blood, religion), which determine identification; informs the ideal of a Pole – Catholic; is exclusive in its essence, utilises the rhetoric of fear and constant threat. There is a challenge to face up to – if patriotic discourse does not find its identity, if the crisis develops, then nationalistic discourse, possibly in its extreme version of chauvinism, is likely to set in.

While I argue the current changes transforming the present reality do not lead to the atrophy of patriotism, it may be concluded that they result in the reconstruction of the idea. As Król argues, "(...) in modern liberal societies patriotism has not vanished, as it is often reckoned, but it became pluralistic" (2004: 112) The question arises, though, what are the emerging features of patriotism and how it is realised. The current profound changes which affect the nation-state, at the same time affect patriotism. Firstly, under the conditions of deepening pluralism of culture and values, and growing diversity, cultural homogeneity in the confines of the nation-state seems to be unattainable. This may result in the shift of emphasis from the cultural to the political dimension of patriotism. Political patriotism allows for reconciliation of individuals who may choose to define themselves in divergent ethnic and cultural terms, but may share political culture abiding by the rules of democracy and the rule of law. Today, a modern perception of patriotism means engagement in the process of transformation, scrupulous fulfilment of one's duties such as paying the taxes and abiding by the law. However, this pragmatic attitude towards our motherland has yet to break through thick layers of traditionally conceived patriotism. (Simonides, 1998:21)

As a result of multiple forces that have shaped the traditions of Polish patriotism it may be concluded that the concept connotes belonging to Roman Catholic Church, common language, national mythology, traditions depicted in art and literature, shared culture. However, thus traditionally conceived patriotism appears to be too weak to generate progressive activities and accumulate enough energy to prod people to undertake concrete actions aiming at development of the common good.

In the recently (January 2009) conducted survey, students of European Studies at the Jagiellonian University, Kraków were given a questionnaire primarily assessing their attitudes toward patriotism. All the respondents were of Polish nationality, twenty – up to twenty-seven years old. They were asked about the meaning of patriotism and homeland, patriotic and antipatriotic behaviour and characteristics of a contemporary patriot. The underlying assumption was that it is the young generation who are not contaminated with the corrupt legacy of the Communist times, people who have been educated in democratic and independent Poland and who are presumably open to the new shape of the country and of the world. Young, educated people in their twenties would provide a fresh, uncontaminated approach to the subject; they would be able to

coin a new definition of the term and point to activities that are relevant in the changed environment.

The survey reveals that most of the students are capable of defining patriotism, which induced positive associations in the majority of answers, such as emotional attachment to the country, respect for national symbols, history and tradition, and pride in the country. What is worth noting, a lot of the participants emphasise care and work for the common good. Examples of action perceived as patriotic include on an equal footing participation in elections and action for the sake of the country (such as promoting Poland abroad, Polish products and the image of Poles as modern, well-educated and enterprising people). Conversely, as unpatriotic were considered feeling ashamed of the Polish origin, lack of knowledge of Polish history and culture, lack of interest in political-social life, disrespect towards the country and compatriots when abroad as well as action detrimental to the common good (corruption, financial crime, theft or destruction of public goods).

Interestingly enough, most respondents consider Poles patriotic and declare that they feel patriots. What seems important is that there are some tokens of what might be called everyday patriotism, understood as care for the homeland, solidarity, and work towards the common good and involvement in democratic life of the civil society. A considerable number of respondents expressed their belief that currently patriotism is best realised by participation in elections, involvement in civil society organisations and due payment of taxes.

The analysis of the survey proves there are noticeable signs of departure from the understanding of patriotism as glorification of the martyrs and elevation of the mythologized past. Common reference to civic duties, conscious participation in elections and significance of involvement in civil society structures allows us to hypothesize that these might mark the shift from understanding patriotism as a distant, elevated ideal to patriotism characterised by responsibility, solidarity and activity.

Patriotism in Poland has long been comprehended in terms of constant struggle for sovereignty of the country and sustaining the nation. At the present moment the feeling of patriotism cannot be expressed in militant terms – Poland is sovereign, independent, safe, deeply embedded in the structures and networks of international cooperation. There is no need to prove the love of the country in militant terms. Nevertheless, patriotism is still very often perceived as something ceremonial that deserves celebration, solemn, yet distant. As such it does not require any effort on the part of the people, poses no challenges – it suffices to hang out a flag, stand to attention when the national anthem is played and maybe attend a parade on a national holiday.

When we touch upon the nature of this attachment and loyalty, there seem to be at least two main renderings of patriotism; the first would be of the ethnic type, the other of the civic character. The first ethno-national one would concentrate around common descent, mythologised history, language and religion. The other one, the civic interpretation of patriotism, assumes different character. It is devoid of exclusivism, implies pluralism, tolerance and cooperation towards the common good in the name of love of one's country. It is constructive, not blind, and allows a realistic view of the nation and the country. It seems possible that, with some prodding, patriotism can develop its civic dimension, which will allow for the recognition of an individual and

inclusion on the grounds that certain principles and values are of greater significance than common ethnic origin and history. This form of civic identification, Leoussi (2001: 241) believes, relies on constitutional principles, whose adoption can eliminate exclusionary tendencies and is believed to be "an antidote to aggressive, xenophobic and illiberal nationalism". Non-exclusivist patriots are able to recognise the value of other cultures, and thus they contribute to strengthening democracy, which safeguards pluralism.

The question whether patriotism is conducive to democracy emphasises the crucial distinction between 'blind' and 'constructive' patriotism (Staub, 1997). Whereas blind patriotism denotes an uncritical loyalty and attachment to one's country, which often finds its most fierce expression in nationalism, constructive patriotism promotes what Ervin Staub once called 'critical loyalty' (1989), namely support for questioning the conditions and practices in the country with the intention to improve it.

In line with the logic of constructive patriotism, there is another requirement to be fulfilled from the standpoint of democracy, which is active participation of citizens in democratic practices of the country that are intended to result in positive change. The patriotism of today needs to be deeply embedded in the civil society. One needs to find partners for interaction, not enemies or rivals. Without an increase in social trust an effective public sphere cannot be built. A patriot treats others with respect, doesn't exclude others who think differently, but accepts them as members of the same community. We need patriotism which requires perception of potential partners for cooperation.

To conclude and with these two criteria in mind, critical loyalty and civic involvement, I argue that such a democratic vision of patriotic commitments may contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Poland. Profound and fast transformations and a complex interplay of transformative occurrences in the hitherto familiar world provide a unique opportunity for the reconstruction of patriotic commitments, and thus open further avenues of research which merit consideration.

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# Campaign 2.0 – the Role of the Internet in Political Campaigns

*Ovidiu Tierean*

*Transilvania University of Brasov, 29 Eroilor Blvd 500036, Brasov, Romania,  
[dide\\_bv@yahoo.com](mailto:dide_bv@yahoo.com)*

## 1. Introduction

The presidential election of November 2008 in the US brought to the world a new ingredient of a successful campaign: the Internet. Just as President John F. Kennedy won against Richard Nixon in the 60s with the marvel of that time, the television, that's how in 2008 Barak Obama used the most expanding media environment in the US and the rest of the world to win the election in front of old-fashioned campaign of John McCain.

This presidential campaign was not a "one time only" campaign. Candidates from all over the world will follow this model in their attempt to win elections. The questions that need to be raised are: what are the ingredients of winning an election with the help of the internet and can we, Europeans, witness such a campaign and if we do, when will it happen?

The US has 304 million inhabitants and 220 million Internet users. That's a penetration of 73.6%. The EU has a population of 490 million and 297 million Internet users, that is 60.7% penetration. The highest penetration is recorded in Finland and the Netherlands (83%) and the lowest in Malta (23%) and Bulgaria (32%). Here's the table from Internet World Stats (2008), updated on December 31<sup>st</sup> 2008.

I believe that without a penetration of at least 60% or so any attempt for an efficient internet political campaign would be a failure. 13 countries meet this criterion at the moment with another 3 following close (Lithuania, Latvia and Ireland). The Internet penetration will only grow as the years pass levelling to around 80% by 2015.

So how can the Internet influence the result of an election? We do know the basics of political Internet use: get e-mail addresses and raise money online. Not enough: today the Internet touches all dimensions of a campaign, from advertising to field operations to voter mobilization. Political campaigns need to accomplish several goals:

<b>EUROPEAN UNION</b>	<b>Population (2008 Est.)</b>	<b>Internet Users, Latest Data</b>	<b>Penetration (% Population)</b>	<b>User Growth (2000-2008)</b>	<b>Users % Table</b>
<b>Austria</b>	8,205,533	<b>5,601,700</b>	68.3 %	166.7 %	1.9 %
<b>Belgium</b>	10,403,951	<b>7,006,400</b>	67.3 %	250.3 %	2.4 %
<b>Bulgaria</b>	7,262,675	<b>2,368,000</b>	32.6 %	450.7 %	0.8 %
<b>Cyprus</b>	792,604	<b>324,880</b>	41.0 %	170.7 %	0.1 %
<b>Czech Republic</b>	10,220,911	<b>4,991,300</b>	48.8 %	399.1 %	1.7 %
<b>Denmark</b>	5,484,723	<b>4,408,100</b>	80.4 %	126.1 %	1.5 %
<b>Estonia</b>	1,307,605	<b>854,600</b>	65.4 %	133.1 %	0.3 %
<b>Finland</b>	5,244,749	<b>4,353,142</b>	83.0 %	125.9 %	1.5 %
<b>France</b>	62,150,775	<b>40,128,178</b>	64.6 %	372.1 %	13.5 %
<b>Germany</b>	82,369,548	<b>55,221,183</b>	67.0 %	130.1 %	18.6 %
<b>Greece</b>	10,722,816	<b>4,932,495</b>	46.0 %	393.2 %	1.7 %
<b>Hungary</b>	9,930,915	<b>5,215,400</b>	52.5 %	629.4 %	1.8 %
<b>Ireland</b>	4,156,119	<b>2,410,549</b>	58.0 %	207.5 %	0.8 %
<b>Italy</b>	58,145,321	<b>28,255,100</b>	48.6 %	114.1 %	9.5 %
<b>Latvia</b>	2,245,423	<b>1,324,800</b>	59.0 %	783.2 %	0.4 %
<b>Lithuania</b>	3,565,205	<b>2,103,471</b>	59.0 %	834.9 %	0.7 %
<b>Luxembourg</b>	486,006	<b>363,900</b>	74.9 %	263.9 %	0.1 %
<b>Malta</b>	403,532	<b>95,000</b>	23.5 %	137.5 %	0.0 %
<b>Netherlands</b>	16,645,313	<b>13,791,800</b>	82.9 %	253.6 %	4.6 %
<b>Poland</b>	38,500,696	<b>20,020,362</b>	52.0 %	615.0 %	6.7 %
<b>Portugal</b>	10,676,910	<b>4,249,200</b>	39.8 %	70.0 %	1.4 %
<b>Romania</b>	22,246,862	<b>7,430,000</b>	33.4 %	828.8 %	2.5 %
<b>Slovakia</b>	5,455,407	<b>2,705,882</b>	49.6 %	316.3 %	0.9 %
<b>Slovenia</b>	2,007,711	<b>1,300,000</b>	64.8 %	333.3 %	0.4 %
<b>Spain</b>	40,491,051	<b>27,028,934</b>	66.8 %	401.7 %	9.1 %
<b>Sweden</b>	9,045,389	<b>7,295,200</b>	80.7 %	80.2 %	2.5 %
<b>United Kingdom</b>	60,943,912	<b>43,221,464</b>	70.9 %	180.7 %	14.6 %
<b>European Union</b>	<b>489,111,662</b>	<b>297,001,040</b>	<b>60.7 %</b>	<b>214.6 %</b>	<b>100.0 %</b>

Figure 1. Internet World Stats: Internet Usage in the European Union

## 2. Awareness

Gaining name recognition and awareness of a candidate are important in a busy election year. The higher the Internet penetration, the better for candidates. The efficiency and reach of online advertising provides an effective complement to television in introducing a candidate to the public. Paid search and online display ads are good ways to reinforce a message, but we'll deal with this later. Here are two print screens of the Obama application on iPhone. It's easy to see the green "Donate" button on the bottom left.



Figure 2. Print screens of Obama 08 application on iPhone

### 3. Persuasion

Television is still the most powerful persuasion media of our time, but online advertising shouldn't be left aside for its ability to influence voters. In order for any candidate's message to reach voters, the message must be easy to understand and create an emotional connection. Even if a viewer does not click to the official website from an online ad, the message may be very persuasive if targeted correctly. The power of media, video and the opportunity to interact with the online audience makes online advertising a powerful tool to help achieve the reach needed to persuade voters.

#### 3.1 Building contact lists of supporters

Political marketers have begun to understand the power of e-mail marketing just as aggressively by database matching, rental of e-mail lists and co-registration through a variety of sites. They are able to acquire e-mail addresses economically, manage data efficiently and develop relationships with newly identified supporters and the loyal base of voters. Because postage rates and printing charges continue to rise, this alternative becomes more appealing.

#### 3.2 Fundraising

Online fundraising began with the McCain's 2000 campaign. As people have become more comfortable entering credit card numbers into web forms, online fundraising has grown in its effectiveness. Online banners and e-mail appeals can drive traffic to a candidate's fundraising webpage. While the average online contribution is still around

100 USD, people make multiple contributions online and develop contribution habits that will grow over time. Online advertising for fundraising shows strong return on investment because the cost for these efforts is significantly less than for traditional fundraising events or expensive mailings. Although McCain was the ice-breaker in online fundraising, in the 2008 election he raised a total of 360 million USD (online and offline), while Obama raised 640 million USD. By September 2008, Obama has raised 67% of funds through online donations.

### 3.3 Campaign management

The Internet can make several aspects of campaign management more efficient, especially in the areas of field operations, volunteer recruitment, event promotion, voter registration drives and petition circulation. Online advertising can help these functions by using targeting and lead generation techniques to find desirable campaign workers and supporters. The MyBO (My Barak Obama) application was easy to use and gave volunteers their own level of involvement:




Figure 3. Print screens of MyBO application on the internet

In the four days before the election (Friday to Monday), 3 million calls were made using neighbour-to-neighbour, an online activity within MyBO application. That weekend, 70,000 people raised 30 million USD on personal fund-raising web pages.

### ***3.4 Rapid response***

The ability to create attack ads or to respond quickly to accusations is enhanced by the real-time nature of online advertising. Within hours, a standard banner or video ad can be ready as part of a media planning to communicate a message or to drive users to more information. Of course, the same techniques can be used to introduce messages about a competitor with the hope that they do not have the Internet capabilities to respond quickly.

### ***3.5 Finding voters online***

When consultants are asked about the best ways to reach loyal base voters online, Internet activities are high on the list. The same is not true for reaching swing and independent voters. Online advertising is seen as twice as effective for reaching the base while television ads are seen as twice as effective for reaching swing and independent voters. The E-Voter Institute (evoterinstitute.com, 2008) includes e-mail, online ads, candidate websites, blogs, podcasts, webcasts, online video and social networking sites in this category in order to understand the large scope of Internet activity in a campaign. During the 2008 campaign, Obama's staff sent 1 billion hyper-segmented e-mails to 13 million addresses. In 2004 Democrat candidate John Kerry sent out 3 million e-mails.

### ***3.6 Search engines***

Search is built around people who look for information. Giving the right information to the right person at the right time is the key. This is a critical point when constructing a search campaign. Since people are looking for information, the entire process should be based on helping people to find answers to their questions.

A good political search strategy can have a huge impact on traffic to a candidate's website and on donations to a candidate's campaign. It needs to include both paid search advertising and organic (non-paid) search engine optimization (SEO). SEO involves improving a site's rankings among non-paid search results listings.

Search advertising allows marketers to control what they spend and track the results. The process is managed by professionals because when done properly, the return on the investment and the campaign's ability to respond to negative news and do damage control quickly and effectively is priceless. But, when done improperly, the campaign can easily lose money and get little back in return for its efforts.

Search ads can be used to identify and recruit supporters and to ask for donations. They can be used to get out the vote among supporters or to reach out to undecided voters in the final days and hours before an election. They can be purchased on a national basis

or targeted geographically right to the zip code level, depending on the audience the campaign needs to reach.

Why is search such a powerful tool in the political environment? Because search is engaging. “Unlike television, search engine users actively request information. Search is a ‘lean-forward’ medium, whereas television is a ‘lean back’ medium.” (Bosley *et al*, 2008) It is among the most easily monitored of all advertising media, allowing political marketers to see what works, to refine their approach and improve their return on advertising investment over time. For example, campaigns may use search to build name recognition early in the campaign cycle. As goals are more clearly defined and conversions become more valuable than total number of clicks, campaigns can manage the costs of their search relative to the value of the specific responses it wants to achieve.

Each major search engine has its own criteria for determining relevance and therefore placement of organic (non-paid) search results. Most major search engines change their algorithms regularly to keep greedy marketers from taking advantage of the system. In addition to its sophisticated automated monitoring for relevance, Google employs human “search auditors”, who review the quality of search results for specific queries (Google Inc, 2006).

There are a number of things site owners can do to increase the relevance of their websites. These steps are split into two basic categories: improving site, landing page content and making sure that the text, images and video you feature can be easily and properly indexed by the search engines. Once done correctly, the traffic generated by efficient SEO is almost free. But if Google finds a site that breaks its search engine rules in an attempt to gain a higher search rank then Google removes that site from their index.

Rather than attempting to overcome the system, political marketers work on improving their site indexing and keeping their content fresh and relevant, which is a major service to the people they’re trying to reach.

Major search engines consider a number of factors in determining which search results are listed first. Certainly, the rate one is willing to pay impacts the ranking, but many other things also come into the equation. One such factor is the site relevance. Search engines are extremely competitive. They want to deliver the best product possible to users. Their credibility goes hand in hand with their ability to deliver quality responses to search queries and to do it perfectly. They can’t afford to give away top slots to the highest bidders only to disappoint users who click through and find those sites don’t deliver relevant information.

From an advertiser’s point of view, this means that the site content on a campaign link must back up the key words they paid for. Increasing relevance of the landing pages increases their chances of earning and staying in a top sponsored link position. So, while spending does increase the chance that the candidate or the campaign will receive a high position among sponsored listings, it doesn’t guarantee the top spot. Generally speaking, the top spot goes to the advertiser with the highest relevance in addition to being one of the highest bidders.

Another factor to consider is the daily budget cap. If, for example, one is paying 50 cents/click and your daily budget cap is 10 Euros, then he/she would reach his/her budget limit at 20 clicks per day. The closer he/she gets to that budget cap on any given day, the less likely he/she is to be shown in the top sponsored links.

When Google introduced universal search (that is, search that looks at everything from news results to books, blogs and videos along with website listings) in 2007, the number of possible relevant results got much greater and therefore the results lists got much longer. Now, a candidate's official site is no longer automatically listed as the number one, natural (non-paid) search result. Wikipedia, news results or even books by the candidate may come up before the official site on a page where only four to five natural results can be seen above the fold.

### **3.7 Social networks**

Social networking sites are now easily accessible to the general public and have established an important presence on the web. The most popular social networking websites (MySpace, Facebook and YouTube) all come up among the top 10 most visited sites on the web.

Launched at the end of 2003, MySpace allows its members to create personal profiles and share photos, journals and interests with other group members and their own personal network of friends. MySpace had 60 million unique monthly US Internet visitors to its site in fall 2006 and has added another 5 million over the past year.

Facebook, which launched in February of 2004, supports similar applications, but had restricted its membership to people within universities until fall 2006. Today more than half of its 50 million unique visitors visit the site daily and generate an average of 2 billion page views per day. The number of people who visit Facebook rises by a million per week (New Politics Institute, 2008).

YouTube made its debut in February 2005. Its primary applications are the watching and sharing of original videos and video clips, but users also may post commentary and discuss content with other members. YouTube had close to 30 million unique visitors at the time of the last election and has grown to just over 100 million today (New Politics Institute, 2008).

In terms of both audience reach and public acceptance, social networks have become a medium to which campaigns must turn to. However, their objectives differ from those of political campaigns and, as a result, introduce different opportunities and challenges. A major dilemma for campaigns has been how to control both website content and how users interact with it.

To date, there are limited data to directly assess and demonstrate whether and how much benefit candidates are taking from online campaigning (Glaser, 2008). Social network supporters do not (because of their platforms) and will not (because of personal motivation and individual opportunity costs) convert to participants in traditional offline campaign activities and events.

The objective of social networking sites is to cultivate a sense of community among members. Their users contribute and even control content as well as initiate contact with other users, which together create opportunities that can empower the individual. This is of electoral benefit to campaigns if core supporters are thereby transformed into advocates, contributors, volunteers, and ultimately votes for the candidate. It also can introduce unanticipated distractions and force campaigns to respond in ways that distract others from their core message.

Anyway in Obama vs. McCain the figures speak for themselves (Harfoush, 2008):

Social Network		
	3,279,102 friends	620,359 friends
	1,043,850 friends	218,172 friends
	1,824 videos uploaded 20,024,491 views	330 videos uploaded 2,221,268 views
	137,206 followers	4,848 followers

Figure 4. Social networks stats for Obama and McCain (October 2008)

### 3.8 Political blogs

In the past 5 years, the political blogosphere has grown considerably, moving from an interesting curiosity to a necessary feature of the political landscape. Political bloggers are now constantly featured in the mainstream media (Drezner and Farrell, 2008). As the phenomenon of blogging has grown, researchers have had trouble keeping pace with this rapid development. Methods developed just three years ago, when the total size of the blogosphere was estimated around 2 million, are overcome by a blogosphere that is now more than 112 million.

Technorati has emerged as the most reputable blog-tracking site on the web. For researchers, this success comes with a price. In 2004, technorati tracked 2 million blogs. A large part of their top 100 was occupied by political blogs. Today, technorati

tracks 112.8 million blogs. As the total blogosphere has expanded, much of the political blogosphere has been left out of the overall top 100. Only 16 political blogs are listed in the technorati top 100. All political blogs are tracked, but the value of technorati is now derived from site-specific search (Iskold, 2007).

The rise of the blogosphere's importance has been coupled with a declining capacity for measuring and understanding what is going on. The Blogosphere Authority Index (BAI) is a system for measuring online influence that takes into account four distinct variables and combines them to offer a comprehensive picture of the blogosphere. After the failings of previous methodologies, the BAI represents a new technique for comparative ranking of political blog sites (Blogosphere Authority Index, 2009).

Consider the following example: blogger A posts whenever on a personal site. This results in a small reader base and comparatively few hyper-links from around the blogosphere. The few people who frequent his/her blog are highly influential, either in the blogosphere or in more traditional political institutions.

Blogger B posts once or twice a day on his/her individual blog, which was picked up by a major online news magazine. He/she has a journalistic background and specializes in developing new arguments or breaking new stories. He/she chooses to be a blogger because he/she likes to set his/her own deadlines, operate without an editor and publish instantly. He/she often relies on blogger A for insights that he/she researches and turns into original articles. He/she is among the most often cited bloggers online, by the whole political spectrum.

Blogger C posts 15-20 times per day. He/she rarely publishes original content, instead pouring over other blogs and writing short posts that tell his/her reader base about something interesting elsewhere on the web. He/she acts as a gatekeeper for his/her massive readership, who use his/her site as a roadmap to the rest of the Internet.

Blogger D is the "information dealer" of one of the most active community blogs in the country. He posts 8 times per day, with some original content and some "open threads" so that his community can keep their own discussion going. This community also publishes their own diaries, more than 50 a day. Political endorsements from this site mean dollars in a candidate's pocket.

This example is an illustration of four distinct areas of influence: network centrality (blogger A), link density (blogger B), site traffic (blogger C), and community activity (blogger D). The BAI has converted information from all this four areas of influence into one ranking. The conclusions that arise are the following: progressive blogs (mostly linked to Democrats in the political spectrum) hold the first 6 ranks out of 10, but conservative blogs (mostly linked to Republicans in the political spectrum) are better linked to each others. Every candidate needs as many bloggers from each category: the influential who starts the rumour, the journalist who has credibility, the gatekeeper who spreads the information and the community activist who keeps people updated.

## 4. Conclusion

The Internet has come a long way from the “key hole” of every household through which we used to communicate to being an *Agora* of humanity. Although *Agora* is a concept of European civilization, the US is one step further in shaping politics and campaigns with the help of the Internet. For all young Europeans this is a new challenge.

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# **From Welfare Politics to Neoliberalism: Reaction of Social Classes to Labour Market Reforms in Greece and Turkey**

*Özgül Sarımehtmet Duman*

*Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science*

## **1. Introduction**

In the history of 20<sup>th</sup> century political economy, Keynesian welfare politics had been influential from the end of WWII to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s. Deepening of industrialisation necessitated the import of advanced goods and technology; and capitalism needed to cross its national borders and reach the international competitive market. This new era of capitalism, namely neoliberalism, is described by the integration of national economies to the international market. Neoliberal economic policies and reforms have been followed by many capitalist countries since 1980s, and the process of economic integration has been supported by international financial institutions and supranational organisations. In addition to trade and financial liberalisations, labour market reforms have been commenced to decrease the labour cost and increase the compatibility of national economies.

This paper aims to evaluate the increasing conflict between social classes due to the labour market reforms undertaken during economic policy shift from welfare politics to neoliberalism; and compare Greece, which is a late-comer in the sense of trade and financial liberalisation, privatisation, flexibility and deregulation, with Turkey that has been following the rules of neoliberalism since their introduction worldwide. As well as analysing the reasons of dissimilar reactions given to economic policy shift in these two countries, the international actors that have been influential (namely the European Union in the case of Greece and the International Monetary Fund in the case of Turkey) will also be mentioned.

## **2. The Significance of Labour Market Deregulation in the Neoliberal Era**

Throughout the history of capitalism, the basic contradiction between labour and capital has been the capital's attempt for minimizing the labour cost and the labour's intention to decrease the working hours and increase the living standards. With the demise of welfare politics and the rise of neoliberal economic policies as the one-and-only strategy in the late 1970s, the contradiction between labour and capital has become much more explicit and cruel since the neoliberal policies towards the labour market deregulation had increased the pressure on the working class.

A significant tool for labour market deregulation is flexibilisation, which has replaced the mass production strategy of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and compartmentalised production into small enterprises. Besides preventing the organisation of working class within big factories, employing unregistered workers over the maximum working hours in arduous and unhealthy occupations and avoiding insurance and tax expenses are easily achieved in flexible labour markets (Müftüoğlu, 2006: 133). Flexibilisation policy also includes different strategies such as part-time work, temporary work and tele-work to form an illusion that labour has diverse benefits.

Internationalisation of production is also a crucial tool of neoliberal economic policies since labour is the most significant cost item in the countries that cannot compete in technology and/or energy. Internationalisation creates a competitive environment, and motivates the national states to minimise the labour cost to raise competitiveness in the international market. As a result, wages decrease, labour rights weaken, unemployment increases, and syndicalist organisations deteriorate in capitalist countries.

In addition to internationalisation of production, transformation of production capital into financial capital does shift the asymmetrical relationship between labour and capital in favour of the capital as well. Although the dependence of capital on labour continues during the production process, capital's liquidisation via transformation to the financial one threatens the working class organisations.

In addition to all these factors, privatisation policy, as one of the *cine qua non*s of neoliberal economic policies, has a negative effect on the power of the working class organisations. As a result of privatisation, employment possibilities are diminished, wages are minimised and syndicalist organisations lose their power for collective action (Müftüoğlu, 2006: 139).

### **3. Reaction of the Social Classes to Labour Market Reforms in Greece**

The military regime of 1967–1974 period and civilisation policies of the late 1970s are remarkable in the recent history of Greece. The government has prepared the 1975 Constitution as a symbol of civilianisation and liberated class organisations as opposed to the military regime. As a sign of state's power and control over the economy, socialisations were implemented in significant sectors. However, the state's effort 'to control labour and impose income policies' and the political parties' attempt 'to gain influence through unions' resulted in the development of 'adversarial labour relations' and high rates of strikes (Zambarloukou, 1997, cited by Zambarloukou, 2006: 216; Ioannou, 1999: 6).

In the period that starts with PASOK's (*Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα* – Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement) triumph in 1981 general elections, several laws were adopted on 'democratisation of the trade union movement for safeguarding workers' trade union freedoms' (EIRO, Trade Union Independence From State Intervention: 28 March 1998); and on 'worker participation in managing, mapping out strategy, programming and monitoring enterprises' (Eurofound, Board-level Employee Representation: The Case of Greece: September 1998). Along with the promises of

socialisation and extensive social spending, an anti-EU agenda was pursued in Greece, who joined the EU in 1981. Moreover, new distribution relations had further diverged Greece from the EU (Pagoulatos, 2000: 193).

However, EU's common market and capital liberalisation policies have transformed Greece's political economy since financial internationalisation necessitated equally efficient and competitive national markets. Because, if 'real interest rates remained negative or at lower than market levels, and the national financial system was not competitive and efficient enough', savings would 'flow out of the country and the payments balance would collapse' when capital controls are lifted (Pagoulatos, 2000; 195). Thus, Greece started to undertake the necessary financial reforms to be part of the European Monetary System. The state's anti-business discourse ended, and SEV (*Σύνδεσμος Επιχειρήσεων Και Βιομηχανιών* / Federation of Greek Industries) has acquired a dominant position among the business representatives.

After the 1990 elections, in which ND (*Νέα Δημοκρατία* / New Democracy) gained 46.9% of the votes and become the ruling party, financial reforms and liberalisations were taken more sincerely. As the first step towards neoliberal transformation, collective bargaining was freed of 'state interventionism' and 'dialogue' and 'consensus' between the employees and employers were introduced (EIRO, The Mediation and Arbitration Service and the Development of Collective Bargaining: December 1998). Moreover, collective agreements were degraded to the company level; and the power of working class organisations at national and occupational level collective bargaining processes was undermined. Part-time work was promoted and flexibility of the working conditions was encouraged (Eurofound, Part-time Work: Greece). Interministerial Privatisation Committee was established; and the law on privatisation was put into force (Pagoulatos, 2001: 130). EU's encouragement and legitimisation have also facilitated the whole privatisation process, by which the public-private boundary was re-drawn to the advantage of the private sector (Pagoulatos, 2005: 367). Since privatisation caused negative conditions only for the workers of privatised companies, organised reactions of the working class remained limited.

The European concept of "social dialogue" has been influential by the second half of the 1990s. In 1997, trade unions and employers' representatives were invited for negotiations on the themes of growth, competitiveness and employment (Zambarloukou, 2006: 220). Following a seven-month dialogue process, a Confidence Pact was signed between the labour confederations GSEE (*Γενική Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Ελλάδας* / Greek General Confederation of Labour) and ADEDY (*Ανώτατης Διοίκησης Ενώσεων Δημοσίων Υπαλλήλων* / The Supreme Administration of Civil Servants' Trade-Unions), SEV and the government. The Confidence Pact was supposed to be followed during the discussions on new labour legislation, creating job opportunities and labour market policies.

However, the Confidence Pact could not have a chance to survive. Although the bill on 'working time, atypical forms of employment and the distinction between dependent and independent labour' was not approved by the employees' and employers' representatives, it was adopted by the government (EIRO, Bill on Regulation of Labour Relations: July 1998). Thus, the Confidence Pact was called off in its first year. Even though government intended to re-establish the consensus-based politics in the

following years, its stubborn attitude toward implementing neoliberal policies did not leave any hope for trust among social classes.

After PASOK's victory with 43.79% of the votes in 2000, the Minister of Labour and Social Security announced a neoliberal reform programme. Although GSEE disapproved the proposals and called for a 24-hour strike, the government pursued the meetings with employers' representatives and legislated terms agreed in discussions with slight changes as a law. Discussions with trade unions and employers' representatives on unemployment and working conditions ended in a similar manner. Despite the fact that social classes could not reach an agreement, government adopted the law on 'overtime and overtime exceeding maximum working hours; working time arrangements; reduction of social insurance contributions; part-time workers' pay; and collective redundancies' (EIRO, New Draft Bill Proposes Industrial Relations Reforms: December 2000).

The relations between the social classes have been shaped by the social security system reform in the 2000s. The government put the reform of social security system into its agenda first in 2001, arguing that social security payments result in budget deficit. GSEE and ADEDY disapproved the government proposals concerning the social security system, which were perceived as 'unfair, antisocial and ineffective, because they raise retirement ages, lower pensions and abolish special categories of insured people', and called a 24-hour strike (EIRO, 24-Hour General Strike Over Social Security Reform: May 2001). Strike participation rate reached 100% in some sectors. Following the meetings and marches against the reform proposal, the government had to drop the reform draft, and resistance of the working class has ended with a victory. However, one year later, trade unions and employers' organisations were invited once more to discuss the possibility of the reform of the social security system. Inconclusive discussions were followed by a call for general strike by GSEE and ADEDY. The government issued a law with comparatively limited reforms (Zambarloukou, 2004: 12) proving that reaching a consensus was nothing more than a bureaucratic procedure that had to be followed. Reform of social security system was re-considered in 2007.

The relations between the government and trade unions were also uneasy in 2003, when the new law concerning labour market deregulation was put into force (EIRO, New Law on Part-Time Employment in Public Sector: September 2003). The law, which was supposed to 'recruit unemployed people and other groups in a difficult labour market position on part-time, fixed-term contracts in order to provide certain social services', was criticised by ADEDY, who argued that 'introducing part-time employment in the public sector will probably not be effective in addressing unemployment, but only reduce it statistically and recycle it' (EIRO, New Law On Part-Time Employment In Public Sector: September 2003). ADEDY and many other sectoral unions called for a 24-hour strike, aiming to condemn the government's 2004 budget and low wage increases as well as the law on part-time employment in the public sector.

After 2004 general elections from which ND emerged victorious, collective bargaining meetings among employees' and employers' representatives started. Since a consensus on 2004-2005 collective agreements could not be reached, there had been a 24-hour nationwide general strike with the participation of public and private sector employees. The strike, which was organised against part-time work in the public sector,

liberalisation of public services, deregulation of industrial relations, increase in the work-place accidents, low-paid and insurance-free working migrants and social security system reforms, proved to be successful; and the working class sustained improvement in their rights. In the next period of collective bargaining, GSEE and ADEDY, with an intention to put more pressure on employers, called for a 24-hour general strike in advance to the discussions. As a result of all this resistance, 2006-2007 collective agreement had provided significant gains for the blue- and white-collar workers.

Despite all the class opposition, labour market deregulation was pursued by a law regulating part-time employment in the public sector. Additionally, government announced that they would decrease the spendings on education and health sectors, and limit the wage increase in the public sector with 3.2%. After ADEDY had gone on a general strike that became quite successful, GSEE and ADEDY called for a 3-day industrial action to clarify how dissatisfied the working class was with all these regulations. In early 2005, PAME (*Πανεργατικό Αγωνιστικό Μετωπο* / All Workers Militant Front) also announced a strike, aiming to struggle for better employment conditions and free public education and healthcare systems, and challenge the 'austerity policies of the ND government and the EU, as well as the [so-called] liberalisation of the working day, the privatizations, [and] the violation of democratic and syndical rights' (KKE, <http://inter.kke.gr/News/2005new/strike/>).

After 2007 general elections that were marked with ND's electoral victory, the new government has dealt with social security system with a reform package. GSEE and ADEDY strongly opposed the proposals, arguing that they 'bring to light the government's hidden agenda' of 'free[ing] up public and social resources in favour of the economy and making profits' (EIRO, *Controversial Changes in Store for Social Insurance System*: October 2007). Trade unions also declared that they were not participating into any discussion before the denouncement of social security system reform proposal, and called for a 24-hour general strike. It was a strike with the highest participation rate in the Greek history, in some sectors it even reached 100%. Since the capitalist class incurred considerable damage from resistance movements, employers' representatives asked the government to postpone the social security system reform. This development indicated the power of working class organisations in forcing the capitalist class to take a step back.

The debate continued in 2008-2009 collective bargaining process, during which GSEE announced a general strike arguing that the government had been carrying the social security system reform further. Suffering from this tense situation, SEV pronounced that 'profit-sharing for workers, creation of a permanent body for cooperation between the social partners, and measures for the modernisation of all institutions relating to employment and unemployment' were essential for modest relations among social classes (EIRO, *Bargaining Begins over New National Collective Labour Agreement*: March 2008). The two-year collective agreement was signed with significant achievements for the workers.

SEV's moderate attitude towards trade unions continued when the government reintroduced the pension system reform and announced 4.5% wage increase to be paid in two instalments. As a response to government action, trade unions organised a protest meeting stating that the real wages had been decreasing in comparison to real

prices. SEV supported these protests declaring that ‘the business world supports every social initiative against price increases and demands that the state implement the necessary reforms to combat this instead of maintaining the status quo’ (EIRO, Social Partners Protest Against Rise in Cost of Living: September 2008). SEV’s effort for improving the positive relations proves that the working class resistance damages not the state but the capitalist class itself.

To sum up, labour market reforms has started by the late 1980s in Greece, and gained pace in 1990s and 2000s. Despite the state’s stubborn consistency to implement neoliberal reforms in the labour market, resistance of working class organisations achieved to prevent some of the attempts through meetings, protests, and strikes. Business representatives, who were hurt the most during these industrial actions, have tried to convince the state to postpone the neoliberal reforms.

#### **4. Reaction of the Social Classes to Labour Market Reforms in Turkey**

Turkey has experienced a political and economic crisis by the end of 1970s. As the necessity for the import of technology and advanced goods increased and the profits decreased, import substituting industrialisation was slowed down. By the late 1979, balance-of-payments difficulties, inflation and ‘the sharp confrontation between the labour and capital led the economy to a complete collapse’ (Tünay, 1993: 19), and numerous changes in the government were experienced.

In 1970s, labour rights were significantly comprehensive and employee’s representatives were quite powerful in the decision-making process (Cam, 2002: 97-8). Raising working class consciousness had resulted in an increase in labour cost and a subsequent decrease in the profit of the capitalist class. Thus, the Turkish bourgeoisie regarded the increasing class consciousness and trade unions as a threat, and pressurised the government for a strategic change. The members of TÜSİAD (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği* / Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association), the most powerful businessmen organisation, began criticising the inward-looking economic strategy, and lobbied for their views in the IMF headquarters in Washington (Boratav, 1991: 72). It was a significant motive behind the policy shift towards the integration of Turkish economy with the global market (Keyman, 2001: 11).

Turkey’s Stabilisation Program of 24 January 1980 was designed under these circumstances to radically change the country’s economic structure towards a liberal and outward-looking strategy (Balkır, 1993: 135). The aim was the integration of Turkish economy into the world capitalist system (Ramazanoğlu, 1987: 93), and it was one of the largest financial operations of its kind (Kopits, 1987: 1). The programme supported by the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD included devaluation of Turkish Lira, liberalisations, elimination of import restrictions and export incentives.

However, since the anti-labour policies of the January 24<sup>th</sup> reform package were strongly opposed by trade unions, it was not easy to implement them fully. The regime change in 12 September 1980 by the military has eliminated the last remaining

obstacles for enforcing the new economic program (Boratav, 1995: 122). The military regime left no room for opposition via strict controls over political movements, trade unions, universities and the press. All political parties were dissolved and strikes were forbidden. Students and university professors were banned from participating in any political organisations (Sayarı, 1992: 31). All activities of trade unions and confederations were suspended, except Türk-İş (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* / Confederation of Trade Unions of Turkey), which was organised predominantly among public sector employees. DİSK (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* / Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey) and MİSK (*Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* / Confederation of Nationalist Trade Unions) leaders were put on trial. Whereas Hak-İş (*Türkiye Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* / Confederation of True Trade Unions of Turkey) was allowed to resume its operations in 1981 and MİSK in 1984, DİSK has re-gained its status late in 1991.

After the 13<sup>th</sup> stand-by agreement was signed with the IMF in June 1980, an unexpectedly quick liberalisation was sustained; deposit determination and lending rates of commercial banks were unleashed. Although there was initially no explicit statement about the labour market and employment issues in the economic programme, it was including a labour market reform that was essential for gradual shift to export-oriented policies (Şenses, 1993: 99). Labour market reform was necessary because restricting domestic demand via wage restraints was the only way to accumulate exportable surplus accumulation. Under stricter monetary control, exchange rate was left more flexible and the labour market was tightly regulated. The role of central planning was diminished, and private foreign investment was encouraged (Kopits, 1987: 12; Öniş, 1991: 30). Thus, the 1980-1983 period could be summarised with economic stabilisation and trade liberalisation (Celasun, 1998: 4).

The military regime has prepared a new constitution in 1982, which introduced certain limitations on labour rights. According to the provisions of the new constitution, trade unions were banned from any political activity; general strike was forbidden; public sector was excluded from the collective bargaining process; right to strike and lock-out were restricted only to the collective bargaining disagreements (Özveri, 2006: 75-116). The only article protecting labour rights in the constitution was focusing on the employees' right to unionise, which practically could not have been implemented. Most of the provisions of the new constitution have still not been altered, but only re-formulated.

During the first civilian rule after the military regime, both trade regime and capital accounts were liberalised (Öniş, 1991: 29) with an effort for 'attracting capital' (Gold, 1989: 1). Tariff protection on imports was reduced, and restrictions on foreign exchange were abolished. In 1983, the new labour law was introduced by the civilian government. This law defined trade unions as organisations solely with economic and social functions. Organisation on a national level has become compulsory, and professional unions and federations were forbidden. 'In addition to affiliating the majority of the workers at a certain enterprise, the unions were compelled to organise at least 10% of the total workers in that branch' in order to conduct collective bargaining (Aslan and Baydar, 1998: 6). The Supreme Council of Arbitration, which has the authority to postpone or ban strikes, became compulsory in cases of dispute among social classes. Lock-out was defined as a right of the employer, whereas the

strikes pursued when the employer does not fulfil the collective agreement were banned by law.

In 1984, a law on state's control over employees' and employers' representatives was adopted, and all trade unions were taken under the state's control. Followingly, fixed-term contract procedures in the SEEs were clarified; free trade zones were established with a ten-year strike ban; retirement age was increased; pensions were decreased; getting organised in the private sector was undermined (Koç, 2003: 203-214). By the legal regulations, the neoliberal strategy was institutionalised in both public and private sectors via policy tools such as privatisation, subcontracting, compulsory retirement, dismissal, de-unionisation, subcontracting, illegal work and flexibility.

In line with legal changes, tight income policy was applied to radically reduce the real wages (Şenses, 1993: 106). Wage suppression, which was reducing both production costs and domestic absorption, was aimed to take the domestic demand under control and to conduct the productive sectors to the international markets (Boratav and Yeldan, 2001: 6). Constitutional restrictions on strikes and serious limitations on the bargaining power of trade unions assured the continuity of production for the international market (Öniş, 1991: 30).

However, this regime had its own contradictions. Although the private sector was encouraged to earn the foreign exchange, the public sector was held responsible for foreign debt servicing (Boratav, Yeldan and Köse, 2000: 5). The role attributed to the public sector was in sharp contrast to the motto of neoliberal reforms, that is "minimisation of the state and its withdrawal from economic affairs" (Öniş, 1991: 32). Although prices were set by the market forces and control over the prices was decentralised (Gold, 1989: 2), public sector investment continued to be the dominant form of capital accumulation through 1980s. It was in the late 1990s that privatisation of publicly owned banks and SEEs were spelled out.

By the late 1987, the export-led growth strategy reached its economic and political limits in terms of surplus creation (Boratav and Yeldan, 2001: 7), and the phase of integration vis-a-vis financial liberalisation has started (Boratav, Yeldan and Köse, 2000: 3). Controls on foreign capital transactions were eliminated and the convertibility of the Turkish Lira was declared.

The export-oriented strategy of the post-1980 period went hand-in-hand with wage restraints. Increasing poverty had given way to the development of class-consciousness among the working class (Koç, 2006: 166). 1989 Spring Actions were followed by strikes and other democratic mass movements in early 1990s. As a result of resistance movements, wage decrease ended; and the working class recognised its power with all elements in the public and private sector. Legal changes adopted in those years provided the working class with wider social rights and liberties. Although the number of participants declined and the effect of strikes diminished, struggle against neoliberalism was pursued by united trade union organisations called "Democracy Platform" and "Labour Platform" through 1990s. Moreover, the approval of many ILO agreements in 1992 and the abolishment of the law that prohibited trade unions' political actions facilitated the working class struggle.

However, by mid-1990s, the state's anti-labour discourse gained pace, and labour market deregulation continued further with privatisation, flexibilisation and

subcontraction. In 1999, social security rights were restrained, and retirement conditions were made more difficult. In 2001, the public sector employees' right to strike and collective bargaining were restricted. The job security principle that was introduced by a law in 2002 was removed by another law in 2003 (Koç, 2003: 219). Moreover, working on-contract for a limited time period was facilitated, and the labour market was made more flexible. These regulations were in sharp contrast with ILO agreements.

Neoliberal attack has continued by many privatisations through 2000s. Later, in line with neoliberalism's rhetoric of the "minimisation of the state", it was declared (in the letter of intent submitted to the IMF) that the share of social security spendings would be decreased from 4.5% to 1% of the budget. Along with the promises given to the IMF, social security and pension system reforms were seriously undertaken, and two laws were adopted in 2006. According to the law on Social Security Institution, all social security institutions in public and private sector were unified. In parallel with this, a new law on Social Insurance and Health Insurance re-regulated provisions for social and health insurance. The retirement age was increased whereas the pensions were decreased. Moreover, the measures taken by these laws included impediments to the retirement process and augmentation of the contributions made by the citizens in health issues. Through adoption of these laws, the state's duties in social security issues were limited, and social spendings on health and insurance were minimised (Çelik, 2007).

With the effect of laws adopted in the post-1980 period, collective agreement meetings didn't witness harsh quarrels among social classes. Whereas public sector employees could hardly find place in the meetings, private sector employees could not pressurise either government or employers. In the case of private sector, the low level of real wages with very low number of strikes frankly illustrates the situation. When KESK (*Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* / Confederation of Unions of Public Labourers) had met the quota requirement to participate at collective bargaining meetings in 2002, the issue was brought to the Supreme Council of Arbitration due to disagreement. Since KESK did not accept the assessment of the Supreme Council of Arbitration, the Council of Ministers had to make the final decision on the level of wage increase. A similar result was achieved in 2006, when KESK withdrew from the collective bargaining talks due to the government's anti-union attitude (ITUC Annual Survey, 2007). Thus, two attempts of public employees to participate into the collective bargaining process failed.

To sum up, it could be argued that Turkey's experience of shift from welfare politics to neoliberalism has been facilitated by the military take over. Moreover, the 1982 Constitution and the following laws concerning labour rights have left little room for opposition among the working class. As the increasing consciousness during the 1990s could not survive for long, labour market reforms have taken place in forms of privatisation, subcontraction, flexibilisation and deregulation. Employees' passive attitude towards social security system reform and pension reform has eased the process, and the working class rights have significantly deteriorated.

## 5. Conclusion

Since the end of welfare politics, the neoliberal economic policy has been dominating the world capitalism, and national markets have been stimulated for integration into the global market. As this process has been assisted by the international financial institutions and supranational organisations, national economies have adjusted to the rules and regulations of the global economy through trade and financial account liberalisation. Moreover, to diminish organised working class resistance and minimise labour costs, deregulation of the labour market through flexibilisation, internationalisation and privatisation has been targeted.

Greece's integration with the world economy and the implementation of labour market reforms have started after its membership to the EU. In order to render the Greek economy consistent with the European Single Market Policy, integration of the national market to the global one has been realised via policy tools such as financial and capital market liberalisation. Moreover, labour costs have been decreased and labour market deregulation has commenced for increasing the competitiveness within the Union. The state's control over the collective bargaining process was removed, and several laws/regulations regarding part-time work, privatisations, flexibilisation of working hours and places, social security system reform and labour productivity were passed. In line with these regulations, real wages declined, working hours were extended, and job security deteriorated.

Labour unions could express their disappointment with neoliberal reforms, and raised their objections by strikes, protests, demonstrations and marches. While the number of strikes were increasing, wage bargaining processes were getting arduous and the conflict between social classes was flourishing, the state had to postpone some of the reforms to avoid social disorder. Therefore, neoliberal labour market reforms have caused disagreement and discontent between the social groups and the state in Greece. Working class and trade unions have efficiently made use of collective bargaining processes and they successfully blockaded important labour market reform attempts such as social security system and pension reforms. Although there have been several issues in which the working class could not manage to sustain its position, there have also been significant achievements in preventing the neoliberal reform policies and labour market deregulation.

In the Turkish case, on the other hand, the shift from welfare politics to neoliberal strategy has been assisted by the military regime, which had pressurised the working class opposition via strict rules and regulations. Also, the IMF has played an encouraging role and legitimised neoliberal transformation with the help of stand-by agreements and other policy tools. Trade liberalisation policy of the 1980s was followed by financial market liberalisation after 1989, and labour market deregulation was commenced in order to attain competitive labour cost and comparative advantage. Privatisations of the SEEs gained pace by the 1990s, and export-oriented strategy was sustained vis-a-vis wage restraint on the working class. Whereas the public sector employees could not generally be represented in the collective bargaining meetings due to the quota application, the private sector employees could not defend their position since there have been legal barriers to strike and any other opposition. In 2000s, the share of education and health expenditures in the state budget was decreased, and

social security and pension reforms that deteriorate the social rights of the working class were implemented.

In Turkey, the working class could not encounter the challenge of neoliberalism put forward by the transformation of political economy and labour market deregulation policies. The shift from welfare politics to neoliberalism, which has been targeted by the capitalist class and implemented by state measures, has not been strongly opposed by the employees' representatives since they have been comparatively weak and passive as opposed to their Greek counterparts. That is because the working class interests have been set apart in such a way that the employees in the public sector would have different interests than the ones in the private sector. Moreover, the weakness of the working class organisations has facilitated it further for the bourgeoisie as well as the capitalist state to execute labour market reforms. Thus, labour market deregulation process has not witnessed serious confrontation among social classes in Turkey.

To sum up, it could be argued that a well-organised working class might have the capacity to slow down or challenge neoliberal policies and labour market reforms, as partly shown in the Greek case. However, as in the Turkish case, labour market reforms might be implemented without any obstacle if/when working class organisations are not strong enough to resist. Since the labour still is the most important component of the production process, the capitalist class is still vulnerable to its disobedience. Thus, where the working class organisations are powerful and effective, the capitalist class and the state might take a step back in neoliberal policies.

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# The Missing Link: Policy Interaction in EU Policy Implementation

*Petya Ognyanova Dragneva*

*Department of Politics and School of Law, University of Sheffield,  
p.dragneva@sheffield.ac.uk*

## 1. Introduction

As stated in its annual management plan (2009) the mission of Directorate General ‘Environment’ of the European Commission relates to three key objectives. These are respectively initiating and defining new environmental policy and legislation, promoting the integration of environmental concerns into other policy areas and ensuring that agreed policy measures are implemented effectively in the European Union<sup>1</sup> Member States (hereafter, the ‘EU’ ‘MSs’).

The present paper aims to examine two of these objectives, namely environmental policy integration as set in Article 6 TEC and implementation of environmental legislation in the MSs, and show the particular salience and complexity of this dimension of EU environmental policy. For this purpose the paper, *firstly*, discusses the origins and development of the EU environmental policy integration objective as well as the way this objective is conceptualized in the existing academic literature. It reviews its interpretations in the context of EU policy- and law-making as well as in connection to the process of implementation at the domestic level. This perspective draws the attention to the need for further empirical exploration of environmental policy integration during implementation in the Member States which is an area that has remained insufficiently studied in the academic literature.

*Secondly*, in doing so the present paper adopts the concept of policy interactions as expression of the unpredictable dynamics (Glachant, 2001) of environmental policy integration exhibited in implementation. It draws on the findings of the Europeanization perspective and adapts one of its models<sup>2</sup> to take into account the role

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<sup>1</sup> The ‘European Union’ (EU) was established by the Treaty of Maastricht which came into force in 1993 and was based on the foundations of the pre-existing European Economic Community. The latter was created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and constituted part of the European Communities (ECSC, EURATOM, and EEC) since the Merger Treaty of 1967. The Merger Treaty was abrogated by the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997 (into force since 1999).

For greater simplicity the demarcation ‘EU’ will be used throughout the paper even if reference is made to earlier points in time, except for the cases in which the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) is discussed.

<sup>2</sup> Cowles, Caporaso and Risse’s three-step model (2001)

of policy interactions as a major factor in the Europeanization process at the domestic level. It does this particularly with regard to implementation outcomes in the environmental sector.

Aiming to emphasize and discuss the critical role of policy interaction for the implementation of EU environmental legislation, the paper uses examples of the interaction between EU environmental and EU cohesion policy in the MSs which have been identified in the academic literature (eg. Lenschow, 2002a, b) and gathered by the present researcher. The examination is based on a qualitative research strategy involving primarily consultation of secondary academic sources as well as consideration of primary and secondary EU legislation.

## **2. Environmental Policy Integration: Origins and Development. Conceptualization**

Environmental policy integration (hereinafter, the 'EPI') has been the object of extensive research in the social science literature. Academic debates have focused predominantly on the level of EU policy-making. An area which is particularly well examined is the setting of the EPI as a key EU objective feeding into other policy areas (Art. 6 TEC). Scholars have emphasized the 'transversal' character of EU environmental policy (Knill and Liefferink, 2007) and the huge implications it has for other EU policy areas such as regional policy, transport, internal market, etc. (Dhondt, 2003; Lenschow, 2002a; Lenschow, 2002b; Scott and Trubek, 2002; Scott, 2002; Jordan and Schout, 2006; Knill and Liefferink, 2007; Krämer, 2007 etc.). Krämer (2007) even goes as far as stating that the integration requirement is 'the most important of the principles which govern environmental policy, since it constitutes the bridge between environmental policy and all other policies at Community level' (p. 390). As such it has developed into a 'core application' of the concept of sustainable development (Lenschow, 2002b).

The foundations of EPI can be traced back to the First Environmental Action Programme (hereinafter, the 'EAP') which posited that 'effective environmental protection requires the consideration of environmental consequences in all technical planning and decision-making processes at national and Community level' (OJ 1973/6, cited in Lenschow, 2002b: 22; Dhondt, 2003: 17; Krämer, 2007: 60-61). This approach was further strengthened in the third (1983), fourth (1986) and fifth EAP (1993)<sup>3</sup>.

The EPI is now incorporated in the latest sixth Environmental Action Programme. Article 1 (1) of Decision No 1600/2002/EC<sup>4</sup> holds that the '[P]rogramme should promote the integration of environmental concerns in all Community policies and

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<sup>3</sup> The first Action Programme on the Environment was followed by further action programmes respectively in 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 2002).

See <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/newprg/legis.htm> (Date of reference 17.09.2008)

<sup>4</sup> See Decision No 1600/2002/EC of The European Parliament and of The Council of 22 July 2002 Laying Down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme [2002] OJ L 242/1

contribute to the achievement of sustainable development through the current and future enlarged Community'. Until the adoption of the 6<sup>th</sup> EAP, by being of a non-binding character the EAPs featured as mere reflections of the Commission's policy-planning agenda (Lenschow, 2002b: 9; Krämer, 2007: 60-61). The new development with the adoption of the 6<sup>th</sup> EAP is that this was carried out by way of joint decision between the European Parliament and the Council (in line Art. 175 (3) TEC) what made its provisions binding. At the same time, as Knill and Liefferink (2007) underline, in this context the conviction that 'effective environmental policy cannot be carried out if it is detached from other policy areas' was further reinforced (p.34).

Although the EAPs underlined its political salience, the formal institutionalization of the environmental policy integration objective was undertaken in the process of the parallel treaty evolution of the EU (Lenschow, 2002a, b). The Single European Act<sup>5</sup> was first to establish a legal basis for environmental policy in general and of the environmental policy integration objective, in particular. Article 130r (2) EEC spelled out the need to integrate environmental objectives into other policies in order to achieve effective and sustainable success in environmental protection. It can, then, be maintained that the legal start of EU environmental protection was accompanied by awareness and readiness to handle its transversal features within the framework of an EPI governance approach (Jordan and Schout, 2006; Lenschow, 2002a, b; Dhondt, 2003).

The Treaty of Maastricht<sup>6</sup> added a stronger sense of obligation to this strategy by rewording Article 130r (2) EEC in a way that 'environmental protection *must* be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community policies' (emphasis added). For the first time the Treaty explicitly stated that a 'policy in the sphere of the environment' would be considered one of the principal EU activities (Art. 3 TEC). It also provided reference to the concept of sustainable development by substituting Article 2 and including a new text stipulating that the EU aimed at achieving 'sustainable...growth respecting the environment' (discussed by Jordan and Schout, 2006: 67; Lenschow, 2002a, b; Krämer, 2007; Dhondt, 2003).

The prominence of sustainable development was also evidenced at the international arena within the context of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 which led to the adoption of the so-called Rio Declaration. The declaration contained 27 principles among which a prominent place was granted to the integration of environmental protection and economic development. The UNCED also adopted 'Agenda 21' featuring an elaborate action plan containing a specific chapter on environmental policy integration (Dhondt, 2003: 58). Despite the non-binding nature of these international documents, they present evidence for the existence of political will in support of EPI in the international community at the beginning of the 90s which affected thinking at the EU level too.

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<sup>5</sup> Single European Act OJ L 169 of 29.06.1987

<sup>6</sup> See Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) OJ C 191 of 29.07.1992 signed in 1992 and into force since 1993

The Treaty of Amsterdam brought about further changes with regard to EPI. It included a new Art. 6 TEC according to which EU environmental protection requirements had to be ‘integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community policies and activities...in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development’<sup>7</sup>. This provision codified the environmental policy integration concept as an EU principle. At the same time it led to enhancing the integrative element of EU environmental law and policy into different policy sectors (Dhondt, 2003; Knill and Liefferink, 2007; Bell and McGillivray, 2006; Jordan and Schout, 2006; Lenschow, 2002a,b).

Following this formal legal recognition, specific political steps within the context of the so-called Cardiff Process were taken towards the practical application of the environmental policy integration objective in achieving sustainable development in the EU (Dhondt, 2003; Jordan and Schout, 2006; Lenschow, 2005; Lenschow, 2002a,b). The Luxembourg European Council (December 1997) addressed the Commission with a request<sup>8</sup> for drafting an EPI implementation strategy. As a result, a Communication ‘Partnership for Integration – a Strategy for Integrating Environment into EU Policies’ was delivered in 1998<sup>9</sup> (Jordan and Schout, 2006: 70). It acknowledged EPI as a ‘chief concern’ in the EU and formulated practical guidelines and procedures for integrating environmental considerations into other policies. Such a measure was, for instance, the introduction of environmental impact assessments (Lenschow, 2002a: 28).

Particular reference was made to EU regional policy and enlargement with regard to the necessity to introduce environmental protection requirements in the Structural and pre-accession EU funding. The close interrelation between regional policy and environmental policy was underlined by the Commission on other occasions as well. Back in 1995 the Commission delivered a communication on cohesion policy and the environment<sup>10</sup> which emphasized the interdependent character of environment and regional development with regard to natural resource management, infrastructural development, tourism, etc. It presented cohesion policy as an instrument for improving environmental protection and achieving sustainable development. The communication also reflected the Commission’s commitment to prevent infringements of environmental rules within Structural and Cohesion funds operations.

This approach was maintained in revisions of the EU Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund regulations from the beginning of the 90s which provided that measures co-

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<sup>7</sup> See Treaty of Amsterdam OJ C 340 of 10.11.1997

signed in 1997 and into force since 1999

<sup>8</sup> European Council (Luxembourg) Presidency Conclusions, 12 and 13 December 1997

<sup>9</sup> See Communication from the Commission to the European Council of 27 May 1998 on a partnership for integration: a strategy for integrating the environment into EU policies (Cardiff-June 1998), COM(1998) 333 - Not published in the Official Journal

<sup>10</sup> See **Communication** from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Cohesion Policy and the Environment, COM(95) 509 final from 22.11.1995 - Not published in the Official Journal

financed by the EU had to comply with EU environmental provisions<sup>11</sup> (Krämer, 2007: 438). The interdependent character of environmental and regional policy was further strengthened in the revised 1999 EU Structural Funds regulation<sup>12</sup> (Lenschow, 2002b: 196-197). Article 12 of this regulation spelled out the need for operations financed by the EU funds to be in full conformity with Community policies and actions on environmental protection. Article 8 engaged with promoting sustainable development through ‘the integration of environmental protection and improvement requirement’. Furthermore, Article 39 of the regulation allowed for suspension and withdrawal of regional funding in cases of violation of EU environmental law (discussed by Lenschow, 2002b: 196; Krämer, 2007: 438). It was in relation to this that in 2000 the environment Commissioner Wallström pointed out that if governments did not provide for the adequate implementation of environmental legislation that would ‘cause delays in receiving billions of Euro in regional aid from Brussels’ (Lenschow, 2002a: 30, 2002b). According to academic analyses the threat of financial sanctioning appeared to be a more promising tool for bolstering EPI implementation by the EU Member States as compared to legal action in line with Art. 226 TEC (Lenschow, 2002b: 232).

However, the latest 2006 regulation on EU Structural Funds<sup>13</sup> brought about some changes in this respect. On the one hand, the regulation adheres to the position that ‘the objectives of the funds shall be pursued in the framework of sustainable development and the Community promotion of the goal of protecting and improving the environment as set out in Article 6 of the Treaty’ (Art. 17). On the other hand, this regulation does not contain any more reference to the option allowing the Commission to retain funds due to non-compliance with EU environmental *acquis* (Krämer, 2007: 438).

These interdependence patterns reflect the existence of ups and downs in the development of the EPI in the EU. In a 2004 working document on ‘[I]ntegrating environmental considerations into other policy areas - a stocktaking of the Cardiff process’, the Commission recognized the existence of problems and the need to improve the delivery of environmental integration. A point was made that any ‘soft’ measures taken at the EU level need to be complemented by serious commitments and action at national level. Interestingly, the Commission pointed out that the ‘stringent implementation by Member States of the directives on Environmental Impact

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<sup>11</sup> See **Council Regulation** (EEC) No 2081/93 of 20 July 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 on the tasks of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments [1993] OJ L 193/5; **Council Regulation** (EC) No 1164/94 of 16 May 1994 establishing a Cohesion Fund [1994] OJ L 130/1;

<sup>12</sup> See **Council Regulation** (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds;

<sup>13</sup> See **Council Regulation** (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Funds, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 [2006] OJ L 210/25.

Assessment...is a key to advancing environmental integration through projects, plans and programmes at national level'<sup>14</sup>.

For instance, decisions on the financing and the implementation of major waste infrastructural projects in the MSs, such as the construction and reconstruction of regional waste facilities, are dependent on the assessment of their immediate and long-term environmental consequences. The latter is necessitated in the context of the environmental impact assessment EU legal requirement<sup>15</sup>.

At the same time, in the cases of the new MSs such major investment projects contribute towards meeting specific EU environmental criteria. For example, in order for these countries to comply with the EU targets of reducing the percentage of waste going to landfills, they need to put alternative waste management infrastructure in place. This requires 'heavy' investments (Vasilis, Getimis, Paraskevopoulos, 2006) and adequate administrative and institutional expertise to manage these investments at national and sub-national level. Thus, by being able to manage and absorb EU structural funding, the MSs also manage to comply with the EU environmental legal requirements. Vasilis, Getimis and Paraskevopoulos have undertaken an extensive study of the application of EU cohesion policy and the implementation of EU waste legislation in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary and Poland. According to their findings the lack of adequate financial resources, added to institutional incapacities at national and sub-national levels, have the potential to aggravate the implementation process. Given this, the complex interdependence of EU cohesion and environmental policy at the implementation level can often lead to measures which do not prove to be in the interest of environmental protection (Krämer, 2007; Lenschow, 2002 a,b).

In this context, the value of the EPI appears somewhat 'self-evident'. Its rationale suggests that environmental consideration should be granted firmer standing in public policy (Jordan and Schout, 2006: 64). Nevertheless, its practical implementation brings an element of ambiguity to the fore (*Ibid.*). Scholars acknowledge that despite it being a 'nice' principle (Krämer, 2007: 396), EPI has remained mainly in the sphere of political rhetoric. Its practical application at EU and MS level has proved to be rather limited (Lenschow, 2002a; Nollkaemper, 2002; Jordan and Schout, 2006) and not 'taken seriously' (Krämer, 2007: 396).

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<sup>14</sup> See Commission Working Document, Integrating Environmental Considerations into Other Policy Areas-a Stocktaking of the Cardiff Process, Brussels, 01.06.2004, COM(2004) 394, Official Journal C 49 of 28 February 2006

<sup>15</sup> See Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997 amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [1997] OJ L 73/5, Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Funds, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 [2006] OJ L 210/25, Commission Regulation (EC) No 718/2007 of 12 June 2007 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 establishing an instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA) [2007] OJ L 170/1

Krämer (2007) discusses predominantly the European Commission measures for introducing EPI in EU policy-making since the beginning of the 1990s. These included: assessment of all Commission proposals on their environmental effects; indication by a green asterix of the proposals in the Commission work programme with potentially significant environmental effects; setting up of a new integration unit in the DG 'Environment', etc. (*Ibid*; Lenschow, 2002 b: 10). In 1998 the European Environmental Agency also came with a number of indicators which were expected to help assessing the integration of environmental actions into sectoral policies. According to Krämer's analysis the overall value of these measures has turned out to be 'insignificant' (p. 393). When reflecting on the latest EU performance with regard to the EPI, Krämer concludes that 'any political and administrative effort to give life to Art. 6 has been abandoned or, in a number of policy areas...even not seriously started' (*Ibid.*).

This, it is argued here, can become problematic during the process of implementation at the domestic arena as it is then that the EPI dynamics become particularly complex and unpredictable (Glachant, 2001). Therefore, in the absence of adequate institutional coordination capacities at the implementation level they could develop as potential constraints to implementation performance. In her analysis Andrea Lenschow seeks to explain this EPI implementation deficit by positing that policy integration is critically dependent on the institutional context where it should be implemented. She argues that EPI 'on the ground often fails due to insufficient capacities and a lack of substantive guidance' (Lenschow, 2002b: 231).

One of the possible reasons for the EPI implementation problems that has been discussed in the literature concerns its 'uncertain legal status' (Nollkaemper, 2002: 23; Dhondt, 2003). Nollkaemper examines three distinct conceptual roles of the environmental integration principle in the EU and international environmental law. According to his first interpretation, the EPI serves as an *objective*<sup>16</sup> almost overlapping with environmental policy proper. The second role of the EPI qualifies it as a *rule of reference* where it does not have an autonomous normative meaning but rather refers to environmental protection requirements contained in other norms (in primary and secondary EU law). The third meaning examined by Nollkaemper grants the EPI the status of an autonomous principle and a 'closing norm' in instances where adopted procedural rules such as the requirement for environmental impact assessment would not apply (*Ibid.*). Such are, for instance, the cases of minor EU funded projects or projects falling with Annex II of the EIA directive<sup>17</sup>. In this context, however, the application of the environmental integration principle is left largely to the discretion of the Member States (Krämer, 2007: 170-171). Hence, it depends on a number of intervening factors including institutional legacies and administrative capacity at

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<sup>16</sup> *objective* or according to Dworkin's (1984) definition a *policy* seen as 'that kind of standards that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some economic, political, or social feature of the community' (cited by Dhondt, 2003: 138)

<sup>17</sup> **Council Directive** 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [1985] OJ L 175/40

national and sub-national level in relation to both project management and implementation of the EU environmental legislation.

It is with reference to these arguments that the paper looks at the existence of unpredictable policy interactions at the domestic level in explaining environmental implementation problems in the MSs. At the same time, it argues, that the existence of such uncontrolled policy interactions is largely determined by the potential inability of national and sub-national administrations to maintain a sustainable environmental policy integration approach.

### **3. Policy Interactions in EU Environmental Policy Implementation**

In contrast with the abundance of academic research dedicated to the examination and conceptualization of the environmental integration principle, the theme of policy interactions at the level of domestic implementation has remained largely understudied.

The argument that efficient policy-making and implementation are strongly determined by the existence of policy interactions forms the basis of a collective book from the 1970s edited by Hanf and Schapf (1978) (cited by Glachant, 2001: 182). This argument was adopted by Glachant (2001) who examines the need for 'adaptive' implementation of EU environmental legislation necessitated by the co-habitation of parallel policy processes at the EU and the domestic arena. According to Glachant's analysis, the outcome of these processes can either lead to *over-compliance* (as in the example with the implementation of the Large Combustion Plant Directive in the UK and France) or to *non-compliance* or implementation difficulties (as in the case of the implementation of Directive 89/429 on waste incineration in France).

Glachant (2001) posits that there can be three main sources of policy interactions which can in turn lead to positive or negative implementation outcomes. These are first, pre-existing domestic policies that regulate the same environmental problem. He looks particularly into instances where domestic policies entail more stringent measures than ones required in the EU secondary legislation. To a certain extent this explanation overlaps with the 'goodness of fit' perspective debated in the Europeanization literature which will be considered further below. The second factor producing policy interactions can be related to the emerging of other policies or regulations adopted at national, EU or international level. The third factor can be traced to the impact of other non-environmental policies.

In this line of thought, Glachant infers that the 'implementation of a particular European text should be viewed as part of a complex patchwork of dynamic interactions across a multi-level and multi-centred policy system' (2001: 182). Seeking to explain how environmental implementation can cope efficiently with policy interactions, he distinguishes between two scenarios. The first one relates to instances when policy interactions are envisaged at the policy formulation stage. Such a case, for example, could be the adequate application of the environmental policy integration principle which would provide for controlled and foreseeable policy interactions during implementation. The second scenario concerns situations where policy

interactions are not anticipated in which case there is stronger need for ‘adaptive’ implementation (Glachant, 2001: 182). The latter scenario is very much relevant to the case of implementation of EU environmental legislation in the new Member States where there can be identified critical policy interactions between EU environmental and cohesion policy especially with regard to the transposition of ‘heavy directives’<sup>18</sup>

In a later study, Vasilis, Getimis and Paraskevopoulos (2006) examine waste management and cohesion policy in Hungary and Poland. Their conclusions seem applicable to other new MSs as well, such as Bulgaria (Carius, Krüger, von Homeyer, 2001). For these countries, waste management is one of ‘the most crucial environmental policy issues’. It can have huge implications for a large number of sectors, including environmental protection itself, tourism, economic and social life. At the same time, waste management (and environmental protection in general) is considered a very ‘expensive’ policy area (Vasilis, Getimis and Paraskevopoulos, 2006: 219). It requires substantial technological and infrastructural investments towards the development of a new institutionally sound waste management system which needs to comply with specific technical and procedural parameters. It also necessitates efficient performance on behalf of a competent and active public administration at national and sub-national level. The local authorities, for instance, need to handle waste management legacies such as poor infrastructure, uncontrolled and inadequate waste facilities and landfill sites, and to prevent any potential harm of pollution caused by this infrastructure. The role of the interaction between EU cohesion and waste policy in this context comes to the fore as a particularly prominent factor. On the one hand, cohesion policy becomes instrumental for implementing EU waste legislation<sup>19</sup>. Also the environmental impact assessment requirement for major projects incorporated in the EU Structural Funds regulations (Art. 40) constitutes a safeguard ensuring that the specific project complies with the EU waste management standards. On the other hand, failure to absorb EU cohesion funding can lead to inability of the public authorities to implement the EU environmental (waste) provisions.

This framework becomes even more complex when considering the nature of the accession of the new Member States to the EU which has been characterized by conditionality and top-down Europeanization dynamics in the context of the so-called ‘enlargement governance’ (Dimitrova, 2002). It provides that in implementing the EU environmental *acquis* they perform as policy-takers rather than policy-shapers (Jordan and Liefferink, 2004; Goetz, 2005).

The latter unfolds as a crucial element in the context of the ‘goodness of fit’ argument discussed in the Europeanization literature (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001; Bulmer

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<sup>18</sup> ‘heavy’ directives – term used in the Environmental Operational Programme of Bulgaria 2007-2013 to denote ‘costly’ investments

<sup>19</sup> Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste [1999] OJ L 182/1

Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives [2008] OJ L 312/3;

and Radaelli, 2005). Despite being largely criticized ‘goodness of fit’ has served as basis for subsequent empirical studies which build upon it, revise it or develop it even further depending on the specifics of the EU policy sector they are looking into (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2005; Bache, 2008). The ‘goodness of fit’ concept is part of a three-step model developed by Cowles, Caporaso and Risse in 2001.

According to the ‘goodness of fit’ argument, the degree of ‘fit’ between EU and national policy content determines the intensity of the ‘adaptation pressures’ of the EU processes on the member state and affects implementation performance (Knill, 2006). It has been argued that the existence of misfit and high adaptational pressure is ‘a necessary but not a sufficient condition for domestic change’ (Caporaso, 2007: 29). Risse, Cowles and Caporaso single out five variables that can serve as mediating factors in the process: multiple veto points, mediating formal institutions, political and organizational cultures, differential empowerment of domestic actors, and learning. Other authors exploring the Europeanization implications in various policy sectors propose and examine a long list of additional factors that could influence the EU-member states (accession countries) relations such as political or partisan conflict (Bache, 2008: 17), formal and informal institutions (Caporaso, 2007: 30), domestic economic pressures, long-term industrial transformations or emergence of new public management (Börzel, 2007: 230), stage of regulation in relation to European policies, the level of sectoral reform capacity (Héritier and Knill (2001), etc.

Having discussed the importance of policy interactions for implementation in the environmental sector, this paper proposes that policy interactions are included in the above model as a potentially critical variable. This framework would, thus, rely on Cowles, Caporaso and Risse’s three-step approach as an analytical tool-kit which will take into account the role of policy interactions as a major factor in the Europeanization dynamics particularly with regard to implementation outcomes in the environmental sector. According to this logic of analysis policy interactions would either facilitate or constrain implementation performance depending critically on the nature of the institutional context in which they emerge (please, see Fig.1).




Fig. 1.

Source: Adapted from Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001:6)

It would be beyond the scope of this inquiry to put this analytical tool-kit to the test. The methodological approach chosen here provides for a theoretical rather than empirical examination of the problems discussed. While it contributes to clarifying the framework for conceptualising policy interactions in the areas defined above, its practical implications need further empirical examination, which will be the subject of subsequent research.

## 4. Conclusions

The main objective of this paper has been to engage in a discussion on the role of the environmental integration principle and the existence of policy interactions determining the implementation performance of the EU Member States in the environmental sector. It has, firstly, undertaken an extensive overview of the development of the environmental integration principle. By tracing its evolution at the European Union level, this inquiry has identified interesting trends of gradual build-up exhibited by the incorporation of the EPI in *soft* instruments such as the first wave of environmental action programmes to its inclusion in *hard* ones such as primary and secondary EU law. However, it has been discovered that this process has been marked by reversals at the policy-formulation stage. Furthermore, it has not led to successful implementation of the EPI in the EU Member States and has rather been characterized by an 'implementation deficit'. The argument here has been that these problems with the application of the environmental policy integration principle cannot be silenced by disregard. They emphasize the existence of a missing link between environmental policy integration and implementation in the Member States.

It has been maintained here that policy interactions, for instance between EU cohesion and environmental policy, can emerge in the absence of a sustainable environmental policy integration approach at the domestic arena. Hence, the *second* point of reference in this paper has been related to examination of the policy interactions concept as discussed in the social science literature. While considering the available writings this paper has adopted the concept of policy interactions as an expression of the unpredictable dynamics of environmental policy integration exhibited in implementation. The paper has, then, proposed that policy interactions are taken as a key mediating factor in the Europeanization process at the domestic arena as they can have significant implications for the implementation outcomes in the environmental sector.

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# Turkey and the European Union: Prisoners in Cyprus

*Sırma Süren*

*Political Science, Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey*

## 1. Introduction

Turkey and the European Union (EU) relations represent a *sui generis* process for history of the Union and in terms of foreign policy making in Turkey. Enlargement process usually signifies a 'win-win' game for both the candidate country and the EU. Nevertheless, rules of the game are not easy to define when it comes to Turkish membership. Turkey has been portraying itself as a 'Western democratic' country since the formation of the republic; however for many Europeans it still stands in binary opposition to Western norms and values. Its size, geographic position, large Muslim population, unstable democracy and economy are the most common objections that determine opposing debates on Turkey's membership. On the Turkish side, the perception of the EU as a 'Christian Club' which does not want Turkey in by denying its Europeanness, leads to a loss of support for the Union. The sheer magnitude of ambiguity present in Turkey's membership makes strategic decision a priority for both Turkish officials and Brussels. Given the highly contentious and complex nature of relations between the parties, it was very much evident that the process will be marked by 'digestion pauses'(Lungescu 2005). The first severe 'digestion pause' manifested itself in 2006 during an escalation over Turkish ports leading to the freezing of eight negotiation chapters; free movement of goods, freedom to provide services, financial services, agriculture, fisheries, transport policy, customs union and external relations.

After the accession talks began, Cyprus emerged as the initial point of disagreement between Turkey and the EU. The south, a member of the EU, remains unrecognised by Turkey whilst Turkey is the only country to acknowledge the existence of an independent state in the north, Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC). Turkish government expects TRNC to be treated in a legal status equal to the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, claim that the northern part of the island is illegally occupied by Turkey since 1974 and thus perceive Turkish Cypriots as a minority who seek secession. According to Bac and Guney (2005) with the Greek Cypriot membership, the Cyprus dispute became the determining factor in Turkey-EU relations regardless of the fact that it is not a part of the Copenhagen criteria. Hence, conflict over closed Turkish ports to Greek Cypriot vessels/planes became the first major obstacle which put Turkey and the EU into stalemate. A year after the start of Turkey's accession talks, the actors found themselves in a conundrum. A series of highly contentious events took place between the parties from 2004 to 2006 gradually altering their bargaining positions away from cooperation towards deviation. The rationale of negotiations which are shaped by mistrust and punishment must be examined to understand the changing dynamics of Turkey-EU relations. The question

arises as to whether the Turkish government was following its usual hard-line position, devoid of any compromise on Cyprus, or it was a rational response to the Union's stance. The EU on the other hand, was opting for a punishment strategy through the power asymmetry in the game.

This paper aims to analyse the events leading to an impasse between Turkey and the EU over Cyprus by using the game of Prisoner's Dilemma. Unfolding of events demonstrated the importance of rational decision making in foreign policy choices. Actors involved in the conflict defined their respective position by taking into account short term goals and immediate gains which hamper both solution options in Cyprus and prosperous Turkey-EU negotiations. Hence unfulfilled commitments over Cyprus influenced by rational domestic concerns on both sides generated a de-constructive environment resulting in the freezing of eight chapters of the *acquis communautaire*. The main argument is that the impact of social dilemmas such as the Cyprus problem in the absence of confidence building measures obstructs already fragile Turkey-EU relations. And if no conclusive solution is found on the island then it is highly unlikely for the actors to reshape their preferences towards cooperation.

## 2. Cyprus Impasse: An Overview

Conflict in international relations arises from the threat against the identity and security of the parties involved (Diez 2002) and Cyprus emerged in 1960s as the island where parties defended their interests without any compromise. Turkish position on the Cyprus problem was defined by nationalist sentiments which were so strong that according Volkan Vural,<sup>1</sup> none of the political parties in Turkey had the power to accept the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) as the government of Cyprus (Vural 2007). This position narrowed solution options acceptable to Turkey. Nevertheless change to Ankara's obstinate stance was brought by the UN Plan or the so called Annan Plan. In Turkey, more moderate options for solving the Cyprus problem were being discussed under the Justice and Development (AKP) government. The carrot of EU membership accompanied with pro-solution leaders like Mehmet Ali Talat and Tayyip Erdogan was the main stimulating factor which created the climate of policy change. Aware of Cyprus posing a serious obstacle to EU membership (Duzgit 2006), Turkey pursued a moderate stance, since sitting across the Greek Cypriot government without a solution during the EU negotiations would be very challenging for Turkey. Hence, supporting conflict resolution could remove the threat of Greek Cypriot veto and ameliorate Turkey's relation with the EU (Kazan 2002).

When analysing solution options for Cyprus, Turkey's influence must be kept in mind. In Turkey, many believed that the strong military pressure in politics would never allow for a policy change but AKP's revolutionary stance overcame conservative policies (Birand 2004). Long-standing political figures, like Rauf Denktaş, who was against the formation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, were receiving severe criticisms for their anti-solution stance. In TRNC, public began searching for new

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<sup>1</sup>Volkan Vural is the former UN Permanent Representative of Turkey and the Secretary of the EU Affairs.

solutions under President Mehmet Ali Talat. A few days before the referendum on the Plan, Turkish Cypriots protested against Denktash to show that they will choose the certainty of a loose federation over the uncertainty of their status quo (Wright 2004). In Turkey, AKP accused Denktash as having 'disingenuous complaints' (Bryant 2004) for condemning the Annan Plan as obliterating TRNC's right to self-determination. An anti-Denktash campaign began both in Turkey and in TRNC because of the fear that his rejectionist stance would impede pursuit of EU membership and solving TRNC's ambiguous position. Therefore, although the Annan Plan could jeopardize Turkey's security concerns and did not fully satisfy the aspirations of the Cypriot communities, Turkish government put its full support behind reunification (Bryant 2007).

The same pro-solution stance was not followed by the Greek Cypriot leader, Tasos Papadopolous, who stubbornly campaigned for 'No' to the plan by arguing that RoC should not accept such a fait accompli (Moulakis 2007). Papadopoulos' rejectionist propaganda on the grounds that voting 'Yes' for the plan would lead to 'Greek Cypriot Community' rather than an 'international recognized state', was a turning point for the EU, Turkey and two Cypriot communities drawing Turkey and the EU closer (Gurel 2007). Consequently, the Annan Plan officially failed after being voted 75% 'No' by the Greek Cypriots and 65% 'Yes' by the Turkish side (Moulakis 2007). The outcome of the referendum substantiated that the EU would be accepting a divided island which would hinder its capacity to bring a just solution to the island (Friis 2002). The EU, in 1999, had removed the solution as a pre-condition to Cyprus' membership but, as Günter Verheugen stated they were 'feeling personally cheated by the Government of RoC' (Duzgit 2006). Hence, the EU decided that 65% of the Turkish Cypriot population who voted in favour of the plan should not go back to their isolated life. The Council stated that it is 'determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community' and that 'its future rests in a united Cyprus within the EU' (European Council 2004).

Turkish support for the Annan Plan and the Union's decision to remove the isolations on TRNC has improved the northern part's international position but most importantly the developments have facilitated trust building between Turkey and the EU. Under this constructive environment, Turkey signed the Additional Protocol in 2005 extending the Customs Union to ten new member states including RoC. However, Turkish declaration, which stated that signing of the Protocol did not imply recognition of RoC impaired relations once more resulting in deviation. The EU demanded from Turkey to stabilize its relations with RoC, open its ports to Greek Cypriot traffic as part of Customs Union whilst Turkish government insisted that opening up of ports and the isolation of TRNC should be handled together. It is evident that in Cyprus, Turkey and the EU is pursuing a 'tit-for-tat' strategy where one cooperates only if the other cooperates. Therefore if the atmosphere of trust had lasted between the actors, we could expect employment of a cooperation strategy in Cyprus. But unkept promises on both sides hampered the fragile trust environment.

### **3. Prisoner's Dilemma and Cyprus**

The classical game of prisoner's dilemma accounts for social dilemmas without a recourse to a centralized authority and demonstrates how lack of trust among players

can cause an undesirable outcome for both players. If the game is played once, both players will choose to defect since each player is better off playing 'defect' regardless of what the other player does. If the game is played many times, then there is some incentive for both players to at least start off by cooperating. However, as soon as one player deviates by playing 'defect' at any stage, then the game goes into a stalemate where both players end up with a worse pay-off.

In the case of Cyprus, prisoner's dilemma helps to analyse the reasons that put Turkey and the EU into stalemate. While Turkish position on the opening of ports was regarded as a traditional hard line decision imposed by nationalist sentiments on Cyprus, it was actually a strategic response to the Union's failure to end isolations. With its support for the Annan Plan and the signing of the Protocol, Turkey had abandoned its nationalist stance in pursuit of membership and played 'cooperation' in Cyprus. The EU, on the other hand, took advantage of its more powerful bargaining position leaving aside its promise to end isolation of Northern Cyprus. Confined by RoC's interests, the EU realized that it could end up with a better pay off by sacrificing less and also get Turkey to fulfil its obligations under the Additional Protocol by the legally binding nature of the agreement. Furthermore, Turkey perceived the EU as reluctant to end isolation of TRNC and rejected opening its ports and hence played 'defect' regardless of how punishment strategy of the EU could hamper its membership process. The lack of trust, resulting from unfulfilled commitments on both sides determined the options available to players. Table 1 provides a more comprehensive explanation of the Cyprus imprisonment of Turkey and the EU.

		The EU	
		Cooperate	Defect
Turkey	Cooperate	<p>A – compromise</p> <p><math>A^* + \text{compromise}^*</math></p>	<p>A – compromise – freeze</p> <p><math>A^* + \text{compromise}^* + \text{freeze}^*</math></p>
	Defect	<p>A</p> <p><math>A^*</math></p>	<p>A – freeze</p> <p><math>A^* + \text{freeze}^*</math></p>

A = Uncompromise with Cyprus

Table 1.

Playing 'cooperation' in the case of Turkey would mean opening its ports to Greek Cypriots and fulfilling its obligations under the Additional Protocol with a pay off (A\* + compromise\*). Moreover, the EU, by playing cooperation would have to keep its political promise to end the economic and political isolations that TRNC suffered. The action of cooperation would correspond to both parties keeping their respective commitments. On the other hand, if the players decided for (cooperate, defect) then this strategy profile (A-compromise-Freeze, A\*+compromise\*+Freeze\*) would mean that Turkey would be complying with its legal commitments and opening up the ports to Greek Cypriots and ending up with a worse pay off than under cooperation whilst the EU would be getting the better pay off without making any sacrifices.

The strategy option (defect, cooperate) is not a valid one for our game because of the power asymmetry that dominates the game. The EU aims to act as one single entity when it comes to external relations. Hence, when the EU acts, especially in areas subject to unanimity, it has to take into consideration the will of all member states. It would be unreasonable to expect the member states to give Turkey what it wanted (lifting of isolations) without Turkey fulfilling its legal obligations as a candidate country. In the game of Prisoner's Dilemma the strategy (defect, defect) constitutes the equilibrium of the game. In our case, it corresponds to the breakdown of talks in 2006 with respect to Cyprus leading to the freezing of eight chapters of the *acquis*. Under this scheme, Turkey realized that if it cooperated and the EU deviated, (defect, cooperate), then it would end up with nothing. For AKP, this would mean a major loss of votes, freezing of EU talks and another defeat in the Cyprus bargain. The electorate had to be convinced that Turkey would not sacrifice its values in the pursuit of EU membership. Hence, the probability of the EU playing defect caused Turkey to deviate i.e. not opening its ports. The EU, on the other hand, incapacitated itself by accepting a divided Cyprus and found itself entangled in Greek Cypriot's veto power. At the end, both players found it more rational to conclude with a lower pay off by playing (defect, defect). The game shows that actors' short term interests could be prior to long-term benefits such as successful negotiations regardless of ending with lesser pay off.

#### 4. Cooperation, Cooperation

Cooperation on behalf of the EU requires necessary measures to be taken to alter the isolation that the Turkish Cypriot community is under since 1974. At this point, it is crucial to define what the term 'isolation' means for Cyprus. The Turkish side suffers from economic isolation resulting from closed ports of Gazimagosa, Girne and Gemikonagi, the non-operating Ercan Airport and exclusion of the northern part from direct trade with any state except Turkey (Turkish Foreign Ministry 2006). But biggest blow to TRNC's economy came in 1994 with the ECJ's ruling that prohibited the export of citrus fruit and potatoes from TRNC to the EU countries (Talmon 2001). This was a considerable loss since agricultural products made up 48.1% of total exports which mostly was to EU countries (Talmon 2001). Moreover, in light of the Greek Cypriot arguments that TRNC does not suffer any isolation, RoC's membership<sup>2</sup> meant

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<sup>2</sup> In theory, TRNC is also a part of the EU; however the *acquis* is not put into force in the north. The EU documents refer to the north as 'those areas of the RoC in which the government of RoC

that TRNC would suffer major political restrictions since they had no voice in EU institutions (Hughes 2006). After the failure of the Annan Plan, the first significant aid to eliminate TRNC's isolation came in February 2005 when the General Affairs Council decided to grant 139 million Euro to encourage the economic development of Turkish Cypriot Community (General Affairs and External Relations 2005). And the Green Line Regulation, in line with Art. 3 of Protocol 10 on Cyprus,<sup>3</sup> constituted the first concrete step to alleviate the inferior economic situation of the northern part. The EU defends these economic interactions to facilitate progress in TRNC and bring a solution to the island. Hence, the Union's strategy of cooperation could only be employed by keeping its promises on eliminating the isolation of TRNC.

The action of cooperation (A\*+ compromise) on the Turkish side comprised the signing of the Additional Protocol that extended the Ankara Agreement to new members including RoC. Turkey's determination both in pursuing the tough reform process for fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and its support for the Annan Plan showed determination to cooperate. With its support for the Annan Plan, AKP government tried to keep Cyprus and Turkey's accession process separate from each other so that a divided island will not determine the fate of Turkey-EU relations. Nonetheless, the signing of the Additional Protocol eliminated this option and made it legally binding for Turkey to stabilize its relations with RoC and open its ports to Greek Cypriot traffic. This meant that if Turkey had fully opted for cooperation strategy then it would have opened up its ports to Greek Cypriot traffic and prevented adoption of strategy profile (defect, defect).

## 5. Deviation, Deviation

Until the signing of the Protocol and the declaration, Turkey and the EU were in a virtuous relationship regardless of failure of the Annan Plan. TRNC and Turkey have been expecting the EU to fulfil its political promise to end isolation. The signing of the Protocol and the Union's financial aid and direct trade initiatives can be perceived as opting for strategy profile cooperation, cooperation. However, Turkish declaration and the Union's counter declaration which stated that Turkey's declaration was 'unilateral and had no legal effect on Turkey's obligations under the Protocol' (European Commission 2005), indicate the actors' decision to opt for a higher pay-off.

## 6. The EU deviates

With the EU becoming a party in the Cyprus dispute the impartiality of the Union as an arbitrator has been abolished (Salahi 1997). RoC's veto power on the isolation of

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does not exercise control' which means that Turkish Cypriots can not enjoy the benefits of EU membership.

<sup>3</sup> Protocol 10 on Cyprus states that the northern part is not under the exercise of the *acquis* but Article 3 of the Protocol asserts that "nothing in this Protocol shall preclude measures with a view to promoting the economic development" of the Turkish side.

TRNC puts constraints on the decision making ability of the EU. The best examples are the financial aid and direct trade packages which were blocked by RoC in 2006. The payment of funds was prevented by RoC in a technical management committee, which hardly ever sees a vote and decides by QMV if needed, on the basis that the aid package was against reunification of Cyprus (Hughes 2004). GLR, 'the best deal that TRNC got from the EU' (Hughes 2006) was also away from assisting TRNC's economy due to major implementation problems (Arslan 2005). The Head of Turkish Chamber of Commerce, who gives certificates for goods that cross the line, proclaims that the process is 'cumbersome and bureaucratic' due to Greek Cypriots requirement that obliges trucks to obtain a roadworthiness certificate issued in the south which means that companies should be registered in both regions bringing extra financial burden (Hughes 2006). Furthermore, RoC opposed any form of direct trade with TRNC on the grounds that it will mean recognition and hence, fulfil Turkish Cypriots' secessionist acts (Hughes 2006). This argument points to a failure of political consensus on whether establishing direct trade relations with an unrecognized party would mean recognition. While the EU advocates that opening of Turkish ports to RoC would not mean recognition, RoC also rejects this claim with its position on blocking direct trade to TRNC. These examples demonstrate exploitation of Union's political domain by Greek interests which cause the EU to deviate from its cooperation strategy leading to a loss of 'dynamic qualities of the European project, the idea that realities are shaped by spillovers, and constructed solidarities, and by the constraints of legal enmeshment (Oxford Workshop Report 2007). This means that the Union's determination to end the isolation of TRNC would only remain as good intentions.

## 7. Turkey Deviates

Turkey is accused of being in breach of the Ankara Agreement and the Customs Union independent of the Protocol (European Parliament Resolution 2005). The ECJ case law<sup>4</sup> relating to the free circulation of goods refutes Turkish position on denying access to the ports for Greek Cypriots on the basis that it is not related with the Customs Union. However, Turkey is aware of the benefits of opening the ports since Cyprus is the shortest route for carrying petrol from Yumurtalik port to the EU, a 5 billion dollar commercial task (TESEV 2006). Then why does Turkey choose to keep its ports closed to Greek Cypriot traffic? The common perception is that Turkey resists recognizing RoC by opening its ports unilaterally. However, this claim has no historical validity. Prior to 1997, some of the Turkish ports were open to Greek Cypriot traffic. The decision to close the ports was taken by the then Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz against RoC's embargoes on TRNC and their insistence to deploy S-300 missiles in Cyprus (Bumin 2006). This evidently shows that denying access to Greek Cypriot traffic is not really about recognizing RoC but rather a rational move to see EU keeping its promises.

AKP government, on the other hand, aware of the dangers of such a 'train crash' prepared an Action Plan in January 2006 to prevent Cyprus impasse hindering Turkey-EU relations. Turkish government's decision to opt for such a plan is obviously a sign

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<sup>4</sup>Judgement of the ECJ of 16 March 1983, Case 266/81, European Court reports 1983 p.731.

of power asymmetry in the game. The main goal of the plan was to enable rapprochement between the actors under the supervision of the UN. The failed plan involved granting access to Turkish ports for RoC, opening of North Cyprus ports and Ercan airport and inclusion of TRNC into the Customs Union. Under the Finish presidency, another initiative that proposed opening up of few of Turkish ports, transfer of the port of Famagusta to the EU and taking over of the Varosha area by the UN failed in November 2006 (Watt 2006). The last Turkish initiative proposed the opening of Ercan airport and Magusa port to international traffic in exchange of granting access to one Turkish airport and sea port (ABGS 2006). RoC rejected the proposal on the basis that it was 'non-negotiable for it disregarded Turkey's obligations...'(ABGS 2007).

According to AKP's Vice-President Yasar Yakis, Turkey is "aware of the obligations and we will have to abide by it. But there is another obligation: when we were asked by the EU to encourage Turkish Cypriots to vote 'yes', we said 'what if we vote yes and the Greek Cypriots no?' They said don't worry we will alleviate economic restrictions of northern Cyprus and twist Greek Cypriot arms" (Hughes 2006). Such concerns by Turkish officials demonstrate that they would like to see the EU keeping its promises so that the public will not accuse AKP of being exploited by Europeans. Hence, under these circumstances, any further sacrifice by Turkey on Cyprus would mean a political suicide for AKP given the fact that 87.2% of the electorate wanted the ruling party to 'follow an honourable foreign policy that it is suitable to the national identity' (Carkoglu and Toprak 2006).

## 8. Conclusion

This paper examined the stalemate between the EU and Turkey with respect to the ports issue and TRNC's isolated position by using the game of Prisoner's Dilemma to analyse the reasons behind the strategic decisions of Turkey and the EU. It has been argued that AKP's policy with respect to the ports issue was shaped by rational choices determined by the Union's strategic choices rather than the traditional hard line position over Cyprus. The Union's strategy options, on the other hand, are hampered by RoC's membership which prevents any solution to the conflict initiated by the EU. The unfulfilled commitments, political and legal, had created an environment of mistrust which caused the actors to deviate from the strategy profile (cooperation, cooperation) resulting in the freezing of eight chapters of the *acquis*. The issue had fundamental impacts both for the EU and Turkey. In Turkey, the power of membership carrot that facilitated public support began to fade away. The Union's failure to fulfil its promises whilst continuously asking for more sacrifices caused public disenchantment from membership aspiration. The tense political climate from 2005 to 2006 was reflected in the public opinion where the support for EU membership declined substantially from 62 % in 2004 to 55% in 2005 and to 44% in 2006 (Eurobarometer 2006). Such a decline obviously explains the difficulty of unilateral opening of Turkish ports to Greek Cypriots. Turkish public wanted to see the EU keep its political commitments due to the perception that opening of ports to RoC will achieve nothing but bring further sacrifices to Turkey (Sozen 2007). In addition to this, unremitting debates in Europe about Turkey's Europeaness from leaders such as the French President, Nicola Sarkozy who summarised his views by saying that 'If Turkey

were European, we would know it' (Duzgit 2006) raised anxiety among public on whether the EU will treat Turkey equally as a candidate. The Union's decision to deviate from its promises on Cyprus combined with the heated discussions generated the idea that Turkey will be the only side to make sacrifices.

For the Union, Turkish enlargement process is probably the most contentious issue on its foreign policy agenda and the Cyprus problem deteriorates relations further between the parties. Moreover, the EU enjoys the leverage of power asymmetry employing punishment strategy against Turkey by freezing eight chapters of the *acquis*. It is a widely accepted fact that the EU damaged its impartial catalyst position which could facilitate a solution to the island by accepting Cyprus without a solution. Furthermore, some argue that the deadlock on Cyprus is being exploited by some European politicians who are against Turkish membership (Hughes 2006) affirming arguments on the EU being 'an economic giant but a political dwarf'. The perception that Turkey due to its usual hard-line position was not abiding by its legal obligations, justified employment of punishment strategy in antagonists' eyes and provided evidence for those who believe that Turkey does not deserve a place in the European order.

The analysis of the ports issue and its outcome is vital for determining the right actors which could deliver a solution to the island. The freezing of eight chapters of the *acquis* has not only impeded Turkish accession process but also obstructed solution for Cyprus. However, the change of government in RoC with Dimitris Christofias emerges as a new chance for unity. Christofias' pro-solution stance demonstrated by his earnest efforts to begin negotiations with TRNC to reunite the island creates a climate of trust. The decision to open the Ledra gate was the first concrete step for solution taken by Christofias and Talat governments in 2008. Although it might not bring adequate change to Cyprus conflict, it is crucial for building a constructive environment. Under this scheme, the UN emerges as the right international actor to solve the problem and the Union's involvement via financial assistance mechanisms could strengthen political measures taken by the UN. The areas of financial aid offered by the Union range from energy, urban infrastructure and loan scheme for SMEs to history teaching, telecommunications and Community scholarship programme (European Commission 2008).

The analysis of the stalemate on the ports has demonstrated that Turkey and the EU, without recourse to a centralized authority and in the lack of constructive environment fail to cooperate. It is shown that prior knowledge shaped by security and identity interests and domestic concerns constrain strategy options of the actors. Thus, the problem stands as the most contentious issue in Turkey-EU relations. As parties in the conflict, it is significant to build trust between Turkey and the EU to prevent the notion that Turkey's EU journey ran aground in Cyprus. In the wider perspective, a solution in the island is for the social and economic benefit of all international actors. A reunited Cyprus because of its strategic geographic position would emerge as the ultimate economic and political actor in the Mediterranean. After more than forty years, it could stand on its own feet gaining from Union's democratic and economic climate. Turkey and the EU, on the other hand, would continue their negotiation process under a more encouraging environment with higher pay off in the absence of exploitation by external actors.

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# The Impact of Horizontal Concentration of Power on Ethnic Mobilization in Post-Soviet Georgia

*Stela Garaz*

*Political Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary,  
[pphgas01@phd.ceu.hu](mailto:pphgas01@phd.ceu.hu)*

## 1. Introduction

In the academic literature concentration of power is often viewed as conducive to democratic instability in ethnically divided societies. The most famous proponent of power sharing - Arend Lijphart – argued that stable democracy in deeply divided societies is highly unlikely under majoritarian winner-take-all systems that are characterized by concentration of power in one-party governments and by absolute majority rule (Lijphart, 1969). This is because such systems block the access of ethnic minorities to decision-making process, which leads to their alienation and hence, increases the chance for ethnic minorities' discord.

This paper is focused on the development and empirical testing of this argument. On the basis of post-Soviet Georgia case and by applying process-tracing method, I aim to establish the causal mechanism between horizontal power concentration and ethnic mobilization. I aim to determine whether an eventual causal relation between these two phenomena in Georgia points to a similar type of effect as the one established by consociationalist theory, which argues that concentrated power leads to the intensification of ethnic minorities' discord.

Georgia is a relevant case to study because during transition it experienced both fragmented and concentrated horizontal power. Moreover, it has an ethnically diverse population, with ethnic groups that mobilized at different levels since country's independence. The population censuses identify nine ethnic minority groups in Georgia. In this paper I mainly focus on two – Armenians and Azeris - which are the greatest in size and have significant territorial concentration. I also refer to Abkhazians and Ossetians for comparative reasons. I disregard the other minority groups because they are neither considerable in number, nor territorially concentrated.

The paper is structured as follows. In the first part I present the dynamics in the degrees of power concentration and ethnic mobilization in Georgia. Then I link power concentration with ethnic mobilization through the analysis of vertical decentralization promoted by the incumbents of concentrated power. In the third part I link power concentration with ethnic mobilization through the analysis of electoral system. I summarize the findings in the concluding part.

Ethnic Minorities in Georgia – 1989 and 2002 Population Censuses Compared*		
	1989 (%)	2002 (%)
Georgians	70,1	83,8
Abkhazians	1,8	0,1
Ossetians	3,0	0,9
Armenians	8,1	5,7
Russians	6,3	1,6
Azeris	5,7	6,5
Greeks	1,9	0,4
Ukrainians	1,0	0,2
Kists	-	0,2
Yezids	0,6	0,4
Others	1,5	0,5

**Table 1.**

\* Source: compiled by the author, on the basis of data from Department of Statistics of the Republic of Georgia, provided at the author’s request in October 2008.

## **2. Ethnic Mobilization and Concentration of Power in Georgia**

Before exploring any possible link between horizontal power concentration and ethnic mobilization, I first clarify what these terms generally imply and how they can be measured. I also apply available measurement tools on the case of Georgia and determine the degree in which horizontal power concentration is empirically associated with increased level of mobilization.

### ***2.1. Horizontal Power Concentration - Definitions and Measurements:***

The power configuration implied by what Lijphart called “majoritarian winner-take-all system” is the one characterized by the existence of majority executives, the dominance of the executives over the parliaments and the concentration of the legislative power (Lijphart, 1984). Hence, horizontally concentrated power is the situation in which the decision making process is concentrated in the hands of few political actors at central level that are linked by shared policy positions, institutional ties, and loyalty.

Power concentration was often associated with the parliamentary system, as the dichotomy presidentialism/parliamentarism had at its core the separation vs. fusion of powers. However, this association is often criticised because both parliamentary and presidential systems conceal a great deal of variation in the extent to which they concentrate or disperse power (Rockman, 1997, Cheibub and Limongi, 2002). Therefore, it is not enough to attribute a certain institutional label to a case in order to

determine its degree of horizontal power concentration. Additional indicators are needed.

Such indicators have been suggested by Malamud, who defined two types of presidencies, based on the degree of presidents' parliamentary support. He defined "concentrationist presidency" as the type in which there is an absolute majority in parliament constantly supporting a pro-presidential government and "separationist presidencies" as the type in which the head of state lacks a constant support in parliament (Malamud, 2001). From this classification it results that for measuring the degree of horizontal power concentration in Georgia it is important to determine whether there was a pro-presidential, constant, and absolute majority in parliament and whether that majority was characterised by internal discipline.

Periods with Concentrated Horizontal Power and Periods with Fragmented Horizontal Power in Georgia (1991-2008)*					
Fragmented			Concentrated		
1	1991-1992	-Formally strong presidential powers -Highly fragmented parliament -No support in parliament for president			
2	1992-1994	-Formally weak head of state's powers -Highly fragmented parliament -No secured parliamentary majority supporting head of state			
			3	1995-1999	-Formally strong presidential powers
			4	1999-2000	-Pro-presidential, stable, disciplined absolute parliamentary majority.
5	2001-2003	-Formally strong presidential powers But: -Fragmented parliament -No secured majority support for president in parliament			
			6	2004-2008	-Formally strong presidential powers
			7	2008	-Pro-presidential, stable, disciplined absolute parliamentary majority.

**Table 2.**

\* Source: compiled by the author, based on the legal acts that established the division of powers among legislative and executive branches; the interviews with former deputies in Georgian Parliament, conducted by the author in October 2008 in Tbilisi; the works of J. Wheatley (2005), G. Nodia (1998), L. A. Mitchell (2006).

The measurement results are presented in table 2, in which the periods of concentrated power and the periods of fragmented power in Georgia are distinguished. The periodization is based on measurements of formal presidential powers, parliamentary fragmentation and presidents' legislative support. The table shows that the power was fragmented at the beginning of the 90s and shortly before the Rose Revolution. It also shows that the periods with concentrated power were rather long-lasting, which implies that there was considerable time for its potential effects to manifest.

## ***2.2. Ethnic Mobilization - Definitions and Measurements:***

The ethnic mobilization is one of the types of social mobilization. Generally, social mobilization is defined as 'the process of creating movement structures and preparing and carrying out protest actions which are visible movement 'products' addressed to actors and publics outside the movement.' (Rucht, 1996). Hence, ethnic mobilization contains two necessary elements: movement structures and protest actions.

By movement structures it is implied the existence of organizations that aggregate and represent ethnic groups' demands. By protest actions it is implied what Tedd Gurr defined as 'communal political action': the action 'initiated by members of a group on behalf of its interest and [...] designed to influence state authorities.' (Gurr, 1993). Hence, in order to determine the degree of ethnic mobilization in Georgia during transition and its change within time, first a look at the level of movement structures' organizations and, second, an analysis of the intensity of protest actions are needed.

The Abkhazians and Ossetians had the strongest movement structures and the most intense protest actions at the beginning of 90s among the Georgian ethnic minorities. According to the data provided in Minorities at Risk Database (2005) these groups were mobilised in political parties and grassroots movements. Their "communal political actions" started with relatively peaceful demonstrations at the end of 80s and culminated in the 1991-1993 civil wars. The level of demands was very high, as both regions asked for territorial separation.

The Armenians living in the southern region of Georgia have also had certain level of organizational structure, which varied in its intensity during transition period. At the end of the 80s a social movement was formed – "Javakh" – that had a high level of popularity among Armenians. The organization was defending the promotion of the Armenian culture and also voiced demands for territorial autonomy.<sup>1</sup> But by 1994 its popularity started to decrease and then it gradually fell apart. Between 1994 and 2000 the mobilisation of Armenians in local organizations was very low.

Non-violent protest actions in the region with Armenian concentration were organized at the beginning of the 90s, with manifestation of small-scale mass demonstrations and verbal oppositions. These protest actions were ethnic in character, and people were

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<sup>1</sup> Author's interviews in October, 2008 with: Mihail Kolikidi (chairman, Forum for Civic Integration in Akhalkalaki); Nair Iritsian (mayor, Akhalkalaki district); Merujan Iezuan (member of Akhalkalaki Administrative Council).

voicing demands for territorial autonomy. But later during the 90s there were no more local protest actions and generally no demands with ethnic character.

Since 2000 several organizations exist in the region with Armenians. Some of them advocate language rights and sporadically, territorial autonomy. According to an International Crisis Group Report (2006), in 2002 one of these organizations managed to bring together several region's organizations in support of one of its leaders' candidacy for local elections, leader who eventually became the mayor of one of the regions' districts. This organization has advocated more self-governing rights of the region. By the end of 2006 it lost from its importance and had to face competition from other local groups.

Protest activities in the region also reappeared after 2000. In 2003 the leader of one of Armenians' organizations addressed to the central government the request to grant a formal status to the region with territorial concentration of Armenians. Later by 2005 ethnic demands were also voiced during mass demonstrations (Lohm, 2007). But gradually these demonstrations disappeared, although the central government has not met any of Armenians' demands.

The Azeri minorities territorially concentrated in South Georgia mobilized less than Armenians during the period of transition. Nevertheless, they had a highly popular local ethnic organization – “Geyrat” – which was formed in 1990 and which had as primary goal to protect Azeris' cultural rights. Between 1992 and 1994 the organization had the role of local security for Azeri citizens from local criminal groups. By 1995 its importance started to decrease. According to the International Crisis Group Report (2006), after 2000 several organizations have been registered in the region with Azeri concentration, but none of them have developed the capability to mobilize more than a handful of people to protect the community interests.

After Georgia's independence the Azeris' protest actions had little intensity, and were expressed mostly through small-group meetings supporting different local elites. Neither during Shevardnadze's presidency (1995-2003), nor after the Rose Revolution have there been important protest actions in the region.<sup>2</sup>

In table 3 I classify the cases of ethnic mobilisation into four gradual levels, from “very low” to “high”, depending on the level of movement structures and intensity of protest actions. The degree in which the level of ethnic mobilization in Georgia corresponds with the periods with horizontal power concentration is also shown. It reveals that Georgian minorities generally mobilized in periods with fragmented power, and that by contrary, they mobilized much less in periods with concentrated power. These findings do not confirm the consociationalist views that in majoritarian winner-take-all systems there will be high degree of inter-ethnic discord, which will result from the very nature of the system.

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<sup>2</sup> Author's interviews in October, 2008 with: Fait Mammedov (professor, University of Marneuli); Fizuli Mustafaev (vice-mayor, Marneuli); Izumrud Qurbanov (co-founder, Geyrat organization).

The Link between Ethnic Mobilization and Power Concentration in Georgia (1990-2008)*							
Dynamics in power concentration		1991-1992	1992-1994	1995-1999	1999-2000	2001-2003	2004-2008
		Fragmented		Concentrated		Fragmented	Concentrated
Level of ethnic mobilization	Very low			Armenians 1994 - 2001		Azeris	
	Low						Armenians 2006-present
	Medium	Armenians 1990-1993				Armenians 2002-2006	
	High	Abkhazians 1990-1993					
		Ossetians 1990-1993					

**Table 3.**

\* Source: compiled by the author

### **3. The Territorial Organization as Linking Element between Power Concentration and Ethnic Mobilization in Georgia:**

The political incumbents in a system with concentrated power seek to keep the system in place as long as the majority group controlling the power preserves the internal coherence and discipline. For replicating the concentrated power from one electoral cycle to another the control over potential formation of political alliances within the country's regions is needed. Hence, it is expectable that in systems with lasting horizontally concentrated power the level of decentralization is relatively low.

#### ***3.1 The Territorial Organization of State Power:***

For determining the degree of decentralization in Georgia, I used the conceptual tools elaborated by Daniel Treisman, who defined six "conceptions of decentralization": vertical, appointment, electoral, fiscal, and personnel decentralization (Treisman, 2002). These attributes are particularly useful for my purposes because they can reveal

how much of internal resources for eventual ethnic mobilization territorially-concentrated ethnic groups had in Georgia.

By applying these conceptual tools on a range of qualitative data on Georgian state territorial organization, I determined that its degree of decentralization changed several times since independence. Before 1994 the central government had little factual control in the country's regions. Nevertheless, since 1994 the way in which Georgian territorial organization function always implied means for effective control of sub-national affairs and leadership.

Between 1994 and 2002 the central government could control local leadership due to its appointment powers at local level which, combined with weak electoral and personnel decentralization, guaranteed local leadership's loyalty towards the centre. The central government could also keep the local affairs under control during this period due to the low level of fiscal and decision-making decentralization. In 2002 the territorial organization slightly decentralized, as the centre loosened control over the local leadership by guaranteeing appointment and electoral decentralization. However, by 2005 the previously loosened control over the local leadership formation was counterbalanced with a tighter central control over the local financial resources and by the process of decision making centralization.

### ***3.2 Territorial Organization and Ethnic Mobilization:***

As mentioned above, the two main elements of ethnic mobilization are the organizational structures and the protest actions. But for ethnic mobilization there is need for mobilizational resources. Olzak identified loyalty, financial and organizational resources as the main mobilization sources (Olzak, 2004). Cornell also mentioned leadership as a necessary source for ethnic mobilization (Cornell, 2002).

In Georgia the state territorial organization by its very nature limited the access to financial resources for potential ethnic mobilizers. Before 2005 the local budgets depended on the transfers and redistribution of taxes from the central government, which implied that the centre had strong means to eventually punish non-loyal local leaders. Because the loyalty of the region's population towards local leaders depended on the success of their administrative performance, and this performance was determined by the amount of money coming from the central government, the motivation of local leaders to discourage local ethnic mobilization and through this, demonstrate their loyalty to the central government was increased.

The financial dependency of the regional administrative leadership increased even more in 2005, because since then much of the shared revenues are collected and redistributed directly by the central government. The local leadership is now motivated even more than before to be loyal towards the central government.

The discouraging effect of a low fiscal decentralization's on ethnic mobilization can be augmented by the existence of a concentrated central power, when the opposition has little influence on deciding how state budget resources shall be distributed to particular regions. When a strong president who leads over the government has control over the parliament through a loyal-to-the-president majority fraction, the regional leaders will

not ally with the opposition at central level to lobby for more financial resources, because the opposition has no lobby potential on resources redistribution in such system.

The state territorial organization of Georgia also limited the potential for ethnic mobilization by limiting the access to mobilizing leadership. Most of local leaders in regions with Azeri and Armenian territorial concentration have been given with local administrative positions. The incumbents of concentrated horizontal power could do so due to the weak appointment/ and electoral decentralization system of Georgia before 2002. All key local positions were filled by appointees of Georgian president or his representatives in the districts. Eventually, any change in these appointees' loyalty towards the Centre could be punished simply by removing them from their positions of authority.

After the 2002 legislative amendments that provided for appointment and electoral decentralization, this method of controlling the local politics was weakened, as local leaders started to be locally elected. This type of decentralization gave incentives to local elites to look for internal resources for support of their candidacies in local elections. A relevant example is the one from the Armenian community concentrated in the Southern region, where in 2002 several local non-governmental organizations mobilized their resources for electing their representative as mayor in local elections, according to the International Crisis Group Report (2006).

Hence, the low level of decentralization in Georgia did not have as effect the provocation of ethnic mobilization. By contrary, through limiting the access of potential ethnic mobilizers to leadership, financial and loyalty resources, the rather centralized system of territorial organization made it possible for the central concentrated power to keep under control eventual ethnically mobilizing processes. Hence, the horizontally concentrated power in Georgia constituted a hindering factor for the rise of ethnic mobilization, by virtue of its control over the regions through the rather centralized territorial organization of the country.

#### **4. The Electoral System as Linking Element between Power Concentration and Ethnic Mobilization in Georgia:**

In a semi-presidential regime, in order to concentrate power it is important to bring a pro-presidential majority in parliament. In order to replicate the concentration of power from one electoral cycle to another it is important to preserve the pro-presidential majority in parliament, which can be done through the choice of an electoral system that would favour the pro-presidential party.

In the literature it is often suggested that majoritarian electoral systems produce two party systems, while proportional systems produce multi-party systems. This position suggests that under a majority electoral system there is more chance for the formation of a parliament with a party holding an absolute majority (Blais and Massicotte, 1996).

However, some scholars found limitations to this pattern. Birch revealed that in Eastern Europe it was the single member districts that led to the parliamentary representation of the largest number of parties. This is because in Eastern Europe the

parties during the 90s were in formation, often small and with regionally concentrated support (Birch, 2000). Therefore, in transition countries the majority electoral system is not the best option for ensuring the formation of absolute parliamentary majorities.

Generally, the highest proportion of wasted votes is attributed to majority systems. But under proportional systems there can be a great number of wasted votes as well if a high threshold is introduced. Birch' data on proportional systems in Eastern Europe showed that PR with high threshold can increase significantly the level of disproportionality (Birch, 2000).

Coming back to Olzak's sources for ethnic mobilization, ethnic minorities need organizational structures in order to get mobilized. Ethnic or ethno-regional party organizations can constitute such a resource. This type of ethnic mobilization is possible only when the formation of such parties is encouraged by the electoral system.

The consociationalist literature suggests that a highest level of ethnic political representation can be achieved under a proportional electoral system, as in such systems the small parties have greater chance to get into parliament. Nevertheless, when the ethnic groups are territorially concentrated and ethnic parties regionally based, a majority electoral system can favour even more the electoral success of such parties. By contrary, a PR system based on single nation-wide constituency and on a high threshold will not have the inclusive effect of ethnic parties as predicted by consociationalists.

#### ***4.1 Electoral System and Power Concentration:***

Since independence Georgia always had a mixed electoral system, with proportional and majoritarian voting applied in parallel. However, specific electoral rules have been often changed. As data in table 4 reveal, after independence the PR vote had a greater weight on the election results than the majority vote. Also, starting with 1995 the PR threshold was gradually increased to 7%, and only recently decreased to 5%. The PR elections were always conducted on single nation-wide constituencies with nation-wide party lists, except in 1992 when different party electoral lists for different regions of the country were allowed.

As mentioned above, the proportionality of an electoral system is determined by the amount of "wasted votes". In order to determine a number that would illustrate the effect of threshold on wasted votes, one can sum up the percentages of votes given in PR elections to parties that have not passed the threshold. The results of such calculation for Georgian elections are presented in table 5, which shows high numbers of wasted votes particularly for 1995 and 2004 elections, the years following periods of fragmented power.

The Mixed Electoral System of Georgia - Developments since Independence*				
Parliamentary elections dates	Number of seats in the parliament	Electoral system – mixed		
		majoritarian component %	proportional component %	proportional component threshold %
1990	250	50	50	4
1992	225	33	67	0
1995	235	39	61	5
1999	235	36	64	7
2004	235	36	64	7
2008	150	50	50	5

**Table 4.**

*\*Source: compiled by the author, on the basis of data from Central Elections Commission of Georgia, provided at the author's request in October, 2008.*

The proportionality of a PR electoral system is also determined by the difference between the percentage of votes and percentage of seats a party gained through the PR elections. Data in table 5 reflect the degree of this proportionality in different parliamentary elections of Georgia, on the basis of PR votes and seats won by the mainstream party. Data show the lowest proportionalities in 1995, 2004 and 1999 elections. This demonstrates that the mainstream, pro-presidential parties in Georgia benefited from the existing electoral rules for concentrating the power within parliament.

The Effect of PR Threshold on Proportion of Wasted Votes and Distribution of Seats - Georgia Parliamentary Elections (1990-2008)*					
Elections	Threshold %	% "wasted votes" in PR part of elections	% PR votes granted to the mainstream party	% PR seats gained by the mainstream party	Total % seats gained by the mainstream party
1990	4	16,4	54	64	62
1992	0	0	20	19	16
1995	5	44,1	24	62	46
1999	7	16,5	42	57	56
2004	7	19,3	66	90	65
2008	5	7,0	59	64	79

**Table 5.**

*\* Source: compiled by the author, on the basis of data provided by the Central Elections Commission of Georgia at the author's request in October, 2008.*

#### 4.2 Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities:

For determining the characteristics of ethnic minorities' political representation in Georgia, I use Pitkin's "standing-for" and "acting-for" types of political representation. Pitkin defined the "standing for" representation as the one in which it is not important what a legislature does, but how it is composed. Applied to minorities' political representation, it can be determined by the reflection of the entire population's ethnic composition on the ethnic composition of the parliament. By contrary, she defined the "acting-for" representation as the one in which it is not important how the legislature is composed, but what deputies do (Pitkin, 1967). In case of minorities, it can be determined by the degree in which political parties or individual deputies appeal to pro-minority discourse in electoral campaigns and by the importance they attribute to defending minority interests within parliament.




Figure 1.

Source: compiled by the author, on the basis of data provided by the European Centre for Minority Issues in Georgia at the author's request in October 2008.

In order to determine the "standing for" ethnic representation in Georgia, a comparison between its population's ethnic compositions and its parliamentary ethnic composition for different mandates is necessary. Data in graph 1 show that overall ethnic minorities never constituted more than 6% of Georgian parliament. Data in table 6 demonstrates that in Georgia the parliament never constituted a "descriptive [ethnic] sample" of the entire population.

The "acting-for" representation can be determined by policies and/or discourses of individual deputies or parliamentary parties. In Georgian parliaments minority deputies were overall inactive. Their parliamentary voting behaviour was generally in line with their party's position, even when it was about voting for legislation directly affecting

minority groups.<sup>3</sup> Minorities in Georgian parliament rarely brought ethnic-related issues on the agenda. Neither have such issues been raised by non-minority MPs.

Comparing Ethnic Minorities' Representation in Parliament with the Population Census Data*						
minorities	Total minorities	Armenians	Azeri	Russians	Ossetians	Abkhazians
1989 census %	29,9	8,1	5,7	6,3	3,0	1,8
2002 census %	16,3	5,7	6,5	1,6	0,9	0,1
Maximum % representation in parliament	5,0	3,0	2,1	1,3	0,4	0,9
	1999-2004	1999-2004	1999-2004	1995-1999	1995-1999	1999-2004

**Table 6.**

*Source: compiled by the author, on the basis of data provided by the European Centre for Minority Issues in Georgia at the author's request in October 2008; on the basis of data provided by the Department of Statistics at the author's request, in October 2008.*

The political discourse of electoral candidates is also relevant for the “acting-for” representation. For determining the degree in which parties tried to attract minorities in electoral campaigns I analyzed the content of party manifestos and diverse electoral materials for the 1992-2004 parliamentary elections. It revealed that in all 1992-2004 campaigns the greatest “promise” made by parties to minorities was to respect minorities’ cultural rights and not to discriminate them on ethnic basis. But no party ever referred to more specific pro-minority policies, such as political representation, administrative status of minority regions, or public use of minority languages.

Hence, the political representation of minorities in Georgia hardly ever had an “acting-for” form, as neither individual deputies, nor political parties presented themselves as voicing minority groups’ interests through their legislative behaviour or electoral discourse. Minorities in Georgia had only “standing-for” parliamentary representation. But even this representation did not reflect the real ethnic composition of population.

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<sup>3</sup> The author’s interviews in Tbilisi (October, 2008) with: Zura Sanikidze (deputy in Parliament of Georgia, 1990-1992); Koba Kikabidze (deputy in Parliament, 1992-1995); Temur Andriadze (deputy in Parliament, 1995-1999); Demur Giorkelidze (deputy in Parliament, 1999-2003); the author’s interviews with Mihail Kolikidi (chairman, Forum for Civic Integration in Akhalkalaki), Fait Mammedov (professor, University of Marneuli).

### ***4.3 Electoral System and Ethnic Mobilization***

As mentioned above, the electoral processes may develop the “party oriented” ethnic movement structures - the ones in which ethnic or regional parties’ organizations can serve as organizational resource for ethnic mobilization. The degree in which such parties develop depends, besides other things, on the type of electoral system. There are electoral systems that encourage the development of parties based on a single issue, a particular ethnic group, or a particular region. The development of “party oriented” ethnic movement structures will be normally catalyzed by such systems.

There are also electoral systems - called “centripetalist” - that reward political parties that are based on an electoral support beyond a specific ethnic community or region of a country (Reilly, 2001). In such systems parties are discouraged to focus on a specific issue that would be on the interest of a specific category of population. In such systems the formation of ethnic or regional parties will be discouraged, while office-seeking minorities’ leaders would have more chance to get into parliament by joining mainstream parties than by creating their own ethnic or regional party.

The analysis of Georgian party manifestos and electoral materials reveals that there have been no political parties which focused on regionally-based issues or on specific ethnic-based issues during the parliamentary electoral campaigns. Hence, no party had an ethnic or regional character by virtue of its political discourse.

In Georgia the electoral system has been a “centripetal” one, except for 1992 parliamentary elections. The predominance of the PR system with a high threshold and nation-wide electoral party lists gave little chance to small parties to get into the parliament. It gave also little incentive for the formation of ethnic- and regional- based parties, because territorially concentrated Armenian or Azeri communities could not eventually provide enough votes to such parties to overcome the threshold.

Data in table 7 show that minorities who passed in parliament through the PR part of elections after 1995 were mostly elected through the list of the pro-presidential, dominant party. The fact that many of the Azeri and Armenian leaders joined the pro-presidential parties demonstrate that these leaders found it easier to join the mainstream parties in order to get into parliament than organizing ethnic- or regional based parties and mobilize their respective communities for parliamentary support.

Hence, the Georgian electoral system has not contributed only to the consolidation of pro-presidential majorities in parliament. It also contributed to the limitation of the ethnic mobilisation because it reduced the incentives to form regional or ethnic parties. By reducing these incentives, the Georgian electoral system limited the access to organizational resources for an eventual “party based” ethnic mobilisation.

Ethnic Minorities in Georgian Parliament 1990-2008**			
Parliamentary mandates	Minorities in parliament elected on PR lists (% out of the total number of minority MPs)	Minorities in parliament representing the dominant, pro-presidential party (% out of the total number of minority MPs)	Minorities in parliament elected through PR lists and representing the dominant party (% out of the total number of minority MPs elected through PR)
1990 - 1992	50	33	33
1992 - 1995	75	n/a	n/a
1995 - 1999	70	77	90
1999 - 2004	50	79	100
2004 - 2008	50	50	57
2008 (May)	50	100	100

**Table 7.**

\* *The ethnic minorities considered in this data compilation: Russians, Abkhazians, Ossetians, Armenians, and Azeris.*

\*\* *Source: compiled by the author, on the basis of data provided by the European Centre for Minority Issues in Georgia at the authors request in October 2008.*

## 5. Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to explore the link between power concentration and ethnic mobilization in case of post-Soviet Georgia. It had as starting point the consociationalist claim that in multi-ethnic states with majoritarian winner-take-all systems the chances for inter-ethnic conflict are increased. This is because such systems block the access of ethnic minorities to decision-making processes, by virtue of the concentration of power in majority one-party governments and by virtue of the absolute majority rule.

An analysis of ethnic mobilisation processes in Georgia revealed that ethnic minorities generally mobilized in periods with horizontally fragmented power, and that by contrary, they mobilized much less (or not at all) in periods with horizontally concentrated power. These descriptive findings do not confirm the general consociationalist views.

The empirical analysis of Georgian case revealed that indeed, as argued by consociationalists, the ethnic minorities were under-represented politically in the central branches of power. Moreover, the ethnic minorities' representatives that still managed to get in parliament never played the role of "acting for" representatives for their ethnic groups.

In the case of Georgia this under-representation was linked with the fact that the horizontal power was concentrated. This is because in order to preserve the

concentrated power, the electoral rules were moulded such that bigger parties were privileged and smaller parties were disadvantaged. Implicitly, the formation of small ethnic or regional parties that could ensure an “acting for” representation for minorities was discouraged.

However, the closer analysis of the causal chain between power concentration and ethnic mobilisation in Georgia revealed that in this particular country the implications of the horizontally concentrated power hindered the potential for ethnic mobilisation, because due to these implications, the access of potential mobilizers to mobilisation resources have been reduced.

This was firstly because in order to preserve the power concentrated, incumbents kept a weak level of territorial decentralisation of the country. This permitted them to keep under control the political processes in the regions. Moreover, central political incumbents moulded the territorial organization so that the regional actors could be rewarded/ or punished for their expressed/ or non-expressed loyalty towards the central power.

Secondly, the very fact that ethnic and regional parties’ formation was discouraged by an electoral system that advantaged incumbent concentrated power means that the access to organizational structures for potential ethnic mobilization was hindered. As Georgian electoral rules discouraged the formation of regional and ethnic parties, ethnic minorities were politically under-represented. But at the same time, for the same reasons the access to an important resource for mobilization was blocked.



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# Labour, Livelihoods, Legality: An Ethnography of *Antimafia* Agrarian Cooperatives in Sicily

*Theodoros Rakopoulos*

*City College Thessaloniki,*

## 1. Field site and history

Despite the plethora of scholarly works on the mafias, there has been -outside Italy- very moderate debate on people struggling against them. In order to demonstrate a tangible example of the popular mobilisation against labour patronage and the mafia, the agrarian cooperatives founded and operating on terrains confiscated by *Cosa Nostra* in Western Sicily have been identified as an **excellent case study**. My anthropological research (still in progress) is thus based on an organised attempt of the state and a social movement to create work opportunities disentangled from the mafia's patronage in a Sicilian 'agro-town' (Schneider and Schneider 1976), composing an ethnography of social change from the point of view of the *antimafia* activists.

I specifically refer to the case of the **mafia stronghold San Giuseppe Jato**, a town settled on a mountainside in the Palermo prefecture that numbers 9000 inhabitants. In its fertile terrains exquisite vines are cultivated since many generations. The area is a mountainous plain, warm and dry in the summer and quite rough in the winter. The zone's lack of small villages is due to its feudal agrarian past that dictated agglomerations of people in small compact towns with clear boundaries (Hobsbawm 1971). San Giuseppe Jato is a typical such agro-town with which I came in contact two and a half years ago. I was overwhelmed by the news of the -very recent at the time- capture of Provenzano, *Cosa Nostra*'s "boss of bosses" (Lodato 2007) in neighbouring *Corleone*, an act that brought these small towns in international headlines.

The surrounding cultivated areas have laid the stage for **class crashes** between the landowning elites with their "mafia protectors", (Stille 1995, Schneider and Schneider 1996, Dickie 2004) and the *braccianti*, local peasants whose labour was trafficked by the mafia bosses of San Giuseppe. With the rise of the so-called *Corleonesi* clan, dominant within *Cosa Nostra* throughout the years 1980s and 1990s this town had become one of the epicentres of mafia activity in the island. Many mafia leaders hail from the area such as Toto Riina and Giuseppe Brusca, main organisers of international heroin trafficking during this era. The town is similarly renowned for struggles against the mafia as well, such as land occupations in the 1940s.

The mass arrests of *Cosa Nostra* leaders between 1996 and 2006 have brought the organisation into a standstill in the area and left the terrains owned by local incarcerated bosses unattended. A constellation of agrarian unionists and anti-mafia

activists proposed the ‘social usage’ of these lands, under a scheme inspired by the civil society awakening of Palermo’s area (Jamieson 2000: 147). Schneider and Schneider (2002) describe the *antimafia* movement as a participatory -albeit mainly urban and middle-class- take on the formation of special legislation schemes for the Sicilian mafia issue. Activists thus have gathered one million signatures around Sicily and demonstrated their will for a recuperation of the land that belonged to *mafiosi* for the common good. Such mobilisation was followed in 2000 by a “popular initiative” legislation which demanded that the land in the area of this ‘*commune*’ owned by people associated with the mafia been confiscated by the state<sup>1</sup>.

This land’s ownership was attributed to the San Giuseppe municipality and consequently distributed -following a public contest- to local unemployed youth. Interestingly, the contest excluded people above 35 years of age and non-residents of the above *commune*. The present legal process was operationalised in the establishment of agrarian cooperatives on lands confiscated from organised crime around Sicily as well as other mafia-inflicted areas of Southern Italy. In the zone of my interest, a heretofore successful association of cooperatives has been operating since 2000. It consists of the coops “*Placido Rizzotto*” and “*Pio La Torre*” that employ 26 and 18 people respectively; the workforce is consisted of people less than 40 years of age at the present stage, both women and, mainly, men. The coops operate continuously since 2000 and their modes of cultivation are organic, their produce marked under ‘high standard quality’ in the Italian market. They are, in conjunction with the rest of the *anti-mafia* cooperatives around Southern Italy, branded in the market under the maxim *i sapori della legalità* (‘the taste of legality’) and are widely appreciated. Their produce includes durum wheat, oil and wine.

By focusing on this particular site, I locate the bulk of my ethnographic research in notions of change, following the relatively rapid, yet continuous transformations that social relations of production and organisation face in the community of San Giuseppe, a site indicative of broader workings in Sicily. I have chosen my field site assuming that **mafia brokerage is based on control of channels to labour opportunities**. Despite the diverse literature around the Italian mafias, no work has been produced on how the lives of people dependent on organised crime’s investments are rearranged when actors are deconstructing this scheme. I thus compose a detailed ethnographic study of how local people **organise their livelihoods in opposition to mafia networks**. My ethnographic work traces precisely this process of transition from a labour regime that is patronage-related to one that is excluding mafia patrons altogether, utilising indeed the resources people have appropriated from patrons, in this case land.

## 2. Analytical tools: Labour and Cooperativism

Using the case-study of the San Giuseppe cooperatives, I propose an anthropological analysis which treats labour as an analytical category through which to explore

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<sup>1</sup> The law 109/96 paved the way to a complex ensemble of laws on the confiscation and use of mafia properties.

production and productivity. If the cooperatives -as I assume- are the embodiment of the *antimafia* survival strategies of a local society towards economic autonomy, it follows that work within them is, at once, the site of an enduring struggle and the objective of that struggle. Labour here appears not only to be a process that produces value but also **embodies symbolic value in itself**. Hence, I shall use labour as a dynamic analytical category, moving away from attempts to treat it as a fixed structure through which to study social schemes difficult to trace empirically (such as class).

On the contrary, the cooperatives are functioning as small communities of people engaged in legality praxis, who are totally dependent economically on their work in these spaces. The material relations of production they create are directly experienced in equal and moral working conditions. As elsewhere, work is the main factor of the community's reproduction as well as the social self of the participants. However, it also is an aim in itself, as it seems to guarantee social cohesiveness and a continuity of the community's aims in its self-organisation on an *antimafia* basis. Indeed, the reproduction of the *antimafia* social project and of the community within it, entails a political activity entrenched with labour.

Thus, I study how the coops work and how people experience work within them. Setting labour as my main focus, I explore why it seems to bring together people in the same project against the mafia for the first time when labour had been the cause of mafia dependencies' reproduction for decades. In relation to my own research, work on the mafia's social control has shown that its totalitarian grasp of the social routes that offer access to labour had been the main reason of its reproduction and of the social consensus it enjoys (Santino 2007). The manipulation of the construction industry for example had indeed turned unionists to express positions supportive of the organisation (Schneider and Schneider 2002). This establishment of mafias as agents of informal recruitment in precarious industries worldwide is explored in ethnographies amongst day-labourers in different settings (see Arlacchi 1983 for Calabria; Fantasia 1988 for Las Vegas; Gill 2001 for Yokohama). Claims have been made that the current deregulation of Italian labour law is indeed facilitating traditional strategies of labour trafficking, in the South known as *caporalato*, orchestrated by mafia networks (Supiot 2001).

The tight connection between the dominant political class and the labour market had constituted the mafia in a privileged position of controlling, through patronage, the "experience" of -or public at large- participation for most Sicilian people (Boissevain 1974). Interestingly, ending this entanglement of public services with the mafia is the main scope of the *antimafia* movement's strategies today. Coop activists that I interviewed underlined that the phrase that captures their view of this experience is "the state procures as a right what the mafia offers as a gift".

In such an environment of labour relations at once personalised and yet hidden the relationship between transparency, legality and production becomes central to understanding the contemporary *anti-mafia* struggle. Work is an issue of contention in Sicily and can be **used as a prism** through which legality -and possibly the state too- can be observed. My case breaks away from the regional literature to the extent that here, originally, there is an organic relationship between legality and successful productivity in an Italian setting. Transparency and visibility are prerequisites for work in the cooperatives, whereas in the ethnographies mentioned below the opposite is true.

Indeed, a multidimensional edifice of different kinds of labour, usually premised on the informal economy has been prominent in the Italian peninsula. A rich literature in Italian industrial sociology speaks of a certain tripartite regionalisation of the country's productive forces, the South being the most vulnerable area to informalised workings of the typical 'network-enterprise' (Mingione and Redclift 1985). My work is posing the question if –and how- people involved in the *antimafia* movement's workspaces - who claim to be not only law-abiding but daily safeguards of transparency-, contest this experience.

Current research thus, stresses the pervasiveness of *hidden* labour, integrated within "personal, yet invisible" relations of production (Blim 1990). It has been noted that local administrative units, taking advantage of the decentralised and efficient running of "familial, flexible" business have promoted regionalism supporting the informal nature of such work relations (Triglia 1989). The complicity of regional governing in labour deregulation has been noted in other, more recent Mediterranean ethnographies too (Narotzky 2004).

Particularly for Southern Italy, ethnographers argue that the informal sector is not autonomous but entrenched within the strategic planning of Italian capitalism at large. Thus, Goddard's work proposes that the unregulated, domestic labour in working-class Naples is functionally linked to the official large-scale production of the city (1996). In Naples, the naturalisation of the workforce's skills, considered part of the family's upbringing, is obscuring exploitation of a docile familial working environment. Regarding the organic introduction of domesticated labour within capitalist speculation, a more generic contribution was made by Meillassoux (1975). He proposes that the reproduction of cheap labour power in small communities compelled to be self-sufficient is setting people to work in the centre of capitalist circulation albeit living in the verge of a subsistence economy. These continual dependencies have been further addressed in economic anthropology since and until current European neoliberal labour regimes.

Further research around Italian entrepreneurs has shown that commitments to familial sentiments are common around the business class as well. Indeed, the language of family trust and betrayal is central to genealogies of work and investment for the Como silk producers (Yanagisako 2002) or the industrialists of Brianza (Ghezzi 2006). I follow such ethnographic material methodologically in order to trace family traditions of labour through life and kin histories. Thus, I place the coop members within a temporal map of production and with regard to the land they administer at the moment, as well as their families' experiences of work. This way I shall trace the possible cohesiveness between their individualities as workers-activists and the familial and micro-societal relationships into which they are embedded. This dynamic approach is done through mapping actors' lives into households in some genealogical succession.

My work in this respect follows several ethnographies that focus on the "**means of livelihood**" thesis that, despite the fact that capital accumulation remains the driving force organising the material reproduction of societies, the aim of the anthropologist is to study what people do on the ground in terms of their everyday working life (Hart 1973, Smith 1987, Mollona 2005). In my research I moreover follow Fantasia's ethnographic suggestion that objectivity and subjectivity are conjoined in the work process and not abstracted (1988). Consciousness thus –as in the case of the will to

participate in work that is actively *antimafia*- is granted in life activity. The engagement of the coop workers in a common life project suggests autonomous praxis vis-à-vis their land, produce and labour (De Angelis 2007). If we assume that the mafia's patronising role in an economic community contributed to exploitative work relations becoming subsumed within the 'reproductive' realm of 'self-provisioning' work, then constituting such a workers' community in the cooperatives could entail an experience of detachment from past dependencies and a conscious act towards social change.

Following the thread of local people's lives between the workplace, the community and the home could reveal much along these lines. Presumably, the coops are the most tangible economic expression of a community that moves away from a past of continuous dependency. To achieve this I propose the use of life histories that in such a community usually entail kin pasts and contested ideas on what counts as public space, as zones of work and areas of leisure. Analytical traditions outside anthropology suggest that in recent years the 'factory' has colonised the whole social body, blurring the limit between social life spent living and social life spent working (Hardt and Negri 2000). On the contrary, ethnographies where work histories have been extensively used suggest that workspace and households can be modelled on each other (Hareven 1993).

Specifically, Italian cooperatives have rarely put their own principles before the need to be profitable; they have, however, discovered ways of competing with other companies that enable their principles to be maintained (Oakeshott 1978). Their methods of industrial democracy presuppose a degree of transparency and in the case of the San Giuseppe economic project, a viable interaction with the community whose interests, at least on a symbolic level, they are supposed to safeguard. Cooperatives thus, show a more 'responsible' attitude to labour than other firms, an issue that, as Halmström notes (1989), renders them attractive to local government. In this respect, I suggest that a new relation between legislation and work practices is formulated in Sicilian communities around the *antimafia* cooperatives. Local people's livelihoods seem to be rearranged around new economic strategies that affect their everyday contact and interaction with the local authorities and systems of administration at large. These strategies, I expect, might reformulate a broader sense of community, shaping relations of trust and cooperation.

I hence underscore with my participant observation methods -in the working space procured to me by the cooperative and within the workload I face during my stay in San Giuseppe-, the apparently novel social cohesion (through labour) for this community. Reproducing social links probably broken since the mafia evacuated the area, the local economic system -despite the alleged persistence of personalised practices- can be built around other dynamics. My work should hence trace the articulation of rules of the cooperatives and the fabric of everyday economic life in the overarching environment. I thus explore the ways in which the people involved in the coop project strategise on reconfiguring their economic dependencies and contributing to broader changes in the local social plateau.

Specifically, as far as the **familial environments** of the members are concerned, my study plan yields relevant data regarding how their own position in the cooperatives is negotiated at home and how this activity might form continuities and discontinuities with family practices of the past. In fact, I suggest that what appear to be new

(“*antimafia*”) ideas of trust and cooperation might in fact be widely held work ethics (Pardo 1996) negotiated across generations within the local community.

This opens the possibility for new analytical categories regarding patronage and the mafia itself. Specifically, “*antimafia families*” -suggested as such by their members- could potentially be a banal reality that affects the interaction of the private and the public space in the area. The social usage of the term is potentially offering an analytical lens through which to rethink the notion of the family as an economic unit in a Mediterranean setting. Through a shift away from an alleged mafia as a social structure incorporating behaviours of Sicilian families, my work challenges family dynamics studied previously in South Italy. Specifically, authors claim that the mafia is located in a certain ‘moral climate’ (Gellner and Waterbury 1977) or view it under the prism of a patronage centred on family ethics (Arlacchi 1983). My case study instead, brings forward the issue of **access to labour** as the means of its reproduction and offers a novel viewpoint on kinship as a social unit accommodating legality and cooperation-contrasting past ethnographies.

A lot of the relevant work relates deregulation of labour and the roll-back of the state in a European context (Supiot 2001) with coexisting ‘light’ social institutions of regulation such as neighbourhood (Mollona 2005) or the locality (Narotzky and Smith 2007). This literature contributes to the development of my project, as I explore how relations of the state and the community are reconciled through the *antimafia* cooperative movement.

Moreover, a cooperative labour project as a form of sociopolitical organisation with specific aims that include and transcend economic profit is central to my study of San Giuseppe. Agrarian cooperativism has often been related with an overarching ideology -as in Humphrey’s double ethnographic visit to a Siberian communist and post-communist coop (1986, 1993 respectively). In an Italian context, where peasant mobilisation has been paramount to the successes of the political Left, Pratt’s ethnography discusses the blurred boundary between socialist ideas on productivity and policy in Tuscany (1994). Another case relevant to Sicily is a nationalist rhetoric that creates a ‘common sense of working for a common land’, present in a political form in the Basque Country’s *Mondragón* project (Kasmir 1996).

In the most diverse contexts, cooperative work has bonded people’s quotidian lives for generations, around what seem ideals on social organisation. I suppose that what prevailed in such experiences and is certainly prominent amongst *antimafia* activists today is a mode of acquiring their individual **means of livelihood** on a solid basis that entails protection of the community. The relations of state and community are reconciled in the everyday economic reality of local actors through such projects of co-organisation of production. I shall thus examine how people negotiate notions of trust and morality in relation to personal and public networks and relationships both through and around the cooperatives.

Particularly, I explore the extent to which the cooperatives’ strategy to reconfigure such values (legality and transparency) might be informed or disrupted by enduring **personal dependencies** and entanglements (Gledhill in: Pardo 2004). To highlight this, I focus on everyday economic relations within and around the cooperatives that give rise to a ‘sense of community’ (Gudeman 2001). The junction work/legality as

experienced in transparent, lawful working environments that contest the mafia trafficked labour regimes is of additional importance to the analysis of the empirical data I am currently gathering on labour relations in the coops.

In the case of the cooperatives, I assume a certain *recovery to legality*, namely the transition to a set of relations governed by legal regulation and transparency, set upon particular ideas of work that is equal, creative and non-alienating. More precisely, the way the cooperative participants work the land might resonate what Polanyi (1953) and Thompson (1975) note on the commons of 19<sup>th</sup> century England. This re-appropriation of common land is based on jurisdictional rights of usage and not territorial rights of property. It thus potentially reproduces links between the community and its territory that the mafia had broken. In that sense, I shall not treat the coops as a formalised structure as such but as a historically dynamic social project that reflects the need for a stable work that the participants share, as well as a sense of social cohesion. In their strife to reconfigure community and work relationships, participants seem to formulate social relations through legislation on land administration (confiscation) that works immediately as an overarching protective structure above actors and as a dynamic force amongst them.

Interestingly, a certain degree of autonomy over their own working lives has never been experienced before in this community. The *antimafia* organised economic community constitutes a field of public life where dependencies from external actors have been altered and economic activity is shaped by the moral choices of the community. This self-organisation of the local community in the face of hegemonic patterns of economic activity informed by patronage is building the potentiality for a present without mafia in San Giuseppe. I discuss the existing literature on patrons and social movements in the following section.

### **3. Theoretical Issues: Patronage, social movements, social change**

In “Mediterranean societies”, ethnographers have underlined the centrality of patronage for negotiating a grouping’s or a family’s connection to the public sphere. Strongly gendered notions of ‘honour and shame’ that inform the politics of reputation have been central in many of such ethnographies, used as analytical categories for Sicily as well (as per Peristiany 1965; Blok 2001). Cross-cultural comparisons of ‘instrumental friendships’ (Boissevain 1974) have been productive but remain problematic, because of the tendency to de-historicise and de-contextualise in many such comparisons (as outlined in critiques of the “Mediterranean” for e.g. Herzfeld 1987; Goddard et al 1994).

My work diverges from the relevant literature regarding **patronage** insofar as the nature of the unequal dyadic relationships that presumably lies at the core of the notion is concerned. I take into account this charged concept not as an analytical category in itself, but introduced within specific historical dynamics regarding quotidian economic relations in my field site. Authors have in some cases discharged the historical specificities of a given economic area, attributing practices of patronage or the mafia itself to behavioural analyses, often prone to some degree of essentialism. I take on

board however that, patron-client relations can be a channel through which people think about their own political culture (as for Malta in: Mitchell 2002). Thus, I shall trace possible continuities of clientelist practices, which potentially mark divergences from the culture of transparency and legality regarding the cooperatives' recruitment, storage and distribution systems.

Authors have in some cases ignored such historical specificities when attempting to account for the mafia phenomena in South Italy. Hence, **essentialist approaches** have perceived Southern societies as static, blocked in a-historical nets of oppressive family ethics: Banfield's notion of "amoral familism" had some influence in sociological accounts of the region (1958). Indeed, such ideas resonate still in the 1990s: Putnam notes a complete lack of "civic sense" in the *mezzogiorno* (1993); Gambetta furthermore, argues of an alleged "social need" for the mafia's racketeering, as it substitutes for trust's scarcity in everyday economic relations in Palermo (1993). I diverge from such accounts, recognising the historically dynamic nature of the mafia's cultural codes and specific configurations with institutions such as the state and trade unions. Assuming that the recent rearrangements in community mobilisation and the state's policies (Jamieson 2000) confirm the Sicilian society's shift towards change vis-à-vis the mafia, I use ethnography to explore this prospective further.

I propose that the establishment of the *antimafia* cooperatives, sustained as they are from a grassroots social movement, offer us an excellent example through which to rethink the limits of patronage in Sicily. The configuration between grounded community life, personalised policy and influence of local brokerage seems to be reshaping toward different dynamics that do not involve local patrons. The cooperatives might be a site of contest in which the daily lives of local people under a transparent and safe labour status are shifting away from a passive stance in their community. They rather seem to move a social movement's goals a step beyond, towards the organisation of material relations of production. The *antimafia* is a movement in which people are involved not only to denounce patronage but indeed to divert their livelihoods away from its grasp (Santino 2000).

The hybrid status of this *antimafia* community is based both on its members' commitment to the aims of a social movement and to the partial realisation of such aims in the form of the cooperatives, which actively involve people's livelihoods in the *anti-mafia* process. Taking into account Edelman's (2001) critique of network-based approaches to social movements, I choose instead to focus on employment and work. In this way, my project contributes to contemporary debates regarding how anthropology traces social change, as the need to ethnographically account for collective action around labour solidarity (Fantasia 1988) is becoming urgent.

Anthropological writings on social movements stress the lack of research beyond identity politics (Escobar 2004). Claims have been made that the separation of the 'cultural' from the 'political' in social mobilisation's cultural politics is flawed and does not contribute to the discipline (Alvarez et al 1998). Rather, researchers should take into account issues of class and historicity when working around activists (Gledhill 1994). A social movement aims to compose a positive discourse, based on facts of a community's everyday life and not just contest what might be hegemonic forces in a society. Accordingly, in my work I shall explore how the *antimafia*

movement attempts to actively involve local people in a plan for a dignified labour status and social life.

One particular contribution towards this analytical direction that I acknowledge is Pratt's analytical framework of *identity narratives*; he proposes to redefine ethnography around activists paying attention to the existing social relations in which their narratives are embedded (2003). This technique tests my hypothesis regarding the entrenchment of *antimafia* in relations outside the cooperatives, in households and community. The method feeds back to one of my original aims in this project, namely to pass on from an analysis of the law and legislation as structure imposed on people to a social phenomenon that is dynamic and shaped in everyday discourse and constantly debated by people. A shift from structure to discourse in terms of understanding the legal and economic activism of people whose praxis a whole community enjoys is relevant for my work.

Specifically, I centre my attention to social mobilisation based on material claims that yield rearrangements in work relations and the re-organisation of labour and property, especially vis-à-vis landowning. This way social change can be examined as a process reflected not only in a cluster of radical laws regarding e.g. confiscation but also as a participatory activity with which people might feel their own everyday reality coinciding.

Sicily, currently experiencing conflictual changing patterns (Davis 1996, Schneider and Schneider 2006), is an excellent site to pursue anthropological considerations regarding how people experience a relative social transformation. I assert that, mapping the lives of social actors who participate in such developments across generation lines could be insightful for an anthropological account of change. Referring to a past that has been paradigmatic with struggles of all kinds against organised crime, contestants form an imaginary temporal continuity with social struggles against the mafia in the same area. Their view of change seems to be not a violent break with past processes but a rejuvenation of those elements within Sicilian society that openly stood against *Cosa Nostra*. It is significant that the break with the use of productive, large pieces of land by people in San Giuseppe is marked by a **generational shift**, given that all cooperative members are below 40 years of age.

Methodologically, this reflects on the use of life histories to place local people's social activity in temporal perspective, addressing their views for the future and accounts of the past. Archives (especially legal documentation), providing a biography of the cooperatives also add a temporal axis to my analysis of "practicing *antimafia*": negotiating and safeguarding past struggles (Santino 1995).

Such view opens possibilities for historicising change through generations by further exploring *antimafia* traditions and the roots of the movement in **households' economic organisation**. The "identity narratives" of the cooperatives' members have to do with their own families' involvement or indifference towards such workings in the past. As for most of these people their position in the cooperatives is their first full time job and hence the main way to build a life independent from their families, tracking their views on domestic capital would be important from my research. Such methods follow novel perspectives on the autonomy of movements from hegemonic discourses and their embeddedness instead in kinship and intimacy, as well as skill, through labour.

## 4. Epilogue: anthropology and beyond

Organically coordinated with macro analyses, social anthropology can be the grounded study of microeconomics: an overview of cooperatives integrated into the reality of a local society is the main aim of my current work, while the “made in Italy” economic boom has largely been a cooperative project resistant to current deindustrialisation processes. In my view, cooperativism offers a vivid example of flexible growth for South East Europe. Anthropology’s contribution to studying the global economy’s fluctuations in a turbulent global setting starts from the ethnographer’s micro-view of a certain field but aims, through the comparative approach, to proposing patterns of sustainable development elsewhere, in my case to Balkan fragile economies, so afflicted by organised crime. ‘Mafias’ are peripheral systems of patronage related with national political apparatuses and the global economy- not just plainly organised crime syndicates. Sicilian *antimafia* suggests ways (integrated in local economies and people’s experience of work) of confronting corruption in South East Europe as well as Italy. The confiscation and cooperative production processes can be models of development and contention to organised crime for the Balkan region.

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# Observing Oral Examiners' Discourse Practices: Results and Implications

*Delieza Xenia*

*University of Athens, Faculty of English Studies*

## 1. Introduction

Many studies on oral testing (Lazaraton, 1996a; Lynch and McNamara, 1998; Meiron and Schick, 1998; Alderson and Banerjee, 2003; Brown, 2003, 2005, among others) have stressed that the nature of oral assessment is very complex and subjective. Thus, researchers and test designers bear the responsibility of finding ways to observe and describe this complexity and subjectivity with a view to revealing areas which might be threatening validity, reliability and fairness in the oral test procedure. Within this objective lies the study of the role of examiners as interlocutors in oral proficiency interviews, which is the focus of my PhD research. Observation was seen as an initial method of gaining insight into and collecting data on the discourse practices used by oral examiners as interlocutors and the effect these practices have on the candidates' language output. In this paper, I will report on data collected during a series of phases of an observation project that was designed and implemented as part of a larger investigation I am conducting, concerning the ways in which interlocutor practices may affect the candidates' language output.<sup>1</sup>

## 2. Purpose and methodology

My PhD research<sup>2</sup> focuses on the discourse of oral examiners who assume the role of interlocutor, i.e. conduct the oral test, in oral proficiency interviews. The way that this role is enacted is a major variable – or *facet* as this is very often referred to in the literature (Bachman, 1990; Bachman et al. 1995; McNamara, 1996; Milanovic & Saville, 1996; Lazaraton, 1996a, 2002; Bonk & Ockey, 2003, among others) – which

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<sup>1</sup> My work is supported by the *Research Centre for English Language Teaching, Testing and Assessment* (henceforth, RCEL, [www.uoa.gr/english/rcel](http://www.uoa.gr/english/rcel)) and was implemented within the framework of a larger project using observation as a method of evaluating and monitoring KPG oral tests. The project is being carried out under the supervision of Professor B. Dendrinos, Director of the RCEL, who is responsible for the preparation of the KPG exams in English and Head of the English KPG Research and Exams Development Team (henceforth English Team) and Dr E. Karavas, Assistant Director of the RCEL, who is responsible for the training of oral examiners and script raters.

<sup>2</sup> It started in October 2005 with supervising committee Professor V. Dendrinos who is the head and also Dr E. Karava and Professor M. Sifianou of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Faculty of English Studies.

can interact with other variables to affect candidate output and examiner rating. The context of my investigation is the Greek state exams for foreign language proficiency, known as KPG exams, –the English exams in particular– and specifically the component which aims at assessing oral production and mediation in the two out of the five levels currently administered, i.e. B2 and C1 (based on the scales set by the Council of Europe as described in the *Common European Framework of Reference for Languages*, henceforth CEFR).

The assessment of oral language proficiency today has become virtually synonymous with the language proficiency interview (LPI), which is a common practice of most, if not all, language examination and language certification systems. Within this context, there are many studies which have shown that interviewer, or interlocutor (which is the term I will be using henceforth) variation in the elicitation of communicative performance of candidates is a major factor affecting the candidates' language output, thus threatening validity and reliability in oral tests. To refer to only a few, Ross (1992) states that there can be variation even in the way an interlocutor formulates a pre-specified question in his or her effort to facilitate the candidate and compensate for 'trouble' caused during the interview. Also, Ross and Berwick (1992) have shown that in cases where interlocutors are inclined to over-accommodate to all non-native speakers regardless of their need, or contrastingly, are unaware of the propositionally complex probes they produce, validity is threatened and along with it reliability in rating is put at risk. Lazaraton (1996) draws attention to findings that prove inconsistency in the amount of support given by interlocutors to candidates and raises concerns about the impact of such support on the language production and the ratings of it. Finally, McNamara and Lumley (1997) have found that raters perceived differences in the competence of the various interlocutors in conducting role plays and also in establishing rapport with the candidates, which led to higher ratings.

In order to investigate interlocutor variation the following methods have been selected:

- a. Observation of the actual KPG oral test at B2 and C1 levels, which has been completed, and some results from which will be presented today,
- b. Simulated oral tests and discourse analysis of transcribed data, which has been partly carried out, and has partly contributed to some basic conclusions, and
- c. Verbal protocols by expert judges-raters and analysis of recorded data, which remain to be conducted.

### **3. The context of the research**

Before discussing variation in the context of my research I should allude to the nature of this context, i.e. provide a general description of the linguistic event which takes place in the situational context of the KPG oral test.

### 3.1 The KPG Oral Test: the examiner's perspective

According to the KPG exams specifications<sup>3</sup>, the oral test procedure involves two examiners and two candidates in the examination room. One of the two examiners conducts the exam (in other words, asks the questions, assigns the tasks and participates in the speech event). She or he is the 'Interlocutor'. The second is the 'Rater', and sits aside silent, observes the examination and rates the candidate's performance. The Interlocutor also rates the candidates' performance, but after they have left the room. Within the day of the oral test administration, the two examiners alternate in their role as Interlocutor and Rater every three or four testing sessions.

Oral examiners participate in seminars, usually once a year, during which they receive training for their roles both as Interlocutors and Raters. However, on the day of the exams administration, they are reminded about what they have to do through the 'Examiner Pack'. This is a six-to-eight-pages pamphlet which contains guidelines regarding the test procedure and the rules of conduct as well as the oral test material: questions, tasks and rating criteria.<sup>4</sup>

In terms of genre, the KPG oral test is a type of interview and it very much resembles other kinds of interviews in many ways. The interviewer, in this case the interlocutor, is the one who has the absolute control of the event and the one who gives or takes the floor at his/ her own will. It is certainly expected that s/he does so according to the guidelines provided by the designers. There is an asymmetry of power between interviewer and candidates in the oral test, which is not so obvious in other kinds of interviews, like for instance political interviews. This distribution of power is defined by the roles and goals of the participants, which in the case of the oral test are those of the examiner and the examinees and the context is a formal testing situation whereby the result from the linguistic interaction will bring about success or failure for the examinees, i.e. those with the less power.

Within this framework then, the formality of the event is confirmed by the existence of a 'ritual', which is prescribed by the rules and guidelines of conduct for the specific test. So, the examiners are generally instructed to: (a) explain the test procedure, (b) use/ read task rubrics as they are (not paraphrase them, not provide their own rubrics or assign their own tasks), (c) maintain their profile as *listeners* in the speech event, allowing candidates to use all the time they have available to produce continuous and coherent speech and, (d) interrupt candidates only in certain cases (as described in seminars and repeated in the Examiner Pack).

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<sup>3</sup> The complete document of the KPG exams specifications can be found in the following two URLs: [http://ypepth.gr/el\\_ec\\_category8602.htm](http://ypepth.gr/el_ec_category8602.htm) or [http://www.cc.uoa.gr/english/rcel/kpg\\_exams.htm](http://www.cc.uoa.gr/english/rcel/kpg_exams.htm). The specifications also comprise the description of the oral test at the different levels, which could not be included in this paper.

<sup>4</sup> The Examiner Pack is handed to examiners at least two hours before the exam begins along with the Candidate Booklet which contains the prompts for the test (photos and Greek texts, since one of the Activities involves mediation).

From the very first KPG exams administration, it became obvious that examiners did not often follow the prescribed rules and guidelines and there was considerable variation in the way they enacted their role as Interlocutors. My study set this specific goal: observe and describe such variation and the ways in which it may influence the candidates' language output.

#### **4. Observation in the KPG context**

My research is only a part of a quite large and ambitious project which set observation of the English KPG oral test as a means of evaluation of the oral test procedure within the framework of research carried out for the general improvement of the KPG exam system. As such, launched through the RCEL in November 2005, the overall initial goal of observation was to gain information about efficiency of the oral exam administration, task validity and exam organisation, examiner efficiency, validity of assessment criteria, intra- and inter-rater reliability, all of which are different variables affecting the examination. In the following lines, some information is given about the observation project and how it has been carried out so far.

The observation project was introduced in November 2005 (Observation Phase 1) as a method of monitoring the oral test in terms of organisation and examiner efficiency. The results from this first phase were used in Observation Phase 2, in May 2006 which also led to Observation Phase 3, in May 2007 and Observation Phase 4, in November 2007. Since then, observation has been established as a means of evaluating examiners 'on the job' in all examination periods, so there have been 2 more phases: May 2008 and November 2008<sup>5</sup>.

The project has been conducted, so far, in a random choice of examination centres all around Greece<sup>6</sup>. During observation, trained professionals, who have been selected to play the role of observers, go to different examination centres on the days of the actual exam administrations, enter the examination rooms as third parties and observe the test procedure without interfering with it in any way. They are supposed to fill in an observation form before, while and after they have observed the process. The observers are present at the examination centres going from one examination room to the other as long as the examination sessions last, i.e. morning to afternoon.

With regard to the observation forms, each form is designed so that it is used in one examination session, i.e. with one examiner examining a pair of candidates. Observers are instructed to observe each examiner twice, i.e. with two pairs of candidates. In terms of format, the observation forms are clearly defined, structured checklists, easy to analyse, and based on specific categories and subcategories having to do with rules and guidelines pertaining to the test procedure and examiner conduct. They are in the form of

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<sup>5</sup> While this paper was being written, the 7<sup>th</sup> phase of the project, that of the May 2009 exams administration, was also being organised.

<sup>6</sup> The choice of examination centres was based on the number of examiners and candidates assigned to the centres. The aim was to cover centres all over Greece, but those which had more examiners and candidates were preferred as they were expected to yield more results.

tables, where the observers circle-YES/NO or tick for the presence of a particular feature, but there is also some space in some of the questions where the observers can take notes if necessary. The forms have gradually been changed from one phase to the other following the research needs and the analysed results. Today, they have come to be quite simplified and short, mainly with ‘circle YES/NO’ or ‘tick’ questions basically aiming at the assessment of the examiners’ performance on the basis of specific criteria (see part 6, below).

Table 1 shows the scale of the six observation phases carried out so far and includes numbers for all levels<sup>7</sup>. It is remarkable that the sample of examiners and candidates observed in all six examination periods is considered to be quite representative in terms of the number of examiners and candidates in each period: it constitutes at least 10% of the total number of examiners used and candidates examined in each administration. It is also considered representative of the exam population, since observation was carried out throughout almost the whole of Greece. Although Table 1 comprises numbers for all six phases and all five levels, only the first four phases and only levels B2 and C1 are relevant to the present study; therefore, the results outlined in the following section are presented within these limitations.

			Examiners	Candidates
PHASE 1: November 2005 Levels B2 & C1	25 observers	B2	138	470
		C1	98	288
PHASE 2: May 2006 Levels B2 & C1	33 observers	B2	155	540
		C1	118	418
PHASE 3: May 2007 Levels B1, B2 & C1	32 observers	B1	35	146
		B2	156	734
		C1	105	350
PHASE 4: November 2007 Levels B1, B2 & C1	42 observers	B1	50	201
		B2	177	753
		C1	100	339
PHASE 5: May 2008 Levels A1-2, B1, B2 & C1	48 observers	A1-2	45	184
		B1	60	193
		B2	182	612
		C1	136	440
PHASE 6: November 2008 Levels A1-2, B1, B2 & C1	41 observers	A1-2	51	113
		B1	55	154
		B2	187	659
		C1	100	329

**Table 1. The scale of the KPG observation project**

<sup>7</sup> The B1 level exam was administered for the first time in May 2007 and the integrated A1-A2 levels exam in May 2008.

## 5. Observing ‘intervention’

The observation project has proved extremely useful both for the KPG test designers’ work and for the present research. Since its results and implications for the KPG exam system cannot be analysed within the limitations of this paper, the focus will be placed on those which are directly relevant to this study. These are connected with variation in interlocutor discourse practices which I have come to define under the umbrella term interlocutor ‘intervention’.

So, intervention for the present study can be defined as

a discourse practice whereby the interlocutor-examiner chooses to make a linguistic change to or linguistically interfere with the given rubric and/ or interrupt the candidate or interfere with his/her language output; this practice brings some kind of change in or affects in some way the candidate’s language output.

Concerning the change of or interference with the rubrics, it is considered as an inherently wrong type of intervention as it defies the rule of using the rubrics as they are given to ensure consistency among different examiners and examiners with themselves (inter- and intra-examiner consistency). Regarding the interruption of the candidate or the interference with his/her language output, it appears that there are different categories, some of which affect the candidate’s language output only to the extent that they encourage him/her to continue through his/her own linguistic means; while there are others which influence the candidate’s language output by providing him/her with the linguistic means to continue.

On the basis of this definition, in the following parts, I will present the results from the first four observation phases which are connected with the changes to the rubrics and the interruption or interference with the candidate language output, i.e. intervention.

### *5.1 The November 2005 observation phase*

Beginning with the first November 2005 observation process, we should point out that it was a piloting mode of the method and, as such, it was conducted on a trial basis. The first observation checklists designed for the November 2005 exams were aiming at many different aspects of the test, some of which are not directly relevant with the present study. For instance, it included categories of investigation like organisation of the examination centre, punctual arrival of examiners to the examination centres, course of action by the examination committee etc. Nevertheless, its most important part was a first attempt at investigating whether examiners follow the rules and guidelines for conducting the oral test, as these have been explained and discussed in training seminars and are also given to them as part of the material for the examination (in the Examiner Pack).

So, the observers were asked, among other things, whether the interlocutors used the exact words of the given rubrics and whether they interfered in any way or interrupted the candidate, and were also asked to note down in what ways they did so. Thus, both quantitative and qualitative results came out.

Intervention	B2	C1
changes to the rubrics	12%	10%
interruptions and/or interferences	18%	16%

**Table 2. November 2005 - Percentage of intervention at B2 and C1**

Table 2 shows the percentage of the two types of intervention in levels B2 and C1. There were 12% changes to the rubrics and 18% of interruptions and/or interferences in B2, and 10% changes to the rubrics and 16% of interruptions and/or interferences in C1, while since observers also listed different examples of such intervention, qualitative results also came out, which provided specific categories included in Table 3 many of which have also been found by other studies (Ross and Berwick, 1992; Ross, 1992; Marlaire and Maynard, 1990; Lazaraton, 1996a) to affect the candidate's language output. These categories were integrated in the new and improved May 06 observation form.

Changes to or interference with the rubrics	Interruption of the candidate or interference with his/her language output in order to...
S/he used an introductory question. S/he changed one-two words. S/he expanded the question. S/he explained the rubric without being asked to/ after being asked to. S/he repeated the rubric (more slowly) without being asked to/ after being asked to. S/he supplied a synonym for a word without being asked to /after being asked to. S/he used examples.	..redirect the candidate because s/he misunderstood something ..to help the candidate continue by repeating his/her last words ..make some kind of correction ..repeat the question or part of it ..supply one or more words the candidate was unable to find ..ask a seemingly irrelevant question ..add something

**Table 3. Categories of intervention**

### ***5.2 The May 2006 observation phase***

The May 2006 phase and observation material were designed on the basis of the November 2005 piloting phase results and analysis. Emphasis was placed on the role of the examiner as Interlocutor and aimed at finding out whether the categories of intervention listed through the November 2005 phase would be confirmed and also produce some statistical results for the existence and frequency of such variation.

The categories of intervention already described were confirmed, since they were detected by the observers, who were expected to tick for the existence of each kind of intervention and also answer YES/NO as to whether it appeared to affect the candidates' language output and explain how. The amount of intervention and influence is shown in Table 4.

Intervention	B2	C1
changes to the rubrics	15%	9%
interruptions and/or interferences	17%	10%
influence	55%	36.5%

**Table 4. May 2006 - Percentage of intervention and its influence at B2 and C1**

So, there were 15% changes to the rubrics and 17% of interruptions and/or interferences in B2, and 9% changes to the rubrics and 10% of interruptions and/or interferences in C1. It was also observed that 55% of the cases of intervention in B2 appeared to influence in some way the candidate's language output and 36.5% in C1, which are very significant percentages.

### ***5.3 The May 2007 observation phase***

In May 2007, the categories of intervention were again included in the observation form, but in a more condensed form. The results from this phase showed that there were 33% changes to the rubrics and 7% of interruptions and/or interferences in B2, and 20% changes to the rubrics and 10% of interruptions and/or interferences in C1 (Table 5). Emphasis was also given to the influence of the interlocutor's intervention (change of rubric/ interruption or interference) on the candidate's language output. Thus, observers observed that 31% of the cases of intervention in B2 appeared to influence in some way the candidate's language output and 28.5% in C1, which are very significant percentages. They were also required to circle whether this influence made it easier or more difficult for the candidates to answer. The results showed that this influence made it easier by 93% and more difficult by 7% in B2 and easier by 94% and more difficult by 6% in C1.

Intervention	B2	C1
changes to the rubrics	33%	20%
interruptions and/or interferences	7%	10%
influence	31%	28.5%
easier to answer	93%	94%
more difficult to answer	7%	6%

**Table 5. May 2007 - Percentage of intervention and its influence at B2 and C1**

A further statistical analysis<sup>8</sup> was conducted which yielded even more interesting results. According to this analysis, firstly, the possibility of the candidate's language output being influenced by specific types of interventions statistically increases on a 5% level of significance. (The zero hypothesis is rejected since significance is less than 0.05 – When significance is <0.05, then we check the regression coefficient, B. If it is a positive number, then the possibility increases, if it is negative, it decreases). Tables 6a and 6b present examples of changes to the rubrics or interruptions in different activities of each level.

B2			
Activity	Type of intervention	B (regression coefficient)	Significance
1	Expanded the question	.826	.002
1	Made some kind of correction	1.133	.015
2	Add something	1.481	.000
3	Used examples to explain the rubric	1.049	.001

C1			
Activity	Type of intervention	B (regression coefficient)	Significance
1	Expanded the question	1.253	.010
1	Helped the candidate by repeating his/he last words	1.260	.030
2	Redirected the candidate by repeating the task or part of it	1.962	.008
2	Reminded the candidates of the goal set by the task	1.187	.015

**Tables 6a and 6b. Examples of intervention affecting the candidate's language output**

Additionally, the possibility of the candidate's language output being influenced by specific types of interventions and becoming in some cases easier and in some others more difficult statistically increases on a 5% level of significance. This means that specific types of intervention *can* influence the candidate's language output by making it either easier or more difficult for the candidate to answer. In most cases, it appears that interventions *can* facilitate the candidate's language production rather than make it more difficult. Of course, any such effect on the candidate's performance threatens the

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<sup>8</sup> Multinomial logistic regression was used in order to find out whether specific types of changes to the rubrics or interruptions can affect the candidate's language output. This model is used when the variables are not ordinal but nominal. In this case, the variables are nominal: YES-NOT SET-NO. We check NOT SET as opposed to NO and YES as opposed to NO, while with Easier-More difficult, we check EASIER as opposed to NOT SET and MORE DIFFICULT as opposed to NOT SET.

validity of the test items and the reliability of the final mark. Tables 7a and 7b at show some examples.

B2			
Activity	Type of intervention	B (regression coefficient)	Significance
1	Expanded the question	1.456	.000
1	Made some kind of correction	1.990	.000
2	Used examples to explain the rubric	1.608	.000
3	Add something	2.257	.000

C1			
Activity	Type of intervention	B (regression coefficient)	Significance
2	Redirected the candidate by repeating the task or part of it.	1.939	.001
2	Reminded the candidates of the goal set by the task.	1.799	.000

**Tables 7a and 7b. Examples of intervention facilitating the candidate's language production**

#### ***5.4 The November 2007 observation phase***

In November 2007, there were further changes to the design and nature of the observation forms following research needs. Thus, observers were asked (1) again whether the interlocutors changed or interfered with the given rubrics and whether they interrupted the candidate or interfered with his/her language output in any way, (2) to tick from a list the possible cause of such course of action and (3) to also tick from a list the way in which such course of action influenced the candidate's language output. In other words the November 2007 observation checklist focused on the causes and the effects of intervention. The categories used are outlined in Table 8 below and were collected through a qualitative analysis of relevant open-ended questions in the previous observation checklists.

The statistical results from this phase showed that there were 25% changes to the rubrics and 31.5% of interruptions and/or interferences in B2, and 17.5% changes to the rubrics and 28% of interruptions and/or interferences in C1.

Causes of intervention	Effects of intervention
<p>The candidate got stuck/ couldn't continue.</p> <p>The candidate hadn't produced enough language output.</p> <p>The candidate had answered part of the question/task.</p> <p>The candidate did something other than what the task required (e.g. wasn't using the photo/text, or wasn't taking the role).</p> <p>The candidate asked him/her to repeat the question/ clarify something.</p> <p>The candidate gave a partly relevant/ irrelevant response to the question(s).</p> <p>The candidates were not interacting.(C1)</p> <p>The candidates didn't refer to all texts. (C1)</p> <p>The candidates had forgotten the goal set by the task/ the purpose of the interaction. (C1)</p> <p>For no obvious reason.</p>	<p>It helped the candidate produce more language output.</p> <p>It helped the candidate give a more complete answer.</p> <p>It helped the candidate respond to the task requirements.</p> <p>It didn't help the candidate produce more language output.</p> <p>It confused the candidate – the candidate got stuck.</p>

**Table 8. Causes and effects of intervention**

Intervention	B2	C1
changes to the rubrics	25%	31.5%
interruptions and/or interferences	17.5%	28%

**Table 9. November 2007 - Percentages of intervention at B2 and C1**

Percentages came out also for the causes and effects of intervention. Within the limitations of this paper, Tables 10a and 10b include only the causes which were more frequently selected by observers in each activity in the two levels.

B2		
Activity	Cause	Percentage
1	For no obvious reason.	16%
2	The candidate had answered part of the task.	21.5%
3	The candidate got stuck/ couldn't continue.	16.5%

C1		
Activity	Cause	Percentage
1	The candidate had answered part of the question.	16%
2	The candidate had responded to part of the task	8%

**Tables 10a and 10b. Percentages of most frequent causes of intervention**

Additionally, Tables 11a and 11b include the effects that were more frequently selected by observers in each activity.

B2		
Activity	Effect	Percentage
1	It helped the candidate produce more language output.	22%
2	It helped the candidate produce more language output.	30%
3	It helped the candidate produce more language output.	22%

C1		
Activity	Effect	Percentage
1	It helped the candidate produce more language output.	24%
2	It helped the candidate respond to the task requirements.	16.5%

**Tables 11a and 11b. Percentages of most frequent effects of intervention**

Further statistical analysis showed that (1) on a 5% level of significance specific causes increase the possibility of both types of intervention being made in all activities of both levels, and (2) again on a 5% level of significance specific causes increase the possibility of all listed effects on the candidate's language output in all activities of both levels. There is a long list of examples of these kinds of influence, which could not be included in this paper due to length restrictions. What is important, though, is that there *is* dependence between causes and intervention and between causes and effects in both levels.

As a general remark, it appears that the first four observation phases have contributed a great amount of data to the present study, which has also been supported by findings from the transcribed simulated oral tests carried out in November-December 2006 and are still being analysed. In the final part of this paper, results and implications of observation and this research for the KPG oral test are briefly presented.

## **6. The importance of observation and the present study for the KPG exam**

Closing this paper, reference should be made to the importance of observation and the implications of this study for the KPG oral test, and to some extent for the oral testing arena, since no project has been conducted with observation as a technique for collecting data of such quantity and quality (at least to my knowledge).

First and foremost, the results have contributed to the improvement of the examination in terms of organisation and content. It has thrown light on issues that may affect the oral examination procedure indirectly, e.g. lack of preparation of examiners before the test, interruption of the actual test by third parties etc. and such problems have been generally solved.

Additionally, through observation, the oral examiners' performance can be evaluated. This is very important since the ultimate aim of the system is to establish a certified body of trained examiners. To this aim, the latest development was a scale with

specific criteria on the basis of which examiners can be evaluated ‘on the job’. These criteria were compiled on the basis of the findings from the observation project and were actually tried out in November 2007. Since then, i.e. for May 2008, November 2008 and May 2009, the observation forms have been standardised: they are quite simple one-page tables basically aiming at assessing the examiners’ language competence and performance on the basis of six criteria as defined in a given scale.

Furthermore, and this is a very significant point, the results and insights from observation are used in the preparation of the material for the oral examiner training seminars. In connection to the training material, a very comprehensive list was compiled including categories of examiner discourse practices classified into two basic types: ‘categories against suggested procedure’ and ‘categories according to suggested procedure’ which is believed to gradually tackle the problem of variation.

Another major development which came as result of the observation project was the decision that the introduction of an Interlocutor Frame in the oral test could also contribute to tackling the problem of variation, and it *was* actually made in November 2007. An Interlocutor Frame is a script where from the interlocutors read out, just like actors do, in order to conduct the test. The importance of its use has been stressed by Fulcher (2003) as a means of reducing differences between the talk of different interlocutors. Also, Lazaraton (1996b) calls for more emphasis on adherence to interlocutors frames during examiners training and Cséspes (2004) talks about the significance of standardisation of elicitation of oral performances by use of interlocutor frames.

Finally, the observation data analysis is used to further support findings obtained through other methods of data collection, which are very important for the oral test monitoring, e.g. Oral Examiners Feedback forms, which are completed by examiners on the day of the oral test administration and Seminar reports which are written by oral examiner trainers called ‘multipliers’.

## **7. Conclusion**

Study into examiner discourse practices as a variable affecting outcomes in oral proficiency tests presents itself as an area of widespread interest in the international testing arena, where the demand for coherence and transparency in language certification have been repeatedly accentuated and especially emphasised with the introduction of the CEFR. The oral test of the KPG exams in English, being part of a relatively new language testing battery provides a fertile ground for research, the results of which contribute to the understanding of the nature of foreign language performance, give insight into aspects of variation which can detract from reliability and validity and reveal possible ways of coping with such variation. It appears that real-time observation of oral tests has already worked successfully towards that direction producing a very rich amount of data both in terms of quality and quantity.

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# Europeanization of Minority Rights: Turkey as a Case

*Zelal Kizilkan-Kisacik*

*University of Cologne, Department of Political Science, Jean Monnet Chair, Gottfried-Keller-Str. 1, 50931 Köln, zkizilkan@yahoo.com*

## 1. Introduction

In the recent Eastern enlargement, the EU sets specific democratic conditions for the accession and developed a new human rights policy, featured as an increased level of conditionality and fulfillment of certain requirements. It has used membership card as an incentive to implement human rights norms and principles in the candidate countries. All candidate countries have involved themselves in a large-scale process of transformation approximating their standards to European standards and practices. By this way, the EU has assumed important external dynamics through changing domestic policies of the candidate countries. Protection of minority and cultural rights has appeared to be an important aspect of the enlargement discourse both in the CEEC and countries like Turkey in this regard. Even though minority rights do not belong to the competences of the EU, the positive influence of the EU on the candidate countries has been more pronounced. Compare with non candidate countries; the countries of CEEC have been successful at peacefully finding solutions to the minority rights problems.

Turkey has also become the target of human rights promotion policies of the EU. Since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, it has initiated several reforms related with cultural and minority rights. Minority rights become particular policy area in which the EU has promoted important progress, but not sufficient enough to meet international standards of minority rights protection in Turkey. However, it opens the “Pandora’s box,” leading to diffusion and discussion of these principles and launches the process of normative shift in the public discourse.

On this basis, the main aim of this article is to analyze the transformative effect of the EU on the domestic structures of Turkey. It has two main objectives. The first one is to assess the impact of the EU on norm adoption in the field of minority rights. The second one is the overall assessment and conceptualization of mechanisms and factors having impact on policy change in this field. Both “top to bottom” and “bottom-up” mechanisms of change are employed. In the “top to bottom” patterns of change, the EU directly targets governments and changes the opportunity structure for them by offering new incentives and constraints. In the bottom-up patterns of change, by empowering non-state actors like NGOs and opposition groups through financial aid and constitutional liberalization, the EU promoted social mobilization for change from the bottom. In turn, the governments appeared to be subject to both “top to bottom” and “bottom-up” pressure. By this way, it would be possible to get the picture of a different typology of change in the reluctant candidate countries.

This paper consists of four parts. In the first part, the concept of Europeanization and the causal mechanisms explaining domestic change for both member and candidate countries are discussed. In the second part, the current state of minority rights protection in the legal order of Turkey is analyzed with an historical and sociological perspective. In the third part, the impact of the EU on the formal rule adoption and implementation in the field of minority rights is analyzed. In the last part, the question of how “top to bottom” and “bottom-up” mechanisms of change are relevant in Turkey’s case is discussed.

## 2. Europeanization and Domestic Change

Europeanization is a “contested concept” (Olsen 2002, p.921). As Olsen (2002, p.924) argues, it is used to refer different phenomena and processes of change like “the changes in external boundaries,” “developing institutions at the European level,” “central penetration of national systems of governance” and “exporting forms of political cooperation” and “political unification project.” No consensus is reached between scholars in terms of its definition and meaning. For example, Börzel (1999) describes Europeanization “as process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy making (p.574).” Radaelli (2003, p.30) broadens the scope of Europeanization as a process of first construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, ways of doing things, shared beliefs and norms at the EU level and then their incorporation to the domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policy. In general sense, Europeanization is considered as a “two way process” (Börzel 2002:p.193). On one hand, total or some part of the domestic political system and structures are affected by the EU level decisions. Thus, it can be defined as domestic change due to the European integration. On the other hand, Europeanization is conceptualized as the establishment and evolution of the EU system of governance and institutions by member states on the basis of their preferences, identities and interest. In this system, member states “upload” their policies to the EU level for reducing the “costs” in downloading them at the domestic level (Börzel 2002:p.193).

Even though Europeanization entails these “bottom-up” and “top to down” dimension, considering Turkey’s case as an applicant country with no access to the decision making process and thus unable to upload its preferences to the EU level, only the “top down approach” of Europeanization is employed here. However, one has to keep in mind Börzel’s (1999, p.574) argument that analyzing Europeanization exclusively from a “top-down” perspective can lead to failure to understand the two-way causality of European integration.

Parallel with the definition stated above, Europeanization literature is generally concerned with analyzing the EU’s impact on the domestic level in candidate countries. The basic question that the theoretical framework seeks to answer is to what extent and how the EU influences the domestic political change in the member states. Inspired from new institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 936-57, see also Aspinwall and Schneider 2001), Europeanization identifies two different mechanisms of how institutional change occurs. These are rationalist and sociological institutionalism. These approaches are also employed to the Europeanization of

candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, Grabbe 2006, Kelley 2004). These two logics of change emphasize different factors enabling domestic change due to the Europeanization pressure. Both mechanisms share a common point. In order to have Europeanization process, there must be some “misfit” between European and domestic policies, processes and institutions (Börzel 2000, p.5, Radaelli 2000, p.17). The level of “misfit” will determine adaptation pressure on member state. The more the misfit is, the higher the adaptation pressure would be (Risse Cowles, and Caporasa 2001).

Rationalist choice institutionalism (RCI) embodies “the logic of consequentialism” (March and Olsen, 1989). For RCI, actors are rationally self interested utility-maximizing agents (March and Olsen 1998, p. 943-69). They involve themselves in strategic interaction, trying to maximize their benefits and seeking to reduce their costs on the basis of their preferences. Agents calculate their cost and benefits for different strategic options. In this mechanism, Europeanization can lead to the emergence of different opportunities and constraints for different agents (Börzel, 2000, p.6). On the one hand, it provides some actors with material and ideational resources indispensable for exploiting European opportunities and consequently promoting domestic adaptation. On the other hand, it constrains the opportunity of other agents for pursuing their goals. Veto points in the domestic structure can act as a stumbling block for domestic adaptation. Formal institution can facilitate change though providing material and ideational resources.

Constructivist institutionalism, on the other hand, focuses on the “logic of appropriateness.” The domestic impact originates from a process of socialization in which domestic actors internalize norms that they regard appropriate or legitimate (Checkel, 1999a; p.545-60, 1999b; p. 83-114, 2001; p.553-588, Schimmelfennig 2000; p.109-139). In this mechanism, Europeanization process results in the emergence of new norms, ideas, and collective understanding. According to Börzel and Risse (2003), norm entrepreneurs and cooperative informal institutions or political cultures are the key factors facilitating change. They act as principal agents in social learning process in which actors learn to internalize new norms and rules in order to become members of the international society (Börzel and Risse, 2000). There are two kinds of norm entrepreneurs. One is epistemic communities which has an authoritative claim to knowledge, persuades the actors, and legitimizes the norms through providing scientific knowledge. The other one, much more related to the discussion here, is the advocacy or principled issue networks (Keck and Sikkink 2002, p.89-101). These networks have common beliefs and values. They persuade decision makers to change their policies and redefine their identities. A good example of principled issue networks is transnational advocacy networks working in the field of human rights. They act as socialization agents for international human rights standards and the target of their activity is to change state behavior in the field of human rights (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999).

The important difference between these two mechanisms is that, in rationalism, compliance is interest based. The actors comply with the norms because they see a material benefit for the domestic policy changes. In constructivist institutionalism, the actors make norm based calculations. Here the concern is not a social or material compensation, but doing the appropriate thing. In general sense, it is hard to

differentiate between norm and interest based calculations. They may act at the same time.

### 3. Minority Rights Protection in Turkey

The issue of minority protection has been the most challenging aspect of the Turkey-EU relation due to the several political and sociological reasons, whose roots go back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century historical legacy of the Ottoman disintegration. The Ottoman Empire signed the Sevres Treaty after the First World War. The treaty regulated the provisions dividing the Empire on the basis of national lines. But it was replaced by the Lausanne treaty which had more positive conditions for Turkey. However, the fear that minorities in strong cooperation with the foreign states would again represent a threat to the unity of the country has prevailed. Thus, the Republican regime tried to establish an ethnically homogenous nation state through assimilation policies, envisaging the construction of Turkish national identity, even though territorially Turkey represents strong level of heterogeneity in terms of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups.

On the basis of this historical legacy, only national minorities recognized by the international treaties (particularly the Lausanne Treaty) are officially considered as minority in Turkey (Oran 2004, p.49-58). This situation is in line with the general historical conviction that only non-Muslims are considered as minority in the administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire (Oran 2004, p.49-58). In this system, while the people having Muslim origins, regardless of their ethnicity and sect, were forming the “core” and considered as the constituting element, non-Muslims were the “periphery” of the empire, forming “second class of citizens.” This image was strengthened in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, in which minority issues were used as a significant instrument for foreign intervention and in turn considered as the reason for the Empire’s disintegration.

The reflection of this perception on the political culture, legal developments, and state society relations is very significant, forming the basis of long lasting problems in Turkey. The first immediate consequence is not granting minority rights to Muslim minorities with a view that extending the scope of minority rights to other groups would lead to further disintegration of the state. The founding fathers of the Turkish republic accepted a very restrictive conception of minority rights. There are *de jure* and *de facto* differences in the treatment accorded to minorities officially recognized as non-Muslim minorities under the Lausanne Treaty, like Armenians, Jews, Greeks and those outside its scope (European Commission 1998), leaving Kurds, Aleviten and Assyrians without protection. But this situation does not mean that non-Muslim minorities enjoys their full minority rights in Turkey (Oran 2004, p.49-58). The economic and social exclusion of these non-Muslim minorities in the framework of the nationalization of capital accumulation has been a long term state policy. For example, in 1942, the government issued a tax which is called *Varlik Vergisi*, literally translated “Wealth Tax or “Capital tax” on wealthy citizens of Turkey. The aim was to raise funds to fill the treasury in case Turkey entered World War II. It was believed that the tax was levied on all Turkish nationals regardless of their minority background at the same rate. But later it became clear that the tax targeted mostly non-Muslim minority groups, holding great proportion of the economy and it aimed at nationalizing the

Turkish economy by reducing the non-Muslim minority population's leverage and power over the country's trade, finance and industries. Compared to Turkish citizens, the members of non-Muslim minority were forced to pay higher tariffs, often in an arbitrary and discretionary way. Those who could not pay the tax within 30 days, were sent to the labor camps in the Southern region of Turkey and their properties were confiscated (Yeldağ, 2000, p; 23). *A second important incidence is "Events of September 6–7" in 1955. This was a Turkish pogrom particularly targeting Greek minorities and the other non-Muslim minorities. The events started with the alleged bombing of Mustafa Kemal house, who is the founder father of the Turkish Republic, in Thessaloniki where he was born. A group of Turkish rioters coming from other cities of Turkey started to attack non-Muslim properties and buildings, living in Istanbul. In two days, 4,348 Greek-owned businesses, 110 hotels, 27 pharmacies, 23 schools, 21 factories, 73 Greek (and other Christian) churches and over a thousand Greek-owned homes were badly damaged or destroyed (Kuyucu, 2005, 381-380). After these events, a significant proportion of the Greek minority fled Turkey. These two examples show that Turkey not only grants Muslim minorities their rights, but also violates full exercise of certain rights given to its non-Muslim groups, by the international treaties.*

The second consequence of this development is that, the state used the Islamic identity in an opportunistic way to unify ethno-linguistic groups, even though it sets its ideology in opposition to Islam. The treaty of Lausanne (1923) stressed common religious identity and thereby refused to accept ethnicity as the basis of its national identity, referring instead to the territorial-religious dimension of national identity (see Yavuz 2000, p.21-42). By using Islamic rhetoric, the new Turkish state tried to nationalize Islamic identity and tried to assimilate Muslim ethnic and linguistic groups to the Turkish national identity. This policy was successful for some groups. Some of the ethnic and linguistic groups have voluntarily accepted Turkish national identity. However, due to the several demographic, geographic and sociological reasons, Kurdish groups refused to accept the religiously oriented Turkish identity. They conceived the ethnic rather than the religious aspect of the Turkish collective identity, even though Islamic religion has for a long time been an important reference of common ground, linking Turkish and Kurdish people.

The above mentioned approach of Turkey towards Muslim groups has directly linked the minority issue to the Kurdish problem, leaving Kurdish people forming the largest ethnic community, with a population of approximately 12.000.000-15.000.000 in Turkey, without any minority protection system. The official ideology of Turkey towards the Kurdish issue has been to deny the existence of a Kurdish minority, and thus their cultural-linguistic rights, accompanied by brutal repression of those who speak about a Kurdish cause. As Bruinessen (1992, p. 242) states, since 1925 there has been a systemic policy aiming at detribalization and assimilation of the Kurds in Turkey. In this process, everything that is related to a separate Kurdish identity was to be abolished, including language, (traditional) clothing and Kurdish names. Even in contemporary Turkey, there is a constant policy of repression, including a ban on Kurdish language, literature, publications and education, and deportation of thousands of Kurds away from their towns and villages (Peach 2000, p.160).

Generally, the negative developments in human rights issues during the late 1980s and 1990s were linked to the Kurdish problem. The struggle of the Turkish Republic against the PKK has resulted in serious human rights violations in Kurdish regions. Even though human rights violations in Turkey are a general problem of Turkey regardless of ethnic origin, there have been serious acts of infringement solely targeting Kurdish people. According to Gunter (1997), the human rights violations in the Kurdish region are generally based on (1) prohibitions against the use of Kurdish languages and culture, (2) the forceful displacement of the Kurdish population in the southeastern region and the killing of Kurdish civilians, (3) disappearances, extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, and torture, (4) the infringement of fundamental freedoms like freedom of assembly, press and association. Such violations have become hotly discussed issues between the EU and Turkey during the 1990s.

#### **4. The Impact of the EU on Minority Rights Protection**

Minority rights have become one of the most important elements of European discourse since the 1990s, when it was included in the Copenhagen criteria as a condition for accession of new member states. Legally, minority rights are not within the scope of traditional EU competence. There is not any explicit definition what minority rights are in the legal order of the EU. The EU generally makes reference to international and European standards for protection of minorities and the documents of the Council of Europe and OSCE, when it is acting in the field of minority rights. According to Sasse (2005), this situation poses several compliance problems during the accession process. First of all, it led to the important heterogeneity in terms of the practices of current member states. The practice of member states ranges from total “constitutional and legal means for minority protection to the outright denial that national minorities exist.” Secondly, the lack of definition and clear standards in what constitutes minority at European and international level severely limits the impact of the EU on candidate countries. There is a causal relationship between credibility and consistency of the conditions, and the EU’s domestic impact and Europeanization.

However, it is interesting to note, the EU has managed to influence the domestic transformation in the field of minority rights in Turkey. The adaptational pressure of the EU has become very stark after granting Turkey candidate status in the Helsinki Summit of 1999, due to the “misfit” between European liberal norms, ideas and identity and pre-existing domestic structures of Turkey. Turkey functions in accordance with the Constitution of 1982, drafted and adopted during the period of the military rule following the September 1980 coup. The Constitution asserted the supremacy of the state over the realm of politics and placed limitations on the political system (Evin 1988, p.208). According to Gonenc (2005), “limitation was the rule, liberty was the exception” in the 1982 Constitution. Rather than protecting individuals from the state, the 1982 Constitution of Turkey was written in a way that protects the state from an individual’s activities. The provisions of the Constitution give a very narrowly defined area for civil liberties and political rights and thus it is the source of laws and practices that frequently undermine basic freedoms and human rights (Rouleau, 2000, p: 100-114).

In this respect, the adaptational pressure becoming stronger after the Helsinki Council decision provided new opportunities and constraints, creating several conditions and incentives encouraging reforms in Turkey. Besides this new opportunity structure, the ideas, norms and collective understanding with respect to human rights appeared to be more pronounced in the public discourse in Turkey. In between 1999-2005, several constitutional reforms in terms of minority rights have been made. The parliament adopted seven "EU Harmonization Packages," for fulfilling the EU demands. Particularly, since 2002, the majority government of the Justice and Development Party has rigorously made constitutional amendments, touching upon the taboo issues of Turkey. First of all, Article 26 of the Constitution was amended by deleting the phrase "language prohibited by law." This article was included into the Treaty in order to ban the use of Kurdish language (see Ozbudun, 2004). Moreover, the third reform package in 03.08.2002 changes "The Law on Learning and Teaching of Foreign Languages" and "The Law on the Establishment and Broadcasts of Radio and Television Channels (LEBRTC)." Such changes lift the limitations on the use of local languages other than Turkish, giving permission to learn "different languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives" in radio and private language courses (Oran 2004, p. 88-105) Following the June 2008 amendments to the relevant Law, TRT - the public service broadcaster is allowed to broadcast nationally all day long in languages other than Turkish. Since 2004 this had only been possible for half a day. The change in the constitution was really revolutionary, having direct implications to Turkish identity and security considerations. Moreover, the Law on Foundations was amended many times since 2002, regulating the ownership of non-Muslim immovable properties and their disposition. Even though the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 gives the right to manage community foundations, including social, religious, charitable and educational institutions, this law never implemented properly and non-Muslim minorities have never exercised this right easily. The minority foundations are today under the jurisdiction of the Directorate General Foundation and they were regulated by the Law on Foundation of 13.06. 1935. The law stated that all the foundations had to submit a property declaration listing immovable and other properties possessed by the foundation. Such declaration had not been given particular importance up to the military confrontation between Turkey and Greece in the 1960s. Since then, the Directorate General Foundation confiscated belongings of non-Muslim minorities and limited their property ownership due to the restrictive interpretation of the law. The directorate decided that the foundations were legally entitled to own and administer the immovable properties they have declared in 1936. The state would expropriate all of the immovable property acquired after 1936. The reforms in 2003 due to the EU pressure, particularly the third reform package, eased owning and disposal of properties. In 20 February 2008, Turkey adopted a new legislation which makes it possible to return back the properties confiscated by the state to non-Muslim minorities. Any other legislation change due to the EU demands is that Turkey adopted the 1965 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 2002 and the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 2003. With all these developments, Turkey has made important developments in the field of minority rights.

It is believed in this study that minority rights protection in Turkey is one of the most important areas where the impact of the EU can be strongly noticed and the EU as an external dynamic promoted significant reforms. But it is also argued that there are still

shortcomings in the field of minority rights acting as a stumbling block to Turkey's accession. The rise of nationalism and the problem of implementation are still stumbling blocks with respect to minority protection. According to the Commission's Regular Report in 2008, in parallel to the Frameworks Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, full protection and respect of fundamental freedoms for all citizens irrespective of their origin has not been fully realized. There are still important shortcomings. Turkey has not signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities or the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Even though Turkey is a party to the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it has reservation to the rights of minorities and UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) regarding the right to education. There are also several problems with respect to cultural rights, particularly, on the use of languages other than Turkish in broadcasting, in political life and when accessing public services. There are no opportunities to learn these languages in the public or private school systems.

## 5. The Mechanism of Change

The norms related with minority rights protection can be achieved under three conditions: First, adoption of minority norms should be in the interest of decision-makers as a result of their strategic based calculations. Second, there should be a certain degree of social mobilization having transnational advocacy linkage so that they pressure the present political actors to implement the new norms from below. Thirdly, there must be a perception of acceptability, legitimacy and appropriateness of the minority rights protection norms both in general public and among elites. By this way, the EU's impact on human rights occurs via both mechanisms of "top to bottom" and "bottom-up." In the former, the EU determines in general sense pre-accession conditions and the rewards (carrots) of compliance and the leaders decide whether it is in their interest to adopt the reforms or not, while in the latter the EU's pre-accession conditionality serves as a common reference point for minority groups for their rights.

The reform process in the period 1999-2005 was essentially driven by rationalist calculations of governments in power, making cost-benefit calculation as a response to changing opportunity structures after granting Turkey candidate status in the Helsinki summit in 1999. Generally, human rights conditionality of the EU works in a way of "reinforcement for reward," (Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2004) whose strategy is withholding the reward in cases of failure to meet the conditions. According to Grabbe (2001), the rewards can be membership, access to negotiations and further stages in the accession process, benchmarking and monitoring, provision of legislative and institutional templates, aid, technical assistance, advice and twinning. If the decision makers perceive the costs of compliance higher than the rewards, then no change will occur.

Helsinki Summit decision in 1999 has positively influenced the benefit side of the equilibrium. By offering a candidate status to Turkey, a strong institutional linkage between the EU and Turkey was established, granting Turkey a perspective of membership. This was indeed a very important development providing incentives and conditions for promoting domestic transformation. In the post Helsinki period, the

reward that Turkey struggled for was the opening up of negotiations with the EU. In order to get the rewards, Turkey had to implement further reforms demanded by the EU. In terms of cost, it is possible to observe a decrease in the values of adoption cost for the ruling party. Particularly, for the AKP government, fulfilling the EU demands was consistent with the political targets of party, providing financial resources and pretext to transform the Turkish state to a more democratic and liberal one. With regard to the EU relations, AKP has a pragmatic approach. This approach gives the possibility to the AKP to prevent political conflict, staying in power and declaring its political program which is consistent with the EU norms (Dogan 2005, p. 421-437). I believe that it also provides AKP government with an important source of legitimacy, as a party alleged to have a hidden agenda of bringing Islamic rule to Turkey. Moreover, it would utilize the financial resources and know-how that EU institutions would provide during the accession process as well as the expected capital inflow (Dogan 2005, p. 421-437).

As a result of the adaptational pressure of the EU, in between 1999-2005, two consecutive governments of Turkey involved themselves in very ambitious reforms in the field of human and minority rights. These constitutional amendments were made in a top-down manner due to the EU pressure. In general sense, they were adopted due to the rational calculations of the decision makers in power. The norm adoption in this period was consistent with Risse and Sikink (1999)'s "boomerang model," stating that the process of human rights norms adoption generally starts with instrumentally and strategically motivated adoption by national governments.

But due to the lack of internalization of minority protection, change in identity and perception towards the minorities, minority reforms are not linear and persistent, characterized by ups and downs depending on the political party in the government. Like Wiener's (2004) "contested compliance" patterns, there was only formal compliance without having social consensus on the adopted norms in Turkey. In between 2005-2009, interestingly, following opening up negotiations, the government has showed important unwillingness to maintain reforms in the field of human rights. In this period, rationalist calculations of decision makers and bottom up mobilization are at work at the same time. On the one hand, election politics, the EU stance and important veto actors in the domestic structure, particularly Kemalist elites and the army, have made the adoption costs higher compared to the previous period. On the other hand, instrumental adoption of minority rights norms has opened the process of minority group mobilization and set into a motion a process of open public discussion for the minority issue.

It would be very optimistic to argue that there is a total collective identity transformation in Turkey. But the reform process in 1999-2005 has strengthened civil society actors, who now participate more at the decision making processes. Their members can work without relatively being subject to more restrictive regulations and bureaucratic procedure in this period. Such an environment in Turkey gave the opportunity to the development of civil society organizations concerning human rights issues funded by the EU's democratization and human rights projects and generated a bottom-up mobilization among minority groups generally having transnational advocacy network in Turkey. Indeed, the EU aid has increased substantially since the Helsinki summit. For 2000-2006, almost three billion Euros of EU assistance was

granted to Turkey (Kubicek 2005). Due to their increasing strength, many business, academic, and human rights organizations put pressure on the Turkish government to adopt various reforms. These actors directly link to the EU institutions or other international organizations working on human rights issues in order to put pressure on the governments from inside and outside.

## 6. Conclusion

It is believed in this study that minority rights protection in Turkey is one of the most important area where Europeanization can strongly be noticed, and the EU as an external dynamic promoted significant reforms. But it is also argued that there are still shortcomings in the field of minority rights acting as a stumbling block to Turkey's accession.

The combination of both "top to bottom" and "bottom-up" patterns of Europeanization is employed here in order to understand norm adoption in the field of minority rights. It is argued in this article that the norms related with minority rights protection can only be achieved under three conditions: First, adoption of minority norms should be in the interest of decision-makers as a result of both their strategic or norm based calculations. Second, there should be a certain degree of social mobilization having transnational advocacy linkage so that they pressure the present political actors to implement the new norms from below. Thirdly, there must be a perception of acceptability, legitimacy and appropriateness of the minority rights protection norms both in general public and among elites. By this way, the EU's impact on human rights occurs via both mechanisms of "top to bottom" and "bottom-up." In the former, the EU determines in general sense the pre-accession conditions and the rewards (carrots) of compliance and the leaders decide whether it is in their interest to adopt the reforms or not, while in the latter the EU's pre-accession conditionality serves as a common reference point for minority groups for their rights.

Particularly, following Helsinki Summit in 1999, which grants Turkey candidate status to opening up negotiations in 2005, instrumental calculation of the governments is a determining factor for the decision to adopt the EU norms. In this period, the balance sheet is on the benefit rather than cost side of the equilibrium. Decision makers respond to the material incentives of the conditionality and make some formal changes. Opening up negotiations was an important reward that Turkey was seeking for. Europeanization in the field of minority rights follows the "top to bottom" pattern and thereby it's not possible to talk about internalization.

In between 2005-2008, the government perceived norm adoption very costly in the face of rising nationalism, potential veto actions and divergence between the EU human rights agenda and the headscarf issue. Even though this led to the unwillingness for further reform and nationalist discourse, it is possible to observe in this period a certain level of bottom-up mobilization and open public discussion of minority issues. The EU reforms paved the way for empowering civil society in the field of human rights through its financial aid. By this way, the reforms which are strategically and instrumentally adopted set into motion a process of discussion for collective and marginal identities. It is too early and too optimistic to argue that human rights norms

are internalized in Turkey. But opening up the discussion taboo issues of collective identity gives hope for further liberalization.

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**RISK, COGNITION AND  
WELL BEING**



# Language, Theory of Mind and Executive Functioning in Preschoolers

*Sophia Dimopoulou*<sup>1</sup>, *Efrosini Kalyva*<sup>2</sup>, *Michael Siegal*<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>SEERC, 17 Mitropoleos Str, Thessaloniki, Greece, [sdimopoulou@seerc.info](mailto:sdimopoulou@seerc.info)

<sup>2</sup>City College, Dept. of Psychology, 24 Prox. Koromila Str, 54622 Thessaloniki, Greece, [kalyva@city.academic.gr](mailto:kalyva@city.academic.gr)

<sup>3</sup>The University of Sheffield, Dept. of Psychology, Western Bank, Sheffield, S10 2TN, UK, [m.siegal@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:m.siegal@sheffield.ac.uk)

The extent to which young children can perform well on Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks is still controversial. The goal of the study was to investigate preschoolers' performance under the optimal testing conditions. Participants were presented with two ToM tasks, namely the Sally-Ann task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985) and the Andreas task (Maridaki- Kassotaki et al., 2002), in which the test questions refer to how a story character with a false belief can be misled in searching for the location of a desired object. Following (Yazdi, German, Defeyter & Siegal, 2006), children were tested either in a standard condition or in a condition where the test question referred explicitly to where the story character would look first for the object. As the lexical terminology for 'look' in the test question might influence the children's responses (Maridaki- Kassotaki et al., 2002), half the test questions used the verb *kitazo* (look) and the other half used the verb *psahno* (search). The findings revealed which was the optimal testing condition and that children's EF performance did not predict their performance in ToM but age did. The results are discussed in light of how the optimal testing conditions facilitate children's daily cognitive process.

## 1. Introduction

Theory of Mind involves the seeing of oneself and others in terms of mental states; such mental states are the desires, the emotions, the beliefs, the intentions and other inner experiences that are manifested in human action (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2004; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). It underlines two essential features of everyday psychology; its coherence and mentalism; the understanding of people in these terms is thought to have a notable coherence between mental states and actions (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Leslie et al., 2005).

An achievement in the domain of mental state reasoning is referred to the ability to solve problems, requiring prediction of the action of a character with a false belief. A

well known example was the ‘Sally-Anne’ task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). In this task, children are told about a story character, Sally, who had a false belief about the location of a marble. The character is described as having placed the marble in a box, but while she was away, another character, Anne, placed it into a novel location. The task question refers to where Sally will look for the marble. According to research (Wellman et al., 2001) children aged 4 and 5 years often succeed in this ‘standard’ false belief task, in contrast with children aged 3 years, who do not succeed. However, the mechanism which allows a shift from incorrect to correct responses on false belief tasks between these ages is still rather controversial (Scholl & Leslie, 2001).

Two main accounts could give an explanation for improvement across this age range in children. Wellman and his colleagues (2001) have referred to the theory-theory account, where there is a conceptual change in children’s understanding of mind that underwrites such an improvement. Thus, the failure of 3-years-olds on false belief tasks could be attributed to a conceptual deficit in their theory of mind. On the other hand, children older than 3 years, who answer false belief tasks correctly, are assumed to have developed a more mature theoretical understanding of what beliefs really are.

The second account suggests that mental state reasoning is underlined by a modular mechanism, which is domain specific, and forms the capacity to first attend to and then learn about mental states (German & Leslie, 2001; Scoll & Leslie, 2001; Yazdi, German, Defeyter, & Siegal, 2006). According to this account, theory of mind (ToM) concepts do not involve theoretical understanding of mental states; on the contrary, they serve to token instances of the relevant mental state in the world. Thus, they permit children to attend to the properties of believing, desiring as well as pretending in an attempt to learn about them (German & Leslie, 2001; Leslie, German & Polizzi, 2005).

Yazdi et al., (2006) point out that mental state concepts are expressed early in typically developing children within their second year of life within the index of pretend play. Thus, it could be concluded that something else should account for the change in performance in the ability to succeed in false belief tasks at the age of four.

Leslie (2000) referred to processing models of successful false belief reasoning in which gradual increase in executive selection processing could allow children to overcome belief desiring reasoning problems that lead to consistent mistakes (Bloom & German, 2000).

Indeed, executive functions are critically important in the overall neuropsychological functioning of the developing child and play a fundamental role in the child’s cognitive, behavioural and social- emotional development (Isquith et al., 2005).

Executive functioning (EF) refers to higher order, self- regulatory, cognitive processes that aid in the monitoring and control of both thought and action. These skills include inhibitory control, planning, attentional flexibility, error correction and detection, and resistance to interference (Carlson, 2005).

Two topics for research on young children’s cognitive development are early executive functions (EF) and the emergence of Theory of Mind (ToM). Even though, at first glance these constructs appear to be quite distinct, a great number of studies provide

evidence for a robust relationship. For example, research with typically developing children underlines the synchrony of developmental milestones in Executive Function and Theory of Mind. During preschool years, young children show marked improvements in both EF (Diamond, 1988; Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond, 1994; Zelazo, Frye & Rapus, 1996) and ToM (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001). Such studies also indicate consistently strong correlations between individual differences in EF and ToM, even with factors of age and IQ controlled (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses & Breton, 2002).

A number of research findings suggest that false belief performance in young children is improved by manipulations which could reduce executive functioning demands (Birch & Bloom, 2003; Happe & Loth, 2002; Siegal & Beattie, 1991). Other findings relate false belief performance with executive abilities, such as inhibitory processing (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses & Breton, 2002). These types of findings are consistent with different performance accounts. However, they all share the notion that manipulations to the standard false belief task will exist, which will have an effect on performance, undermining the position that conceptual change plays role in the explanation of developmental shifts on theory of mind (ToM) reasoning tasks.

Wellman and his colleagues (2001) discussed the importance of performance factors in the solution of false belief tasks. However, because there was no single performance factor which removed the difficulty for younger children, they came to the conclusion that the ‘truth’ concerning false belief was that conceptual changes should play a role in explaining the shift between the ages of 3 and 4 years. It was also suggested that some performance manipulations are effective only for children older than 3 to 4 years of age, thus achieving conceptual change. This type of ‘look first’ performance manipulation was addressed by Siegal and Beattie (1991) with children whose age was between 3- and 4- years.

Siegal and Beattie (1991) designed two experiments in order to examine the responses on false belief tasks in terms of children’s awareness of the purpose and relevance of test questions about the beliefs of the story character. They hypothesised that when a researcher during the experimental setting asks the question ‘Where will Sally look for the object?’ children aged 3 years might not share the researcher’s intention that the question refers to how a person with a false belief will be misled. Instead, children might assume that the question refers to where Sally must look, or should look, in order to find the desired object.

To test this hypothesis, Siegal and Beattie (1991) changed the question in the false belief task. Instead of asking children ‘Where will Sally look for the object?’ they asked ‘Where will Sally look first to find the object?’ They claimed that, under explicit questioning, young children would more likely to share the purpose and the relevance of the research question. The findings of their two studies indicated that by using the ‘look first’ procedure, 3-years olds performance was significantly improved to a level above what would be expected by chance. This could be explained in terms that 3-years- olds might interpret the test question as being intended by the researcher.

The ‘look first’ effect has been replicated in several studies (Leslie, 2000; Yazdi et al., 2006) and has been described as achieving its facilitating role in terms of circumventing the executive inhibitory demands, which underline the process in the

standard version of the ToM task. This early developing competence could be viewed in terms of a modular mechanism (Leslie, 2000), the Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM). This kind of mechanism supplies basic mental state concepts such as belief, desire and pretend, which permit children to attend to behaviour as well as to infer underlying mental states. ToMM also supplies a rather small number of candidate belief state contents for a certain stream of behaviour, while it involves a true belief content as a default one. The true belief content is always supplied because in the absence of any other information, the only constraint on the protagonist's belief is the present true state of affairs.

In most of the cases, the default attribution might not pose a problem because most of the time people's beliefs are true. In terms of conversational understanding between the speakers and the listeners, speakers follow rules that prompt the listeners to assume the truth of the beliefs. However, in some other cases speakers do not follow such rules, thus including false beliefs in others. In such cases where a false belief has been acquired, the default attribution should be inhibited and an alternative non-factual content for the belief should be selected instead (Yazdi et al., 2006).

Such performance demands have been suggested to be held by another mechanism, the selection processor (SP), which is described to be a kind of executive function, however more domain general. The SP might not be necessarily specific to the domain of belief desire reasoning, even though it is possible that the inhibition and the selection process are to some extent domain specific (Leslie & German, 2005).

Surian and Leslie (1999) sought to explain the way 'look first' question improves children's performance on false belief tasks. They claimed that in belief attribution, false contents that were true were attributed by default. In a false belief, the default true contents lead to an incorrect answer and thus it needs to be inhibited. By increasing the salience of the first location as the possible content of Sally's belief, the 'look first' question reduces the need for inhibition. Thus it could be argued that, the 'look first' false belief task has less of a load on the selection process and enables children's performance in contrast with their performance on the standard false beliefs tasks.

However, children aged between 3 and 5 years construe the relation between the pair of verbs. Thus, it could be predicted that the availability of two Greek verbs impels young children to assign the semantics of only one of the two verbs to a mentalistic rather than to a behavioural level. Research is revealing the extent to which 'early word learning receives important support from children's theory of mind skills' (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001). Reciprocally, theory of mind skills are facilitated by language that focuses attention on mentalistic concepts (De Villiers & De Villiers, 2000).

According to Maridaki-Kassotaki and her colleagues (2002) verbs of agency underline relations between behavioural and mental states. Thus, 'John is *looking for X*' takes a mentalistic construal, while John's desire for success as well as his belief about how to search, explain his observed actions. The Greek language has two verbs of agency, which could be used by adults to mean 'to look for'. Each of the two Greek verbs, 'kitazo' (look) and 'psahno' (search) could be used with the complement 'na vro', which literally means 'to find', to ask the critical question 'Where will X look for Y?' 'Na vro' denotes the success condition and either 'kitazo' or 'psahno' denotes attempt.

The word 'na' in the constructions 'kitazo na vro' and 'psahno na vro' is not like the English 'to', but it is a subjunctive particle.

In the study of Maridaki-Kassotaki and her colleagues (2002), it was hypothesised that young children will obey the principle of contrast to diagnose that one verb is mentalistic and the other verb is to be construed behaviourally. According to their findings, the majority of Greek preschoolers (9/ 12) in the 'kitazo' group passed the test question as expected; while 10 out of 12 preschool children failed in the 'psahno' group. Thus, this pattern of findings confirms that the unexpected- transfer procedure could be assessed to test for a difference in children's understanding of the two verb forms.

Based on Yazdi et al's (2006) results, one hypothesis of the Study, was that Greek preschoolers' aged 3- to 5- years will do better on ToM tasks in the **look first condition** than in the **standard condition**. Another hypothesis, based on Maridaki-Kassotaki et al (2002) findings, is that they would respond better when the verb *kitazo* was used rather than the verb *psahno*.

Another hypothesis involved the effects of executive functioning. As the **look first** effect has been described as achieving its facilitating role in terms of circumventing the executive inhibitory demands that underline the process in the standard version of ToM tasks (Yazdi et al., 2006), executive functioning measures were used in order to identify the executive abilities of children.

Two different forms of executive functioning measures were administrated at the present experiment, as it was the case in Study I; the Wisconsin Card- Sorting task as well as the Day & Night test. It was hypothesised that children's performance on these measures would be associated with their performance on the ToM tasks.

A final hypothesis, in order to pursue further differences in parental education level and children's performance on ToM and EF tasks, involved that preschool children, who have parents with higher educational level, will perform better on the standard conditions of ToM tasks as well as in the EF measures. According to Ardila et al. (2005) an important environmental influence on children's cognitive development was the parent's level of education. It was revealed that parents with a higher educational level could create a more intellectually stimulating environment for their children.

## 2. Method

### *Participants*

Participants of the current study were 180 children attending public nursery schools located in middle- class areas of Thessaloniki. Participants were divided into three age groups: 60 3-year-olds; 60 4-year-olds and 60 5-year-olds. All participants were of native European Greek origin. This is considered to be rather important because due to immigration there is a large number of preschoolers', whose native language is not Greek. Language unfamiliarity could create difficulties in their performance at the tests

used at the study, since they would not be able to fully understand the meaning of the words used. For this reason, children whose native language was other than Greek were excluded from the study. Children were informed about the presence of the researcher as well as the principals and the teachers at the nursery schools and kindergartens. However, it has to be noted that children were told that the researcher had another function within the school environment; thus, the experimenter was presented as a teacher, who was there to show them some new games. If for any reason a child did not wish to participate, he/she would not take part at the experiment. However, at the present experiment there were no such cases; all preschool children accepted to participate. Informed consent was solicited from their parents.

At the present study, children's parents were divided into two categories; the first category involved those parents of preschool children, who had a higher educational level (university); and those who had a secondary educational level (lyceum).

## ***Materials and procedure***

### **Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks**

Preschoolers' were presented with two ToM tasks, namely the ***Sally-Anne task*** (Baron- Cohen et al., 1985) and the ***Andreas task*** (Maridaki-Kassotaki et al., 2002), where the test questions refer to how a story character with a false belief could be misled in searching for the location of a desired object. Following Yazdi et al., (2006), children were tested either in the ***standard*** condition or in a condition where the test question referred to where the story character would ***look first*** for the object. Having in mind, that the lexical terminology for 'look' in the test question might influence children's responses (Maridaki-Kassotaki et al., 2002) half the test questions used the verb *kitazo* and the other half used *psahno*.

Participants were described the ***Sally-Anne*** task in detail. However, because the task was given to Greek preschoolers, the English names were replaced with Greek ones. Thus, the story went like this: '*There are two dolls, Maria and Anna. Maria has a basket and Anna has a box. Maria puts in her basket a ball and then she leaves the room. Anna takes the ball from Maria's basket and puts it inside her box. Then Maria comes back to the room*'. After having told the story the following questions were posed to children:

- (a) Where will Maria ***psahno*** (search) to find her ball?
- (b) Where will Maria ***psahno first*** (search first) to find her ball?
- (c) Where will Maria ***kitazo*** (look) to find her ball?
- (d) Where will Maria ***kitazo first*** (look first) to find her ball?

The ***Andreas task*** was also fully described to preschool children. According to this story, there were two dolls Andreas and Dimitris. Andreas put his ball onto a table and

left. In his absence Dimitris moved the ball into a cupboard. After having told the story, the following questions were posed to children:

- (a) Where will Andreas *psahno* (search) to find his ball?
- (b) Where will Andreas *psahno first* (search first) to find his ball?
- (c) Where will Andreas *kitazo* (look) to find his ball?
- (d) Where will Andreas *kitazo first* (look first) to find his ball?

Both unexpected- transfer tests (Sally-Anne task & Andreas task) were enacted with a scene using toy furniture and four dolls (Maria, Anna, Andreas and Dimitris). Following, Picture A (Andreas task) and Picture B (Sally- Anne task) show the enacted scene of the two tasks, as they were presented to preschoolers'. All children were exposed to all conditions; however what differed was the actual order of the conditions. Within each age group, the order of the stories was counterbalanced. At both tasks responses were scored on a scale of 0 to 2.



Picture A

ToM: The Andreas task



Picture B

ToM: Maria and Anna Task

### ***Executive Functioning (EF) tasks***

*Wisconsin Card- Sorting task:* A child adapted version of the Wisconsin Card- Sorting task used by Woolfe, Want, and Siegal (2002) was also a measure used to assess attentional inhibition. The specific task required inhibition of previous shape/color categorizations of colored shape stimuli, to enable their categorization on the alternative dimension. Two sets of twenty cards displaying colored shapes were used. The two sets differed from each other in terms of the shapes and colors displayed.

Each set contained 10 cards displaying one shape and 10 cards displaying another. Of these cards, 10 displayed shapes of one color and 10 displayed shapes of another color. Thus, one set might contain 10 triangles (5 pink and 5 red) and 10 stars (5 pink and 5 red) while the other set might contain 10 circles (5 blue and green) and 10 squares (5 blue and 5 green). At the beginning of the test children were asked if they wanted to

play a game with the cards on the table, and were then asked to choose one of the sets (the other was taken by the experimenter). Preliminary questioning regarding the shape and color labeling was used to establish that children could distinguish the cards.

In the first phase, the researcher told the child that she would sort by shape and she proceeded to sort 5 of her cards accordingly. Then, she asked the child to sort some of her cards in the same way. During this stage corrective feedback was given as required. When the child had correctly sorted 5 cards by shape, the second phase commenced. The child was told that now they were going to sort the cards by color, and the experimenter sorted 5 more of her cards according to color. The child should do the same with her own cards. No corrective feedback was given this time. When the child sorted 5 more cards by color, the third phase commenced. The children were told that they were going to sort the cards by shape again. No corrective feedback was given to the child. The total number of cards correctly sorted in the last two phases was recorded as the score to be used in later data analysis with a possible range of 2- 10.

*Day & Night task:* A version of Stroop test was also used, as an additional EF measure, requiring participants to inhibit a natural tendency to give a different verbal response in a 16-trial session. According to Stroop-like ‘day and night’ test, both memory and inhibition are required in order to have a successful performance. In that test, preschoolers were asked to say ‘day’ whenever a black card with a moon and stars appeared, and ‘night’ when they were shown a white card with a bright sun.

All participants were tested individually in a quiet room. The testing procedure lasted approximately 10 to 15 minutes. Children were introduced the tasks as games, played by them and the experimenter.

### 3. Results

The findings of the present study revealed that all preschoolers, regardless of their age, performed extremely well at the **look first** rather than the **standard condition**. In the **standard condition** there was a steady increase across the age groups; as the age group increased, the ability to answer correctly was increased also, indicating that younger preschool children have not developed fully their Theory of Mind ability.

Preschoolers’ performance in the **look first condition** was perfect, despite which verb of agency was used (psahno or kitazo). Since, the findings have underlined a perfect performance of all preschool children in the **look first condition**; indicating a ceiling effect, it was decided to be excluded from the analysis, since there was need to be compared with the other condition.

Thus, it was important to indicate whether there was a significant difference between the **standard condition** and the verbs of agency. Indeed, it was found that there was a significant difference between the Spsahno and the Skitazo conditions only in 3- and 4-year olds; while in 5 year olds there was no significant difference between Spsahno and the Skitazo conditions, indicating that the performance of 3 and 4 year old children depended upon the verb of agency that was used; however, this was not the case for 5 year olds.

Moreover, the performance on Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks was related with the Executive functioning (EF) measures, but according to the statistical analysis EF did not predict children’s performance at ToM tasks, but age did.

The distribution scores of the two conditions of ToM tasks are shown at Table 10, which shows the means and the standard deviations of preschool children’s overall performances at the **standard** and the **look first condition**. According to the findings, 4- and 5-year olds performed perfectly at the **look first condition**. However, 3-year old children have scored almost the same as the 4- and the 5- year olds; indicating that despite which verb of agency was used, the look first manipulation enables them to answer correctly. Moreover, at the **standard condition** there was an increase across the age groups; as the age of preschool children increased, the ability to answer correctly increased also, despite which verb of agency was used.

	Standard Condition	Look first Condition
	M (SD)	M (SD)
3years	1.4 (1.2)	3.9 (.25)
4 years	2.9 (.95)	4 (.00)
5 years	3.7 (.64)	4 (.00)

**Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Overall performance at the Standard and Look first condition in ToM task.**

Note: range of score: 0- 4

Table 1 shows the distribution scores of the two ToM tasks. It shows the means and standard deviations of children’s performance in the four ToM conditions; standard psahno (Spsahno), look first psahno (Lfpsahno), standard kitazo (Skitazo) and look first kitazo (Lfkitazo).

	Spsahno	Lfpsahno	Skitazo	Lfkitazo
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
3years	1.1 (.95)	2 (.00)	.33 (.7)	2 (.00)
4years	1.9 (.2)	2 (.00)	.95 (1)	2 (.00)
5years	1.9 (.4)	2 (.00)	1 (.98)	2 (.00)
Total	1.66 (.73)	2 (.00)	1 (.98)	2 (.00)

**Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Children’s performance in the four ToM task condition.**

Note: range of score: 0- 2

According to findings, preschool children aged between 3- to 5- years old performed perfectly in the **look first condition**, despite which verb of agency was used (psahno or

kitazo). On the other hand, in the **standard condition**, as it is shown in Table 2, there is a steady increase across the age groups; as the age group increases, the ability of children to answer correctly increases also. It has to be noted also, that 3-, 4- and 5-year olds performed better at the Spsahno condition rather than the Skitazo condition.

In order to seek the reason why all preschool children, despite their age, performed better at the Spsahno rather than the Skitazo condition, it was necessary to underline whether there was a difference between Spsahno and Skitazo condition.

Thus, in order to compare these two conditions of related samples of ordinal data, non parametric analysis was used. According to Wilcoxon Sign test, Table 3 shows that there was a statistically significant difference at 3- and 4- year old children's performance at Spsahno and Skitazo condition; while there was no statistically significant difference at 5- year olds performance between Spsahno and Skitazo condition.

Spsahno-Skitazo		
3years	Z = - 4.18	Sig. = .000*
4years	Z = -5	Sig. = .000*
5years	Z = -.37	Sig. = .705

**Table 3. Contingency between the verbs of the standard conditions of ToM tasks**

\*p< .05

Children's performances in Executive Functioning tasks are shown in Table 4. It could be argued that the overall performance of preschool children in EF measures was extremely good. Regarding both the Day & Night test and the Wisconsin Card-Sorting test, there was a steadily increase across the age groups; as the age group increased, the ability to solve the test increased also.

	Wisconsin Card Sorting test	Day & Night	EF
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
3years	8.7 (.8)	13.1 (2.8)	21.9 (3.1)
4years	9.5 (.84)	15.2 (.97)	24.8 (1.2)
5years	9.9 (.3)	15.4 (1.3)	25.3 (1.3)
Total	9.4 (.85)	14.6 (2.1)	24 (2.5)

**Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations of Overall performances in Executive Functioning by age**

Note: The maximum score of the sample at the Wisconsin Card Sorting test was 10; while the minimum score was 5. In terms of the Day and Night test children's maximum score was 16 while the minimum was 8.

As shown in Table 5, there was a significant relation between EF and ToM measures only in the **standard conditions**, since the **look first condition** was excluded because of the perfect scoring. Specifically, children's performance at the Day & Night test was

related with their performance at the Skitazo condition of the ToM tasks. Furthermore, children’s performance at the Wisconsin Card- Sorting test was related to their performance at the Spsahno condition and the Skitazo condition of ToM tasks.

However, it should be noted that even though EF tests were related with the **standard conditions** of ToM tasks, only the Wisconsin Card-Sorting card test was related with both the **standard conditions** despite which verb was used.

Day & night task		Wisconsin- Sorting card task	
		Standard psahno	
<i>r</i>	.090		.340*
<i>p</i>	.114		.000
		Standard kitazo	
<i>r</i>	.301*		.379*
<i>p</i>	.000		.000

**Table 5. Correlation between ToM and EF tasks**

\*Significant at 0.05 level

Even though the findings revealed a number of associations between ToM tasks and EF measures, it was important to seek whether EF measures could predict preschool children’s performance in ToM tasks. For this reason, Regression analysis was used. According to the results, only the age of children could predict their performance in ToM tasks; while EF measures could not predict children’s performance in ToM measures (Table 6).

	Beta	t	Sig.
EF	-.009	-1.34	.894
Age	.689	10.5	.000*

**Table 6. Regression Coefficient of EF and ToM tasks**

\*Significant at 0.05 level

As shown in Table 7, a significant difference was found between the **standard** conditions of ToM tasks and parents educational level, according to Chi- square analysis.

Parental educational level			
	$\chi^2$	df	Sig.
Spsahno	27, 2	2	.000
Skitazo	46, 5	2	.000

**Table 7. Difference Between SD Conditions and Parental Educational Level.**

Moreover, preschool children who have parents with higher educational level performed better at both EF measures (Day & Night and the Wisconsin Card- Sorting test) according to Mann-Whitney non parametric test (Table 8).

	Parental Educational level	
Day & Night	$z = - 7, 49$	Sig. = .000
Wisconsin Card Sorting test	$z = - 6, 46$	Sig. = .000

\* $p < .05$

**Table 8. Contingency between Parental Educational level and EF Tasks**

## 4. Discussion

The findings of the current Experiment revealed that 3-, 4- and 5- year’s old preschoolers performed extremely well at the **look first** rather than the **standard condition**. However, in the **standard condition** there was an increase across the age groups; as the age group increased, the ability to answer correctly was also increased.

On the other hand, in the **look first condition** preschool children’s performance was perfect, despite which verb of agency was used (psahno or kitazo). Since, the findings have revealed a perfect performance of all preschoolers in the **look first condition**; it was regarded necessary to be excluded from the analysis, because of the ceiling effect.

This type of finding comes in accordance with previous studies (Birch, & Bloom, 2003; Happe, & Loth, 2002; Siegal & Battie, 1991), which suggests that false belief performance in young children is improved by manipulations that could reduce executive functioning demands.

Furthermore, at the current Study, there was a significant difference between the Spsahno and the Skitazo conditions only in 3- and 4- year olds; while in 5 year olds there was no significant difference between Spsahno and the Skitazo conditions, revealing that the performance of 3- and 4- year old children is depending upon the verb of agency that is used; however, this was not the case for 5- year olds.

It has to be mentioned that the main difference between the present Study and the previous studies (Birch, & Bloom, 2003; Happe, & Loth, 2002; Siegal & Battie, 1991; Wellman et al., 2001) was that in the **standard** as well as in the **look first condition** two types of verbs were used (psahno & kitazo). At the study of Maridaki- Kassotaki et al. (2002) no manipulations were used, such as those of the **standard** and the **look first condition** as it was done in the current Study, the findings of their study comes in accordance of those in this Study, where indeed children tended to answer correctly when the verb kitazo was used rather when the verb psahno was used.

Moreover, at the current study, the performance on Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks was related with the Executive functioning (EF) measures. However, EF did not predict children’s performance at ToM tasks, but age did.

Specifically, preschool children's performance at the Day & Night test was related with their performance at the Skitazo condition of the ToM tasks. On the other hand, children's performance at the Wisconsin- Card Sorting test was related to their performance at the Spahno condition as well as at the Skitazo condition of ToM tasks.

Thus, it could be concluded that even though both EF measures were associated only with the **standard conditions** of ToM tasks, only the Wisconsin-Sorting card test was associated with both the **standard conditions** despite which verb was used (psahno or kitazo).

According to the results of the current Study, there was a significant difference between the parental educational level and the standard conditions of ToM tasks; indicating that the educational level of parents play a significant role in their children's ToM performance. Specifically, children who have parents with higher educational level performed better at the standard conditions of ToM tasks.

These findings, comes in accordance with those of Ardila's and his colleagues (2005) which suggests, that an important environmental influence on children's cognitive development was parental level of education. According to their study, parents with a higher educational level could create an intellectually stimulating environment for their children. This type of findings reveals that children's performance could be influenced by the stimuli parents are giving within their family environment.

The results of the present Experiment, have underlined also which are the optimal testing conditions; the **look first condition** along with the verb kitazo.

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# Preventing High Levels of Mortality in South Eastern Europe

*Dimitris Florinis*

*Dept. of Balkan Slavonic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece*

To further examine the mortality pattern in South Eastern Europe (SEE) and health outcomes in relation to other European Union (EU) countries. To present the causes of death that could be avoided through effective health care system and mainly through better intersectoral policy interventions in SEE that prevent deaths attributable to behavioral pattern. Mortality Data from the WHO/Europe HFA 2007 database has been obtained for countries of the SEE region to present the level of life expectancy at birth for each gender and to calculate Standardized Mortality Rates (SMRs), by avoidable causes of death in 1992/1993 and 2002/2003. The notion of Avoidable mortality that was introduced by Rutstein in the 1970s, has been used as an indicator of effectiveness of a health system as a whole. Its further classification proposed by Newey to Treatable, Preventable and IHD mortality has been used, in order to clarify the level of mortality that could be avoided through more effective medical care or through broader health policy interventions.

The notion of Avoidable mortality has been used as an indicator of effectiveness of a health system as a whole. Evidence suggests that health systems in most SEE countries are generally not as effective as in rest of Western Europe.

However, the overall picture for the region is complex. Although it seems clear enough that there is a different pattern in health in SEE countries, there are also many similarities between them. On the one hand, there are countries that have made considerable progress in modernizing their health systems as reflected by improvements in outcomes, although further improvements are possible. On the other hand, there are countries that still have a considerable way to go to achieve EU outcomes, although some of them have already joined EU. More specific, SEE countries could be compound in two wider groups, to those that perform better and reaching EU-15 average (group A: Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania) and to those performing worse (group B: Bulgaria, Romania, FYROM, Moldova). Levels of mortality that could be avoided through medical treatment were highest in countries of group B in both 1992/93 and 2002/03. Evidence suggests that mortality that could be avoided through broader policy interventions differs according to geographical position of countries from South doing better than those from North. Similarly, in IHD mortality there is also a South- North divide in differences between SEE countries.

Moreover, there is a substantial gap between men and women in all countries, with death rates among men usually at least three times bigger than those of women in both Preventable and IHD mortality; although for Treatable mortality this is not the case. Overall, there are much more to be done in terms of better

health care provision, through investments in health care facilities and through better access to vulnerable groups. In addition, policy makers should also focus in factors broader than health care, such as smoking, alcohol and diet. Only eight countries of the SEE region have been included due to lack of adequate data availability, while there has also been a great concern about the quality and availability of such a data in many SEE countries. However, at the beginning of 2000 many countries conducted national censuses and data allow more accurate calculation of health indicators in the region. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that mortality data takes into account final cause of death, but not other underlying factors of health. Thus, the reliability of death certification becomes increasingly questionable, especially at older ages. In order to overcome this limitation broader groups of causes of death and age limit of 75 years have been used to present analysis. The list of indicators of 'Avoidable' mortality is to some extent arbitrary, in a sense that any cause is the final event in a complex chain of events. Furthermore, for some conditions it is not clear in which category could be placed in, while they could be both treatable and preventable condition. Moreover, the method is subject to differences in diagnostic patterns, death certification, differences in coding of cause of death and generally data quality. Finally, the method of Avoidable mortality cannot be applied to older ages (75+) because of different and simultaneous causes that can occur in the late stages of life.

The examination of different aspects of "Avoidable" mortality, such as "Treatable", "Preventable" and "IHD" mortality, could give a better understanding in mortality patterns and help policy makers to propose effective interventions. Moreover, the usage of such broad categories could overcome data limitations that possibly occurring in SEE countries. It is the first time that the notion and trends of Avoidable mortality has been introduced for the purposes of such research in examining population's health in SEE. The final goal of this section is to propose future areas for research on population health at the SEE region and possible interventions relating to health policy.

## 1. Introduction

It was recently that international health community welcomed the findings of the WHO's Commission on Social Determinants of Health (CSDH). After few years of hard work, the Commission, gathered the evidence, proposed a Framework and presented a policy plan for action. Although, the adoption of the plan seems to be problematic or for some people not realistic enough, it is more than clear that health is more than health care. Especially now, where there is a great concern about the international financial crisis and the affects to global health and to the most vulnerable. Thus, focusing in lessons from recent past could be helpful for decision makers and could give some indication on what can be done in terms of policy.

In the era of health policy the case of SEE countries and the examination on how transition affects population's health could be a useful task. Indeed, during the last decade there is a growing interest on health and mortality patterns in SEE, where it is evident an increasing health divide between the region and the rest of Europe (McKee & Shkolnikov, 2001). Moreover, the Balkans, although it is perceived as one of the

most culturally diverse regions on earth, it is however a region with similar patterns in terms of socioeconomic or cultural environment and development. Almost all countries have experienced a political and economic change during the last decades, with high levels of unemployment and corruption. In addition, many of SEE countries have similar life-style patterns, with relatively heavy smoking and alcohol consumption or similar dietary patterns with the so called. In this context, SEE governments took action in order to maintain collapsing health care systems, although it has been criticized that health sector reforms were generally delayed (WHO, 2006).

Therefore, focusing in SEE countries' health status could give a better view in health policy and planning and in explaining pathways of socioeconomic determinants of health. Was the lack of material factors and underinvestment to health care that affected population's health after transition or an adoption of unhealthy life-style? For the purpose of present analysis, the notion of Avoidable mortality has been used as an indicator of effectiveness of a health system as a whole. Its further classification to Treatable, Preventable and IHD mortality has been used, in order to clarify the level of mortality that could be avoided through more effective medical care or through broader health policy interventions. Overall, this paper examines the level and the trends of population's health in South East European (SEE) countries in terms of life expectancy at birth and to specific avoidable mortality outcomes since 1990. By this it could be clearer to explore possible explanations to recent "health crisis" and to mortality pathways in Balkan Peninsula and finally, to propose eras for future research, policy intervention and resource allocation.

## **2. A Background on Public Health in SEE**

Studies on population health in South Eastern Europe (SEE) or the Balkans have not always emerged from the need to explain negative trends on health status and observed "health gaps". For instance, after World War II some of SEE countries have experienced a rapid improvement of life expectancy, while some others didn't follow the slowing down in life expectancy that had been observed in other former communist countries. These facts led the academic community for relative research, in focusing on "Paradoxes" from SEE (the Greek and the Albanian paradoxes) or on the cases of Bulgaria and Romania in relation to other East European countries (Chenet et al., 1996; Gjonca et al., 1999; Bobak & Marmot, 1996; Dolea et al., 2002; Rechel et al., 2003). Moreover, although SEE is perceived as one of the most culturally diverse regions on earth, it is a region with similar patterns in terms of socioeconomic environment and development. For example, many people in SEE countries have similar cultural and behavioral patterns, like life-styles with relatively heavy smoking and alcohol consumption or similar dietary habits. Thus, from public health's point of view, Balkans have been challenging, as good examples from there could give a better understanding in explaining pathways of good health and mortality.

On the other hand, the pattern has changed in late 90s and early 2000s and recent work has dealt mainly with the increasing health gap to other European countries. Indeed, although for some SEE countries in years after transition net improvements in health took place, many researchers mentioned that most of the countries have experienced "a health crisis" which causes an increasing health divide between the region and the rest

of Europe (Levett, 2001; Rechel & McKee, 2003; Rechel et al., 2004). In general, it has been pointed out that economic benefits which followed transition had not translated to broader improvements on societal level, while many countries of the region maintained high levels of poverty, inequality, unemployment and corruption, something that had an impact to health (WHO, 2006). Hence, many research programs focused in SEE and a substantial amount of literature has been lately broadly available (ECOHST, 1997).

According to the literature, disease profile of SEE is rather complex, with consequences of the new socioeconomic framework affecting health status, sometimes in a different way (Levett & Kyriopoulos, 2006). For instance, Romania have suffered a setback since the 70s, while in the 90s has experienced an increase in middle aged and elderly male mortality rates, due to increase in cardiovascular disease, cirrhosis and high mortality rates in infectious diseases (WHO, 2006; Rechel et al., 2004). On the one hand, Slovenia has experienced decrease in mortality rates, especially the avoidable ones, and has reached levels of other old EU members (Newey et al., 2005). Overall, past researches concluded that the situation in SEE is consisted mainly by a large burden of “diseases of affluence” and differences in adult mortality. The main picture includes rise in death-rates from non-communicable diseases (especially from cardiovascular disease, cancer and external causes) with an underlying increase in some communicable diseases, while there is a mixed picture of children’s health with high levels of infant mortality (McKee & Shkolnikov, 2001; Rechel et al., 2003; WHO, 2006).

Many researchers tried to explain the overall complex picture in SEE countries and the different mortality pattern comparing to other central east and northern European countries. In general, modern literature on public health in SEE dwells on determinants from broader socioeconomic environment, such as poverty, material possession and deprivation, accessibility to and effectiveness of health care systems, or as behavioral factors such as smoking, alcohol and diet or other broader, such psychosocial stress. Furthermore, it has been appointed that economic, social and political transformation or wars in the region, produced socio-economic differences, which had a great impact on health of the people who lived there (Rechel & McKee, 2003). On the other hand, other researchers suggested that mortality differences within Balkans could also be attributed to cultural and behavioral factors like Mediterranean diet (Gjonca et al., 1999). In addition, other studies tried to cover both health care and other behavioral factors by focusing on trends of Avoidable mortality and by studying deaths attributable to inefficiencies of treatment and health or those attributable to life-style and preventable by broader intersectoral health policy interventions (Newey et al., 2005). Overall, it is mentioned that health situation in SEE is not a clear-cut, thus more precise investigation on determinants of health in SEE is needed.

### **3. Data and limitations**

In present analysis Mortality Data from the WHO/Europe HFA 2007 database has been obtained and only eight countries of the SEE region have been included due to lack of adequate data availability. Countries where data is available and have reached an adequate level of accuracy are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Greece, Moldova,

Romania and Slovenia. However, it is worth mentioning that when using mortality data we take into account cause of death and not other underlying factors of health. Moreover, the reliability of death certification becomes increasingly questionable, especially at older ages. In order to overcome this limitation and to make the results better interpreted we use broader groups of causes of death and age limit of 75 years.

In addition, there has also been a great concern about the quality and availability of such data in many SEE countries, despite that at the beginning of 2000 many countries conducted national censuses and data allow more accurate calculation of health indicators in the region. For most countries of the region, data was highly problematic during the 90s, since wars and other conflicts affected the gathering and the accuracy of data. For instance sudden increase in life expectancy at birth in Croatia between 2000 and 2001 did possibly not reflect real improvements, while it is mentioned that data were unreliable for the whole 90s (Bozicevic et al., 2001; Rechel & McKee 2003). Furthermore, for many SEE countries there is a notable difference between the conventional and estimated life expectancy. For example, according to estimations of WHO- Europe although for most SEE countries the difference in life expectancy at birth exists but in a small extend, for Albania the estimated differences was about 4.9 years lower, thus findings for that country should be treated with carefully (WHO, 2006).

Overall, despite the limitations and the need for better and more reliable information about population health in SEE, it could be stated that mortality data in the region has reached an adequate -although not perfect- level and it could be useful to the aim and the extend of the present analysis.

#### **4. Methods - Avoidable Mortality**

The concept of Avoidable Mortality was introduced by Rutstein in the 1970s, in order to assess the contribution of health care to mortality by classifying causes of death into avoidable and not avoidable to health care (Rutstein et al., 1976). Although it was questioned by a part of the academics during the 90s, Avoidable mortality has been used progressively, especially after the re-orientation of the concept and to the further division to Treatable, Preventable and IHD mortality. However, according to Newey et al. (2005) the method has some limitations. Firstly, the list of indicators of 'avoidable' mortality is to some extent arbitrary, in a sense that any cause is the final event in a complex chain of events. Secondly, for some conditions it is not clear in which category could be placed in, while they could be both treatable and preventable condition. Thirdly, the method is subject to differences in diagnostic patterns, death certification, differences in coding of cause of death and generally data quality. Finally, the method of Avoidable mortality cannot be applied to older ages (75+) because of different and simultaneous causes that can occur in the late stages of life. On the other hand, it is suggested that the use of broad diagnostic categories could minimize any effect from possible variation in coding practices, while older ages are usually excluded from this kind of analyses (Newey et al., 2005).

In present analysis, the concept applied by Newey et al. in 2005 is used, where Avoidable mortality can be further classified to Treatable, Preventable and IHD

mortality. It is assumed that different kind of avoidable mortality could explain better the possible explanations in health differences. For instance, Treatable mortality is more related to patterns involving gaps in health care delivery and accessibility, while Preventable mortality could be seen as an indicator of differentials in behavioral patterns as smoking and alcohol consumption. IHD mortality is more complicate thus is treated alone and could be a mixed indicator of both Psychosocial stress, behavioral and health-care factors.

## 5. Trends in Life Expectancy in South- Eastern Europe

This section will summarize briefly the general trends in life expectancy at birth ( $e_{(0)}$ ) in South- Eastern Europe (SEE) over a decade (1990- 2004), according to data from WHO/Europe HFA database 2007. Life expectancy is the most commonly used indicator of population health, although all health data for most countries in the SEE region have to be treated with caution.

Figure 1, shows trends in life expectancy at birth for both sexes in the South- Eastern Europe (SEE) countries, the average of pre-enlargement European Union countries (EU 15) and the average of New Members of EU (New-EU) since 1990. In general, there is a considerable variation among SEE countries, where in some countries  $e_{(0)}$  has been steadily improved, while in others  $e_{(0)}$  has not significantly increased. Thus, among men, Moldova has continuously been at the bottom, with life expectancy at birth at 64.63 years in 2004, while Greece has been at the top, at 76.67 years in 2004. Albania, Slovenia and Croatia are closer to Greece with a life expectancy over 72 years, while Bulgaria, Romania and FYROM are closer to the New-EU average below 70 years. Among women, life expectancy at birth has also been lowest in Moldova, while it has been highest in Greece. Slovenia, Croatia, and Albania are closer to Greece with a life expectancy over 79 years. On the other hand, Bulgaria, FYROM and Romania are closer to Moldova, way below the New-EU average of 77.95 years (76.28 years in Bulgaria, 76.11 years in FYROM, 75.59 years in Romania). In 2004, figures ranged between 72.49 years in Moldova and 81.46 in Greece. Finally, it is worth mentioning that all SEE countries perform worse than the EU-15 average.

Table 1, shows the improvement in life expectancy between 1990 and 2004 in each country, the difference from EU-15 average and the difference between two genders. According to the table, the gap from EU-15 average is stable or is widening, while there is a considerable gap between men and women in all countries. More specific, SEE countries could be compound in two wider groups, to those that perform better and reaching EU-15 average (group A: Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania) and to those performing worse (group B: Bulgaria, Romania, FYROM, Moldova). The group A experience a steadily increasing  $e_{(0)}$ , with a trend towards convergence with EU-15 in terms of  $e_{(0)}$ , while gender gap is narrowed. On the other hand, countries in group B have not experienced a notably improvement in  $e_{(0)}$ , while it is evident a widening gap from EU-15 average and gender gap.





Figure 1. Trends in life expectancy at birth for both sexes in the South- Eastern Europe (SEE) countries since 1990

## 6. Trends of Avoidable mortality in South- Eastern Europe

This section examines age-standardised death rates from treatable and preventable cause and from ischaemic heart disease (IHD) between selected South- East European countries in 1992/1993 and 2002/2003.

Life expectancy at birth, in years, male										
Years	Albania	Bulgaria	Croatia	Greece	Republic of Moldova	Romania	Slovenia	TFYR Macedonia	EU members before May 2004	EU members since 2004 or 2007
1990	69,64	68,25	68,69	74,78	65,05	66,62	69,88		73,04	66,76
1991		68,37	66,05	74,79	64,18	66,9	69,5	69,88	73,15	66,68
1992	69,8	67,84	67,06	74,82	63,88	66,07	69,64	68,95	73,52	66,65
1993	70,29	67,55	68,53	75,09	64,03	65,92	69,38	69,53	73,62	66,8
1994	71,87	67,22	69,18	75,23	62,28	65,67	70,07	69,85	74,02	66,76
1995	71,53	67,4	69,3	75,08	62,01	65,54	70,82	70,04	74,13	66,95
1996	71,29	67,49	68,74	75,19	62,96	65,13	71,2	70,55	74,42	67,39
1997	70,82	66,97	68,61	75,58	63,25	65,27	71,16	70,51	74,84	67,6
1998	71,55	67,44	68,6	75,6	64,2	66,28	71,3	70,54	74,96	68,04
1999	72,73	68,36	68,92	75,61	63,79	67,15	71,82	70,65	75,18	68,42
2000	72,03	68,48	69,12	75,59	63,99	67,81	72,31	71,18	75,6	69,07
2001	74,12	68,55	71,03	76,09	64,54	67,69	72,33	71,18	75,9	69,31
2002	73,75	68,86	71,21	76,38	64,39	67,36	72,67	70,87	76,09	69,36
2003	73,31	68,97	71,17	76,57	64,42	67,71	72,6	71,12	76,19	69,54
2004	73,72	69,08	72,13	76,67	64,63	68,3	73,58		76,73	69,88
90-04	4,08	0,83	3,44	1,89	-0,42	1,68	3,7	1,24	3,69	3,12
gap eu 90	3,4	4,79	4,35	-1,74	7,99	6,42	3,16	3,27	0	6,28
gap eu 04	3,01	7,65	4,6	0,06	12,1	8,43	3,15	5,07	0	6,85
difference	0,39	-2,86	-0,25	-1,8	-4,11	-2,01	0,01	-1,8	0	-0,57

Life expectancy at birth, in years, female										
Years	Albania	Bulgaria	Croatia	Greece	Republic of Moldova	Romania	Slovenia	TFYR Macedonia	EU members before May 2004	EU members since 2004 or 2007
1990	75,86	74,95	76,38	79,62	72,02	73,08	77,9		79,79	74,92
1991		74,74	76,21	79,88	71,02	73,45	77,52	74,53	79,94	74,92
1992	76,86	74,8	76,61	79,79	71,82	73,3	77,62	73,72	80,3	75,13
1993	77,23	75,06	76,72	80,09	71,06	73,34	77,61	74,7	80,27	75,22
1994	79,19	74,77	77,02	80,27	69,77	73,31	77,84	74,79	80,68	75,25
1995	78,33	74,89	77,21	80,31	69,73	73,51	78,55	74,48	80,78	75,5
1996	78,22	74,65	76,47	80,44	70,4	72,85	79,07	75,32	80,96	75,63
1997	79,47	73,82	76,47	80,7	70,64	73,35	79,14	75,1	81,23	75,91
1998	78,74	74,66	76,22	80,53	71,57	73,78	79,19	74,94	81,26	76,26
1999	79,48	75,12	76,55	80,68	71,4	74,2	79,48	75,74	81,39	76,5
2000	78,04	75,09	76,68	80,84	71,45	74,82	80,02	75,74	81,76	76,98
2001	80,45	75,44	78,17	81,2	71,94	75,01	80,52	76,6	81,98	77,29
2002	79,2	75,62	78,4	81,25	71,76	74,76	80,66	75,83	82,01	77,42
2003	78,42	75,98	78,23	81,33	71,66	75,1	80,35	76,11	81,95	77,53
2004	78,93	76,28	79,08	81,46	72,49	75,59	80,87		82,5	77,95
Progress	3,07	1,33	2,7	1,84	0,47	2,51	2,97	1,58	2,71	3,03
gap eu 90	3,93	4,84	3,41	0,17	7,77	6,71	1,89	5,41	0	4,87
gap eu 04	3,57	6,22	3,42	1,04	10,01	6,91	1,63	5,84	0	4,55
difference	0,36	-1,38	-0,01	-0,87	-2,24	-0,2	0,26	-0,43	0	0,32

gender gap females- males										
Years	Albania	Bulgaria	Croatia	Greece	Republic of Moldova	Romania	Slovenia	TFYR Macedonia	EU members before May 2004	EU members since 2004 or 2007
1990	6,22	6,7	7,69	4,84	6,97	6,46	8,02	-	6,75	8,16
1991	-	6,37	10,16	5,09	6,84	6,55	8,02	4,65	6,79	8,24
1992	7,06	6,96	9,55	4,97	7,94	7,23	7,98	4,77	6,78	8,48
1993	6,94	7,51	8,19	5	7,03	7,42	8,23	5,17	6,65	8,42
1994	7,32	7,55	7,84	5,04	7,49	7,64	7,77	4,94	6,66	8,49
1995	6,8	7,49	7,91	5,23	7,72	7,97	7,73	4,44	6,65	8,55
1996	6,93	7,16	7,73	5,25	7,44	7,72	7,87	4,77	6,54	8,24
1997	8,65	6,85	7,86	5,12	7,39	8,08	7,98	4,59	6,39	8,31
1998	7,19	7,22	7,62	4,93	7,37	7,5	7,89	4,4	6,3	8,22
1999	6,75	6,76	7,63	5,07	7,61	7,05	7,66	5,09	6,21	8,08
2000	6,01	6,61	7,56	5,25	7,46	7,01	7,71	4,56	6,16	7,91
2001	6,33	6,89	7,14	5,11	7,4	7,32	8,19	5,42	6,08	7,98
2002	5,45	6,76	7,19	4,87	7,37	7,4	7,99	4,96	5,92	8,06
2003	5,11	7,01	7,06	4,76	7,24	7,39	7,75	4,99	5,76	7,99
2004	5,21	7,2	6,95	4,79	7,86	7,29	7,29	-	5,77	8,07
dif 04-90	-1,01	0,5	-0,74	-0,05	0,89	0,83	-0,73	0,34	-0,98	-0,09

**Table 1. Improvement in life expectancy between 1990 and 2004 in each country, difference from EU-15 average and the difference between two genders**

According to Figure 2, which illustrates SDR from Treatable conditions in years 1992/93 and 2002/03, Treatable mortality was highest in Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova and FYROM (countries of group B). In 1992/93 standardised death rates from treatable conditions were highest among men in Romania, at 270 deaths /100 000 population, following by Bulgaria at 253 deaths /100 000, Moldova at 243 deaths /100 000, FYROM at 195 /100 000, Croatia at 181 /100 000, Albania at 166 /100 000, Slovenia at 143 /100 000 and Greece at 79 /100 000. Similarly among women, treatable mortality was highest in Romania, at 212 deaths /100 000 population, following by Moldova at 194 deaths /100 000, Bulgaria at 179 deaths /100 000, FYROM at 177 /100 000, Croatia at 136 /100 000, Albania at 127 /100 000, Slovenia at 108 /100 000 and Greece at 79 /100 000. Similarly, in 2002/03 standardised death rates from treatable conditions were highest among men in Moldova, at 285 deaths /100 000 population, following by Romania at 263 deaths /100 000, Bulgaria at 208 deaths /100 000, FYROM at 170 /100 000, Croatia at 146 /100 000, Albania at 104 /100 000, Slovenia at 103 /100 000 and Greece at 64 /100 000. Among women, in 1992/93 treatable mortality was highest in Romania, at 212 deaths /100 000 population, following by Moldova at 194 deaths /100 000, Bulgaria at 179 deaths /100 000, FYROM at 177 /100 000, Croatia at 136 /100 000, Albania at 127 /100 000, Slovenia at 108 /100 000 and Greece at 79 /100 000. In 2002/03 treatable mortality was highest in Moldova, at 204 deaths /100 000 population, following by Romania at 195 deaths /100 000, FYROM at 151 deaths /100 000, Bulgaria at 145 /100 000, Croatia at 101 /100 000, Albania at 88 /100 000, Slovenia at 73 /100 000 and Greece at 58 /100 000. Overall, during the time period, treatable mortality have remained greater in countries of group B.

Turning to preventable mortality, one obvious feature is the substantial gap between men and women in all countries, with death rates among men usually at least three times bigger than those of women, while preventable mortality differs according to geographical position of a country from South to North (Figure 3). In 1992/93 among men, preventable mortality was higher in Moldova at 161 deaths /100 000 population, following by Slovenia at 160 /100 000, Romania at 140 /100 000, Croatia at 139 /100 000, Bulgaria at 98 /100 000, Greece at 95 /100 000, FYROM at 72 /100 000 and Albania at 60 /100 000. In the same way, among women, mortality from preventable conditions was higher in Moldova at 89 deaths /100 000 population, following by Romania at 42 /100 000, Slovenia at 40 /100 000, Croatia at 28 /100 000, Bulgaria and Greece at 18 /100 000, Albania at 14 /100 000 and FYROM at 11 /100 000. In 2002/03 among men, preventable mortality was higher in Moldova at 169 deaths /100 000 population, following by Romania at 133 /100 000, Croatia at 129 /100 000, Slovenia at 117 /100 000, Bulgaria at 88 /100 000, Greece at 79 /100 000, FYROM at 66 /100 000 and Albania at 46 /100 000. In the same way, among women, mortality from preventable conditions was higher in 2002/03 in Moldova at 93 deaths /100 000 population, following by Romania at 39 /100 000, Slovenia at 33 /100 000, Croatia at 27 /100 000, Bulgaria at 17 /100 000 and Greece at 15 /100 000, Albania and FYROM at 11 /100 000. Overall, there is a large gender gap in preventable mortality, while evidence suggests that according to geographical position of a country preventable mortality differs from South to North.

Turning to ischaemic heart disease (IHD) Figure 7 illustrates how levels were higher in 1992/93 in Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria. It also shows a clear gap between men and women in all countries, with death rates among men usually at least twice than

those of women. Among men, IHD mortality was higher in Moldova at 226 deaths /100 000 population, following by Romania at 166 /100 000, Bulgaria at 157 /100 000, Croatia at 125 /100 000, FYROM at 111 /100 000, Slovenia at 105 /100 000, Greece at 83 /100 000 and Albania at 81 /100 000. In the same way, among women, mortality from IHD was higher in Moldova at 140 deaths /100 000 population, following by Romania at 72 /100 000, Bulgaria at 60 /100 000, Croatia at 48 /100 000, FYROM at 43 /100 000, Albania at 35 /100 000, Slovenia at 32 /100 000 and Greece at 24 /100 000. Similarly, in 2002/03 the gender gap is still great in all countries, while Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria have higher mortality rates. More specific, among men IHD mortality was higher in Moldova at 292 deaths /100 000 population, following by Romania at 157 /100 000, Bulgaria at 133 /100 000, Croatia at 112 /100 000, FYROM at 102 /100 000, Greece at 74 /100 000, Slovenia at 65 /100 000, and Albania at 63 /100 000. In the same way, among women, mortality from IHD was higher in Moldova at 173 deaths /100 000 population, following by Romania at 68 /100 000, Bulgaria at 51 /100 000, FYROM at 43 /100 000, Croatia at 39 /100 000, Albania and Greece at 20 /100 000, Slovenia at 17 /100 000. Overall, for IHD mortality there is also a clear gender gap in all countries, while countries from North- East (Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria) are performing worse.



Figure 2. SDR from Treatable conditions in years 1992/93 and 2002/03




Figure 3. SDR from Preventable conditions in years 1992/93 and 2002/03




Figure 4. SDR from IHD in years 1992/93 and 2002/03

## 7. Discussion

According to our findings, there is a considerable variation in health status among SEE countries, while some countries doing better than others. However, all SEE countries are below the EU-15 average and health gap from EU-15 not only remains present, but in many cases is actually widening. Present analysis clearly demonstrates that health differences between SEE and other EU countries during the period of transition have not decreased. In that context, findings could be supporting to the argument that possible economic benefits in years after transition had not translated to broader improvements on societal level.

Furthermore, findings suggest that SEE countries could be compound in two wider groups, to those that perform better and reaching EU-15 average (group A: Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania) and to those performing worse (group B: Bulgaria, Romania, FYROM, Moldova). Levels of Treatable Mortality were highest in countries of group B in both 1992/93 and 2002/03, provoking that possible explanations could be driven by examining possible similarities between those countries. One possible explanation could be suggested is that there is a negative effect from low investment to health care in relation to GDP. Indeed, it has been reported that public expenditure to health care has fallen dramatically in Republic of Moldova and Romania, while a

survey in the last found that the vast majority of equipment in hospitals and polyclinics was out of date (Vladescu et al., 2000; WHO, 2006). Similarly, it is documented before that Bulgarian health system is working inefficiently; there are problems with primary health care or unequal geographical distribution and quality of secondary and tertiary health care (Delcheva and Balabanova 2001). On the other hand, Slovenia, which according to present analysis perform better in terms of Treatable mortality, had succeeded in securing an increasing proportion of the GDP for health care sector (HiT, 2002). However, when taking in mind countries, such as Albania, which have achieved better health outcomes in low cost, it is for sure further research that is needed for supporting an argument on further investment to health care.

On the other hand, evidence suggests that Preventable mortality differs according to geographical position of countries from South doing better than those from North. Similarly, in IHD mortality there is also a South-North divide in differences between SEE countries. Similar findings have been also mentioned in past studies, which suggested that dietary factors have been traditionally determining health status in SEE. In addition, broader factors outside health care system have been proposed as an explanation before for the mortality crisis in other countries of Eastern Europe (Leon et al., 1997). Present analysis could be supporting to that argument, although it could be suggested that not only diet but there are also other behavioral factors, such as smoking, alcohol and accidents that determine health profile of SEE countries. However, it is reported that smoking levels are relatively high in all SEE countries, while on the other hand there are differences in dietary habits and alcohol consumption (Bozicevic et al., 2004; Gjonca, 1999, Music Milanovic et al., 2006). Therefore, further research on risky behaviors and unhealthy life-style is needed in for a more robust picture.

In addition, according to present findings there is also a considerable different trend on gender gap between SEE countries, which could also imply a support to the behavioral argument. Countries that perform better in terms of health outcomes have experienced a narrowing gender gap, thus, in that sense, present analysis could be confirming to the argument from previous studies that possible explanations for health status in SEE should be driven on men's adult mortality. In addition, analysis on Avoidable mortality showed that there is a notable substantial gender gap in all countries in both Preventable and IHD mortality; while for Treatable mortality this is not the case. Therefore, it could be suggested that it is the adoption of health damaging life-style by men that consist the picture on health status in SEE, although again further research is needed in finding out differences on gender health gap pattern in SEE countries.

Overall, present paper examined the level and the trends of population's health in South East European (SEE) countries in terms of life expectancy at birth and to specific avoidable mortality outcomes since 1990. By this it could be clearer to explore possible explanations to mortality pathways in Balkans and to propose eras for future research on public health. General speaking, there are possible effects on population's health from underinvestment to health care during transition, while there is also a negative effect from the adoption of unhealthy life-style, especially from men. However, the extent of the negative affect of those factors and their contribution to health status are questions that could only be answered from future research. Current analysis gives, however, to policy makers an indication that except from investments in health care facilities, they should also focus in policies broader than health care. In

other words, by preventing from factors such as diet, smoking and alcohol SEE countries could also succeed on preventing some types of mortality.

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# Increased Facilitation masks Inhibition of Return (IOR) in schizophrenia

Fenia Kalogeropoulou<sup>1</sup>, Ana B. Vivas<sup>2</sup> and Peter W.R. Woodruff<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> SEERC, 17 Mitropoleos Str, Thessaloniki, Greece, [fkalogeropoulou@seerc.org](mailto:fkalogeropoulou@seerc.org)

<sup>2</sup> City College, Dept. of Psychology, 24 Prox. Koromila Str, 54622 Thessaloniki, Greece, [vivas@city.academic.gr](mailto:vivas@city.academic.gr)

<sup>3</sup> Academic Clinical Psychiatry & Sheffield Cognition and Neuroimaging Laboratory (SCANLab), Section of Neuroscience, Sheffield University School of Medicine & Biomedical Science, The Longley Centre, Norwood Grange Drive, Sheffield S5 7JT, United Kingdom, [p.w.woodruff@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:p.w.woodruff@sheffield.ac.uk)

Previous research (e.g., Huey & Wexler, 1994; Gouzoulis-Mayfrank et al., 2002) has shown that schizophrenia patients show prolonged facilitation or/and lack of IOR when a single-cue procedure is employed. However, the absence or delayed onset of IOR could be due to increased facilitation that masks the inhibitory effect and not to a problem in inhibition *per se*. In order to test this hypothesis we employed a cue more intense than the target (e.g., a green circle), which usually reduces or eliminates the early facilitation due to sensory masking (Pratt et al., 2001). In the first experiment we replicated the lack of IOR effects, even with long cue-target intervals (2000ms, 3200ms) in the group of schizophrenia patients (N=32) relative to the controls, when the typical cue (an increase of luminance of the box's outline) was employed. The second experiment was identical to the first only that a green circle was presented as the cue and a white square as the target. We observed significant IOR effects for both the controls and the patients at the 350ms and 450ms SOA, respectively. These findings suggest that three effects overlap in time in this kind of cueing paradigms; sensory masking, facilitation and IOR. The inhibitory effect appears to be intact in schizophrenia patients, but it is usually masked by increased facilitation.

## 1. Introduction

Deficits of visual processing in schizophrenia have been found in cognitive tasks measuring visuospatial selective attention (Huey & Wexler, 1994). Orienting of attention within the visual field is exerted through the deployment of both facilitatory and inhibitory processes (Posner & Cohen, 1984). These two types of processes have been usually studied with covert orienting of attention task (COVAT; Posner and Cohen (1984). In a typical COVAT task, a target can appear at the location of a previously presented spatial cue (valid location) or at the opposite non-cued location

(invalid location). When the time interval between the onset of the cue and the target (SOA: stimulus onset asynchrony) is short ( $\sim < 300$ ms), valid trials result in a reaction time (RTs) advantage over invalid trials, as participants detect the target more efficiently in the valid location. However, when the cue-target interval is longer than 300 ms, response times are higher for targets presented in the previously cued valid location as compared to the invalid location. This phenomenon has been called *inhibition of return* (IOR), and it has been proposed to reflect a bias of attention towards new –unexplored– locations (Posner, 1980). Recent research suggests that early facilitation and late inhibition may be two independent processes that arise simultaneously when the peripheral cues is non-informative of the target's location (Maruff et al., 1999). Although early studies (Posner & Cohen, 1984) regarded both facilitation and IOR as automatic and reflexive phenomena, other researchers (Maruff et al., 1999) suggested that, unlike facilitation, IOR is not purely automatic and is affected by experimental manipulations such as target-location predictability (Wright & Richard, 2000), task difficulty (Lupianez et al., 1997) and SOA range (Cheal & Chanstain, 2002).

The interplay of facilitation and IOR has been tested in patients with schizophrenia, although the literature reflects contradictory evidence probably due to methodological differences and heterogeneity of the disorder. For instance, Huey and Wexler (1994), Gouzoulis-Mayfrank, Heekeren, Voss, Moerth, Thelen and Meicke (2004) and Nestor et al. (1992) reported delayed or absent IOR in schizophrenia in the single-cue paradigm. On the other hand, Fuentes and Santiago (1999), Sapir et al. (2001 experiment 2) and Larrison-Faucher, Briand and Sereno (2002) found preserved IOR in schizophrenia patients when employing a second central cue to summon back attention to the centre. The different procedures used in the studies to measure IOR may account for the discrepant results.

Huey and Wexler (1994) employed the single-cue IOR procedure in 11 medicated schizophrenia patients (6 females and 5 males) with four SOAs (100ms, 200ms, 700ms and 1200ms). Healthy participants of the study showed facilitation (shorter RTs in cued trials) at the 100ms SOA, but this validity effect disappeared at the 200ms SOA when they detected the target faster at uncued locations (IOR effect) (Posner and Cohen, 1984). Schizophrenia patients exhibited facilitation at both 100ms and 200ms SOA and showed IOR at the 700ms and 1200ms SOA. However, IOR was both delayed and blunted in magnitude as compared to healthy participants. Furthermore, patients showed increased facilitation for both 100ms and 200ms SOAs, relative to controls, so Huey and Wexler (1994) concluded that schizophrenia patients showed delayed and non-statistical significant IOR because they probably could not overcome the initial facilitatory effect of the cue.

In line with Huey and Wexler (1994), Gouzoulis-Mayfrank et al (2004) employed the single-cue exogenous paradigm with two SOAs (100ms and 800ms) on 40 medicated schizophrenia patients and 34 healthy participants. The researchers examined the patients two times, from the acute state of the disorder to partial remission. The second examination was administered 12-16 weeks after the first. The results showed a time-stable deficit in IOR as patients had similar RTs for both cued and uncued targets in the long SOA both during the initial and the follow-up examination. Gouzoulis-Mayfrank et al (2004) claimed that impaired IOR should be regarded as a trait characteristic of schizophrenia, as therapy did not improve patients' performance.

Under these circumstances blunted IOR could reflect a biological vulnerability marker for the development of psychosis.

In addition, Nestor, Faux, McCarley, Penhune, Shenton, Pollak and Sands (1992) employed the single-cue Posner's (1980) paradigm (SOAs 100ms and 800ms) in 14 patients with schizophrenia. The results of Nestor et al's (1992) indicated that healthy participants and patients demonstrated enhanced RTs for valid targets at the 100ms SOA condition. However, unlike healthy participants, patients did not show the IOR effect at the long SOA condition. The researchers interpreted the above results as evidence of intact engagement and impaired disengagement of attention in patients with schizophrenia.

On the other hand Fuentes and Santiago (1999), questioned Huey and Wexler's (1994) results for blunted IOR in schizophrenia, as the deficit could reflect an impairment in the processes that reorient attention rather than a deficit in filtering information in the inhibited locations. Fuentes and Santiago (1999) argued that certain neurological patients, such as schizophrenia and Alzheimer patients (Faust & Balota, 1997), fail to show IOR with the single cue procedure as they need a second central cue to reorient their attention back to the center. The researchers used the double cue procedure with two long SOAs (950ms, 1250ms) conditions and found normal IOR in a group of medicated schizophrenia patients. In line with this assumption, Fuentes, Boucart, Alvarez, Vivas and Zimmerman (1999) examined further inhibitory processes in schizophrenia by employing both the single and double cue paradigm in the same group of medicated patients. For the single cue condition the researchers used both a short (200ms) and a long (1200ms) SOA value, whereas in the double cue condition only the long SOA (1200ms) was used. The results indicated normal IOR effects in patients in both cuing conditions and researchers concluded that medicated patients do not need the central cue to show IOR. The researchers also demonstrated that patients show more benefits from valid cued than healthy subjects in the short SOA, a result that was also reported by Huey and Wexler (1994). As the cue produces a greater level of activation in schizophrenia, Huey and Wexler (1994) probably found blunted IOR because the duration of the cue coincided with the onset of the target, so patients could not overcome the activation levels produced by the cue and show IOR effects. According to the above findings Fuentes et al (1999) concluded that schizophrenia patients are impaired in the processes that lead to IOR (e.g., increased facilitation) rather than to IOR per se. In addition Sapir et al (2001) employed both cuing conditions in 18 medicated schizophrenia patients and found preserved IOR with the second cue but lack of IOR with the single peripheral cue condition. Maybe these different results are due to heterogeneity and severity of illness as Sapir et al.'s participants were inpatients while Fuentes et al's were outpatients.

Taking into account the findings by Fuentes and Santiago (1999), Fuentes et al (1999) and Sapir et al. (2001, experiment 2) that the employment of a second cue normalizes the differences between healthy and schizophrenic subjects in inhibitory effects, Larrison-Faucher, Briand and Sereno (2002), argued that none of the above studies used different SOAs to address the cross point where facilitation changed to inhibition in the double cue paradigm. As a consequence Larrison-Faucher et al. (2002) administered the double cue IOR procedure in 10 different SOAs (66, 79, 106, 133, 159, 226, 305, 505, 705 and 1000ms) in order to measure facilitation, IOR and the crossover point where facilitation changes to inhibition in 14 medicated patients. By

examining the intermediate SOAs, that had been excluded before, the researchers demonstrated that patients showed prolonged facilitation relative to healthy subjects as the patients crossed from facilitation to inhibition at 450ms, while the crossover point of healthy subjects was at 226ms. These findings with the double cue paradigm lend support to previous results by Huey and Wexler (1994) and Fuentes et al (1999) about increased facilitation of patients in short SOAs, which means that mechanisms that lead to IOR are impaired in schizophrenia (Larrison-Faucher et al., 2002).

However, apart from the different experimental manipulations role of medication seems to be relevant for IOR as well. For example, Fuentes et al (1999) found preserved IOR in medicated patients with the single-cue paradigm whereas Huey and Wexler (1994), Gouzoulis-Mayfrank et al. (2004) and Sapir et al. (2001) reported blunted IOR in medicated schizophrenia patients. Furthermore, Carter, Robertson, Chaderjlan, and Nordahl (1994) employed the exogenous single-cue spatial orienting paradigm (SOAs 100ms and 800ms) in 14 drug-free schizophrenia patients and found normal IOR. The above discrepancies could be due to the severity of illness and heterogeneity of schizophrenia. Fuentes and Santiago (2002) employed both cuing procedures (single vs double) in a group of medicated schizophrenia patients and assessed their performance taking under account predominant symptomatology. In the single-cue condition the researchers reported greater facilitation effects in positive relative to negative patients and reduced IOR effect in the negative group. In contrast, both positive and negative patients showed intact IOR in the double-cue paradigm.

However, it is not clear whether patients do not IOR with the single-cue procedure (Huey & Wexler, 1994) due to a reorienting deficit or increased facilitation masks IOR. Regarding the second possibility previous research (e.g., Gouzoulis-Mayfrank et al., 2002; Huey & Wexler, 1994) had shown that schizophrenia patients show increased and prolonged facilitatory effects –relative to healthy participants- in the single-cue IOR paradigm. In order to further investigate IOR in schizophrenia with the single cue IOR task we conducted two experiments. Experiment 1 we employed a typical single cue IOR task (Posner & Cohen, 1984) to replicate previous findings on impaired and/or blunted IOR in schizophrenia. In order to test the hypothesis that increased and prolonged facilitation masked IOR in schizophrenia patients, we conducted a second experiment similar to the one employed by Pratt et al (2001). In Pratt et al's (2001) manipulated the cue and target, so that they differed in terms of shape, colour and luminance. When the cue was a green circle and the target a white square, the authors found that at the short SOAs (100ms and 200ms) instead of facilitatory effects, the cue produced inhibitory effects in healthy adults. Pratt et al (2001) concluded that cues more intense than the target may have produced sensory masking, which would result in impaired performance at the cued location. In the second experiment, we replicated this manipulation to eliminate or reduce early facilitation at the short SOAs in schizophrenia patients. We expect that if early facilitation is eliminated due to sensory masking, schizophrenia patients will show similar IOR effects to the control group at short SOAs, even when there is not a cue to help participants to re-orient their attention back to the center.

## 2. Experiment 1

The aim of Experiment 1 was to replicate previous findings on the literature of IOR in schizophrenia. Thus, according to previous findings (Huey & Wexler, 1994; Gouzoulis-Mayfrank et al, 2002), schizophrenia patients show delayed/absent IOR and prolonged facilitation with the single cue procedure. We employed Posner's (1980) paradigm with seven SOAs values: 140ms, 230ms, 350ms, 450ms, 600ms, 2000ms, 3200ms. We expected that relative to healthy participants, patients will not show significant IOR in long SOAs values. Also, facilitatory effects will be greater in magnitude and persist for longer time in the group of patients.

### 2.1 Participants

Twenty-nine male and 3 female patients with the diagnosis of schizophrenia participated. Patients were recruited from the psychiatric hospital 'Agia Fotini' and ranged in age from 24 to 54 years old ( $M= 36$ ,  $SD= 12.02$ ). All patients were medicated and signed an informed consent before their participation. Handedness was assessed through the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory. Except for one, all patients were right-handed. The inclusion criteria consisted of a diagnosis of schizophrenia according to the DSM-IV that was confirmed by the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview Greek version (M.I.N.I) (Papadimitriou et al., 2004) and documented evidence of regular antipsychotic drug therapy. Exclusion criteria were the history of head trauma, mental retardation, neurological disorder and drug or alcohol abuse. At the time of the assessment all patients had been stabilized on typical neuroleptic medication.

Twenty-eight healthy adults participated in Experiment 1 (25 males, 3 females). Healthy participants were recruited from the staff of the Psychiatric Hospital 'Agia Fotini'. Although healthy volunteers were matched in age with the patients group ( $M=34$ ,  $SD=10.07$ ) they had more education years relative to patients ( $M=15$ ,  $SD=5.04$ ). Exclusion criteria were the history of mental or neurological disorder, head trauma, mental retardation and drug or alcohol abuse that were assessed through the M.I.N.I (Papadimitriou et al., 2004). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal eye vision and were naïve about the purpose of the experiment.

	Mean	SD
Age	36	12.02
Education ( in years)	11.66	3.97
Years of the disorder	12	12.59
Chlorpromazine-equivalent neuroleptic dose	8.66	4.87
Positive syndrome score	6.2	1.37
Negative syndrome score	8.32	5.04
Disorganization syndrome score	4.11	2.32

**Table 1. Demographic and clinical data (N=32)**

## ***2.2 Materials and Stimuli***

The scale for the assessment of Positive symptoms (SAPS) and the scale for the assessment of Negative symptoms (SANS) (Andreasen, 1982) were used to assess symptomatology. Positive symptoms used in the analysis consisted of global ratings of the severity of hallucinations, delusions, bizarre behaviour and formal thought disorder. Negative symptoms consisted of global ratings of the severity of alogia, apathy, affective flattening, anhedonia and attention. Global ratings were based on ratings of individual items which together reflect the severity of each symptom in a scale ranging from 0 (absent) to 5 (severe). Symptoms were evaluated by two psychiatrists of the hospital and inter-rater reliability for SAPS and SANS items was 0.79 and 0.82 respectively. The evaluation of symptoms was performed by the two psychiatrists at the same time and setting and the sample consisted of 15 patients. In the correlation analysis we included both subscores and global ratings of SAPS and SANS items. The Neuropsychological function of patients was assessed through two executive-frontal tests: the verbal fluency and the Trial-making tests which both have been translated and validated in Greek population (Kosmidis, Vlachou, Panagiotaki & Kiosseoglou, 2004; Vlachou & Kosmidis, 2002). The verbal fluency test consists of two parts, semantic and phonological. In the semantic part words have to be searched according to their semantic relationship through three categories (animals, fruits, objects) as compared to the phonological part where participants have to ignore semantic associations and select words on the basis of their first letter. The Trail-Making test consists of two parts (part A and part B). In Part A, the participant is presented with a sheet of paper with 25 scattered numbers from 1 to 25 enclosed in circles. The test requires participants to draw lines connecting circles in numerical order as quickly as possible. In Part B, the participant is presented with a sheet of paper which has 25 scattered circles containing numbers from 1 to 13 and letters from A to L. Participants are instructed to alternately connect numbers and letters in ascending order 1, A, 2, B, 3, C...as quickly as possible. The dependent variable is the amount of time the subject needs to complete the tests. The intellectual functioning of patients was assessed through the Raven Progressive Matrices test, which is an IQ test of non-verbal abilities and consists of 60 sequences of shapes and drawings with a missing part. Also we assessed patients' abnormal movements due to medication by using the AIMS scale (Abnormal Involuntary Movements Scale).

Stimuli were presented on a colour monitor (VGA) of an IBM/PC compatible computer, and responses were recorded through the computer keyboard. The software used for creating and running the experiment was E-Prime. The stimuli were the two boxes and the target was a white asterisk presented inside one of the boxes. Participants had to press the spacebar as soon as they detected the target. Psychiatric symptoms and neuropsychological function were assessed first and participants performed the experiments during the following four days.

## ***2.3 Procedure***

Participants sat approximately 60cm from the computer and the experimenter explained the experiment verbally to them. Each trial began with a fixation point (a cross) presented in the middle of the screen for 1000ms. Participants were instructed

to maintain their eyes at the fixation point during the experiment. The fixation point was followed by two white boxes were presented in the left and right of the cross for 1000ms. Then, one of the peripheral boxes became thicker for 50ms. This served as a cue to attract attention to the periphery. After a further time interval of 50ms, 90ms, 180ms, 300ms, 400ms, 3150ms, 3950ms (according to the SOA value) the target (a white asterisk) appeared inside one of the two lateral boxes. The target remained visible either until 2000ms or until a response was made (Figure 1).

The participants performed four identical ten-minutes sessions of each experiment. Each session included one practice block of 10 trials and two experimental blocks of 42 experimental trials and 15 catch trials (without target) to avoid anticipated responses. There were 12 trials of each SOA condition of which 6 were cued and six were uncued.




Figure 1. Sequence of events in a valid trial in Experiment 1

## 2.4 Results

### 2.4.1 Healthy adults' group

The mean correct response times and standard deviation are shown in Table 2. Response times were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with SOA (140ms, 230ms, 350ms, 450ms, 600ms, 2000ms, 3200) and target location

(valid and invalid) as the within-subject factors. The analysis of the results showed a significant main effect of the SOA  $F(6, 162)=3.37, p < .05$ . There was a significant two-way interaction between target location and SOA  $F(6, 162)=10.86 p<.05$ .

Further analysis of the interaction using a t-test showed the following results: the mean number of RTs at cued locations ( $M=483, SD=92$ ) and the mean number of RTs at uncued locations ( $M=500.27, SD=93.13$ ) at the 140ms SOA value ( $t(27)=-3.60, p<.05$ ). The mean number of RTs at cued locations ( $M=474, SD=96$ ) and the mean number of RTs at uncued locations ( $M=500, SD=102$ ) at the 230ms SOA value differed significantly ( $t= -4.303, df=27,p<.05$ ). So, there was a significant RT advantage for target detection to cued relative to uncued locations at the 140ms (-18ms of effect) and at the 230ms (-26ms of effect) SOAs values. Also, there was a significant difference in the mean RTs between cued ( $M=500, SD=85$ .) and uncued locations ( $M=489, SD=89$ ) at the 600ms SOA value ( $t= 2.313, df=27, p<.05$ ). The mean number of RTs at cued locations ( $M=502, SD=80$ ) and the mean number of RTs at uncued locations ( $M=490, SD=79$ ) at the 2000ms SOA differed significantly ( $t= 2.059, df=27, p<.05$ ). Finally, the mean number of RTs at cued locations ( $M=503, SD=83$ ) and the mean number of RTs at uncued locations ( $M=456, SD=79$ ) at the 3200ms SOA value differed significantly ( $t= 2.119, df=27, p<.05$ ). So, there was a RT advantage for targets presented at uncued locations as compared to cued locations at the SOAs of 600ms (11ms of effect), 2000ms (12ms of effect) and 3200ms (7ms of effect).

	SOA						
	140ms	230ms	350ms	450ms	600ms	2000ms	3200ms
Cued	482(92)	474(96)	479(91)	480(91)	500(86)	502(80)	503(83)
Uncued	500(93)	500(103)	483(95)	485(91)	489(89)	490(79)	496(79)
Cue Effect	-18*	-26*	-4	-5	11*	12*	7*

**Table 2. Mean of the median correct RTs and SD as a function of target location and SOA value**

Note: Cue effect =  $RT_{cued}-RT_{uncued}$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ .

### 2.4.2 Patients' group

Response times were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with SOA (140ms, 230ms, 350ms, 450ms, 600ms, 2000ms, 3200) and target location (valid and invalid) as the within-subject factors (Table 3).

The analysis of the results showed significant main effects of target location  $F(1,31)=27.915 p<.05$  and SOA  $F(6,186)=1.642 p<.05$ . That is RTs were faster at valid (528ms) relative to invalid (546ms) target locations. We found a significant difference between the means of 140ms SOA and 230ms SOA ( $t= 2.395, df=31, p<0.05$ ). The mean of the 140ms SOA ( $M=543ms, SD=73$ ) was significantly greater than that of the 230ms SOA ( $M=527ms, SD=73$ ). There was a significant difference ( $t= -22.714, df=31, p<0.05$ ) between the means of the 140ms and 600ms SOAs, thus the 140ms SOA mean was smaller than the 600ms SOA ( $M=799ms, SD=68$ ). Also, the means of the 140ms SOA and 2000ms SOA differed significantly ( $t= -21.427, df=31,$

$p < 0.05$ ), as the 140ms SOA mean was smaller than the 2000ms SOA ( $M=810\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=67$ ). There was a significant difference ( $t = -22.700$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) between the means of the 140 ms SOA and the 3200ms SOA ( $M=1200\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=68$ ) values. Furthermore, analysis of the SOA main effect indicated a significant difference ( $t = -3.034$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) between the means of the 230ms ( $M=527\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=73$ ) and the 450ms SOA ( $M=542\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=61$ ) values. Also, the means of the 230ms SOA differed in a significant way of the following means: 600ms SOA ( $t = 21.013$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ), 2000ms SOA ( $t = -20.606$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ) and 3200ms SOA ( $t = -21.937$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ). There were found the following differences between the 350ms SOA ( $M=536\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=74$ ) and the 600ms SOA ( $t = -20.140$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ), the 2000ms SOA ( $t = -22.287$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ) and the 3200ms SOA ( $t = -22.287$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Also, the mean of the 450ms SOA differed significantly with the means of the 600ms SOA ( $t = -18.695$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ), the 2000ms SOA ( $t = -21.732$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ) and the 3200ms SOA ( $t = -21.967$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Finally there were found the following differences between the means of the 600ms and the 3200ms SOAs ( $t = -21.967$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

Also, there was a significant two-way interaction between target location and SOA  $F(6,186) = 7.247$   $p < .05$ . Further analysis of the interaction using a t-test showed the following results: the mean number of RTs at cued locations ( $M=531\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=152$ ) and the mean number of RTs at uncued locations ( $M=555\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=142$ ) at the 140ms SOA value differed significantly ( $t = -3.352$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ). The mean number of RTs at cued locations ( $M= 508\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=132.$ ) and the mean number of RTs at uncued locations ( $M=546\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=138$ ) at the 230ms SOA value differed significantly ( $t = -5.807$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Also, the mean number of RTs at cued locations ( $M=521\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=136$ ) and the mean number of RTs at uncued locations ( $M=551\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=145$ ) differed significantly at the 350ms SOA value ( $t = -4.114$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Finally, the mean number of the cued RTs ( $M=530\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=130$ ) and the mean number of the uncued RTs ( $M=546\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=138$ ) at the 450ms SOA value differed significantly ( $t = -5.807$ ,  $df=31$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

	SOA						
	140ms	230ms	350ms	450ms	600ms	2000ms	3200ms
Cued	531(152)	508(132)	521(136)	529(130)	540(126)	537(111)	534(102)
Uncued	555(142)	546(138)	551(145)	554(146)	549(133)	531(115)	535(113)
Cue Effect	-24*	-38*	-30*	-25*	-9	6	-1

**Table 3. Mean of the median correct RTs and SD as a function of target location and SOA value**

Note: Cue effect =  $RT_{\text{cued}} - RT_{\text{uncued}}$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ .

## 2.5 Conclusion

The findings from Experiment 1 are in line with previous reports (Huey & Wexler, 1994; Gouzoulis-Mayfrank et al., 2004) of blunted and/or delayed IOR in schizophrenia. In contrast to healthy adults, schizophrenia patients showed prolonged facilitation and no evidence of IOR. The above findings confirm the assumption by Fuentes & Santiago (1999) that the processes that lead to voluntary re-orientation of attention to

the center are impaired in schizophrenia. Thus, the deficit is located to the processes that lead to IOR rather than the inhibitory mechanism per se. However, previous research (Fuentes & Santiago, 1999; Fuentes et al, 1999) has taken for granted the impaired re-orienting processes in schizophrenia. In the following experiment we aimed to test an alternative hypothesis suggesting that IOR is not observed in patients without the central cue, due to increased/prolonged facilitation that masks the inhibitory mechanism.

### **3. Experiment 2**

The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether schizophrenia patients do not show IOR with the single-cue procedure either due to re-orienting deficits or to increased facilitation that masks inhibition. If the second hypothesis is correct, IOR should emerge in patients when facilitation is reduced, even without the presence of a second central cue (Fuentes & Santiago, 1999). So, we employed a procedure that was originally developed by Pratt and his colleagues (2001). In this modification of Posner's (1980) paradigm the cue and the target differ in terms of physical characteristics: colour, shape, luminance. The cue is a green circle and the target is a white square. With cues more intense than the target, facilitation is removed due to sensory masking (Pratt et al, 2001). We employed the same SOA values with Experiment 1: 140ms, 230ms, 350ms, 450ms, 600ms, 2000ms, 3200ms.

#### ***3.1 Participants***


Fifteen patients (13 from Exp 1) participated in Experiment 2 ( $M=34$ ,  $SD=11.07$ ). Eleven healthy adults from Experiment 1, participated in Experiment 2 ( $M=33$ ,  $SD=12.02$ ). For both healthy adults and schizophrenia patients we used the same inclusion/exclusion criteria as in Experiment 1.

#### ***3.2 Materials and Stimuli***

Materials and stimuli were the same as those employed in Experiment 1.

#### ***3.3 Procedure***

The procedure was the same as the one in Experiment 1 with the only difference that the cue was a green circle and the target was a white square.



**Figure 2. Sequence of events in a valid trial in Experiment 2**

### **3.4 Results**

#### **3.4.1 Healthy adults' group**

Response times were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with SOA (100ms, 140ms, 230ms, 350ms, 450ms, 2000ms, 3200ms) and cueing (valid and invalid) as the within-subject factors (Table 4).

The analysis of the results showed a significant main effect of target location  $F(1,10)=43.788, p<.05$ . Thus, RTs were faster for uncued (431ms) relative to cued (451ms) locations. Also, there was found a significant interaction between target location and SOA  $F(6,60)=8.947, p<.05$ . Further analysis of the interaction using a t-test showed the following results: the mean number of RTs at cued locations ( $M=423\text{ms}, SD=56$ ) and the mean number of RTs at uncued locations ( $M=406\text{ms}, SD=69$ ) at the 350ms SOA value differed significantly ( $t=2.575, df=10, p<.05$ ). The mean number of RTs at cued locations ( $M=448\text{ms}, SD=73$ ) and the mean number of RTs at uncued locations ( $M=406\text{ms}, SD=62$ ) at the 450ms SOA value differed significantly ( $t=-58.878, df=10, p<.05$ ). Also, the mean number of RTs at cued locations ( $M=476\text{ms}, SD=68$ ) and the mean number of RTs at uncued locations ( $M=430\text{ms}, SD=68$ ) differed significantly at the 600ms SOA value ( $t=5.819, df=10, p<.05$ ). Furthermore, the mean number of cued RTs ( $M=480\text{ms}, SD=55$ ) at the 2000ms differed from the uncued ( $M=458\text{ms}, SD=60$ ) ( $t=4.523, df=10, p<.05$ ). Finally, the mean number of the cued RTs ( $M=488\text{ms}, SD=52$ ) and the mean number

of the uncued RTs ( $M=466\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=49$ ) at the 3200ms SOA value differed significantly ( $t=3.776$ ,  $df=10$ ,  $p<.05$ ).

	SOA						
	140ms	230ms	350ms	450ms	600ms	2000ms	3200ms
Cued	430(57)	416(58)	423(56)	448(73)	476(68)	480(55)	488(52)
Uncued	441(67)	414(73)	406(69)	406(62)	430(68)	458(60)	466(49)
Cue Effect	-11	2	17*	42*	46*	38*	22*

**Table 4. Mean of the median correct RTs and SD (within parenthesis) as a function of target location and SOA value.**

Note: Cue effect =  $RT_{\text{cued}} - RT_{\text{uncued}}$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ .

### 3.4.2 Patients' group

Response times were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with SOA (100ms, 140ms, 230ms, 350ms, 450ms, 2000ms, 3200ms) and cueing (valid and invalid) as the within-subject factors (Table 5).

The analysis of the results showed a significant two-way interaction between target location and SOA values  $F(6, 84)=6.119$ ,  $p<.05$ . Further analysis of the interaction showed that the mean number of the cued RTs ( $M=582\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=143$ ) and the uncued ( $M=559\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=135$ ) at the 450ms SOA differed significantly ( $t=2.044$ ,  $df=14$ ,  $p<.05$ ). Also, there was found a significant difference at the 3200ms SOA ( $t=1.955$ ,  $df=14$ ,  $p<.05$ ) between cued ( $M=586\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=138$ ) and uncued ( $M=563\text{ms}$ ,  $SD=127$ ) RTs.

	SOA						
	140ms	230ms	350ms	450ms	600ms	2000ms	3200ms
Cued	570(149)	550(154)	564(147)	582(144)	588(129)	587(134)	586(138)
Uncued	586(145)	568(143)	554(143)	559(135)	571(153)	559(136)	563(127)
Cue Effect	-16	-18	10	23*	17	28*	23*

**Table 5. Mean of the median correct RTs and SD as a function of target location and SOA value**

Note: Cue effect =  $RT_{\text{cued}} - RT_{\text{uncued}}$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ .

### 3.5 Conclusion

The findings from Experiment 2 confirmed our hypothesis: when facilitation was reduced due to sensory masking, healthy control showed earlier onset of IOR, and most important, schizophrenia patients exhibited IOR even in the relatively short SOA (450 ms). Although, we did not include a central cue (Fuentes & Santiago, 1999) to summon back attention to the centre, schizophrenia patients were able to show inhibitory effects. Our findings suggest that previous reports of impaired IOR in schizophrenia may have been due to failure to observe the effect due to increased facilitation

(Gouzoulis-Mayfrank et al, 2004; Fuentes & Santiago, 1999; Sapir et al, 2001). Our findings also suggest that schizophrenia patients may not have problems to re-orient voluntary attention back to the centre, if this is a necessary condition to observe IOR (Posner & Cohen, 1984). Maybe schizophrenia patients, show increased facilitation because they cannot filter the information appearing to the cued location meaning that the cue –although non-informative- captures their attention for a longer time period. Thus, not only the facilitatory effect of the uninformative cue is bigger for patients but in addition it lasts for longer time intervals.

## 4. General Discussion

In two experiments we investigated inhibitory processes in schizophrenia, employing the typical Posner's (1980) procedure (Experiment 1) and a modification of it (Pratt et al, 2001) (Experiment 2). The results of Experiment 1, replicated previous findings on the IOR literature and schizophrenia (eg Huey & Wexler, 1994; Fuentes et al., 1999). Thus, patients showed increased and prolonged facilitation and absence of IOR even in long SOA values. Previous research (Fuentes & Santiago, 1999) has interpreted the above findings, as evidence of impaired re-orienting processes in schizophrenia. That is, when a non-informative cue is employed, schizophrenia patients would not be able to voluntarily re-orient their attention to the centre. Thus, Fuentes and Santiago (1999) showed that when a second central cue, which automatically summons back attention to the centre, is employed normal IOR is observed in schizophrenia. An alternative explanation may be that IOR is intact in these patients, but the effect cannot be normally observed due to increased facilitation that overlaps in time with the inhibition.

So, in Experiment 2 the cue was more intense than the target in order to produce sensory masking to reduce/eliminate facilitation (Pratt et al., 2001). In the healthy group, we replicated the finding of earlier onset of IOR (relative to Experiment 1). Furthermore, schizophrenia patients showed significant IOR effects and absence of significant facilitation. The above findings suggest that it is the increased facilitation, rather than the deficit re-orienting processes, that account for the impaired IOR in schizophrenia.

Last but not least, our findings suggest that three different processes may develop in parallel in this kind of paradigms: sensory inhibition, facilitation and attentional inhibition. The final effect observed will depend of the strength and timing of each of these effects. When there is no sensory masking, IOR is usually masked but a greater in magnitude facilitatory effect in schizophrenia patients. In a future experiment we aim to investigate further this assumption by dissociating sensory masking from facilitation and inhibition using the same stimuli of Experiment 2, but by presenting the cue and the target are in different positions within the box. This manipulation should prevent sensory masking from taking place, and thus we should observe similar findings to Experiment 1.

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# Climate Change and Health at a Local Level

Zuzana Klochanova<sup>1</sup>, Gabriel Gulis<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*The University of Trnava, Faculty of Health Care and Social Work, Department of Public Health, Univerzitne namestie 1, 918 43 Trnava, Slovakia, [zuzana.klochanova@truni.sk](mailto:zuzana.klochanova@truni.sk)*

<sup>2</sup>*University of Southern Denmark, Unit of Health Promotion Research, [Institute of Public Health](http://www.health.sdu.dk), Niels Bohrs Vej, DK-6700 Esbjerg, Denmark, [GGulis@health.sdu.dk](mailto:GGulis@health.sdu.dk)*

Climate change has direct and indirect impact on human health. The problem is growing and new deaths, injuries and illnesses related to it are on the rise. However, it is possible to mitigate this problem at a local level by taking appropriate actions and implementing policies. The first aim of the study is to evaluate how Trnava can mitigate the climate changes and its impact on human health by the decisions of the city's politicians, contributing to better health of its residents. A descriptive study was carried out through observation, data collection using a questionnaire survey and interviews with members of 2 city council commissions in Trnava city. The survey participation was 100%. From all 18 interviewed 12 knew, what is it climate change, 15 knew real source of emissions at Trnava city area, 11 pointed heat related diseases as an effect of the climate change, 7 agreed that Trnava city can reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 5 agreed that also Trnava city will be affected by climate change, 16 agreed that it is the responsibility of Trnava city to create policies to decrease greenhouse gas emissions, 11 treated building of city junctions and creation of green areas as activity to decrease greenhouse gas emissions.

## 1. Introduction

From the time of Hippocrates it is known that the climate has broad impact on human health. Improving knowledge about climate change process leads to increasing interest of scientists from health care area to identify potential mechanism of impact of the Climate change on human health (Haines, Kovats, Campbell-Lendrum, et al., 2006). The risks resulting from the Climate change are various and probably irreversible in relation with human being. It covers extreme weather events as the heatwaves, floods and storms. Next, it is long-lasting drought in many regions of the world and the melting of icebergs. Also, the sea level is rising and that leads to salination of the soil and the water. Infectious diseases, as malaria and diarrhea, but also protein-energetic malnutrition are the reason of more than 3 millions of deaths every year (Campbell-Lendrum, Corvalán, & Neira, 2007). It was estimated that the Climate change caused

in year 2000 more than 150 000 (or 0.3%) deaths and the lost of 5 500 000 (or 0.4%) DALY (Confalonieri & Menne, 2007).

A dominant pressure, that drives the climate change, involves the greenhouse gases. The global emissions of greenhouse gases produced by human activity increased between years 1970 and 2004 in 70%. The most important gas of these greenhouse gases those are produced by human activity is carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) (IPCC, 2007). Emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> have more than 30% interest in greenhouse effect (SAŽP, 2005). Global emission of CO<sub>2</sub> increased between years 1970 and 2004 at approximately 80% (from 21 Gt to 38 Gt). In this case, the most of emissions were produced during a period of last 10 years (IPCC, 2007). In Slovak republic in 2004 it was produced 83% of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions considered to be a product of human activity. The most important anthropogenic source of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in Slovak republic is in 95% burning and transformation of fossil fuels. The CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for one Slovak inhabitant per year are approximately in amount of 7,7 t. (SAŽP, 2005).

The sustainable development and the protection of healthy environment are essential for human health, but not only for future generation. To mitigate the consequences of the Climate change it is required to begin with good preventive strategy at local level (Campbell-Lendrum et al., 2007). Local initiative at individual, organizational, municipal, national and regional level can be helpful in many interventions with short time period of results return. Local sectors in regard to health of their inhabitants can exactly mobilize public to recognize and to react on climate change issues (Epstein & Rogers, 2004).

The first aim of the study was to evaluate how Trnava can mitigate the climate changes and its impact on human health by the decisions of the city's politicians, contributing to better health of its residents. The second aim is to determine knowledge, attitudes and practices of local politicians in relation to the Climate change and their impact to human health. Thirdly, to determine an interaction of knowledge and attitudes to politicians practice. And, to illustrate knowledge, attitudes and practice of local politicians in area of climate change with their impact to human health in the DPSEEA model.

## **2. Methods**

To reach the aims of the research it was selected a descriptive type of study. The research was created on a base of two types of models, where the first was a DPSEEA model (Driving Forces – Pressures – State – Exposure – Effects – Actions) that describes a system of environmental indicators and a KAP model (Knowledge – Attitude – Experiences).

To define interviewed population for this research it was used systematic selection. The respondents were selected according to their membership in commission of city municipality in the city Trnava. The commissions were selected according to their function of advisory, initiative and control establishments those are regulated by city council. They were selected two commissions – the Commission for Environment and Natural values and the Commission for Health and Social issues. The research included 18 members of both commissions where every commission consisted of 9 members.

The survey was carried out during February and March 2008 in Slovak city Trnava in the way of personal meeting. It was composed of three phases. Two phases, a questionnaire and an interview, were specialized on the topic of the climate change. These two phases obtained a qualitative data with an exception of demography. The questionnaire was designed by using the KAP model and the knowledge from the DPSEEA model. The questions in the third and the fourth part of the questionnaire created at the same time specific guide for standardized open-closed interview (Ulin, Robinson, & Tolley, 2004). The interview was voluntary part of the questionnaire and it was recorded on digital recorder. Thereafter, the recorded interview was rewritten to summary protocol (Hendl, 2005), where they were deleted or generalized specific parts of conversation. These specific parts of conversation were defined by different theme as the theme of survey. The questionnaire was translated into Slovak language from English script because of cooperation with Danish colleague, who carried out similar research in Danish city Esbjerg. The observation took time during a meeting and it was focused on a behavior and an attitude of respondent. Collected data were analyzed in ATLAS.ti 5.2, MS Office Excel 2003 and MS Office Word 2003.

### **3. Results**

#### ***3.1 Observations***

During realization of the survey, 9 respondents from 18 interviewed members of two selected commissions of city council were calm, while 8 from 9 calm respondents were disposed to cooperate and 1 was criticizing the theme of the survey. 6 from 18 respondents felt under time pressure at the moment of the interview. 3 from 18 respondents were markedly nervous because of the survey, but all of them were disposed to cooperate.

#### ***3.2 Demography***

The middle age of 18 respondents was 56 years. The youngest respondent was 31 years old and the oldest respondent was 74 years old. 15 from 18 respondents were academic educated and reached Master diploma or higher. 2 from 18 respondents reached Bachelor diploma and 1 respondent was secondary school educated.

#### ***3.3 Knowledge***

From 18 respondents who expected that they know what it is the Climate change, 12 really knew to explain what it means. From 17 respondents who expected that they know what forces drive the Climate change, 12 really described them. From 18 respondents who expected that they know the sources of greenhouse gas emissions in the Trnava city, 15 really recognized them. 5 respondents presented a nuclear power plant as the source of greenhouse gas emissions and 4 respondents presented general sources without relation to Trnava city. From 17 respondents who expected that they

know negative impacts of the Climate change on human health, 11 respondents listed as such an impacts a heat-related deaths and diseases caused by cardiovascular diseases, mental disorders, injuries caused by extreme weather events and skin cancer. Next, 6 from 17 respondents listed allergies, 5 from 17 respondents listed infectious diseases and 5 from 17 respondents listed other diseases. 14 from 18 respondents expected that the negative impacts of the Climate change on human health threaten also inhabitants of the city Trnava. 15 from 18 respondents expected that they know any action leading to decreasing of greenhouse gas emissions in the city Trnava.

### ***3.4 Attitude***

All 18 respondents agreed with a help for countries the most exposed to the Climate change. And also, that the research, monitoring, education and legislation are tools for mitigation and adaptation to the Climate change. 17 from 18 respondents agreed with an opinion that for decreasing of greenhouse gas emissions any policies in energy production, industry and agriculture are necessary. 16 from 18 respondents agreed with responsibility of the municipality to work with policies in energy production, industry and agriculture to decrease greenhouse gas emissions. And also, the same number of respondents agreed with possibility to limit energetic requirements in global perspective by change in the lifestyle, but with sustainable development in the industry. 15 from 18 respondents agreed with a possibility of adaptation to the Climate change in general. 14 from 18 respondents agreed with possibility of adaptation to the Climate change in the city Trnava and with a fact that it is a responsibility of the city to realize the research, monitoring, education and legislation to adapt on the Climate change and to decrease the greenhouse gas emissions. 11 from 18 respondents agreed with a possibility to stop increasing of greenhouse gas emissions and with a possibility to limit energetic requirements by change in the lifestyle with keeping the sustainable development in the industry at level of the city Trnava. 7 from 18 respondents agreed with a possibility to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the city Trnava and with a fact that also inhabitants of the city Trnava will be exposed to the Climate change.

### ***3.5 Experience***

From 18 respondents 11 expected that the city Trnava monitored the greenhouse gas emissions at its area. From 15 respondents who expected that the city Trnava did at least one activity to decrease greenhouse gas emissions from road traffic, 11 respondents presented building of road junctions in the city. 1 respondent presented a building of paths for bicycles, 4 respondents presented changes in parking system, 3 respondents presented creation of fluent traffic and 2 respondents presented education for inhabitants of the city Trnava focused on traffic. From 4 respondents who expected that the city Trnava did at least one activity to decrease greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture, 1 respondent presented a control of European Union criteria and 1 respondent presented education of farmers. 2 respondents did not know to explain their assumption in are of agriculture. From 8 respondents who expected that the city Trnava did at least one activity to decrease greenhouse gas emissions from energy production

6 respondents presented using a nuclear energy. 1 respondent presented using a natural gas and 1 respondent presented an education. From 11 respondents who expected that the city Trnava did at least one activity to decrease greenhouse gas emissions from private households, 3 respondents presented education of inhabitants, 3 respondents presented legislation of the city and 3 respondents presented fees for the city. 1 respondent presented a monitoring of inhabitants and 1 respondent presented using of natural gas in households. From 9 respondents who expected that the city Trnava did at least one activity to decrease greenhouse gas emissions from local industry, 3 respondents presented accreditation of local industry by the city. 1 respondent presented taxes in the city, 4 respondents presented monitoring of emissions and 1 respondent presented an education. From 15 respondents who expected that the city Trnava did at least one activity to increase the degradation of CO<sub>2</sub> by a green, 11 respondents presented the city investments into the green. 3 respondents presented the maintenance for the green of the city and 3 respondents presented a creation of green areas at the city.

## **4. Discussion**

The Climate change and the extreme weather events influence the human health by different ways. In August 2003 the heatwaves caused only in Europe more than 35 000 deaths. During last years European countries are stricken by still more frequent floods leading to deaths, injuries and different diseases. Besides, during last 30 years the pollen season was extended in Europe (Menne & Bertollini, 2005). The costs uprising by the Climate change also increase. And moreover, these costs have direct consequences on population productivity (Confalonieri et al., 2007). The Climate change is one of major issues at all levels of authorities, from global through national until local (Wilson, 2006). Effective strategies and policies used for prevention as well as for adaptation to the Climate change are necessary already at the local level (Confalonieri et al., 2007). The local authorities should center their endeavor to reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as well as to adaptation to the Climate change (Wilson, 2006).

By detection how the Slovak city Trnava can mitigate the climate changes and its impact on human health by the decisions of the city's politicians, contributing to better health of its residents, it was carried out the research with members of commissions of the city council. For the research they were selected two commissions according to their specialization on health and environment. These two commissions have function of advisory, initiative and control establishments and they are regulated by the city council. The participation at the research was 100%. All 18 respondents presented as a reason of their participation the curiosity about new and interesting theme of the Climate change.

### ***4.1 Knowledge***

One of the aims of the research was to recognize knowledge about the Climate change and their impact on human health by the city politicians. The research showed that from 18 respondents 12 really knew to describe the Climate change. These respondents

presented the Climate change approximately as statistically significant changes in average climate during longer period of time caused mostly by human activities (IPCC, 2007). They are recognized by change in average temperature, precipitation, extreme weather events and increasing sea level (Confalonieriet al., 2007). By detection, if respondents knew driving forces of the Climate change, 12 from 18 respondents pointed at least one of them. According to these answers it is possible to deduce that the respondents understand the theme. The driving forces, following the DPSEEA model (Soskolne & Broemling, 2002), are presented by global limits those are passed by population needs on energy, nutrition and industry. The detection, if the respondents knew any sources of greenhouse gas emissions, was striking when 5 from 18 respondents pointed as main source the nuclear power plant built at area of county. 11 from 18 respondents presented real sources at the area of the city those are traffic, industry and in small measure agriculture (KÚŽP, 2006). By detection of knowledge about negative health impact of the Climate change 17 from 18 presented at least one possible disease. But only 14 from 18 respondents supposed the inhabitants of the city Trnava to be exposed by these negative health impacts. The respondents mostly presented heat-related health impacts as deaths caused by cardiovascular diseases, deaths and injuries caused by extreme weather events, skin cancer, but also mental disorders. Next, they were presented allergies on pollen and mildew.

According to Haines, McMichael and Epstein (2003), at local level the direct impacts of the Climate change manifest as diseases, injuries and deaths caused by thermal stress and natural disasters. The indirect health impacts at local level manifest as changes in distribution of vector-born infectious diseases, in quality and number of available water sources, in changes of agro-ecosystems productivity and also in movement of population threatened by hunger or by rising sea level.

The research also detected the knowledge of the respondents about any general protection that can lead to decreasing of greenhouse gas emissions. Mostly they were presented changes in using and fluency of traffic, in using of filters in traffic and industry, and also changes in infrastructure and in using of alternative sources of energy. The respondents offered similar actions also in focus on the city Trnava. According to Australian government, it is necessary a dual approach at local level. It means administration and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation of existing actions to reduce exposure of inhabitants to negative impacts of the Climate change (SMEC, 2007).

#### ***4.2 Attitude***

All 18 respondents agreed with a help in adaptation for countries mostly threatened by the Climate change. But only 7 from 18 respondents expected negative health impact on inhabitants of the city Trnava. All 18 respondents also agreed with research, monitoring, education and legislation as a tool to decrease the greenhouse gas emissions and to help to adaptation to the Climate change. But only 14 from 18 respondents also expected the research, monitoring, education and legislation as a responsibility of the Trnava municipality. Almost all 18 respondents agreed with a fact that for decreasing of the greenhouse gas emissions it is necessary the legislation in energy production, industry and agriculture at global level as well as at level of the city

Trnava. 16 from 18 respondents agreed with a possibility to limit energetic needs by the change of the lifestyle at global level, but only 11 from 18 respondents agreed with this attitude at level of the city Trnava. 11 from 18 respondents also agreed with an opinion that general increasing of greenhouse gas production in the world can be stopped. But only 7 from 18 respondents agreed with the same opinion at level of the city Trnava. 15 from 18 respondents believe in possibility to adapt on the Climate change. And 14 from 18 respondents believe in possibility to adapt on the Climate change also in the city Trnava.

### ***4.3 Experience***

The aim of this part of the research was to discover how the respondents use their knowledge about the Climate change in practice with influence of their attitude to this theme. 7 from 18 respondents expected that the city Trnava monitored the greenhouse gas emissions at its area, but they had no knowledge about methods of monitoring neither about using of monitored data.

By signing of the Kyoto protocol Slovak republic has a responsibility to register and inventory the greenhouse gases including the emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>. But only available data of CO<sub>2</sub> are limited for Slovak republic as the unit. They are not available any data focused on the city Trnava those would give an information about concrete sources of CO<sub>2</sub> in this city (SAŽP, 2005).

By detection if the city Trnava did any action to decrease the greenhouse gas emissions from the road traffic, 11 from 18 respondents presented a building of road junctions. The road junctions should decrease a density in center of the city, but it does not influence a behavior of inhabitants in frequency of using motor transportation. It is also not clear, if the road junctions, those take the traffic out of the city, can significantly decrease the greenhouse gas production. Only 2 respondents presented in this issue an education and only 1 respondent presented a building of paths for bicycles at area of the city. But in Slovak republic in 2005 the road traffic was 16% producer from all anthropogenic emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> (SHMU, 2007). To improve this situation, it is necessary to support public traffic and active traffic as bicycles or walk (Campbell-Lendrum et al., 2007). By detection if the city Trnava did any action to decrease the greenhouse gas emissions from the agriculture the research showed that 10 from 18 respondents do not any action in this issue. But the area of county of Trnava belongs in areas mostly used for agriculture (KÚŽP, 2007). By detection if the city Trnava did any action to decrease the greenhouse gas emissions from the energy production, 10 from 18 respondents had no knowledge about this issue. But in Slovak republic in 2005 the energy production was 75% producer from all anthropogenic emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> (SHMU, 2007). By detection if the city Trnava did any action to decrease the greenhouse gas emissions from a private households, 3 respondents presented an education of the city inhabitants, 3 respondents presented city legislation in this issue and 3 respondents presented fees for inhabitants of the city. In 2000 it was carried out similar research based on KAP model in Canada, but with the inhabitants. This research discovered that the majority of inhabitants of Alberta is interested in health impacts caused by polluted environment and air, but they are only partially informed about environmental issues. According to the author of the research it is needed a

media support (Plotnikoff, Wright, & Karunamuni, 2007). It is probable that households would be more interested about theme of the Climate change, if they were supported by the city. The education about negative health impact of the Climate change is not sufficient, if the city does not provide possibilities for its inhabitants to influence this impact. By detection if the city Trnava did any action to decrease the greenhouse gas emissions from the local industry the respondents mostly presented the monitoring and accreditation. But in Slovak republic in 2005 the industry was 9% producer from all anthropogenic emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> (SHMU, 2007). By detection if the city Trnava did at least one activity to increase the degradation of CO<sub>2</sub> by a green, 11 from 18 respondents consider an investment into green as important activity. One of possibilities how to influence the impact of the Climate change, as for example a natural disasters, it is appropriate planning of the city infrastructure and good policy for limitation of deforestation and obliteration of green areas (Campbell-Lendrum et al., 2007).

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# Social Functions of Amusement

*Kuba Kryś,*

*Institute of Psychology of Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities*

*'Maybe we will never create general theory of emotions and we will have to focus on separate theory for each emotion which will let us understand its specific character.'*

Paul Ekman 'The Nature of Emotion'

Retranslation from polish issue.

**The purpose of below described research project is to show that positive emotions have rather different effects in social life and are based on different mechanisms than negative emotions do. Moreover positive emotions are distinct among themselves – there are quality differences between them and they shall not be treated only as a positive mood. Research inspired by the Fredrickson's *Broad-and-Built Theory of Positive Emotions* revealed that for example amusement serves as a social courage engine.**

## 1. Introduction

The mission of one of the latest brands of psychology - positive psychology - is to understand and foster the factors that allow individuals, communities, and societies to flourish (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). The focus is on developing human well-being knowledge. What role do positive emotions play in this field of interests?

Negative emotions have adaptive functions and evoke automatic specific behavior tendencies. Emotion theorists (Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991) postulated that generally emotions relate with specific action tendencies. For example anger creates tendency to attack, fear and anxiety link with the flight/fight eagerness and disgust links with the urge to expel.

Although this point of view is mainly based on the research and data for negative emotions, specific action tendencies have been invoked to describe the function of specific positive emotions as well. For example, joy is linked with aimless activation, contentment with inactivity and interest with attending (Frijda, 1986). Is this explanation satisfactory?

Fredrickson (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998) claims that 'the action tendencies identified for positive emotions are notably vague and underspecified'. Contrary to this traditional approach Fredrickson (1998, 2001) developed new theoretical model which she called *The Broaden-and-Built Theory of Positive Emotions*.

‘This theory states that certain discrete positive emotions — including joy, interest, contentment, pride, and love — although phenomenologically distinct, all share the ability to broaden people’s momentary thought-action repertoires and build their enduring personal resources, ranging from physical and intellectual resources to social and psychological resources’ (Fredrickson 2001). She supports this point of view with numerous discoveries and research.

How does it happen? How do we build our resources through the positive emotions?

As most of negative emotions have distinct face-mimic signals (Ekman 1992) most of positive emotions are ‘labeled’ with the same mimic expression – smile. The nature of smiling is closely bounded to Social Psychology. For example one of the Ekman’s co-workers – Fridlund – showed (Fridlund 1991) that people react with smile in the real or only believed presence of other people.

Moreover, Fridlund (1994) claims that smile is a communicate. Hence if smile is a communicate and communication is an act between at least two parties then we may assume that at least some of positive emotions – those responsible for most episodes of smiling – are social behavior episodes.

I believe that we shall look for explanations of how some positive emotions work and what are their functions in the Social Psychology area. The second crucial step for understanding positive emotions shall be grounded in the Cognitive Psychology field – as negative emotions are relatively more automatic than positive do, positive emotionality is based on complex interpretations of our social environment. It is extremely interesting what happens in our cognition when we feel different positive emotions.

When looking for information about the effects of positive emotions in social behaviors the most important discovery says that happy mood leads to mindlessness (Mackie & Worth, 1989). Happy moods are associated with heuristic processing strategies, whereas sad moods are associated with systematic elaboration of information (Bless et al., 1996). I believe that this knowledge shall be yet developed.

## **2. Initial Predictions on Functions of Positive Emotions**

Trying to understand and clarify what is the role of positive emotions I would like to suggest a preliminary explanation for their functions. This theory shall be treated only as an inspiration and material for discussion. Of course it creates a lot of methodological troubles (e.g., what is happiness?), nonetheless I would like to present it to show the way of thinking that led me to the next described experiments and results. Under no circumstances would I like now to defend this theory as a final model for positive emotions’ functions.


I believe that from functional point of view, positive emotions may be divided into at least three main groups.

The first group of positive emotions works as a ‘lubricant’ for social interactions – this group covers amusement, *amae*, acceptance, love, hope, happiness, joy... and I would like to leave this list unclosed to feel free to attach another emotions<sup>1</sup>.

The second group of positive emotions works as a mechanism for ‘gearing and sustaining’ our behaviors – flow, fascination, interest, contentment, hope, joy, happiness, love... The second group emotions have similar function to the stress reaction. The difference is that stress reaction is highly adaptive in the threat or dangerous situation and the above mentioned emotions are gears for our behaviors in unthreatening situations.

The third group of positive emotions – relief, pride, happiness – may be the effect of ‘cleaning’ our bodies from negative emotions.

The below presented figure (fig. 1) is an illustration to the above presented ideas.



**Figure 1. Suggested functions of positive emotions**

Of course a careful researcher will notice that there are emotions – for example happiness – that are included in more than just one group. That is the best example of methodological need for clarifications. Happiness is a label that in many languages fits different feelings. I may feel happy either when I tell the jokes with my friends (lubricant function) or when reading fascinating book (gearing my behavior) or due to successful finish of dangerous situation (cleaning function).

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<sup>1</sup> This functionality would clarify the Mackie and Worth (1989) and Bless (1996) results explaining why we use heuristic processing strategies in a happy mood. When using simplifying heuristics we may assess other people more favorably and this way easily become fond of them. As we do not focus on systematic understanding it is easier not to find disadvantages. If we are not thorough it is easier to like someone – heuristic approach lubricates our social interactions.

Happiness is an example of situation when one label may cover different more specific emotions (amusement, fascination, relief). This complication rises a set of vital and important methodological questions. I will surely try to meet them in another presentation.

Theories need to be proofed. As above suggested theory is a complex model it will need a highly developed research project. Let's see what are the first steps. I have chosen one of the positive emotions – amusement – and tried to answer the question: if amusement is 'lubricant' to social interactions how does it work then?

### 3. Social Functions of Amusement

What for people tell the jokes and what is the role of having fun? Do we do it just to become more heuristic and less accurate in thinking?

As indicated previously I assumed that the amusement is an emotion that mainly appears in social interactions. Less frequently we feel amused alone. Does amusement influence the quality of our social relations and if so what are the mechanisms underlying such effects? First step to answer those questions was done with the help of radio reporter.

#### *Experiment 1*

In June 2008 I have done the natural experiment in the main communication passageway of the campus of Politechnika Łódzka (Technical University in Łódź which is one of the biggest cities in Poland).

I impersonated the 'psychology books' publisher and asked passer-by's to help assess some pictures ('*we work on book about emotions and want to begin each chapter with some corresponding picture*'). Participants (75 individuals) were randomly assigned to one of three groups: AMUSEMENT (assessed 8 funny pictures of one of the best polish comic drawer), SENSITIVITY (assessed 8 photos of beautiful sunrises, waterfalls or high snowy mountains) and close to emotionally NEUTRAL (assessed 8 chinese idiograms).

The second part of experiment was conducted by radio reporter who 30 meters further 'independently' asked for an interview participants of my picture-assessment task. The question she stated was 'what are your holidays plans?'

I hoped to find that:


- a) amused participants would be more willing to take part in a radio-interview (higher agreeableness as 'lubricant' for social interactions), or
- b) amused participants would tell more (longer) in a radio-interview (higher extravert behaviors as 'lubricant' for social interactions), or
- c) reports of amused participants would be more intimate (higher intimacy as 'lubricant' for social interactions), or

d) amused participants would be more willing to leave their contact-data (higher willing to maintain relation as ‘lubricant’ for social interactions).

None of those predictions turned out to be apt.

However amused participants started their speech more glibly – without ‘mhm’, ‘eee’, ‘aahm’ at the beginning (see graph 1). It sounded as if they were more courageous.

**Problems at the beginning of an interview**



in both cases  $p < 0.05$

**Graph 1. Participants in AMUSEMENT condition easily started their answers in a radio interview (percentage of people who said ‘mhm’, ‘eee’, ‘aahm’ at the beginning of an interview).**

May the amusement serve as a social courage engine? This observation became an inspiration for the next experiments.

## ***Experiment 2***


In October 2008 we have done the natural experiment at the main promenade of Łódź. This time participants (50 individuals) were asked to take part in the TV interview after assessing funny pictures (AMUSEMENT condition) or beautiful pictures (SENSITIVITY condition). They answered two questions ‘which values are important to you?’ and ‘what do you do to accomplish those values?’

In the front of camera at the pavement we stuck over a meter long line. Participants were asked ‘please stand somewhere at this line in such a distance that you feel comfortable with camera’. At this line we have discretely marked 7 distances (one set2 long) and noted where each participant stood (closest toe was decisive).

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
<sup>2</sup> Setts at the promenade in Łódź are about 25 cm long.

It turned out, that participants in the AMUSEMENT condition stood significantly closer to the camera than in SENSITIVITY condition (see graph 2).



**Graph 2. Distance to camera chosen by participants depending on emotional condition.**

At this experiment we have also noticed gender differences. Tendency to standing closer to camera in the AMUSEMENT condition was strong mainly among men (see graph 3).



**Graph 3. Distance to camera chosen by male participants depending on emotional condition.**

On the other hand the effect found in the first experiment – easy start of answering to the interview question among amused participants – disappeared. Why? May it be that amused participants were more courageous but when standing closer to the camera they have ‘consumed’ this courage?

### ***Experiments 3 and experiment 4***

Previous results need explanations. May the gender differences be the effect of gender interaction (both experimenters in 2<sup>nd</sup> experiment were male)? On the other hand is it like this that amusement is some kind of asset which participants might have ‘used up’ when standing closer to the camera?

Experiment 3 and experiment 4 were conducted on the same day in January 2009. They were led by two female experimenters (to exclude the explanation that gender effects appeared due to gender interaction). Experiment 3 was replication of experiment 2 with the only change in stated question. This time we inquired: ‘tell us about the situation in which you behave courageously’ (I still hope to find some quality differences in participants’ statements). Experiment 4 was designed similarly to experiment 3 but instead of letting participants choose distance to camera we fixed it at short length (ca. 60 cm). In experiment 4 there was one additional component: after interview we asked the participants whether the camera intimidate them. In each experiment we interviewed 50 individuals so that day we did 100 camera interviews.

Results of experiment 3 are flimsy. We have found only slight tendency ( $p=0.17$ ) that amused men stood closer to camera than amused women. This tendency would be preliminary proof that it is not a gender interaction that is responsible for higher men courage in the above described amusement conditions. Furthermore – as predicted – there was no effect of easiness of beginning the interview-speech.


On the other hand we did not notice predicted differences in choosing the distance to camera depending on the emotional condition. The lack of predicted result I explain with the influence of a camera-woman. The experimenter who operated the camera and led the interview was a very nice and intelligent girl but... physically she looked extremely like a boy and it might have confused most of participants. I hope to support this explanation in the next replication that will be conducted by another more-female person working as an interviewer.

Experiment 4 on the other hand strongly supported predicted results. Interviewees in an AMUSEMENT condition begun their speech more easily – they more scarcely used ‘hesitation’ strategies<sup>3</sup> (see graph 4).

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<sup>3</sup> As a ‘hesitation’ strategy I understand all uncertain behaviors at the beginning of an interview: f.e. repeating the question, saying ‘Oh! It is difficult question...’ or beginning with ‘mhm’, ‘eehm’ etc.

### Easily starting the speech



**Graph 4. Participants in AMUSEMENT condition more easily started their answers to the camera**

(% of people who did not use 'hsitance' strategy at the beginning of an interview).


The above result fits previous puzzles. If participants were allowed to choose the distance to dready object (camera in experiments 2 and 3) then amused people stood closer and there were no differences at the beginning of interview-speech as they had already consumed their 'courage asset' on approaching camera closer. Yet when distance to dready object (camera in experiment 4 and microphone in experiment 1) was fixed, the amused participants still had some 'courage asset' that let them start their speech easily.

Another important result from the experiment 4 is that participants were in a different way intimidated by the camera (see graph 5). In SENSITIVITY condition there were no differences between male and female participants. Yet in AMUSEMENT condition there was significant difference ( $p=0.001$ ).

May it happen that women are not encouraged when amused? Women were as courageous as men when beginning their interview-speech. Therefore women are courageous when amused, but in the above task they probably did not feel good.

I would like to suggest some preliminary explanation of this phenomenon that will take into consideration the nature of the above tasks. Giving an interview is more congruent with stereotypically male behavior and activities. I believe that if we give more stereotypically female tasks than women will show higher courage increment than men will do. This explanation of course requires supportive research that will show higher female courage in a typically women tasks.

### Embarrassment with camera



$p=0.001$  for AMUSEMENT condition;  
 $p\sim 0.1$  (at the level of tendency) in the in-gender comparisons.

**Graph 5. Amusement caused strong differences in embarrassment by the camera**

(0 – ‘camera did not intimidate me’; 3 – ‘camera intimidated me’).

## 4. Summary

The above described experiments are the beginning of my Ph.D. research project. It requires yet a lot of work to do, nonetheless obtained results show that amusement may serve as a social courage engine.

Discovered gender differences require yet good explanation supported by diligent research but it seems quite reasonable that as men and women have different behavior patterns then those differences may influence the way amusement-related courage becomes visible.

Idea that our amusement-related courage is volatile asset also requires further research and it also sounds promising for next steps of project.

Of course to support the above described results further research with altered ways of raising the emotion and different stimuli are required, as well as comparisons to other positive emotions and yet another indicators of courage. Nonetheless I believe that described experiments may lead to strong evidences that amusement works as a social courage engine.

Further steps shall be also made in the Cognitive Psychology area as positive emotions are based on more complex cognitive interpretations than negative emotions do.

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# Smoking Policies in Albanian Schools: Perceptions of Smoking and Nonsmoking Teachers and Students

*Erika Melonashi<sup>1</sup>, Angelos Rodafinos<sup>2</sup>, Lambros Lazuras<sup>1</sup>, Richard Eiser<sup>3</sup>, and Martin Zlatev<sup>1</sup>*

*<sup>1</sup>South East European Research Centre, Greece*

*<sup>2</sup>City Liberal Studies Affiliated Institution of the University of Sheffield, Greece*

*<sup>3</sup>University of Sheffield, United Kingdom*

**By law smoking is banned from all educational settings in Albania. The aim of the present study was to examine differences in the perceptions of Albanian teachers and students regarding the smoking ban. The sample consisted of 495 students and 140 teachers from four Albanian schools. The items analyzed for the purpose of the study were adopted from the Global School Personnel Survey. Teachers and students were compared in awareness of the smoking ban, agreement with the ban, perceived strictness of implementation, and perceived role of the teacher in ban reinforcement. Results showed that teachers were more aware than students about the teachers' ban but there were no differences for the students' ban. They showed more agreement with the ban, perceived it as being more strictly implemented and also differed from students in the reports of the measures taken in cases of violation of the ban. The findings suggest various ways for improving the implementation of the antismoking policy in schools, through the involvement of both teachers and students in the process.**

## **1. Introduction**

Smoking is one of the major causes of preventable death worldwide (Taylor & Bettcher, 2000). The scientific evidence documenting the harmful health effects of both direct and passive smoking (see US Surgeon General's Report, 2006) has increased the need for legal control of the smoking epidemic. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control represents the most extensive and effective effort in this direction (World Health Organization, 2003). Countries that have signed and ratified this convention have taken upon them the responsibility to control the health, social, environmental and economic consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure (WHO, 2003). Albania has signed and ratified the Convention in April, 2006; therefore, presently the Albanian legislation on smoking prohibits this behaviour in all indoor public places, including educational settings.

Educational settings represent a very important influence as regards the acquisition of healthy behaviours by the new generation. Studies investigating smoking initiation show that the majority of smokers have taken up the habit during the school years (Filice, Joseph, Hannan, & Lando, 2003; Kobus, 2003). Indeed, the probability for taking up smoking at an adult age is significantly lower as compared to adolescence (Tingle, De Simone, & Covington, 2003). Hence, the introduction of smoking bans acquires major importance in these settings.

Studies from other countries have documented very positive effects after the introduction of the ban especially in terms of a decreasing smoking prevalence among students (Lovato, Sabiston, Hadd, Nykiforuk, & Campbell, 2007; Moore, Roberts, & Tudor-Smith, 2001). However, research findings suggest that the existence of the ban is associated with positive outcomes only when it is strongly enforced, and when it is accompanied by policies addressing teacher smoking as well (Wakefield et al., 2000). Indeed, there is evidence that schools allowing smoking by staff have greater difficulties in implementing the ban for students (Pickett, Northrup, & Ashley, 1999). For instance, Trinidad, Gilpin, and Pierce (2005) concluded that student smokers who see teachers engage in smoking behaviour in the school setting are less likely to favour the smoking ban. They suggested that students are especially sensitive to double standards, which raise questions on the validity of the ban in the first place, that is, why is it acceptable for teachers but not for students?

In addition to a negative attitude towards the ban, smoking by staff is also associated to an actual increase in smoking rates among adolescents. More specifically, there is evidence that students exposed to teachers smoking have an increased probability of being daily smokers (Piontek et al., 2007; Poulsen et al., 2002). These results have been explained in terms of modelling behaviour (Lantz, et al., 2000). Indeed, as demonstrated in research involving smoking parents and siblings, modelling is a good predictor of smoking behaviour; in fact, daily smoking among adolescents is associated with both parental and sibling smoking (e.g., Barnett et al., 1992; Botvin, Baker, Goldberg, Dusenbury, & Botvin, 1992; Dusenbury, et al., 1992). School teachers and administrators are also very important socialization agents. They represent an extremely influential group for tobacco control due to the daily interactions they have with students (Oetting & Donnermeyer, 1998; The GTSS Collaborative Group, 2006). Therefore, controlling teachers' smoking means controlling adolescents' level of exposure to this behaviour. Indeed it has been suggested that smoking initiation in adolescence is a prevalence-driven behaviour depending on the extent to which adolescents come to contact with others displaying the behaviour (Rowe, Chassin, Presson, Edwards, & Sherman, 1992). Therefore, restricting exposure to smoking models (students as well as teachers) through the introduction of antismoking policies provides an effective means for smoking prevention (Wold, Torsheim, Currie, & Roberts, 2004).

Nonetheless, so far in Albania there has been no research examining the effectiveness of introducing the antismoking policy; a particularly important aspect to consider has to do with feedback from the implementation receivers, i.e., students' and teachers' opinions regarding the smoking ban. Addressing both perspectives is quite interesting considering that now by law, smoking is now prohibited for teachers too. Therefore, potential discrepancies between teachers and students regarding awareness and implementation of the ban might provide useful insight in current practices in schools.

Hence, the purpose of the present study was to examine differences between Albanian teachers and students (both smokers and nonsmokers) in awareness of the smoking ban, agreement with the ban, opinions regarding the strictness of implementation of the ban, and perceptions regarding the teachers' role to reinforce the ban. Considering the different roles of students and teachers, it was expected that overall, teachers would be more aware of the antismoking policies, would tend to agree more with the ban, and would perceive its implementation as stricter compared to students. Differences in the perceptions of the teachers' role in reinforcing the ban were expected as well. Finally, considering the possible influence of smoking status on the present variables, smoking and non-smoking teachers and students were compared separately.

## 2. Method

### 2.1 Participants

Five Albanian schools were randomly selected from the list of all schools in the capital, Tirana. Four of them agreed to participate in the study. Participants were 510 students attending 6<sup>th</sup> to 10<sup>th</sup> grade. Nonetheless, 15 participants were excluded due to missing or invalid responses (e.g., contradictory answers). Hence, the final sample consisted of 495 students, 237 males and 254 females ( $M_{age} = 14$ ,  $SD = 1.46$ ). The teachers of the respective schools also participated in the study. All of them agreed to participate but 10 questionnaires were excluded due to missing or invalid responses. Hence the final sample consisted of 140 teachers, 27 males and 113 females ( $M_{age} = 43.2$ ,  $SD = 10.5$ ).

### 2.2 Materials

A pupil and a teacher questionnaire were developed, including a number of common items, as well as specific ones. The items analyzed for the purpose of the present study were common for both questionnaires and were adopted from the Global School Personnel Survey (The GTSS Collaborative Group, 2006).

*Awareness of the smoking ban* was measured with one item, "Does your school have a policy or rule specifically prohibiting tobacco use among students/teachers on school premises?" with response options *Yes*, *No*, and *Don't know*.

*Agreement with the ban* was measured with the items "Do you think that schools should have a policy or rule specifically prohibiting tobacco use among students/teachers on school premises?" with response options from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

*Opinions regarding the implementation* of the policy were measured through the item "How strictly is the policy on prohibiting tobacco use among students /teachers implemented?" with response options from 1 (*very strictly*) to 4 (*not strictly at all*).

Finally, *the teachers' role* in reinforcing the ban was examined using the stem "If a teacher sees a pupil smoking (s)he... followed by four items: a) asks the pupil to put off

the cigarette, b) reports the pupil to the headmaster, c) calls the parents, d) does nothing,” with response options ranging from 1 (*never*) to 6 (*almost always*).

### **2.3 Procedure**

The data collection procedure lasted two weeks. Questionnaires were administered by research assistants, in collaboration with the respective school psychologists or social workers. The data collection process was conducted according to the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (American Psychological Association, 1992). Students and teachers were approached in the school setting, and were asked to complete anonymous self-report questionnaires. Participants were provided with information about the topic of study through the related sheet prepared by the researcher. They were also assured about their right to withdraw at any time and that the results would be anonymous and confidential.

### **2.4 Design and Analyses**

A between subjects design with two groups, teachers and students, was used. Four dependent variables (i.e., awareness of the smoking ban, attitude towards the ban, perceived strictness of implementation, and perceived role of the teacher in ban reinforcement) were compared.

Considering the different sample sizes and the skewed distribution of data (Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were significant), nonparametric tests were used to compare the two groups. The analyses were run separately for smoking and nonsmoking teachers and students to control for the effect that smoking status might have on the dependent variables.

## **3. Results**

### **3.1 Descriptive Data**

Reported smoking rates for students and teachers were 9.5% and 12.9% respectively. Students showed good awareness of the ban for students (85% were aware of the students' ban) but less awareness of the ban for teachers (only 39.7% were aware of the teachers' ban, while 46% reported that they did not know). Furthermore, they reported higher agreement with the ban for students rather than for teachers ( $M_{as} = 4.55$ ,  $SD = .88$ ;  $M_{at} = 4.13$ ,  $SD = 1$ ). Additionally, they perceived the implementation of the ban for students as somewhere between 'strict' and 'not that strict,' and that for teachers as tending more towards 'not very strict' ( $M_{sp} = 2.52$ ,  $SD = 1$ ;  $M_{st} = 2.82$ ,  $SD = 1$ ). As regards the teachers' role in reinforcing the ban, students reported that they thought the teacher "asks the pupil to put off the cigarette, reports the pupil to the headmaster, and calls the parents" frequently ( $M \sim 4$  in all cases) and that only rarely "the teacher does nothing" ( $M = 2$ ,  $SD = 1.47$ ).

Teachers on the other hand, showed very good awareness of the ban for students (90.3% reported the existence of a ban) but less awareness of the ban for teachers (only 62.5% were aware of the teachers' ban). Furthermore, they showed strong agreement about the ban for students, but agreed less with the ban for teachers ( $M_{as} = 4.88$ ,  $SD = .44$ ;  $M_{at} = 4.37$ ,  $SD = .97$ ). Additionally, teachers perceived that the ban was 'strictly' implemented for students but 'not very strictly' implemented for teachers ( $M_{ss} = 1.94$ ,  $SD = .90$ ;  $M_{st} = 2.70$ ,  $SD = .96$ ). As regards the teachers' role in reinforcing the ban, they reported "asking the pupil to put off the cigarette" and "calling the students' parents" as occurring frequently ( $M = 4$ ,  $SD = 1.5$ ), "reporting to the headmaster" occurring sometimes ( $M = 3.14$ ,  $SD = 1.67$ ) and "teacher does nothing" as occurring rarely to never ( $M = 1.5$ ,  $SD = 1.1$ ).

### 3.2 Differences between teachers and students

*Awareness of the Ban.* Teachers and students were both fully aware of the existence of the ban for students, but differed in awareness of the ban for teachers. Specifically, teachers showed higher awareness of the teacher ban, as compared to students, who were more likely to state they did not know whether teachers were allowed to smoke ( $U = 18953$ ,  $N_s = 439$ ,  $N_t = 116$ ,  $p < .01$ , two-tailed significance). The same pattern was found for both smokers and nonsmokers.

*Agreement with the Ban.* Nonsmoking teachers tended to show more agreement with nonsmoking students towards both pupil and teacher bans ( $U_{sban} = 20956.5$ ,  $N_s = 439$ ,  $N_t = 116$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $U_{tban} = 20586.5$ ,  $N_s = 439$ ,  $N_t = 116$ ,  $p < .01$ , both two-tailed significance tests). However, smoking students and teachers did not differ significantly in their attitude, which was nonetheless positive (see mean values).

*Perceived Strictness of Implementation of the Ban.* Nonsmoking students perceived the ban for students as less strict than nonsmoking teachers ( $U_{sban} = 17913$ ,  $N_s = 430$ ,  $N_t = 115$ ,  $p < .001$ , two-tailed significance). However, both students and teachers perceived the teachers' ban as not very strict.

On the other hand, smoking students as compared to smoking teachers perceived both teachers' and students' bans as less strict ( $U_{sban} = 167.5$ ,  $N_s = 45$ ,  $N_t = 18$ ,  $p < .001$ ;  $U_{tban} = 230$ ,  $N_s = 43$ ,  $N_t = 17$ ,  $p < .05$ , both two-tailed significance tests).

*Perceived Teachers' Role in Reinforcing the Ban.* Both smoking and non-smoking students and teachers differed in their perceptions of the actions that teachers would take in case of violations. Specifically, two outcomes, "The teacher does nothing" and "The teacher reports the pupil to the headmaster," were reported to occur significantly more frequently by students than teachers ( $U_t = 14310.5$ ,  $N_s = 443$ ,  $N_t = 84$ ,  $p < .001$ ;  $U_t = 18167$ ,  $N_s = 477$ ,  $N_t = 101$ ,  $p < .001$ , two-tailed significance tests). However, there were no differences in the two other outcomes (i.e., "the teacher asks the student to put off the cigarette, the teacher calls the students parents"), which were reported to occur frequently by both groups (see mean values).

## 4. Discussion

The purpose of the present study was to examine differences between teachers and students in awareness of the smoking ban, agreement with the ban, opinions regarding the strictness of implementation, and perceptions regarding the teachers' role in reinforcing the ban in smoking and non-smoking teachers and students. As discussed below, the results partially supported the hypotheses.

*Awareness of the Ban.* Findings suggest that both students and teachers have a good awareness of the ban for students, yet they differ in awareness of the ban for teachers. Specifically, students appeared to be less aware of the ban for teachers. However, it should be noted that although teachers, compared to students were more aware of the policy for teachers, reported levels of awareness were still quite low (only 62% report the existence of the teachers' ban). These findings suggest the need for a more explicit communication about the policy as regards teachers' smoking, which should address teachers as well as students. Indeed, it is important that students receive the message that smoking in school premises is unacceptable for everyone, including teachers. Nonetheless, increasing levels of awareness should be accompanied with good implementation of the policy (especially in terms of measures taken in cases of violation) in order to produce positive outcomes such as a reduction of smoking prevalence (e.g., Piontek et al., 2007; Poulsen et al., 2002).

*Agreement with the Ban.* Findings showed that nonsmoking teachers, compared to nonsmoking students, tend to agree more with both the teachers' and the students' ban. These results may be explained in terms of the different roles of teachers and students. Typically, teachers are part of the system that creates and enforces rules in general and the ban in particular. On the other hand, students represent those who have to comply with the rules, generally without any participation in the decisions. The rebellious tendencies appearing in adolescence, quite frequently against any perceived restrictions of freedom might explain students' disagreement with both the students' and the teachers' bans. However, the fact that smoking teachers and students did not differ in their level of agreement with the ban is rather worrying, especially since it might interfere with smoking teachers' role in the implementation of the policy. This finding suggests the need for interventions aimed at teachers who smoke, in order to educate them about the necessity of the policy and their health promoting role towards the students, and perhaps, to assist them in quitting smoking altogether.

*Opinions Regarding Strictness of Implementation.* Students and teachers also differed in their perceptions of how strictly the policy is implemented; indeed teachers tended to report a significantly stricter implementation of the ban as compared to students. A possible explanation could be that students are probably more in contact with other smoking students than teachers are, e.g., they might smoke in zones rarely frequented by teachers. However, this finding is particularly important as reported by smoking students. The discrepancy in perceptions might suggest that the actual impact of the policy on students' behaviour might not be as strict as teachers claim. However, the findings could be due to social desirability effects, in a way that teachers report a stricter policy just to provide a good image of their schools.

Another possible explanation is related to differences in the perceptions of teachers and students as regards the strictness of the particular measures taken in cases of violation of the ban. Although both teachers and students report the same measures as occurring most frequently (i.e., “the teacher asks the student to put off the cigarette, calls the parents, and reports the student to the headmaster”), their respective perceptions of how strict these measures are might be different (e.g., putting of the cigarette might not be considered as a strict measure by students). This issue should be carefully addressed in future studies, since it is especially important to know whether the measures are considered as effective by students themselves.

Furthermore, teachers and students differ in their reports on the option ‘the teacher does nothing,’ which is reported more frequently by the latter. Nonetheless, the difference is not very worrisome, since students report this as occurring rarely and teachers rarely to never. Still, the present findings suggest that although rarely, it can nonetheless occur that teachers do not react against noncompliance; this kind of behaviour no matter how rare might raise questions on the validity of the school policy and reinforce noncompliance behaviour. Indeed, behavioural experiments show that inconsistency of punishment negatively reinforces behaviour (e.g., Van Prooijen, Gallucci, & Toeset, 2008).

However, since the present findings suggest that teachers generally have high awareness of the students ban and positive attitude towards it, they can be considered as very suitable implementation agents. Hence, failure to react against noncompliance behaviour might be due to their status as smokers or confusion regarding the specific roles and duties in the particular context. Whatever the explanation, it is quite important to clarify teachers’ roles and duties in enforcing the smoking ban. The organization of particular activities within or between schools or the preparation of leaflets and brochures might provide a good way to actively engage teachers in the antismoking battle.

The present findings should be considered in the context of the limitations of the study. These include the measures used and the recruited sample. In regard to the first shortcoming, single items were used to measure certain variables of interest. Future studies should use multiple items to increase the reliability of the measures. Secondly, since the schools were all from the capital city, the findings may not apply to rural Albanian schools. Tirana is quite different from smaller cities in Albania in terms of social and economical development. Therefore, it is suggested that the study should be replicated in other cities of Albania as well.

Despite its limitations, the present study is the first one addressing perceptions of antismoking policies in educational settings in Albania from the perspective of both students and teachers. As such, it provides important directions for future research and suggests various ways in which the implementation of the antismoking policy can be improved through the inclusion of both teachers and students in the process.

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# Experience and Opinion in Forming of Politician's Image

*Andrzej Falkowski and Małgorzata Michalak*

*Warsaw School of Social Psychology*

Later received information can influence memories of experiences related to the particular event. The results of the backward framing study evidence the feasibility of transforming memories of a certain experience under the influence of a later read opinion. The study participants ( $N = 232$ ) have been given a description of a Polish popular politician, or another fictional political figure, then all the participants evaluated each aspect of the candidate's image: programme, personality, physical appearance. One week later the study participants read a positive or negative opinion of the earlier evaluated politician and were asked to recall their earlier evaluations of the presented politicians. The study results shown that the recalled information can be related to an experience which in reality has never been gained. Such approach towards construction of reality perception provides a tool for development of fictional political images.

## 1. Introduction

Human memory does not reflect past events with pinpoint accuracy. Pursuant to the pioneering hypothesis put forward by Sir F. Bartlett (1932), "remembering involves much more than just recalling experiences from our memory, it means reconstruction of the earlier encoded material which has become linked to the already gathered knowledge". Thus, the knowledge, which is ascribed by humans to their private experiences, is framed in their minds and therefore is a mere set of experiences accumulated beforehand.

The basic objective of the study performed by Falkowski and Michalak was to analyse the psychological mechanism underlying the re-evaluation of a politician's image under the influence of the subsequent candidate-related press release, through the process of memory transformation. The study results concerning the experience-memory relation (e. g. Braun & Loftus, 1998) have shown that a later received opinion or advertisement can effectively transform the memories of an earlier experience without the respondents being aware of such influence. It is a paradoxical mechanism as people are convinced that their judgments are based on their own experiences, while in reality these experiences have never been acquired. There is opposite phenomenon when experiences saved in memory determine the way how future events are perceived, and thus define the mode of remembering a given event (Bruner, 1978; Neisser, 1967).

### ***1.1 Forward framing***

For long time marketing specialists used forward framing, by Zaltman referred to as preceding framing. This method encourages consumers to look for, or even to expect, certain features in product-related experiences. The results of the conducted studies have confirmed that prior positive or negative information about the product, which has not been yet encountered by customers, induces consumers to focus their attention at the moment of experiencing on product's good or bad qualities (Braun-La Tour, La Tour, Pickrell, & Loftus, 2004; Zaltman 2003). Therefore, it is possible that apart from highlighting potential strengths of a given product or experience, forward framing could also accentuate their weaknesses.

The defining effect in the context of mass media influence on voters' opinions was investigated by Iyengar and Kinder (1987) who assumed that during the assessment of politicians, voters do not avail themselves of all the remembered information, but only concentrate on the easily-accessible pieces.

The relationships presented in mass media may be of vital importance for controlling information accessibility. Consequently, by keeping some problems in the public eye, and excluding other, mass media can achieve the defining effect. For example, information on the unemployment rate, unceasingly supplied by mass media, will probably motivate voters to evaluate politicians by referring to their ability to create new work places.

Through forward framing, a potentially negative or positive feature comes to the fore and becomes perceivable, hence adequately memorized. Accordingly, this mechanism can be applied to political advertising to lay stress on virtues possessed by a given politician and vices of its opponent.

### ***1.2 Backward framing***

The backward framing effect involves distorting memory of past experiences at an unconscious level under the influence of later-acquired information or opinions. As a result, it is possible to recall experiences that in fact have never been lived through. In the event of backward framing, the invoked picture of an experience appears to be the same as at the moment of retaining it in memory. Therefore, people are not aware of the discrepancy between the factual experience and its representation summoned from memory.

Memory holds a multitude of fragmentary recollections which are afresh integrated when recalled. During the process of evoking memories, individual components of an event may fall victims to alterations. Thence, after Bartlett (1932), memories and recollections are not perfect copies of past events but some sort of impressions which undergo transformation in response to directions and motivations, for which such directions are noticed. This approach was complemented by Rozenfeld (1988) who stated that recollections are results of current perceptions shaped by a definite background, along with a prior and present disposition of consumers and their sense of identity.

### ***1.3 Politician's image – operationalization of the concept***

A politician's image is intended to create a positive idea of the candidate in his/her voters. This image covers the relevant election policy, that is, issues, thus the reason for which the specific politician becomes elected. This aspect belongs to central features of the candidate. Visible features of the politician's image include the components which can be seen by voters "with the naked eye", such as age, height or dressing style. The candidate's personality image which guarantees (or not) implementation of his/her election policy consists of invisible features. These comprise e. g. intelligence, education, diligence. According to the brand image concept developed by Keller (2003), at the same time we can define the term image as both the issue (election policy) and personal features, although the general inclination of the researchers studying perception of politicians is to separate them.


The image of a politician may not correspond to the reality. Such possibility poses a threat that voting behavior may come under the influence of reality misrepresentations (Falkowski, 2005).

## **2. Sequential model of the influence of political advertisements**

A majority of analyses conducted so far have been focused exclusively on the changes in the candidate's image resulting from the advertisements, attitude toward the candidate, and voting intention (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Kaid & Chanslor, 1995). However, they do not try to reveal the relations among the created image, one's affective attitude toward the candidate, and the voting intention. These aspects of political advertising's effect, however, provide little understanding for voters' overall behavior if they are analyzed separately. One can only say that viewing the spots leads to decrease or an enhancement of the candidate's appraisal without a possibility of analyzing the consequences of this appraisal for the electoral decision. Thus, in order to find out whether the spots in fact change voters' image of the candidate in such a way that she or he is more or less sure whether to vote for a particular candidate, or even is going to switch his candidate preferences (i.e. change his or her decision) it is necessary to find a causal link between the following four components (Falkowski & Cwalina, 1999):

1. Cognitive-affective elements (candidate image);
2. General feelings toward the candidate;
3. Intention for whom to vote;
4. Decision for whom to vote.

These components are in a causal relationship to one another which can be presented in the model of the influence of spots on voters' behavior (see Figure 1). This model fits very well in the constructivist approach to voting behavior.



**Figure 1. Sequential model of the influence of spots on voters' behavior**

The model assumes the division of voters into electorates, and the division criterion is intention. Therefore the image analysis should be performed for each of the electorates, separately, because each electorate perceives their candidate differently, depending on whether they support the candidate or not.

Based on past research on expectancy effects and recent theory about memory reconstruction, we develop the following hypotheses:

**H1:** Previously submitted opinions affect the evaluation of a later presented politician in accordance with the opinion trend.

**H2:** Memories of the previous politician image assessment have undergone transformation in accordance with the later read opinion trend.

**H3:** Participants will not be aware of the influence that the information referred to in the opinion has had upon their memory of the political image.

### 3. Experiment Forward Framing

#### 3.1 Participants

The subjects were students of political sciences from Warsaw University. Altogether, 237 subjects between the age of 19 - 49 ( $M = 22.2$ ,  $SD = 3.49$ ), participated in the examination, including 153 women (64,6%) and 84 men (35,4 %).

### 3.2 Procedure

The study participants have been given an opinion of a Polish popular politician, or another unknown political figure, which contained a positive or negative presentation of candidate's central and peripheral features. Subsequently all the subjects read a neutral description about the same politician. Next, the study participants were asked to evaluate each aspect of the candidate's image: programme, personality and physical appearance. The subjects in the control group read only neutral description about evaluated politician.

### 3.3 Results

The analysis of how an image of a familiar and unknown politician is perceived consisted of three stages. Initially, the analysis focused on the main components to separate the election programme parameters that underlay the evaluation of politicians. Next stage involved a factorial analysis of preferential features in political images. The factorial analysis was carried out for both politicians simultaneously.

The analysis of the main components with Varimax rotation has provided 3 factors corresponding to the specific aspects of a politician's image. *Election policy* is responsible for nearly 70 % variance. The results are presented in Table 1.

Data	Election policy
Balancing budget will improve economy	0,911
Lowering taxes	0,873
Better health insurance	0,809
We could pay Euro in Poland	0,694
Confronting the growing problems in the housing market	0,822
Will be a good leader as Poland's representative	0,851
Better social insurance	0,838
Reduce crime	0,894
Improving our Schools	0,891
Reduce unemployment	0,868
Protecting families against violence	0,808

**Table 1. The assessment parameters for politician election programmes**

During the analysis of the personality image the following two factors have been set apart: *invisible peripheral features* - stand for 40.97 %, and *visible peripheral features* - stand for 17.04 % (see Table 2).

Data	Visible peripheral features	Invisible peripheral features
Competent	0,89	0,11
Professional	0,90	0,13
Credible	0,85	0,02
Cosmopolitan	0,80	0,08
Honest	0,75	0,00
Hard-working	0,86	0,12
High	0,50	-0,01
Educated	0,78	0,28
Weak	0,12	0,74
Passive	0,17	0,76
Old	-0,21	0,45
Bad dressed	0,18	0,69

**Table 2. The assessment parameters for politician image**

### ***3.4 Results experiment Forward framing***

The analysis of intergroup differences in the submitted evaluations of the politician's image followed. The obtained analysis showed that the assessment of a political election programme, based on a positive opinion of the rated politicians, was higher than in the case of a negative opinion. The evaluation of candidates' election programmes proved to be highest among those study subjects who did not read any opinions of the subsequently rated politician  $F(2.420) = 23.48$ ;  $p < 0.001$ . The post hoc tests (paired comparisons including a correction for Bonferroni's test for multiple comparisons) revealed statistically significant differences between various opinion types: the evaluation of an election programme following a negative opinion ( $M = 301.91$ ) was considerably lower than following a positive opinion ( $M = 427.39$ ) or no opinions at all ( $M = 474.5$ ). All differences were significant at a level of  $p < 0.05$ .

The evaluation of candidates' personal qualities following in accordance with the opinion trend  $F(2.413) = 15.6$ ;  $p < 0.001$ . The post hoc test showed that evaluation of the personal features following a positive opinion ( $M = 468.45$ ) was significant higher than following a negative opinion ( $M = 388.48$ ) or no opinion at all ( $M = 362.99$ ). There is no similar effect for candidates visual aspect.

The obtained analysis results partially confirmed first hypothesis that previously introduced opinion affects the evaluation of a later presented politician. There has been detected an influence of a negative opinion on the policy election while there is no such effect from the positive opinion. Whereas, in the case forward framing evaluation of the politicians personal features a positive opinion was effective only.

## **4. Experiment Backward Framing**

### ***4.1 Participants***

The subjects were students of psychology and political sciences from three universities: Warsaw University, Łódź University and Warsaw School of Social Psychology. Altogether, 232 subjects between the age of 18-59 ( $M = 22.88$ ,  $SD = 4.89$ ), participated in the examination, including 148 women (63,8%) and 82 men (35,3 %).

### ***4.2 Procedure***

The study participants have been given a description of a Polish popular politician, or another fictional political figure, which contained a neutral presentation of candidate's central and peripheral features. Then, all the participants evaluated each aspect of the candidate's image: programme, personality, physical appearance. One week later the study participants read a positive or negative opinion of the earlier evaluated politician (the opinions referred to the same central and peripheral features of the candidates as in the previous description, but now these features were portrayed in good or bad light). Depending on the group, the respondents were informed that the read opinion had been published by a reliable or unreliable daily. The subjects in the control group recall their evaluation without read opinion about politicians. Thus the study procedure covered 6 experimental conditions: candidate (popular vs. fictional) x press release (positive vs. negative) x information source (reliable vs. unreliable). Next, the study participants were asked to recall their earlier evaluations of the presented politicians. Additionally, the respondents assessed the impact of the original and the subsequently read presentation of the politician on their emotional attitude and amount of support for the presented candidate.

### ***4.3 Results***

The earlier evaluation, based on the respondents' own experiences, was deducted from the later recalled evaluation, submitted by each study participant after having read the positive or negative opinion. Subsequently, the analysis of independent group in the submitted evaluations of the politician's image followed. The obtained results indicate that memories of the previous election policy assessment have undergone transformation in accordance with the opinion trend. The respondents presented the recollection of the original evaluation as much more favourable following the positive opinion ( $M = 19.46$ ;  $SD = 136.56$ ) and as much more disadvantageous following the negative opinion ( $M = -20.04$ ;  $SD = 142.04$ ),  $t(204) = 2.07$ ;  $p < 0.05$ .

The recalled evaluation of candidates' personal qualities following an opinion on the previously rated politicians showed no significant deviations from the original evaluation of politicians, both in the case of those study subjects who acquainted

themselves with a positive opinion ( $M = -12.23$ ) and negative opinion ( $M = -0.82$ );  $t(209) = -0.65$ ; *not significant*. Similar effects were observed for the recalled evaluation of politicians' appearance  $t(214) = 0.2$ ; in. (*not significant*). The recalled evaluation of candidates' visual aspects was neither higher following a positive opinion ( $M = 3.99$ ) nor lower following a negative opinion ( $M = 2.47$ ) than the initial assessment of physical outward features.

The collected data were further analyzed using a unifactorial variance model: 3 opinion types: positive vs negative vs no opinion. The analysis results showed that the opinion type had no impact on the distortion of the recalled evaluation of political election programmes [ $F(2, 230) = 2,31$ , *not significant*], personal qualities characterizing political images [ $F(2, 247) = 0,89$ , *not significant*], as well as the recalled evaluation of candidates' appearance [ $F(2, 239) = 0,03$ , *not significant*].

Second hypothesis has been partially confirmed. The obtained analysis results demonstrated that the deformation of how a political election programme is remembered under the influence of press information is less demanding than the deformation of personal and physical features inherent in the candidates' images. Paradoxically, it is easier to deform voter's memory of an election programme than the recollection of politician's appearance and its personal features.

#### 4.4 Regression analysis of voter behavior

The linear regression analysis was used to identify these aspects of the politician's image that contribute to support and affect manifested for the candidates. In order to determine the relation between the evaluation of the candidate's image and the affective attitude combined with the provided support, it was assumed that the declared level of support or affect for politicians, as a dependent variable, is explainable through the original or recalled parameters of the politician's image - independent variables. The analysis results have also shown that both support and affect for well-known and unknown politicians can be explained by the recalled evaluation of the election policy. The details are compiled in Table 3.

Candidate	Explained variable	R2	Beta	t	p	Features
well-known	support	0.39	0.59	3.45	0.001	recalled election policy
	affect	0.44	0.7	4.0	0.000	recalled election policy
unknown	support	0.46	0.46	4.07	0.000	recalled election policy
			0.25	2.96	0.004	original evaluation of personality features
	support	0.43	0.42	3.69	0.000	recalled election policy
			0.29	3.22	0.002	original evaluation of personality features

**Table 3. Regression analysis of the support and affect manifested for well-known and unknown politicians**

#### 4.5 Structural equation analysis

The analysis of structural equations has been performed to identify the actual impact of the recalled evaluation, based on the read political opinions, on the assessment of the candidate's image, and hence on voters' decisions. The analyses have been illustrated in accordance with the model of sequential advertising, proposed by Falkowski and Cwalina (1999). This model allows to determine the actual influence of political advertising on the candidate's image, and accordingly on voters' decisions. Consequently, application of this model to backward framing provides the possibility to verify the potential of constructing false political reality in voters' minds, whose decisions how to vote are then based on untrue experiences, which are never voters' own experiences. The model of the path analysis, designed to review the effect of the recalled evaluation on voting preferences, is shown in Figure 2.





Figure 2. Voting intention based on the recalled evaluation of a politician's image: results of the path analysis ( $\chi^2 = 13.38$ ;  $df = 11$ ;  $p = 0.27$ )

The competitive model of path analysis regarding the impact of an original evaluation of candidates' images on the level of political support is illustrated in Figure 3.



**Figure 3. Voting intention based on the recalled evaluation of a politician’s image: results of the path analysis ( $\chi^2 = 53.29$ ;  $df = 12$ ;  $p = 0.000$ )**

The study results encourage accepting the models describing voting intentions based on the recalled evaluation of a politician’s image and not on the original evaluation founded on one’s own experience. If in the presented model of structural equations, the original evaluations of political images induced changes in the amount of support for the relevant candidates, then the statistical value  $\chi^2$  considerably increased, accompanied by high model significance. Thus, the obtained results of the path analysis indicate that the recalled evaluation, based on the read political opinion, stimulates a certain level of support for the relevant politician, and that support results from affective attitude towards such candidate. The detailed  $\chi^2$  values in the path models for each experimental condition, when support is explained by the recalled and the original evaluation of a politician’s image, are displayed on Figure 4.

#### **4.6 Awareness of the impact created by opinions**

The determination of the awareness scope with respect to the effects created by a subsequently read opinion on the recalled evaluation of a political image is of key importance. Backward framing politician image occurs when the study subjects recall their previous evaluation of the candidate policy election as corresponding to the trend of a later read opinion, however unconsciously of the impact generated by press opinions on the original evaluation of the political image. Otherwise, the study subjects would re-formulate their assessment of the previously evaluated candidate, which is to say consciously re-evaluate their prior views based on the new information.

The results prove that the respondents had not been aware of the influence exerted by the latter on the evaluation deformation through memory transformation,  $t(209) = 2.92$ ,  $p < 0.01$ . This effect is shown in Figure 5 which is composed of two parts. Part I shows

that the study subjects to a considerably broader extent were convinced that their political recalled evaluations draw on the original presentation rather than on the opinion read afterwards.




Figure 4.  $\chi^2$  values in the path models when support toward a politician depends on the recalled and original evaluation of the candidate's image




Figure 5. The role of experiences and opinions for recall of political images

Part II of Figure 5 presents the extent of certainty that the respective evaluation was based on individual experiences and press information read at a later stage with respect to the opinion type. The study subjects who read a negative opinion were to a lesser

degree aware of the impact exerted by the opinion on the distortion of the remembered politician's image than those voters who read a positive opinion.

The third hypothesis has been confirmed.

## 5. Discussion

The study results confirm the feasibility of effective perception modeling regarding political images. The press opinion read before passing a politically-associated judgment framed the evaluation of candidates' images in accordance with the inclination of a previously read opinion. Notwithstanding, an assessment report on a politician read later on, contributed to an effective transformation of the recalled evaluation election policy. The study subjects used the press-supplied information included in the opinions on candidates to reconstruct their memory. The recalled evaluation of election programmes held by individual politicians proved to converge with the tendency of the read opinion on candidates. The results are consistent with the outcome of the study conducted by Loftus (1979, 1998), Braun and Zaltman (1997) which manifested the practicability of framing a remembered experience related to a specific event or product.

The process of recalling memories is not just a simple recollection of previously recorded material but it is actively combined with the acts of thinking and perceiving. Such approach underlines the structural properties of perception and memory. Neisser (1967) claimed that "the role played by the stored information in the recalling process is the same as the role of stimuli in the perception process". In each process, the information is not directly accessible to the consciousness, and also it is not reconstructed in the literal sense.

The study subjects asserted that their recollections of the inceptive evaluation of a politician (based on a neutral description of a candidate) referred to a more significant degree to the original presentation of the politician than to the subsequently read opinion. Additionally, the study subjects who read a negative opinion transpired to be less conscious of the impact generated by the opinion than those study participants who received a positive opinion. Concurrently, the produced results indicated stronger impact of negative opinions on how a politician's image is remembered. Consequently, the recollections of politicians' images were to a greater extent susceptible to deformation in the case of negative opinions, while the study subjects were to a lesser extent aware of such deformation than those who read positive information. The outcome of the experiment concerning forward and backward framing implies that more substantial influence is exerted by negative than positive opinions. The obtained result is compatible with the psychological theory of perspective, according to which we are more inclined to monitor negative than positive information (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979). Furthermore, due to the aversion towards negative events, they are forced out from the consciousness. This effect is relevant to greater disinclination towards losses than satisfaction from the achieved profit.

The recalled information may be linked with an experience which in fact has never been acquired. Under the influence of later information, the respective recollection can be subjected to backward framing. It is also possible to influence expectations which

underlie the reception of future experiences. Due to forward framing, a specific aspect of political image becomes more pronounced and visible. Both mechanisms may be used for the construction of an unreal political image.

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# Prison Adjustment in Youths: Assessment Scales

*Alina Sanda Vasile*

*University of Pitesti, Romania*

The present paper draws on the development and validation of two instruments designed for assessing correctional adjustment in young inmates. First, an operational definition of prison adjustment is provided, together with a special focus on the relevance of the subject for managerial and therapeutic purposes and a review of the literature in the field. Various tools have been developed worldwide to assess correctional adjustment. Described here are the first ones to be used for Romanian youth inmate population: a self-rating questionnaire (YSRIA) and a rating form (PRYIA). Items were generated and successive forms of the instruments (a *Reeducation Centre* version and a *Penitentiary* version) tested for their psychometric properties. For each scale, results yield support for the existence of four dimensions: assessment of institutional life; inmate-staff relations; inmate-inmate relations and psychopathological symptoms.

## 1. Introduction

Correctional or institutional adjustment reflects the process of inmates' adjustment to the correctional environment. This concept has been operationalized using two main types of indicators: behavioral and emotional-attitudinal ones.

*Behavioral indicators* such as official disciplinary acts (disciplinary reports, violence, drug consumption etc.) have been historically preferred in defining correctional adjustment (Taylor, Skubic, & Kistner, 2007). The first studies in the field (e.g. Carey, Garske, & Ginsberg, 1986) considered only this behavioral dimension, using measures such as: rule-breaking; nights spent in isolation; number of lock cell changes; referral for psychological or psychiatric treatment; emergency placement in a psychiatric unit; (if is optional) attending educational or vocational programs.

This approach has had several reasons: disciplinary misconduct is associated with higher costs, increase in sentence length, overcrowding, disciplinary movements, reclassification, creating a dangerous environment (both for inmates and for correctional staff) and others administrative, managerial and legal issues that impact negatively the correctional environment. Behavioral adjustment is considered to be a measure of the efficiency of prison's social control and is thus promoted by prison management standards (Jiang & Fisher-Giorlando, 2002; Trulson, 2007).

But this approach creates a methodological problem: available data on behavior may not reflect properly the concept of correctional adjustment - behavior is not a very

valid indicator of how a person is adapting to a specific environment. Official measures of adjustment reflect just an aspect of the matter; it is also important to examine the psychological dimension, the internal reactions (attitudes, emotions, stress) associated with detention, as incarceration is supposed to impact psychological functioning (Wright, 1988). Further studies assessed both the subjective and the behavioral dimensions of prison experience.

A fact easy to recognize is that there are different *strategies and patterns* of correctional adjustment. Some of these are positive (e.g. program involvement), some negative (e.g. disciplinary reports), and some not easy to classify (e.g., an inmate with a poor quality of pre-prison life feeling better in prison than in the free world). Also, these positive / negative patterns may have different consequences after release; for example, an inmate motivated to participate in correctional activities and programs may find it difficult to adjust in the community if he cannot find a job. In addition, both types of adjustments can be found in one and the same inmate. Behavior motivation analysis can reveal for example that involvement in programs may be due to intrinsic factors (a need for self-improvement– “to use time”) or extrinsic factors (to make a good impression – “to pass time”); these are different adjustment patterns, although the observable behavior is the same.

Apart from the correctional literature, inmates themselves have portrayed different patterns and strategies of prison adjustment. Michael Santos for example, in his book *Profiles from Prison: Adjusting to Life Behind Bars*, details on the experience of adjusting to the contemporary prison culture (after Fisher-Giorlando, 2005). Written in a narrative style, the book is based on interviews conducted with a number of 19 inmates, having different life experiences, criminal histories and profiles of prison adjustment. Adaptation means different things for different inmates; some try to learn something positive, some cannot wait to get out and continue their antisocial lifestyle. According to Santos, adjusting to the correctional environment equals becoming responsible for your own acts, trying to repair the wrong, setting goals that would assure post-release success. Prisons *per se* do not correct, he argues, but offer a chance for self-improvement. Nevertheless, most of the inmates do not take advantage of this opportunity, believing there is nothing to change and that the punishment is unjust, or not having the power to free from the pressures of the peer group.

## **2. Theoretical Background**

The issue of inmates’ adjustment to prison culture is a central theme in penitentiary psychology and of great interest for correctional psychologists, both for administrative-managerial and therapeutic purposes and for subsequent community adjustment. Inmates breaking prison rules pose management problems; violent acts represent a threat to the institutional safety and order and also cost a lot.

A primary goal of correctional institutions, an indicator of prison’s efficiency, is offender rehabilitation, reflected in post-prison adjustment. Community adjustment is assessed on several dimensions: school / professional adjustment; self-reported well-being; recidivism rate. General, violent and sexual recidivism is the most relevant indicator from the point of view of the efficiency of punishment; it is also easier to

assess, as long as follow-up data bases are available. The criminal justice system is often confronted with the failure of the rehabilitation desiderate: the recidivism rates are high. Detention is associated with an increase in recidivism – and this happens because most of the inmates had little resources and a lot of difficulties before admission, and during incarceration their resources usually diminish and their problems flourish (Hochstetler, Murphy, & Simons, 2004).

There are studies showing that disciplinary infractions in prison are predictors of recidivism, while involvement in educational / behavioral therapy programs and attachment to family are associated with a reduction in the probability of recidivism (French & Gendreau, 2006; Dhami, Ayton, & Loewenstein, 2007). Although no clear relation was documented between correctional adjustment and community adjustment, it is hypothesized that inmates' condition on release will impact their ability to desist from crime and become law-abiding citizens. Thus, it is sought to improve inmates' institutional behavior.

Giving the relevance of correctional adjustment, it is important to find ways to explain, evaluate, predict and facilitate it.

*Theories on correctional adjustment.* A debate in the literature has been whether institutional adjustment is influenced by the correctional environment per se, by the preexistent characteristics of inmates or by the concrete situational context. Correspondingly, three main explanatory models have been advanced: the importation model, the deprivation model and the situational model.

*The deprivation model.* According to this model, inmates' adjustment and behavior is explained by factors related to prison. The unique nature of this environment *deprives* inmates of their fundamental needs; inmates suffer losses ("pains of imprisonment" - Sykes, 1958) in five main areas: freedom; goods and services; heterosexual relations; autonomy (personal control); personal safety and security (Hemmens & Marquart, 1999). They also lack social life and significant others and have a feeling of wasting their life, frustrations resulting in a negative image of the self, the world and the future, and psychopathological symptoms.

This approach is the first one advanced in the literature, many specialists promoting it: Sykes, 1958; Sykes & Messinger, 1960; Irvin & Cressey, 1962; Wheeler & Thomas, 1977; Toch, 1977; Flanagan, 1980; Zamble & Porporino, 1988; Wright, 1989 /1991; Paterline & Petersen, 1999; Reisog & Lee, 2000; Butoi, 2003.

A central concept of the model is *prisonization*; in his classic book, *Prison Community* (1940), Donald Clemmer defines *prisonization* as adopting to a lesser or greater degree mentalities, attitudes, behaviors and customs that are adaptive in the correctional environment – adopting the "prison culture". This phenomenon of negative socialization is believed to increase in time and associate with negative effects upon release. Prison are seen as a „total institutions" (Goffman, 1961), completely separated from the outer world, encouraging *prisonization* and negatively impacting personal values, personal models, norms, beliefs and behaviors (Dhami, Ayton, Loewenstein, 2007). Inmates react to this environment by dysfunctional adaptive strategies: increased stress, fury, hostility towards the staff, violence towards other inmates, breaking prison rules, adherence to a „prison code", in order to gain acceptance and self-respect (Sykes, 1958).

Empirical tests of the deprivation model have examined the associations between indices of adjustment and characteristics of the correctional environment („deprivation factors”) such as:

- type of facility / level of security; custody-oriented institutions (e.g. maximum security penitentiaries) are associated with increased frequency of rule-breaking behavior, while favoring the treatment function creates role-conflicts in staff and can lead to alienation;
- institutional structure / degree of coercion; high structure has been shown to generate stress and increase *prisonisation* (e.g. the controversial *boot camps* for juveniles, extremely popular in America after 1990 - Gover, Mackenzie & Styve, 2000);
- overcrowding and lack of personal space, has been found to associate with institutional violence;
- staff -inmates ratio;
- perception of the institutional environment: perceived level of justice / freedom / danger / needs satisfaction; perceiving the environment as motivating and rewarding leads to lower distress and higher successful adjustment, while perceiving it as unjust leads to oppositional, rule-breaking behavior, and drug use;
- involvement in prison programs;
- length of sentence / fraction of sentence executed (Garcia, 2005; Thompson & Loper, 2005); studies have been shown significant differences between short- and long-term detainees. Long-term detainees have been found to adjust to the routine of prison life, participate in work and compulsory / optional activities, socialize less with other inmates, hide their vulnerabilities, diminish contact with the outer world (family, friends); as for the number of disciplinary reports, results are mixed. Time spent in prison is assumed to be directly associated with antisocial attitudes;
- changes in penal legislation.

The deprivation model has the merit of stressing the importance of the correctional context in explaining prison adjustment. But it ignores the unique characteristics of each inmate, the very characteristics that *form* prison cultures; not all the inmates experience in the same manner the „pains of imprisonment” and not all inmates placed in comparable institutional conditions have the same adjustment patterns.

The model has limited explanatory power, not being supported empirically by rigorous quantitative research (e.g. the meta-analysis of Bonta & Gendreau, 1990, cited in Biggam & Power, 2002; Dhami, Ayton, Loewenstein, 2007).

*The importation model.* This model argues for the relevance of pre-prison offender’s characteristics in explaining institutional behavior. Those personal characteristics existed before admission (are thus brought from outside or „imported”, hence the name of the model) and impact both institutional adjustment and the very features of the prison environment. Deviant subcultures in a prison reflect inmates’ personal values and norms, and are extensions of pre-prison cultures (Irwin & Cressey, 1962, cited in Gover, Pérez, & Jennings, 2008).

The external validity of the model was tested by examining associations between measures of institutional adjustment and characteristics of inmates' pre-prison life-personality, social background, life style, life experiences (Gover, Mackenzie, & Armstrong, 2000). It is generally hypothesized that the same factors predicting criminal behavior can also predict institutional maladjustment.

Among the proposed explanatory variables we mention:

- *demographic variables*: race, sex, age (those first three variables were the most well-documented), social class, marital status, educational level, occupational status, region of origin; it seems that a greater risk for institutional misconduct is associated with: younger age – under 25, afro-American race, not finishing high-school (Gover, Mackenzie, Armstrong, 2000); also, risk factors differ depending on gender (Gover, Pérez, & Jennings, 2008; Wright, Salisbury, & Van Voorhis, 2007; Jiang & Winfree, 2006).
- personality features (aggressivity, impulsivity, socialization, depression / anxiety);
- alcohol and drug abuse;
- criminal history (gang affiliation, number of previous arrests, previous incarcerations / sanctions, history of violent behavior, severity of past criminal acts, type of current crime).

Most of the studies revealed significant associations between individual predictors and correctional adjustment measures, although there were studies that cannot prove such an association or that yielded mixed results. Those mixed results can be due to methodological weaknesses, e.g. testing only individual variables and not considering their combined effect (e.g., reflecting a poor quality of general pre-prison life).

*The situational model.* According to this model, contextual factors explain correctional adjustment. The model was promoted by: Steinke, 1991; Haertzen et al., 1993; Endler & Magnusson, 1976; Flanagan, 1983; Kratcosky, 1988; Haertzen, Buxton, Covi, & Richard, 1993. Three categories of factors are discussed in this context:

- place: type of correctional institution, location of the incident;
- time: season / temperature (heat as a risk factor), time of day / work shift;
- interpersonal context: who writes the report, the work experience of the staff, whether others inmates were involved in the incident.

*Testing explanatory models.* The above-mentioned models have been tested for their explanatory power in various institutional contexts: arrest centers, traditional prisons, *boot camps*, using male / females sample, juveniles /adults (nevertheless, most of the studies were conducted on adult males). Most of the studies compared the importation/deprivation models or tested a single model for predictive power.

Studies supported the importance of using variables belonging to different models (Dhami, Ayton, & Loewenstein, 2007; Jiang & Fisher-Giorlando, 2002; Lahm, 2008). For example, in a study conducted by Faith Lutze and David Murphy, age, education, previous arrests and the type of crime were found to be best predictors of institutional

adjustment (Lutze & Murphy, 1999). A meta-analysis conducted by Gendreau, Goggin & Law (1997), which included 39 studies, concluded that personal and situational variables are similar in their predictive power (Gover, Mackenzie, & Armstrong, 2000). It seems that these are singular (independent) predictors of adjustment, as researchers testing *interaction effects* between variables pertaining to different theoretical models found little empirical support for interaction (Dhami, Ayton, & Loewenstein, 2007; Jiang & Fisher-Giorlando, 2002).

Studies testing the validity of explanatory models yielded a mixed set of results; the inconsistent data and subsequent limited empirical support can be attributable to methodological problems related to:

- definition and measurement of variables; differences between researchers in operationalizing predictor, criterion and covariant variables; the fact that many times the unit of analysis was represented by disciplinary reports;
- the list of variables is not exhaustive; most of the studies considered only a limited number of variables;
- generalizability issues; studies were conducted in different types of institutions (at state / federal level) or in different countries (United States, Canada, England); results thus reflect differences between correctional institutions / penal cultures and systems (demographics of penitentiary population / penal policies);
- the use on a transversal research design; this can reveal differences, but cannot detect changes in time (dynamics) (Florian, 1996).

Meta-analytical studies are needed to study the impact of those methodological differences.

Considered initially to be competitive, those models are in fact complementary, because pre-prison life can model the way inmates experience and respond to deprivations and to the concrete situational factors in the correctional institution. Most of the researchers argue for a combined theoretical model. The most efficient models (the ones with the highest predictive power) are those integrating factors from all theories (Gover, Mackenzie, & Armstrong, 2000).

Also, new models have been proposed recently. Farrington (1992) promoted the concept of prisons as “not-so-total institutions”, denoting the fact that, during incarceration, contact with the external world is usually maintained. The „administrative control” model argues that correctional adjustment indicators (violent acts, riots) reflect institutional management strategies such as flawed practices.

*Prediction of correctional adjustment.* Prediction of correctional adjustment pose methodological problems, the most important being: choosing the relevant predictors and the statistical prediction model; finding valid assessment instruments.

Prediction studies were conducted on the general correctional population and on specific populations: adults, youths, gang members, homicide, drug users etc. (Trulson, 2007).

Usually, as predictors of institutional adjustment are used combinations of variables belonging to various theoretical models: criminal history variables; socio-familial situation; personality features: impulsivity, coping abilities (Komarovskaya, Booker Loper, & Warren, 2007; Biggam & Power, 2002). Clinical variables, e.g. psychopathy (Walters, 2003), are of special relevance, as according to the estimates of the USA Department of Justice, 16% of the inmates / paroles suffer from one form or another of mental disorder (Sacks, Stanley et al., 2007).

In the study of Cunningham, Sorensen, & Reidy (2005), it was concluded that younger age and shorter sentences are associated with a higher frequency of violent incidents; by opposition, higher age, a drug-related crime and a higher educational level are associated with a lower frequency of violent incidents.

Objective tools for assessing correctional adjustment have been introduced systematically in correctional practice (many of them have both classificatory and prediction purposes). Among these tools we mention:

- risk assessment instruments: *Psychopathy Checklist - Revised* (PCL-R, Hare, 1992 / 1996);
- clinical personality tests, e.g. *Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory* (Hatway & McKinley, 1942);
- *Self-Appraisal Questionnaire* (SAQ) (Loza & Loza-Fanous, 2002);
- *Risk Assessment Scale for Prison* (RASP-Potasi - Cunningham, Sorensen, & Reidy, 2005; Cunningham & Sorensen, 2006);
- classification systems (e.g. the MM classification system, Megargee & Meyer, 1977).

Usually, effects detected in prediction studies are medium or small, but statistically significant and theoretically important. Anyway, one of the major problems in developing actuarial instruments for predicting outcomes like severe violence in detention is the low base rates of those behaviors.

*Peculiarities of correctional adjustment in youths.* Age is a crucial variable when assessing strategies and patterns of correctional adjustment, due to the developmental characteristic of each age group. Juveniles have different needs compared to adults, are more cognitively and emotionally immature and more susceptible to peer group pressures.

In Romanian criminal law, juveniles found guilty of an offence may be detained in two types of facilities: prisons - *Penitentiaries for Minors and Youths* (Craiova, Tichilești and Târgu-Mureș) and *Reeducation Centers* (Găești, Buziaș and Târgu Ocna). Also, adult penitentiaries have sections for juveniles.

Detaining youths may create special maladjustment issues. Before incarceration, many of them displayed uninhibited and unstructured behavioral patterns; prison admission equals a sharp desistance from this lifestyle, a fact which can bring about major problems: depression, anxiety, fury (Zamble & Poporino, 1988, cited in Gover, Mackenzie, & Armstrong, 2000).

A number of studies were conducted to test the validity of theoretical models of correctional adjustment in juveniles. Attapol Kuanliang and his associates, in a study conducted between the years 1998-2002, found that the frequency and severity of

disciplinary reports and acts of violence was much greater in minors compared to youths and adult inmates (Kuanliang, Sorensen, & Cunningham, 2008). In a model of logistic regression that included educational level, band affiliation, type of crime and punishment duration, age proved to be the most consistent predictor of prison violence. In a study conducted on a sample of 113 adolescents (aged 12 – 15 at the time of offence), correctional adjustment was predicted by personal vulnerabilities as well as institutional-related factors (fear of victimization, difficulties in interpersonal relationships) (Cesaroni & Peterson-Badali, 2005). In another study, conducted on 4684 minors released from a correctional institution, risk for serious misconduct proved significant greater in: males; race other than white; gang members / whose family members belonged to gangs; with a more serious, more extensive and more early debut of criminal activity (Trulson, 2007). The presence of a mental disorder was found to associate negatively with misconduct, according to a study conducted in America on a sample of 176 youths (McReynolds & Wasserman, 2008). In a transversal study conducted by Angela R. Gover and her associates (Gover, Mackenzie, & Armstrong, 2000), the level of anxiety (used as measure of correctional adjustment) was predicted both by deprivation and importation factors. On the whole, the main risk factors for maladjustment are the same as for criminality in general: family criminality, exposure to family violence, substance abuse.

*Assessing correctional adjustment.* When addressing the issue of assessment in corrections, one must consider: what dimensions to assess; when to conduct the assessment process; what instruments to use and what the adequate procedure is.

Both aspects of the construct are usually assessed:

- behavioral aspects (rewards, violent and nonviolent disciplinary reports, inmate-on-inmate assaults, days spent in isolation, attending school and counseling programs, initiating physical fights etc.);
- psychological, emotional-attitudinal aspects (self-reported well-being; psychopathological symptoms; perception of the institutional environment).

Assessment is usually conducted at 6-12 months from admission, using as investigation tools: the study of official documents (prison files, results of previous assessments); the questionnaire method (self-reports, rating scales); semi-structured interviews. The use of self-reports is controversial because of the *bias* of social desirability in self-reports - inmates may be insincere (Florian, 1996). Also, rating scales are vulnerable due to staff prejudices and insufficient knowledge of individual cases. A solution would be the use of multiple information sources. In practice, data availability and data accuracy problems in assessment are often met.

Several instruments have been developed and validated in the literature to assess aspects of correctional adjustment: *Prison Adjustment Questionnaire* (PAQ - Kevin N. Wright 1985, 1986); *Prison Environment Inventory* (PEI, Kevin N Wright, 1985); *Prison Preference Inventory* (PPI, Hans Toch, 1977).

The *Prison Adjustment Questionnaire* (Wright, 1988; Warren et al., 2004) includes 20 items grouped in two sections, which assess the way inmates experience their adjustment problems. The first section compares the way the inmate felt in the free world / feels now, regarding: embarrassment; fury; fear of being attacked / hurt / sick;

sleep disorders; heated arguments and acts of physical aggression; the feeling of being used. Thus, three dimensions are being assessed: an external dimension (relational difficulties), an internal dimension (coping difficulties) and a physical dimension (somatic problems). The second part of the scale assesses the quality of life in prison, referring to the degree of satisfaction of personal needs: the ability to obtain an adequate level of physical activity / sleep/ food / activity; personal space; understanding prison rules; the existence of good friends etc. A complementary instrument, *The Prison Violence Inventory* (Kevin Wright) assesses the level of violence (physical violence, threats, sexual abuse) that each inmate has experienced and perpetrated since admission in the correctional institution. *The Prison Environment Inventory* includes 80 items assessing the way inmates define their institutional environment; the scale is based on *Hans Toch's Prison Preference Inventory PPI* (1977). PPI includes 56 items assessing inmates' psychosocial needs or expectancies: activity, emotional feedback, freedom, intimacy, safety, social stimulation, structure, support. This inventory was tested with good result also on Romanian population, at Rahova Penitentiary (Florin, 2003).

### 3. Methods

The main objective of the present research was to develop and validate a standardized methodology for assessing youths' correctional adjustment.

A number of methodological constraints have been considered: the need to offer a good operational definition for the construct of "institutional adjustment"; the need to use multiple information sources; the need to consider the peculiarities of the chosen age group (16-21 years old). In order to increase objectivity, a mixed approach has been used: inmates completed a self-report questionnaire about the way they experience prison life and in the same time each of them was assessed by two correctional officers.

Two dimensions of correctional adjustment were considered: the behavioral *dimension* (disciplinary problems, involvement in counseling and therapeutic programs) and the *attitudinal-emotional dimension* (well-being, perception of the utility of the institutional environment, perceived need satisfaction, attitudes towards the offence and the sanction).

*The Reeducation Centre forms of the scales.* Initial versions of the scales were generated in February 2008. This preliminary stage was conducted at *Găești Reeducation Centre*. On the basis of interviews with correctional staff and detained adolescents, items were generated. The main aspects of juveniles' adjustment to the correctional environment and descriptions of a typical adapted / maladapted youth (in terms of: behaviors, personality features, attitudes) were also provided in the process (Vasile, 2008).

Items were grouped to form two scales (the *Reeducation Centre Forms*): a self-administered questionnaire (*Youth Self-Report on Institutional Adjustment YSRIA*) and a checklist to be rated by correctional staff (*Professionals Rating of Youth Institutional Adjustment PRYIA*). The initial forms of the scales had 108 items (YSRIA) and 99

items (PRYIA) respectively. Each item was to be rated on a five points Lickert -type scale (from “never” to “always”). Higher scores denote a higher level of adjustment.

The initial form of YSRIA was pre-tested on a small sample of ten juveniles; responses were qualitatively analyzed and items that created difficulties of conceptual understanding were modified or discarded. Also, the initial form of PRYIA was presented to correctional staff for content analysis, and items were added, modified or discarded according to staff suggestions.

The intermediary forms of the scales were applied during May- July 2008 on a sample of 35 juveniles from the *Găești Reeducation Centre*. Responses were quantitatively analyzed in order to obtain a first estimate of the psychometric properties of the scales. The values of the *Alpha Cronbach* coefficient were .877 for YSRIA and .912 for PRYIA, indicating good reliability. Also, each inmate was evaluated using PRYIA by two independent raters (a psychologist and an educator); the inter-rater agreement was high (.849), pleading for the internal consistency of the instrument. Items were eliminated in the process. For example, for YSRIA, many items pertaining to institutional misconduct and delinquent peers were discarded, as they tended to correlate negatively with the rest of the items (such items for kept only for the *Checklist*).

*The Penitentiary Forms of the scales.* The *Reeducation Centre* forms undergone minor subsequent changes as the *Youth Penitentiary Forms* were created. The new forms were applied on a sample of 237 adolescents detained at *Craiova Penitentiary for Minors and Youths*. Youths had a mean age of 19.21 (std. dev. 1.85), were convicted in most of the cases for theft /burglary (34.3 %) and robbery (36.1%) and were housed mainly in the *in* (70.9%) and *closed* (20.9%) levels of custody. Due to methodological constraints (incomplete data), valid cases differed for the individual subscales.

*Youth Self-Report on Institutional Adjustment (YSRIA).* An initial 61-items version was tested. Responses were item analyzed using internal consistency coefficient *Alpha*. Items having negative or very small correlations with the total score were eliminated; a number of 47 items remained, which were grouped under four dimensions. *Alpha Cronbach* coefficients for each dimension are presented in the table below.

	nb. of items	<i>Alpha</i> coefficient
Scale 1: Psychopathological symptoms	12	.740
Scale 2: Institutional life – behavior and attitudes	23	.808
Scale 3: Inmate-staff relations	7	.810
Scale 4: Inmate-inmate relations	5	.538
Total	47	.872

**Table 1. YSRIA - Alpha Cronbach**

The four dimensions of YSRIA refer to:

- *Psychopathological symptoms* (scale 1): self-image, perception of the world and of the future, dysfunctional feelings and emotions, feelings of loneliness and isolation; examples of items: “In feel angry” (item 2), “I feel sad” (item 8), “I feel lonely” (item 9);

- *Institutional life – behavior and attitudes* (scale 2): global perception of institutional life: living conditions, perceived utility, degree of coercion, involvement in programs; examples of items: “People here help me, support me” (item 17), “Here I feel accepted as I am” (item 18), “Time spent here has helped me”(item 23), “Here I have learned good things” (item 24), “I am a better person since I am here” (item 27), “I enjoy going to cultural-educational activities”(item 33), “Psychological counseling programs are useful” (item 34);
- *Inmate-staff relations* (scale 3): relations with the correctional staff (behavior / attitudes); examples of items: “Staff teaches us good things” (item 36), “Staff is fair” (item 38), “A refuse to do what staff tells me” (item 41), “I listen to staff’s advice” (item 44);
- *Inmate-inmate relations* (scale 4): relations with other youths (behavior / attitudes); examples of items: “The other inmates fear me” (item 48), “I get along well with the other inmates” (item 55).

Medium and strong, direct and statistically significant ( $p = .01$ ) correlations were obtained between all the YSRIA scales.

On a subsample of 93 youths, a 70-item version of YSRIA had been tested; in this case, 9 items pertaining to inmate-staff relations were doubled for educators and guards, as it was sought to investigate whether youths interact differently with this two staff categories. The *paired samples t test* computed showed a significant difference between ratings. Overall, the relation with the educational staff tended to be evaluated more favorably, differences being statistically significant for items related to: correctness of staff; staff giving good advices; inmates following staff’s advices. It was thus concluded on the necessity to assess separately inmates’ relation with staff categories. A final version of 56 items resulted as a consequence.

*Professionals Rating of Youth Institutional Adjustment (PRYIA)*. An initial 60-items version was tested. Responses were item analyzed using internal consistency coefficient *Alpha*. Items having negative or very small correlations with the total score were eliminated; a number of 49 items remained, which were grouped under four dimensions, mirroring the ones found in YSRIA. *Alpha Cronbach* coefficients for each dimension are presented in the table below.

	nb. of items	<i>Alpha</i> coefficient
Scale 1: Institutional life	22	.913
Scale 2: Inmate-staff relations	6	.763
Scale 3: Inmate-inmate relations	6	.849
Scale 4: Psychopathological symptoms	14	.830
Total	49	.946

**Table 2. PRYIA - Alpha Cronbach**

The four dimensions of PRYIA refer to:

- *Institutional life* (scale 1): refer to inmate’s behavior inside the facility; examples of items: “Number of rewards” (item 1), “Number of disciplinary

sanctions” (item 2), “Steals from other inmates” (item 13), “Argues with other inmates” (item 14), “He is involved in school / professional training activities” (item 19), “He is involved in cultural-educational activities” (item 20), “Accomplishes designated tasks” (item 24), “Respects rules in group activities” (item 25);

- *Inmate-staff relations* (scale 2): refer to relations with staff (behavior / attitudes); examples of items: “Asks for advice from staff” (item 30), “Argues with staff” (item 32);
- *Inmate-inmate relations* (scale 3): refer to relations with other inmates (behavior / attitudes); examples of items: “Is polite to other inmates” (item 34), “Talks with other inmates about his problems” (item 37), “Listens to other inmates’ problems” (item 38);
- *Psychopathological symptoms* (scale 4): refers to clinical signs and symptoms; examples of items: “Complains about his current situation” (item 42), “Blames others for his own mistakes” (item 55), “Easy-changing mood” (item 57), “Unpredictable behavior” (item 60).

Strong, direct and statistically significant (at 0.01) correlations were obtained between all the PRYIA scales.

*Correlations between YSRIA and PRYIA.* Partial correlations between results on the two instruments were computed; similar results were obtained for controlling time spent in the correctional system / time spent in the *Craiova Penitentiary*.

Results were analyzed also in comparison with the ones obtained for the *Reeducation Centre Form*. The main conclusions are as follows:

- self-reported *psychopathological* symptoms tend to associate positively with institutional behavior as rated by educators, although the correlation is weak and only closes significance ( $r = 0,181$ ,  $p=0,058$ ): also, the correlation between self-ratings and staff-ratings on *Psychopathology* scales is weak and not yet significant ( $r = 0,172$ ,  $p=0,072$ ); this is a result markedly different from the one obtained on the *Reeducation Centre* sample – where the correlation was strong and significant at .001; this can be attributable to two factors: different evaluators (educators vs. psychologists – the later being more competent to detect psychopathological signs) and especially a greater reluctance of youths detained in the Penitentiary to disclose psychopathological symptoms;
- positive, weak but significant correlations between self-ratings and staff-ratings of *institutional behavior and attitudes* ( $r = .262$ ,  $p= .007$ );
- no correlation between self-ratings and staff-ratings of *inmate-staff relations*; this can reflect different perceptions or different tendencies to report on these perceptions;
- no correlation between self-ratings and staff-ratings of *inmate-inmate relations*; as is the case above, this can reflect different perceptions or different tendencies to report on these perceptions;
- positive, weak and not yet significant correlations between global scores on YSRIA and PRYIA ( $r = 0,180$ ,  $p=0,066$ ); significant correlations are

obtained nevertheless for PRYIA and self-reported institutional life, and for YSRIA and staff-rating of institutional life.

As it was sought to illuminate on the self/staff rating discrepancy for *inmate-staff* and *inmate-inmate* relations, it was also noted a negative, weak but statistically significant correlation between self-report on *inmate-staff relations* and staff rating on inmate-inmate relations; it might be said that the more disruptive their relation with other inmates is, the more inmates tend to portray in a positive light their relations with the correctional staff. An argument for more objectivity in staff's ratings is given by the fact that staff ratings on *inmate-staff relations* correlates significantly with self-report on *institutional life* ( $r = .225, p = .021$ ). As inmates' simulation tendencies is a factor that must be consider in such cases, their tendency to lie (assessed by *item 12* form PRYIA) was considered. Spearman nonparametric coefficient was negative and significant for *item 12* and the total score on YSRIA and also for two of the YSRIA subscales, while total correlations between PRYIA and YSRIA (with *Scales 3 and 4* from YSRIA excluded) yielded a significant result.

## 4. Discussion

Assessing correctional adjustment has practical relevance, as it allows the improvement of offender management. The instruments presented in this paper are the first of this kind to be developed on Romanian inmate population.

The instruments, a self-rating measure of adjustment (*Youth Self-Report on Institutional Adjustment*) and a checklist-type staff rating of adjustment (*Professionals Rating of Youth Institutional Adjustment*), were designed for detained youths; special developmental characteristics of this age group were considered. Two versions were created: the *Reeducation Centre Form* and the *Penitentiary Form*. The scales proved good psychometric properties. Data analysis of responses on the *Penitentiary Form* yielded results that were comparable to the ones obtained on the first sample, the difference being a greater reluctance of youths to disclose issues of emotional disturbance.

As expected, it was not a perfect match between the way inmates experience detention and the staff's perception of their accommodation problems; this discrepancy existed for *inmate-staff* and *inmate-inmate relations* scales. Results were attributable to some youths' tendency to lie; controlling for this simulation factor, the correlation between the total score on YSRIA and the total score on PRYIA was positive and statistically significant.

On the whole, the developed scales proved efficient in assessing youth's correctional adjustment.

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# Statistical Tools used for Developing Empirical Classification Systems for Inmates

*Alina Sanda Vasile*

*University of Pitesti, Romania*

This paper presents the methodology of developing correctional classifications, with a special focus on the statistical techniques employed. Despite problems involved in typology research, those are used in many correctional systems as part of institutional management standards. Among the most well-known classification systems for adult and young inmates are the *Megargee-Meyer* system and the *Jesness* system. Specific statistical tools are used in developing typologies: factor analysis, cluster analysis, discriminant analysis. *Cluster analysis* produces groups that share common symptoms, etiology and behavioral attributes. Then, systems are tested for generalizability, stability, dynamic properties, and external / predictive validity. The performance of alternative models is tested using *Discriminant analysis*. To test for the predictive power of the cluster solution, nonlinear models such as *Classification and Regression Trees* are promoted, as an alternative to the classical linear and logistic regression models.

## 1. Introduction

Classification systems (taxonomies) are common in natural sciences and more recently in behavioral sciences and criminal justice also. Their goal is to group individuals or cases into distinct types (categories or *clusters*) based on similarity. Those types are to be homogenous and different from one another.

This process of grouping is called in cognitive psychology „categorization” or „classification” and helps reducing the diversity of the real world and coding the experience into a simple format (Miclea, 2003).

In criminal justice, “classification” usually refers to applied offender classification or applied correctional classification and is generally defined as a system / process by which criminals / inmates are sorted into homogenous groups, groups that are relevant for management and treatment.

Many authors and agencies have pled for the relevance of inmate classification systems as a basis for decision making (Mitrofan, Zdrenghia, & Butoi, 2000). Classification has a long tradition in the United States and Canada, being promoted from the middle of the 1970’s (Brown, 2002). In America, *the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the American Correctional Association* and the *National Institute of Corrections - Prison Division*

has constantly supported the development, validation and dissemination of classification methodology.

Correctional classification has several meanings (Levinson, 1982):

- assigning inmates to an institution with the adequate security level (institutional designation or initial classification); decides for a particular inmate the type of correctional facility, using criminal history variables; facilities are classified based on their security level (the architectural features that help control inmate behavior); the higher the security level, the more restrictive is the context;
- placing new inmates into different quarters / areas in an institution (housing placement); separates physically inmates predisposed at being victims / perpetrators (violent);
- assigning a custody level (custody assignment); “custody” refers to the supervision level established for an inmate (usually, four levels are specified: maxim, medium, minimum and community);
- including inmates into adequate activities and programs (program selection - differential treatment), in accordance with their criminogenic needs; this is the traditional meaning of “classification”.

Classification continuum actually reflects the way inmates move around the correctional system. Initial sorting is done according to security needs, and then every inmate is placed in an initial custody level and housed in a particular area inside the institution. Then follows the program selection: inmates have access at all the programs for which they are eligible in virtue of their custody level. General criteria for classification are represented by *estimates of risk* (risk to escape, risk for violent conduct). The initial custody level is discussed every six months, this allowing the flow of inmates inside the system (institutional transfer).

Deciding the type of facility pertains to *external classification*, while the others procedures pertain to *internal classification* - a refinement of the categorization process, viewing every institution as a mini-correctional system. Implementing internal classification systems at both state and federal level was proved to reduce the severity and frequency of disruptive behavior in inmates.

The rationale of classificatory approach is that inmates / criminals form a heterogeneous population. Grouping them into homogenous clusters has both theoretical and practical implications, such as (Levinson, 1982; Wright, 1988; Andrews, Bonta, & Hoge, 1990; Harris et al., 1999; Clements, 1996; Brown, 2000):

- understanding inmate behavior (theory testing);
- assessment (diagnostic) of the dynamics and structure of personality;
- better inmate management; safety of inmates / correctional staff; efficient resource allocation; matching correctional services with inmates (adequate monitoring, treatment);
- better risk assessment / risk management and behavior prediction;
- guide prevention policies (screening) / ensure public safety;
- in post/release assistance;
- also used inside the probation service (paroles).

Thus, classification systems are the main management tool in correctional context, used to reduce the likelihood of institutional violence and / or escape. Offender classification systems have in fact a double function: to classify and to predict, to estimate the probability of violent behavior / institutional adjustment / recidivism risk.

Classification systems can be used as risk assessment instruments, and also, risk assessment instruments can be included in classification systems. Risk assessment is usually done by combining actuarial (statistical) models and clinical methods – the approach is called *adjusted actuarial* and has proved increased efficiency in terms of accuracy, validity, equity, objectivity, reducing over-classification (Austin, 1986).

Prediction models are pretty controversial; prediction in general is a hard task due to the complex and multifactor nature of the predicted outcome and its low base rate. The most solid predictor in corrections seems to be the young age at first violent incident, and generally predictors linked to the history of criminal behavior. Dynamic factors, although they are relevant for individual treatment, do not have predictive value once included in prediction models.

Several aspects of classification systems are subject to critiques: tendency to oversimplify reality; the type is a mental construct, there is no “pure” type and the intermediary type is the most often meet; unclassified inmates; tendency to change type; correctional environments do much to trigger, elicit, model or reinforce precisely the type of behavior they want to predict (classification label influences inmates behavior - Bench & Allen, 2003); the use of self-reports in assessment (methodological critique).

## **2. Development and testing Classification Systems: statistical procedures**

Classification research in corrections has as a premise that every group of offenders is highly heterogeneous, being composed of individuals with a high variety of personality characteristics and life experiences. Multivariate statistical techniques were developed to derive and test inmate typologies, the most influential being the *Cluster analysis* and cluster-based techniques (Culic, 2004; Schwalbe et al., 2008).

Cluster analysis or classification analysis consists of a variety of methods, statistical procedures used for obtaining a classification. It allows definition of natural groups (clusters) that are homogenous internally and heterogeneous externally. The procedure has a heuristic character, being used for exploratory purposes – it tries to identify the latent structure of data.

Groups are formed based on similarity measures, using various characteristics as classification criteria. The variables included in the analysis are presumed to be relevant for the classification (e.g., variables identified by previous studies as important); they are either numeric variables (e.g., scores on personality tests) or categorical variables; classification models usually prefer to include both types.

Besides the variables introduced as a grouping criteria, the particular cluster solution will then depend on the similarity measure employed and the shape of the grouping algorithm.

Similarity between individual objects may be estimated using various metric or non-metric measures. The most well-known metric measures are distances, used to represent similarity as spatial proximity; distances measures are: Euclidian distances, squared Euclidian distances, Manhattan distances etc. For categorical variables, association coefficients (e.g., Jaccard, Gower) are employed.

The shape of the grouping algorithm refers to the rules used for grouping together similar cases at successive stages of the analysis. Two main grouping methods are employed: hierarchical agglomerative and iterative partitioning.

*Hierarchical Cluster Analysis* is the most widely used method for small data bases. It allows for hierarchical classification – a classification based on inclusion. At each stage, two groups are united based on similarity. The grouping schema is visually represented in the form of a *dendrogram*. Grouping algorithms vary by the rules they use to define distances between groups: single linkage; complete linkage; *centroid* method etc. The last mentioned one uses the *centroid* – defined as the mean value taken by the objects of a cluster for the analyzed variables (the cluster center).

*Iterative partitioning methods* start with an initial partitioning of the data set in a specified number (“K”) of clusters; for each cluster, the *centroid* is determined, and each object is allocated to the group with the closest *centroid*, a new set of “K” groups resulting; the procedure is reiterated until there are no further changes in group membership. The main advantage of this clustering procedure is that the data base is analyzed several times, each time improving the grouping solution. The most well-known algorithm of this type is the *K-means Cluster Analysis*. The major problem here consists in choosing the number of clusters. In practice, an exploratory hierarchical cluster analysis is conducted, and then the K groups obtained at step *N-K* are used as initial partitions of objects, applying iterative methods.

Because it is not know from the beginning which variables are important for grouping, which procedures will yield the best results or what is the optimum number of resulted clusters (this number is usually situated between two and six), successive cluster analysis are conducted, varying the combinations of variables and the employed procedures.

The alternative solutions produced by repeating the analysis are examined comparatively, using two methods:

- graphical exploration of data (e.g. *Dendrogram*, *Screeplot*) and analysis of the statistics produced at each step (distances and amalgamation coefficients);
- assessing the performances of different grouping techniques, using *Discriminant Analysis*. The relative accuracy (predictive power) of the models is tested by comparing the area under the ROC curve (*Receiver Operating Characteristic*).

The most stable cluster solution will be taken as “the best model”. This classification system is subsequently tested for external and internal validity.

After deriving the clusters, the next step in the analysis consist in interpreting each group – examining the values of the grouping variables, in order to understand the nature of clusters. Cases at the *centroid* are examined in detail, as they are the prototypes (the most representative individuals) for that category.

To refine the interpretation, experts (e.g. correctional staff) are asked to describe the groups as far as personality, demographic and clinical variables are concerned (they are presented with a list of the names of the members of each group, and are told only that they belong to the same cluster). This method completes statistical methods, providing greater accuracy.

To test for generalizability, the classification system is applied on an independent sample of delinquents, observing the percent of correct classifications. Another way to examine reliability is to assess the stability over time of the system.

Analyzing the nature of groups is an important step in the analysis and gives a measure of concurrent validity – the capacity of the system to distinguish among groups. The identified groups are compared on the relevant variables (demographic, legal, clinical), using the adequate statistical tests (F tests, Kruskal-Wallis, Chi-square etc.), depending on the type of scale. Thus are identified the critical variables, that differentiate clusters. Significant differences between the clusters give a measure of external (empirical) validity.

But the external validity of classification systems is usually tested for predictive power. As dependent variables may be specified measures of institutional adjustment and / or measures of post-release community adjustment (long-term correctional outcomes: recidivism rate; school / work adjustment; self-reported well-being). The first choice is preferred when it is not possible to monitor inmates after living the correctional system.

As predictor variables are commonly used: group membership; legal variables (criminal history, type of crime, crime peculiarities, motivation, and relation with the victim); demographic variables (age, sex, race, and years of education); clinical variables (clinical diagnostic, intelligence quotient, history of substance abuse, family / social attachment).

Predicting correctional outcomes may be done using two main types of statistical models: regression models (linear, logistic) and „tree-type” models (decision trees) (Culic, 2004; Rotaru, 2006; Popa, 2008).

*Decision trees* have several advantages compared to the traditional alternative in prediction. They are models in which variables are combined in nonlinear manner; their goal is to reveal the interaction between variables. They offer decision rules that are simple to apply, and allow for rapid discrimination between groups. They identify risk groups (e.g. low risk, medium risk, high risk) and the predictors that are specific to each group. The thresholds chosen to differentiate among risk groups are selected intuitively, based on the total probability of a certain outcome in the sample (*base rate*).

Applying multivariate statistical techniques allow researchers to meet many of the criteria of an efficient typology. Those criteria are (Megargee, 1977, V; Clements, 1981):

1. clear operational definitions of the types, so that each individual can be classified with minimum of ambiguity;
2. comprehensive; to be complete enough to classify a high percent of subjects;
3. reliability (*inter-rater, test-retest*); adequate agreement between raters; stability over time;
4. enough dynamic properties, so that changes in features, behaviors or status in an individual (e.g., better coping abilities as a result of the correctional treatment) to be reflected in changing the cluster (thus allowing for progress monitoring);
5. implications for etiology;
6. implications for intervention; meaningful for clinicians;
7. to be valid; to demonstrate that individuals placed in a certain group truly possess the attributes they are supposed to; to possess predictive validity (for attitudes, behaviors);
8. to be economic; to assure for rapid, economic classification of a great number of inmates, minimizing the involvement of specialized staff and maximizing the use of computers in decision making.

### 3. Empirical correctional classification systems: a review

Correctional classification systems date from more than 100 years ago. There are two main methods used in developing such systems: the theoretical or *heuristic* one, based on theory; and the empirical or inductive one, that identifies natural groups of offenders, uses multivariate analysis techniques.

In the methodological quest for the best basis for classification, several criteria have been proposed:

- type of crime (theft, rape etc.);
- type of “criminal career”: situational vs. persistent deviant patterns (Mitrofan, Zdrengea, & Butoi, 2000) ;
- trajectory of criminal career: specialization vs. criminal versatility (Francis, Sothill, & Fligelstone, 2004);
- physical and anthropometric features (see Lombroso, Kretschmer, Sheldon);
- demographic variables: age, race, nationality, socio-economic status, level of education, occupational history; those characteristics are used in various combinations, and are usually used together with legal variables: sentence length, criminal history etc;
- psychiatric diagnoses / clinical symptoms (Mitrofan, Zdrengea, & Butoi, 2000);
- behavioral or personality features – used in behavioral sciences.

There are two ways to analyze criminal personality: by concentrating on personality features or by concentrating on personality type. Psychological typologies of criminals were advanced from the middle of the XX century. The psychometric tradition in classification refers to the use of psychometric instruments (results on psychological tests) as a basis for classification. The resulted systems are referred to as “subjective

classification systems”; those tended to elicit the interest of researchers, but were also criticized.

Among the psychometric classification systems for adult inmates, the most well-known is the *MMPI –based system* (M-B system, MM typology), based on the *Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory* (MMPI I - Hatway & McKinley 1942).

The system was developed between the years 1970-1974, in a federal medium-security facility (*Federal Correctional Institution FCI*, from Tallahassee, Florida), by Edwin Megargee and his associates (James Meyer, Brent Dorhout, Martin Bohn, Mrad) from the Florida State University.

Data were collected from a sample of 1214 young inmates aged 18 to 27. The *M-B system* was derived empirically by analyzing MMPI scores and profiles of those inmates. Along with MMPI profiles, a vast area of social, physiological, behavioral and psychometric data were obtained. In the process of developing and validation of the system, several aspects were envisaged (Megargee, 1977, I; Meyer & Megargee, 1977; Megargee & Dorhout, 1977).

MMPI profiles of young inmates were grouped into distinct groups (clusters, categories). In the initial derivation process 9 groups were identified; later on, a tenth MMPI group was discussed (this was resolved by clinicians).

The ten groups received neutral, alphabetically ordered labels. Groups’ characteristics were determined (Megargee, 1977; Zager, 1988); medium scores on the MMPI scales and comprehensive operational definitions of the types were provided. Descriptions and self-descriptions of the inmates were also obtained using the *Gough-Heilbrun Adjective Checklist* (1965) (Megargee, 1984). Groups are usually discussed in order from the least deviant to the most deviant: *Item, Easy, Baker, Able, George, Delta, Jupiter, Foxtrot, Charlie* and *How*.

The reliability of the system was assessed in terms of replicability, cross-validation and stability of group membership over time.

Replication is the best method to establish reliability; it consists in resuming the original derivation procedures in new correctional contexts (new derivation of types). For the *MM system*, replication studies were conducted in contexts substantially different from the original derivation study (state inmates, *halfway houses*); the distribution of groups was compared to the original one, the results generally supporting the *MM system* (Zager, 1988). However, types *Easy, Jupiter and Bakert* were not found in some studies.

Cross-validation studies test for the system’s generalizability (the possibility to apply it on other populations). For the *MM system*, cross-validation studies were conducted on:

- state correctional institutions (Booth & Howell, 1980);
- inmates on the death row (Dahlstrom et al, 1986);
- military maximum security prisons (Walters 1986);
- forensic psychiatric contexts (Wrobel, Calovini, & Martin, 1991);
- specific samples: murderers, sexual criminals (Kalichman & Henderson, 1991).

All the ten types were represented in those studies, but type prevalence differed a lot, depending on the study population. For example, on the forensic sample, it was found (as it was expected) an overrepresentation of the most pathological groups in the system.

Cross-validation studies were also conducted in European countries, by Sirigatti and associates (2002) on Italian inmates and Sneyers and associates (2007) on Belgian inmates.

Testing the MMPI stability (test-retest reliability) yielded mixed results. Based on studies conducted in federal correctional institutions in Tennessee and Kentucky, Simmons and his team (Simmons et al, 1981) concluded on the high instability of the *M-M system*. Zager (1983) critiqued those studies on methodological grounds (sampling errors, procedural errors, lack of collateral data on behavior / to determine if changes in type is accompanied by behavioral, attitudinal, personality changes) and concluded that more studies are needed to determine the stability of the *M-M system*.

Besides testing for reliability, numerous studies investigated the concurrent and predictive validity of MM.

Concurrent validity tested if the resulted groups differ concerning non-MMPI variables – because, in fact, the true relevance of the system is that the types have in common more than MMPI characteristics. Group characteristics were analyzed especially in terms of demographic variables (age, race, gender, educational level), but also in terms of clinical, personality or criminological variables. Data offer empirical support for the existence of significant qualitative differences between the groups. In the initial derivation study, the ten clusters differed significantly in terms of: early family history; life style; psychiatric history; history of criminal behavior; social functioning; type of crime; behavioral patterns in detention; recidivism etc. (a number of 164 variables were coded, of whom 140 differed significantly between the groups) (Zager, 1988).

Retrospective and prospective studies on MMPI predictive validity yielded promising results; the typology proved its capacity to identify risk groups for maladaptive behaviors in correctional context (Carey et al, 1986; Zager, 1988). MMPI groups entered the analysis as predictors. As criterion variables were specified: measures of institutional adjustment (involvement in educational programs / work; disciplinary reports; aggression and self-harm) or measures of community adjustment (school / work adjustment; recidivism). In general, multivariate analysis revealed significant differences between the identified groups for a number of criterion measures. Nevertheless, there were studies that did *not* account for the validity of the *MM system* (Louscher, Hosford, & Moss, 1983; Moss, Johnson, & Hosford, 1984).

Results obtained by testing the replicability, stability in time / dynamism, generalizability and predictive power of the *Megargee-Meyer system* were mixed, but studies with rigorous designs offer empirical support for the system. Although controversial, it was largely applied in the American correctional system, the *Federal Bureau of Prisons* favoring it; at one moment, every inmate entering the federal system and producing a valid MMPI profile was classified. Correctional institutions varied in their individual use of the system for practical purposes: decisions on institutional assignment, program inclusion, room placement (the most frequent application of the typology; grouping together inmates with similar profiles, separating physically the

“predatory” type from those prone to victimization). As a result of implementing the *MM system*, aggressive acts between inmates were shown to reduce up to 50%.

The introduction of MMPI–II (Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) called for the revision of the original *MM classification system*; a new set of classification rules was conceived by Megargee and his associates (1994; 1995, 1999, 2001). In a replication study conducted on a sample of Belgium federal inmates, six of the ten original MMPI-I types were clearly replicated using MMPI-II (Rossi & Sloore, 2008).

The *MM classification system* was also applied for juveniles. Various authors argued for a continuity between personality and behavioral patterns in juveniles and adults; therefore, stated the possibility to apply on juveniles the taxonomies for adult inmates (Doren, Megargee, & Schreiber, 1980).

In a study conducted by Carol Veneziano and Louis Veneziano on a sample of 251 juveniles aged 12 to 15 (Veneziano & Veneziano, 1986), both adult and adolescent MMPI norms were used. With the adult norms, 79, 3% of the juveniles were classified (those tended to group into the most problematic categories, *Charlie and How*). Using adolescent norms, 81, 2 % of them were classified; the distribution of types also differed from the original one. All 10 groups were found, but five of them had less than 10 members. Plus, 42, 2% of the juveniles were *Item* type (well adjusted; no major interpersonal or psychological problems). All this limit the use of *MM system* for juveniles.

The authors wondered if this limit to system’s generalizability is a consequence of the research paradigm *or* juvenile delinquents are a significantly different population from the one Megargee used to build his typology, the psychopathological symptoms being much less pronounced in their case. Adult inmates may be a selected group, characterized by a long-term pattern of difficulties, reflected in the clinical profiles on MMPI. Most of adult inmates were institutionalized as children, but an important percent of juveniles desist from criminal activity.

Operating some adjustments on data, the authors grouped the clusters, based on face validity, into four categories (categories that proved to have consequences for etiology and treatment needs): normal or non-pathological category; pronounced neurotic tendencies; prodromal and / or pre-psychotic symptoms; character disorders.

Besides MMPI, other psychological instruments were used to derive classification systems for juveniles: the *California Personality Inventory* (Gough 1956) (Worling, 2001); the *Jesness Inventory* (Jesness, 1988); the *Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version PCL:YV* (Hare et al., 2003).

The *Jesness Inventory* is used in the *I –Level Classification System*, developed by Marguerite Q. Warren (initially Grant) and her associates from U.C. Berkeley, based on the concept of „interpersonal maturity”. It is supposed that juvenile delinquents are fixed at an early stage of interpersonal maturity development, and as a consequence they treat other people as objects, their social interaction being governed by stereotypic rules or rigid internalized values. The system identifies nine delinquent types, each linked to a peculiar treatment strategy (Harris, 1988; Harris & Jones, 1999). Although

also criticized, the *I-level system* was used extensively in the juvenile justice system in California, Canada, Anglia, and Australia.

For juvenile population was also developed the *Quay Classification System* - Herbert C. Quay (1964 / 1979), identifying specific “behavioral categories”: conduct disorder (characterized by verbal and physical aggression and dysfunctional social relations); attention disorders (characterized by an inability to cope with the requirements of the environment); socialized delinquency (characterized by theft in the company of peers, loyalty to delinquent friends); anxiety /withdrawn (isolated, anxious, rigid behavior) (after Harris & Jones, 1999).

Comparative studies on the predictive power of the classification models developed for adults / juveniles did not support a clear superiority of one system above the others; each system has advantages and disadvantages (Motiuk, Bonta & Andrews, 1986; Wright, 1988; Van Voorhis, 1994; Sorensen & Johnson, 1996; Harris & Jones, 1999; Marczyk et al, 2005).

In *Romania*, no typology meeting the criteria of an efficient classification system for correctional population was yet derived. Taxonomies in criminal justice were proposed, but they referred actually to criminal behavior; also, they used single criteria (Rădulescu, 1999; Mitrofan, Zdrenghea, & Butoi, 2000; Durnescu, 2001; Butoi, 2003): type of crime; recidivism; intentionality; group delinquency; attitude towards the act and the punishment; motivation of criminal behavior; criminal responsibility / type of mental disorder etc. In general, existing taxonomies lack specificity and use mixed, collapsing criteria; also, they all refer to delinquents in general, not to inmates. The only taxonomy for inmate population was proposed by Gheorghe Florian (1996); the author proposes dichotomous classifications based on: presence of guilty feelings; socio-familial attachments; mental health dynamics; involvement in work activities.

### **3.1 Objective classification systems**

Over the time, correctional classification systems were developed, their psychometric properties were tested, data bases were created and studies were conducted to examine comparatively their predictive accuracy.

Classification systems serve as management and planning tools; but when adopted, they not always provide the expected results. This is due to many factors:

- the subjective nature of the psychometric classifications;
- inadequate implementation of classification systems; uncritical adoption of a system, without pre-testing / cross-validating it (Austin, 1986);
- general rise of the penitentiary population (generating overcrowding and implicitly security problems);
- demographic changes in the correctional population: higher diversity, higher number of older inmates / women / afro-americans / youths / inmates with mental disorders/ offenders that break the probation conditions / inmates with a high level of estimated risk; changes in the structure and needs of the inmate population are reflected in changing the clusters proposed by older typologies;

- changes in the organizational environment of correctional institutions; low financial and human resources;
- change in the penal policies: tougher laws, promoting harder, longer punishment;
- change in the public attitude towards correctional philosophy; public opinion pressures and fiscal pressures to limit inmates' access to institutional jobs, educational / treatment programs; this last aspect is extremely problematic, as classification systems are designed precisely to encourage and reward inmates participation into work activities and treatment programs.

In this context the functioning of older systems needs to be rigorously evaluated and changes implemented (Dallao, 1997). In the last years major changes took place in the scope and structure of the traditional methods of classification.

In this context, objective and comprehensive classification systems were promoted, together with the use of multivariate statistical analysis techniques (cluster analysis, classification and decision trees). The functionality of objective classification systems was assessed in numerous studies, with good results (Dembo & Schmeidler, 2003).

Among the objective classification systems we mention: the model proposed by the *Federal Bureau of Prisons*, from *The Department of Justice of the United States* (a model used in many states); the model proposed by the *National Institute of Corrections*; peculiar models operational in individual departments of corrections: the *California Department of Corrections* (Berk & De Leeuw, 1999; Berk et al, 2003), the *Nebraska Department of Corrections* (Proctor, 1994).

Assessment using objective classification systems is done using standardized forms that evaluate various combinations of criminological, sociological and psychological variables:

- demographic characteristics: age; race; level of education; occupation; marital status;
- criminological / legal variables: criminal history; type of prior commitments; severity of current crime; sentence length; fraction of sentence executed; history of escapes / attempted escapes; history of violent behavior; number of disciplinary reports; type of most severe disciplinary infraction;
- personality and behavioral pattern (Francis et al., 2004): substance abuse; mental and emotional stability; level of responsibility; impulsivity; antisocial personality problems / conduct disorder; antisocial values and attitudes;
- attachment to family and community: community functioning; delinquent peer group.

#### **4. Discussion**

Classification systems prove their usefulness in correctional and probation practice, allowing for better managerial and treatment decisions. They are functional in many

correctional systems, especially in the United States and Canada (at both state and federal level), but also in Belgium, England, Australia, Italy etc. In Romania, no such system was empirically derived.

The standard in correctional classification is currently represented by the use of objective classification systems, the use of multiple data sources (scores on psychological scales, clinical interviews, prison files) and reliance on the statistical approach.

To develop classification systems and to test for their internal and external validity, multivariate statistical tools are employed: *Factor analysis*, *Cluster analysis*, *Discriminant Analysis*, *Regression and classification Trees*.

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# The Right (not) to Smoke: Attitudes of Balkan Company Executives.

*Martin Zlatev<sup>1</sup>, Dr Angelos Rodafinos<sup>2</sup>, Dr Lambros Lazuras<sup>1</sup>, Erika Melonashi<sup>1</sup>, Prof Richard Eiser<sup>3</sup>*

<sup>1</sup>*South-East European Research Centre (SEERC), Research Centre of University of Sheffield and CITY College*

<sup>2</sup>*CITY College, Affiliated institution of the University of Sheffield*

<sup>3</sup>*University of Sheffield*

**This study aimed to explore whether smokers and non-smokers differ in their opinion about matters associated with their rights in the context of a smoking ban policy – an issue often ignored in previous research on attitudes towards anti-smoking regulation. Data were collected from 145 executives studying for a Masters degree in Business Administration, in South East Europe – the region with the highest smoking prevalence in Europe. Results revealed that smokers and non-smokers differed in their perception about smokers’ and non-smokers’ rights and related to them matters. This can serve as a basis for sophisticated anti-tobacco interventions.**

## 1. Introduction

Human rights in the general health context are an issue that cannot be ignored and should be considered by anti-tobacco advocates (Jacobson & Soliman, 2002; Rodriguez-Garcia & Akhter, 2000). However, previous smoking prevention related research has not studied extensively variables referring to “smokers’ and non-smokers’ rights” (Cohen, Milio, Rozier, Ferrence, Ashley, & Goldstein, 2000). The tobacco industry (cf., Fox, 2005) first introduced smokers’ rights to the public. After tobacco industry advocates had admitted that both active and passive smoking considerably harm people’s health, they started to use the so called “smokers’ rights” as the main argument against anti-smoking regulations (Jacobson, Wasserman, & Anderson, 1997). Moreover, tobacco industry campaigns disseminated messages linking smokers’ rights to such core concepts of the Western world such as liberty, freedom of choice, and autonomy (e.g., Magzamne, Carlsworth, & Glantz, 2001; Menashe & Siegel, 1998). In fact, they have misused the term smokers’ rights and have presented anti-smoking regulation as a form of governmental intrusion, violation of privacy, discrimination towards smokers, and unfair treatment (Cardador, Hazan, & Glantz, 1995). In this way, tobacco industry advocates tried to persuade that the common principles of accommodation and courtesy can regulate smoking in public places and therefore governmental regulation of this matter is inappropriate (Poland, 2000). However, this

argument ignores the fact that even in countries with low smoking prevalence and intensive anti-smoking efforts, a significant proportion of non-smokers do not ask smokers to stop smoking in their presence (Bonfill, Serra, & Lopez, 1997; Germain, Wakefield, & Durkin, 2007). Thus, governmental actions are needed in situations where citizens cannot protect themselves effectively. Moreover, the tobacco industry seems to be rather a violator than a supporter of human rights, since it does not give adequate information about the hazards of the products it manufactures (Chapman & Liberman, 2005) and even manipulatively implies through advertisements that there are 'safer' or 'less harmful' tobacco products like the '(ultra)lights' cigarettes (Kozlowski, 2002; Kozlowski & Edwards, 2005).

The issue of smokers' rights is linked to the perceived responsibility of smokers and non-smokers for the health consequences of active and passive smoking (Cohen et al., 2000). If smokers are misperceived as having a free choice to smoke or not to smoke and not as influenced by the tobacco industry advertisement campaigns, they might be regarded as having full control over their behaviour and as personally responsible for the health consequences of smoking. In a similar vein, non-smokers might be perceived as freely deciding to protect themselves or not by being assertive to ask smokers not to smoke in their presence, thus they might be perceived as responsible for the health consequences of second-hand smoke. In this way, the perception of (non-)smokers as responsible for the consequences of (passive) smoking might be associated with the belief that smoking restrictions are governmental intrusion in private matters. However, the argument that smokers choose freely to engage in smoking and are aware of the consequences of smoking contradicts scientific evidence in a number of ways. First, smokers are addicted to nicotine, thus they cannot decide fully freely to smoke or not (Kozlowski & Edwards, 2005; Novotny & Carlin, 2005). Second, smokers are unrealistically optimistic about the harms of smoking (e.g., Weinstein, Marcus, & Moser, 2005) and about their capability to quit (Weinstein, Slovic, & Gibson, 2004).

Although tobacco control advocates have developed logical and reasoned counterarguments against the messages from the tobacco industry, they have not been sufficient (Fox, 2005). As a result, tobacco control advocates responded inadequately to the claims of the tobacco industry about the violation of smokers' rights by smoking restrictions with arguments presenting the harmful effects of smoking (Bayer & Colgrove, 2002; Crow, 2005; Jacobson & Banerjee, 2005). In this regard, the actions of the tobacco industry have built a more consistent and constructive message over the time, whereas the tactics of the tobacco control advocates failed to create a powerful central message (Menashe & Siegel, 1998).

According to Fox (2005), the tobacco industry has already framed its public image as human rights defender. Thus, the tobacco control movement should adapt to this situation and re-evaluate its messages focusing on individual values and freedoms. Fox further claimed that messages inspired by the tobacco industry influenced public opinion and smoking bans were regarded by smokers (but also by some non-smokers) rather as restricting the 'right to smoke' than as protecting non-smokers from the harms of environmental tobacco smoke. Indeed, smokers approve smoking bans to a lesser extent than non-smokers (e.g., Ashley et al., 2000; Poland et al., 2000), especially when they are enforced and imposed by the government rather than by the local communities (Batra, Patkar, Weibel, Pincock, & Leone, 2002). Additionally, several

smokers' rights movements emerged against anti-smoking regulation (Cardador et al., 1995).

The only empirical study examining the perception of smokers and non-smokers' rights was found online<sup>1</sup> ('Prevailing public sentiment about rights and smoking: A survey result of college students'). In a sample of 154 college students, it was showed that smokers agreed to a greater extent that it is nobody's business to ask one not to smoke, that accommodation would be a better solution than governmental regulation when it comes to smoking in public, and that smoking bans in public places will lead to bans on other unpopular activities. Accordingly, smokers compared to non-smokers believed stronger that their right to smoke anywhere is more important than the right of non-smokers' not to be exposed to second-hand smoke. However, non-smokers were not unanimous in their positive attitude towards anti-smoking regulation: nearly half of them agreed that it is anybody's business to ask one not to smoke in public and that courtesy and good manners are better solutions than governmental efforts. Further, a large proportion of non-smokers (93%) felt that smokers have the right to smoke even if it harms them. The attitude among non-smokers against anti-tobacco governmental efforts was related to the number of smoking close friends, demonstrating that perceived normalization of the smoking behaviour might have an influence on attitudes towards smoking rights. The authors concluded that distorted messages about smokers' rights and freedom of choice may influence not only smokers, but also non-smokers. However, the results of this study should be taken carefully, since it does not appear to be reviewed in any scientific journal, although the descriptive validity of the methodology, the results and the discussion seem to be good.

The discussion about smokers' rights stems from Western countries with well-established democracy principles and good human rights records. However, even in settings where the public awareness about human rights is rather low, but where smoking prevalence is high and therefore smoking and not non-smoking appears to be the social norm, arguments of the so called smokers' and non-smokers' rights could significantly impact the public sentiment about anti-smoking regulation. So far, no survey examining this question in settings with pro-smoking social norms has been conducted.

The present study aimed to explore perceptions of smokers and non-smokers about their rights, with participants originating from the countries of South-East Europe – a region with the highest smoking prevalence in Europe, and where accordingly the impact of smoking on health is extremely challenging (Bozicevic, Gilmore, & Oreskovic, 2004). The particular target group of this research consisted of business executives – individuals who often have the decision-making power on whether an anti-smoking policy should be implemented in the workplace.

In essence, the study examined differences between smoker and non-smokers in: a) their attitudes towards a smoking ban, b) perceived negative consequences of smoking, c) perceived right of smokers to smoke and of non-smokers to be protected from passive smoking, d) attribution of responsibility for protecting citizens from the

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<sup>1</sup> This survey was retrieved on February 20 from <http://www.rightsmoke.net/pdf/sentiment.pdf>

outcomes of smoking, e) perceptions regarding possible discrimination against job applicants on the base of their smoking status.

More specifically, the present research explored the following assumptions. First, it was expected that non-smokers would approve smoking restrictions at work to a greater extent than smokers. Second, differences between smoking and non-smoking executives regarding the perceived negative consequences of smoking were explored. It was assumed that non-smokers acknowledge to a greater extent than smokers that active and passive smoking lead to severe negative outcomes. Third, this study questioned whether smoking and non-smoking respondents differ in their opinions whether non-smokers have the right to be protected from second-hand smoke and whether smokers have the right to smoke in their workplace (e.g., right for smoking breaks and specially designated smoking areas). Regarding smokers, it was expected that smokers will hold more positive perceptions of smokers' rights than non-smokers. On the other hand, it was assumed that non-smokers will agree to a greater extent with non-smokers' right to be protected from second-hand smoke than non-smokers. A fourth aim was to explore the perceived responsibility regarding the outcomes of smoking. It was assumed that non-smokers will perceive the state as more responsible for protecting citizens from the negative consequences of active and passive smoking than smokers. Moreover, it was examined whether respondents differ in their opinion regarding the questions: who is responsible to protect non-smokers from environmental smoke at work (executives or the non-smokers themselves), and who is responsible for the smokers' health (executives or the smokers themselves). It was expected that executives will be held as more responsible for protecting non-smokers than the non-smokers themselves. However, it was suspected that smokers will be regarded as more responsible for their health than executives for the health of smokers. Finally, this study examined executives' perceptions regarding possible discrimination against job applicants on the base of their smoking status. It was assumed that smokers will regard the situation where a smoking applicant is turned down by a non-smoking employer more as an act of discrimination than non-smokers. In the opposite case, it was expected that non-smokers will regard it more as discrimination case when a non-smoking job candidate is rejected by a smoking employer, than smokers.

## **2. Method**

### ***2.1 Participants***

The survey was administered to 390 company executives. Data were returned by 155 subjects (45% response rate). Of them, 10 questionnaires were eliminated due to incomplete responses, thus leaving 145 surveys eligible for data analyses. The final sample consisted of 58% males. The average age was 33.37 years ( $SD = 5.62$ ). The majority of the respondents originated from Romania ( $N = 48$ ; 33%), Serbia ( $N = 32$ ; 22%) and Bulgaria ( $N = 20$ ; 20%). The remaining 25% of the respondents came from different countries of the Balkans (e.g., Greece, Kosovo, FYROM, Albania).

## 2.2 Measures

The first part of the survey recorded demographic variables such as age, gender, and country of origin. *Smoking status* was assessed asking participants to choose one of four options describing if a) they smoke at least one cigarette a day, b) they smoke, but not on a daily basis, c) they used to smoke, but they have given up, or d) they do not smoke and they have never smoked. Never-smokers represented 45% of the sample, 19% were ex-smokers, 11% occasional smokers and 25% regular smokers. For the purposes of the statistical analyses, the participants were split into two groups: those who at the period that the study was conducted smoked (occasional and regular smokers) and those who did not smoke (never- and ex-smokers).

*Anti-smoking policy at work.* The current policy at work was measured by ticking one of three response options indicating total, partial, and no smoking restriction in place.

A 5-point Likert scale, with response options ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), was used to assess responses in all of the following items.

*Satisfaction with the current policy* was measured with a single question “Do you approve of the current smoking policy in your company?”

*Global negative consequences of smoking cigarettes.* Further, respondents were asked to what extent they agree or disagree with statements reflecting the global negative consequences of smoking cigarettes, represented by three items: 1) “Smoking considerably shortens the lifetime,” 2) “Smoking is a huge burden for the health care system,” and 3) “Smoking in the workplace has a negative effect on the productivity.”

*The harm of passive smoking.* In addition, respondents were asked in particular about the negative consequences of passive smoking using the stem sentence “Based on what you know or what you believe, non-smokers exposed to passive smoking have higher chances to get...”, followed by four options, describing medical conditions caused by smoking: “asthma, lung cancer, heart disease, and bronchitis.” Additionally, participants indicated “to what extent they believed that passive smoking is dangerous for the foetus, harms the health of children and the health of people suffering from illness.” The scale, composed of the above seven items reflecting the harm of passive smoking, showed good internal consistency Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .87$  ( $M = 3.96$ ,  $SD = 0.67$ ).

*Smokers’ and non-smokers’ rights.* Beliefs about smokers’ and non-smokers’ rights in the workplace were measured by asking participants to what extent they agree or disagree with statements on the following topics: *smokers’ rights at work* (“Smoking employees have the right of specially designated smoking areas” and “Smoking employees have the right of smoking breaks during the work-time”), and *non-smokers’ rights at work* (“Non-smoking employees have the right to be protected from second-hand smoke” and “Even though a non-smoker does not complain about passive smoking he or she should be protected from it”).

*Perceived responsibility.* In order to assess beliefs regarding perceived responsibility for potential health consequences, executives were asked to rate five items. These included *responsibility of non-smokers’ to protect themselves from the harms of passive smoking*: “Non-smokers are responsible for protecting themselves from passive smoking in the workplace,” as well as *responsibility of smokers for their own health*:

“Smoking employees are responsible for their own health.” Additionally, two items assessed the *perceived responsibility of executives* in general for protecting non-smokers from second-hand smoke and for the health of smokers: “Executives are responsible for the health of smoking employees.” Further, one item questioned the *perceived responsibility of the state* to protect citizens from the negative consequences of active and passive smoking: “The state is responsible for protecting from the negative consequences of passive and active smoking.”

*Hiring decisions affected by smoking status.* Finally, two questions examined executives’ beliefs on hiring decisions: “It is an act of discrimination if a non-smoking employer rejects an applicant because the applicant is smoker?” and, vice versa, “It is an act of discrimination if a smoking employer rejects an applicant because the applicant is non-smoker?”

### **2.3 Procedure**

Respondents were approached in the context of an international Executive Masters in Business Administration program, taking place in three locations in the Balkans. A structured questionnaire in English was administered. Before completion of the questionnaire, respondents were given a standardized instruction form informing them that participation is voluntary, and the anonymity and confidentiality of their responses are secured. Although all participants were competent and certified in English, they were instructed to ask their lecturers about the meaning of unfamiliar words or expressions in the questionnaire.

### **2.4 Results**

Means and standard deviations of the variables analysed are presented in Table 1. Differences were calculated using two-tailed t-tests for independent samples. For analyses including within- and between-subjects factor, a mixed within-between ANOVA was computed. Additional analyses examining relationships between variables were computed using Pearson two-tailed correlations. Results are presented in the order of the hypotheses listed in the introduction part of this paper.

### **2.5 Smoking Restrictions**


A company policy of total smoking ban was reported by 63 respondents (44%); partial ban by 70 participants (49%); 11 participants (7%) responded there is no smoking ban at all in their workplace. Data from the latter group were ignored from subsequent analyses involving the variable current smoking policy, because some of these participants also reported that the smoking restrictions in their workplace were violated, which is inconsistent with them reporting that there is no smoking policy in their company.

	Smokers		Non-smokers		Total	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Support for total smoking restriction	4.12	1.27	4.81	0.70	4.52	1.03
Support for partial smoking restriction	4.00	1.14	3.37	1.73	3.59	1.57
Smoking shortens lifetime	3.75	0.92	4.34	0.79	4.13	0.88
Smoking is a huge burden for the health care system	3.73	0.95	4.35	0.70	4.13	0.85
Perceived harms of passive smoking	3.68	0.69	4.12	0.61	3.96	0.67
Smoking employees have the right for specially designated smoking areas	4.32	0.94	3.64	1.14	3.89	1.12
Smoking employees have the right for smoking breaks	3.23	1.34	2.86	1.23	2.99	1.28
Non-smoking employees have the right to be protected from passive smoking	4.37	0.75	4.71	0.52	4.59	0.63
Even though a non-smoker does not complain about passive smoking he or she should be protected from it	4.10	0.79	4.33	0.84	4.25	0.83
Non-smoking employees are responsible for protecting themselves from the harms of ETS	2.90	1.22	2.84	1.48	2.87	1.38
Smoking employees are responsible for their own health	4.28	0.84	4.26	0.89	4.27	0.87
Executives responsible for protecting non-smoking employees from the harms of ETS	3.72	1.15	4.22	0.94	4.03	1.05
Executives are responsible for the health of smoking employees	2.09	1.04	2.46	1.16	2.32	1.13
The state is responsible for protecting from the harms of passive and active smoking	3.44	1.05	4.07	1.02	3.86	1.07
It is an act of discrimination if a non-smoking employer rejects an applicant because the applicant is smoker.	4.48	0.83	3.65	1.28	3.95	1.20
It is an act of discrimination if a smoking employer rejects an applicant because the applicant is non-smoker.	4.21	1.14	4.19	1.16	4.20	1.15

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables**

To examine whether executives' approval of the smoking policy varied as a factor of their smoking status and the existing policy, Mann-Whitney-U-tests were performed, since the Levene test for homogeneity of variances yielded a significant result  $F(3,$

129) = 26.17,  $p < .01$ . Executives approved a total ban more than a partial ban  $U = 1406.00$ ,  $p < .01$  (see Figure 1). When only the group of executive smokers was examined, differences in preferred smoking policy disappeared,  $U = 276.00$ ,  $p = .45$ . However, non-smokers approved the total ban policy to a greater extent than the partial ban,  $U = 440.50$ ,  $p < .01$ .



**Figure 1. Differences in smokers and non-smokers in support for total and partial smoking restrictions at work.**

### 2.6 Negative Impact of Smoking


Compared to non-smokers, smokers agreed less that smoking has a negative impact on the productivity,  $t(140) = -3.91$ ,  $p < .01$  (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations), shortens life considerably,  $t(142) = -4.04$ ,  $p < .01$ , is a huge burden for the health care system,  $t(133) = -3.95$ ,  $p < .01$ , and that passive smoking is related with negative health consequences,  $t(138) = -3.94$ ,  $p < .01$ .

#### Smokers' and non-smokers' rights

Compared to non-smokers ( $M = 4.32$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ), smokers ( $M = 3.64$ ,  $SD = 0.94$ ) agreed in greater extent that they have the right for specially designated smoking areas,  $t(142) = 3.70$ ,  $p < .01$ , but smokers ( $M = 3.23$ ,  $SD = 1.23$ ) and non-smokers ( $M = 2.86$ ,  $SD = 1.34$ ) were undecided whether smokers have the right for smoking breaks during work time,  $t(142) = 1.67$ ,  $p = .10$ .

A mixed between-within ANOVA was calculated, with smoking status as the between subjects factor, and the two categories describing a) the right of non-smokers to be protected even though they are not complaining, and b) without specification if they are complaining or not, as the within subjects factor (see Figure 2). The analysis revealed a non-significant interaction,  $F(1,105) = 0.10$ ,  $p = .75$ ,  $\eta^2 = .001$ , giving the

opportunity for interpretation of the main effects. The between subject factor was significant,  $F(1,105) = 7.36, p < .01, \eta^2 = .066$ , suggesting that non-smoking executives ( $M = 4.55, SD = 0.66$ ) agreed to greater extent than smoking respondents ( $M = 4.24, SD = 0.77$ ) that non-smokers should be protected from passive smoking. Moreover, the within subjects factor reached significance,  $F(1,105) = 11.41, p < .01, \eta^2 = .098$ , indicating that participants agreed to lesser extent with the statement that even non-complaining non-smokers have the right to be protected from smokers ( $M = 4.59, SD = 0.63$ ) than to the statement that non-smokers should be protected anyway, without specification if they are complaining or not ( $M = 4.29, SD = 0.81$ ). Additional correlation analyses, when examined only in smokers, showed that the perceived negative outcomes of passive smoking were associated significantly with both measures: with the statement that non-smokers have the right to be protected from second-hand smoke ( $r = .38, p < .01$ ) and with the statement that even non-complaining non-smokers should be protected from passive smoking ( $r = .25, p = .02$ ).




**Figure 2. Differences in smokers and non-smokers regarding the acknowledged right of non-smokers to be protected from passive smoking.**

### 2.7 Perceived Responsibility

Non-smokers ( $M = 4.07, SD = 1.02$ ) perceived the State as significantly more responsible for preventing from the harms of active and passive smoking than smokers ( $M = 3.44, SD = 1.05$ ),  $t(109) = -2.97, p < .01$ .


Further, mixed between-within subjects ANOVA was conducted to examine whether executives or the non-smokers themselves are responsible for the protection of non-

smokers exposed at passive smoking (within-subjects factor); the between-subjects factor was the smoking status (see Figure 3). The significant within subject effect,  $F(1, 140) = 48.37, p < .01$ , indicated that executives were regarded as more responsible for protecting non-smokers exposed at passive smoking at work ( $M = 4.03, SD = 1.05$ ) than the non-smokers themselves ( $M = 2.87, SD = 1.38$ ). The partial eta value of  $\eta^2 = .257$  suggested a large effect size (Cohen, 1988). The between-subject factor was not significant,  $F(1, 140) = 2.32, p = .13, \eta^2 = .016$ , as well as the interaction,  $F(1, 140) = 3.20, p = .08, \eta^2 = .022$ .



**Figure 3. Differences in smokers and non-smokers in the perceived responsibility to protect non-smokers from passive smoking by target (executives and non-smokers).**


Finally, a mixed between-within subjects ANOVA with smoking status as the between subject factor was conducted to examine if executives or the smokers themselves (within-subjects factor) are responsible for the health of smokers (see Figure 4). The significant within subject effect,  $F(1, 140) = 218.46, p < .01$ , with a large effect size  $\eta^2 = .608$  indicated that respondents did not consider executives to be responsible for the health of smokers ( $M = 2.32, SD = 1.13$ ), but believed that the responsibility lied in each individual smoker ( $M = 4.27, SD = 0.87$ ). The interaction effect was not significant,  $F(1, 141) = 2.07, p = .15, \eta^2 = .016$ , and neither was the between-subject factor,  $F(1, 141) = 2.31, p = .13, \eta^2 = .016$ .



**Figure 4.** Differences in smokers and non-smokers regarding the perceived responsibility to protect the health of smokers by target (executives and by smokers themselves).

### **2.8 Discrimination in Hiring Decisions**

To examine whether smoking status is as criterion in hiring decisions, a mixed between-within subjects analysis of variance was conducted, with between subject variable the smoking status and within subject factor the situation in which a smoking applicant is turned down by a non-smoking employer versus the situation in which a non-smoking applicant is rejected by smoking employer. Executives tended to perceive a case for discrimination in both situations (see Figure 5), although in the wording of the item it was not explicitly indicated that the applicant is rejected because of his/her smoking status. However, the ANOVA with mixed between-within-subject factor yielded a significant interaction,  $F(1, 109) = 11.65, p < .01$ , with a moderate size effect ( $\eta^2 = .097$ ) according to Cohen (1998). A closer perusal of the means revealed that smokers ( $M = 4.21, SD = 1.14$ ) and non-smokers ( $M = 4.19, SD = 1.16$ ) agreed that it would be an act of discrimination if a non-smoking applicant is rejected by a smoking employer,  $t(115) = 3.74, p < .01$ . However, smokers ( $M = 4.48, SD = 0.83$ ), more than non-smokers ( $M = 3.65, SD = 1.28$ ), considered as an act of discrimination the case of a non-smoking employer turning down a smoking applicant,  $t(109) = 0.08, p = .93$ .



**Figure 5. Differences in smokers and non-smokers regarding the cases when a smoking applicant is rejected by a non-smoking employee and when a non-smoking applicant is rejected by a smoking employee.**

### 3. Discussion

The results supported the postulated hypotheses that smoking and non-smoking participants differed in perceived smokers' and non-smokers' rights and related issues. The support for any type of ban on smoking was overall high, even among smokers (75% of the smokers supported a partial ban on smoking and 77% a total one). Non-smokers in a workplace with total smoking restriction approved this policy more than non-smokers in a workplace with partial smoking restriction. Smokers in settings with partial and total did not differ in their support for the anti-smoking regulation. However, in workplaces with a total smoking ban, non-smokers approved the regulation to a greater extent than smokers – a finding consistent with previous research (Ashley et al., 2000). Moreover, non-smokers in the context of partial ban supported the present policy to a lesser extent than smokers. This result might be explained by means of a possible insufficiency of the policy: If the specially designated smoking areas are not efficiently separated from the non-smoking workplace, even distant the smoking might bother non-smokers.

In addition, the present findings demonstrated a difference between smokers and non-smokers regarding the perceived negative consequences of smoking. On all measures of this variable smokers acknowledged to a lesser extent that smoking leads to severe outcomes, perhaps in an effort to reduce the cognitive dissonance resulting from inconsistent cognitions ('smoking is harmful') and behaviour ('I smoke') (cf., McMaster & Lee, 1991). More specifically, the perceived negative beliefs about passive smoking in smokers were positive related to the acknowledged right of non-

smokers to be protected from second-hand smoke: Smokers who believed to a greater extent that passive smoking leads to negative consequences felt more strongly that non-smokers have the right to be protected from it. However, smokers overall acknowledged the right of non-smokers to be protected from second-hand smoke. This finding shows that smokers might view exposure to passive smoking as involuntary and non-smokers as not able to protect themselves from this negative influence, thus external control is needed where persons are unintentionally exposed to a risk. This was supported by the result that executives were viewed as more responsible for the protection from passive smoking than the non-smokers themselves. It was striking how different the perceived responsibility differed by the localisation of the responsibility. In the perceived responsibility for the health of smokers, smokers were viewed both by smoking and non-smoking respondents as more responsible for their health than executives. Clearly, one cannot compare the terms perceived responsibility for the health of smokers and perceived responsibility for the protection of non-smokers from passive smoking at work, since they differ in their specificity and in the different nuances in the meaning of the term responsibility. However, the results showed that both smoking and non-smoking executives regarded smokers as responsible for their health and non-smokers as not responsible for protecting themselves from passive smoking. This finding might be explained by means of the assumption of smoking behaviour as controllable and intended behaviour in contrast to the perception of passive smoking as involuntary exposure.

This finding might be of important practical relevance value. Messages promoting smoking restriction focused on the protection of non-smokers might be seen as protection from involuntary risk exposure, while campaigns propagating anti smoking regulation framed upon risks of smoking and benefits of quitting smoking might be viewed as intrusion in private affairs, if smoking is regarded as voluntary and intended action.

Moreover, smokers perceived the state as less responsible for preventing from the negative consequences of active and passive smoking than by non-smokers, thus, indicating that smokers are more reluctant to conform with external regulation of matters related to smoking. However, the wording of the item measuring the perceived responsibility of the state included both active and passive smoking. Hence, this possible difference in the perception of control over passive and active smoking was not detected. A future study could aim at directly investigating, first, the question to what extent active and passive smoking are perceived as kept under control and second, the association between the constructs perceived control and perceived responsibility.

Data from the discrimination items provided additional support for the assumption that smokers' and non-smokers' rights are an important issue in the public debate about anti-smoking regulation. Both situations (when a smoking applicant is rejected by a non-smoking employer and when a non-smoking applicant is rejected by a smoking employer) were perceived as discrimination, although the items did not specify whether the applicants were turned down solely due to their smoking status. Moreover, smokers considered turning down the smoking job candidate to a greater degree as a case of discrimination than turning down a non-smoking job candidate. This finding might reflect the reasoning that keeping a non-smoker away from passive smoking is a prevention act whereas rejecting a smoker is a discriminatory act of intrusion in

personal freedoms. However, smokers might be more sensitive concerning the rejection of smoking applicants, since the other case is more improbable.

Since the present study was exploratory in its nature, further studies might be able to gain a better insight on the perception of smokers' and non-smokers' rights. A subsequent undertaking could address the distinction between perception of self and perception of others. In the present study, only notions about smokers and non-smokers were assessed, and the view over how participants see their own behaviour was not captured. For instance, there might be a difference regarded the localisation of the perceived controllability (cf., Langer, 1975), which might then influence the opinion on anti-smoking policies.

In addition, further research could address the restriction on smoking framed as restriction targeting smokers or restriction targeting smoking behaviour; the first implying intrusion in the personality, the second restricting solely the behaviour. If an anti-smoking campaign contains messages about smokers and not smoking behaviour, it might provide the possibility for perceiving the policy as restricting the self and not the behaviour. Further, such a campaign might have a counterproductive outcome by subtly labelling smokers, in so doing it could provide a foundation of consolidating actions against the anti-smoking regulation on part of smokers as a group.

Several limitations of this study should be addressed. For instance, it became apparent that the wording of certain items can be significantly improved. Especially the multiple facets of the construct '*perceived responsibility*' could be reflected by more concise measures, since responsibility might imply attribution of causality and thus perceived control over one's action and/or perceived necessity for intervention. Hence, a future study could deconstruct the term and assess it by more definite items. Additionally, the wording of the item "Non-smokers *have the right* to be protected..." was not measured on the same level of specificity as the item "Even though non-smokers are not complaining, they *should be* protected..." It is not possible to determine whether the difference between the expressions 'have the right to be protected' and 'should be protected' has had impact on the results, the latter implying to a greater extent push for taking action. Thus the comparison through within-subjects statistical analyses appears as problematic. A future study might clarify this issue.

A further limitation concerned the relatively small sample, which consisted of selected participants with higher education, so results are not easily generalizable. Finally, it is not sure if using English as language of the questionnaire has had an impact on the responses (cf., Hambleton, 2001). One can argue that since the native languages of the participants differed, they had different ideas about the core meaning of some words. For example, the word 'responsible' may be translated with words that vary slightly regarding their meanings in the different native languages of the respondents. Moreover, English as language of the questionnaire might trigger different culture, thus questions or statements in a foreign language might be answered in a different way than when they are formulated in the native language. This issue could be addressed in a subsequent study with a sample more heterogeneous by means of the mother tongue of the participants or by a multicultural study using questionnaire completed in the specific native languages of the respondents.

In conclusion, the findings of this exploratory study suggest that the perceived smokers' and non-smokers' rights matter and that they could be effectively used in developing more sophisticated anti-smoking campaigns. One message developed on the base of these results could focus on people involuntarily affected by passive smoking, especially children. A strong anti-smoking message could expose the wrong perception of the high control over smoking behaviour and frame smoking in a different way than the tobacco industry does: smoking behaviour not like a chilling session of autonomous pleasure seekers, but more pronounced like addictive behaviour that makes people dependent on purchasing a product leading to severe health outcomes.

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